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Abstract
This thesis intends to explain the problematic development of the political party system in 
post-communist Belarus. There has been very little scholarly discussion of post-communist 
Belarus either in the West or in Belarus itself. Nevertheless, Belarus proves to be a good 
candidate for analysis as it demonstrates some generic features, typical of third-wave 
democracies (Huntington, 1971). At the same time, Belarus has pursued its own sui generis 
path of transition. Behind its democratic fagade of semi-regularised elections, full suffrage, 
and constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties, one can witness an increasing misbalance of 
power that is heavily weighted towards the president and away from parties and the 
legislature. This necessitates a discussion of party system development and associated with 
it, democratic deficit in the new regime.
The thesis proceeds in five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the principal features of third wave 
transitions, and focuses on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which follow a 
different path of development to other regimes. The result is that they are becoming 
‘outsiders’ in the ‘new’ Europe. In Chapter 2 an analysis of transitional theories will be 
undertaken in an attempt to develop a complex explanatory framework, known as the 
‘structure-agency approach’, to study Belarus’ party system. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
chronological development of structural and institutional determinants of party system 
development in Belarus. Chapter 4 examines parties as three-dimensional decision-making 
agencies, that are parties in public office, central office and grassroots vis-a-vis their voters. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter 5 with a wider discussion of what type of democracy, if any, 
is likely to become established in Belarus and what needs to be done in order to sustain it.
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Introduction. Disclosing third wave transitions: Towards an explanation of party 
system development in Belarus
Research objectives
This thesis attempts to explain the problematic development of the political party 
system in the Republic of Belarus. After a decade of transition Belarus remains 
effectively in a pre-perestroika era with limited economic or political restructuring. This 
is manifested in a centrally controlled state economy; state owned media; power lying in 
the hands of a nomenklatura that closely resembles that of the pre-perestroika ruling 
elite; a sophisticated system of patronage; low-level public contestation; and even lower 
inclusiveness in the decision-making process.
Concurrently, Belarus has not genuinely enjoyed the practice of free and fair elections 
and the growth of non-governmental sector. This is due in part to its ineffective legal 
framework and hollow system of representation, and in particular the weakness of 
political parties. Political parties, a cornerstone of most democratic regimes, are 
becoming increasingly less influential, suffering partisan decline and lacking power.
The principal task of this research will therefore be to develop an understanding of this 
phenomenon and explain, through the use of empirical research, the reasons for Belarus’ 
protracted party system development, which is characteristic of many new transitions, 
but especially of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
A general introduction to the phenomena of third wave transitions and particularly the 
CIS will precede the examination of the party system in Belarus. Individual emphasis 
will be placed on economic factors1 as part of the structuring environment, which is 
particularly important for successful democratisation in these countries. This includes 
the CIS complex relations with the European Union and global economic community, 
contrasted with the CIS structural dependence on Russia during the reform process. It is 
believed that an understanding of the ‘philosophy’ of these states, which are gradually 
developing into ‘outsiders’ of the ‘new’ Europe2, is necessary for examining the 
particularities of the system in operation in Belarus.
The following chapter will discuss existing transitional theories, which will assist in the 
search of a more explanatory framework for the analysis of Belarus’ party system 
formation. A tripartite framework grounded on structures, institutions and agency will 
be adopted to allow a comprehensive analysis of why party system development has 
been so slow in Belarus.
The thesis aims to demonstrate that the failure of the political party system in Belarus 
cannot be explained purely in terms of the failure of parties to organise, unite and to 
grow into a coherent system that can offer a forum for public contestation and 
inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971). It will be argued that inherited structures -  especially
1 This will form part of a ‘structure-agency’ framework used in this thesis for assessing party system 
development in Belarus.
impending economic crisis, weak state and the nomenklatura’s control over the 
decision-making process - and their subsequent institutional reinforcement have also 
affected successful democratisation and party system institutionalisation in the republic.
The novelty of this research lies in its pioneering analytical inquiry into party system 
functioning in Belarus, as well as a non-standard methodological technique of analysis, 
which will be outlined below.
The problem outline
The last decades of the twentieth century have witnessed the birth of many new regimes. 
Most countries in Latin America and almost all states in Eastern Europe have begun 
remarkable transformations from a semi-closed economy towards a free market; and 
from dictatorial style regimes towards liberal democratic polity. Many political scholars 
emphasise the sui generis nature of the new regimes, primarily associated with (i) high 
complexity of transitional tasks3 and (ii) incomplete and non-progressing system 
institutionalisation. Scholars agree that many new regimes fit the minimal criteria of a 
polyarchy (Dahl, 1971), but as “a type not yet theorised” (O’Donnell, 1993). Third- 
wave democracies are often cited as ‘democracies by default’, ‘semi-democracies’ or 
even ‘fagade democracies’ (Whitehead, 1992; Mainwaring, 1996; O’Donnell, Schmitter,
2 This debate is pursued by S. White, M. Light, and J. Lowenhardt as part of their research project, 
entitled ‘The Outsiders: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the New Europe’, within the ESRC 
programme ‘One Europe or Several?’. See chapter 1 for further references.
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Whitehead, 1986; White, 2000). This essentially implies little system change, populist 
politics, lowering of public expectations of what could be achieved through political 
action, and consequently, low-level participation and delegated leadership in an Hl- 
legal’ environment, that is to say a system that is not protected by its own constitution. 
Regimes of this type are, paradoxically, sustainable, and characterised by various 
degrees of wow-institutionalisation, imder-representation and wow-intensive political 
competition. This suggests that a continuing inquiry into theories of transition, and 
especially of party system development, which lies at the core of democratic policy­
making, should be undertaken.
Post-Soviet states have appeared to embark on a more complex transition to democratic 
polity than any other in the European region. Historically, these countries were 
strongholds for socialism, and simultaneously, the initiators of transition. Culturally and 
structurally, they suffered most from inherited legacies, and unsolved conflicts. Their 
present developments have led to economic stagnation and impending system collapse, 
as well as the lingering threat of ‘red’ (or ‘red-brown’) dictatorship, populist and mass 
alienated politics, extreme social divisions, and growing international isolation. The 
latter is particularly alarming for the CIS states. The dual enlargement of the European 
Union and NATO eastwards, as well as the incorporation of more successful Central 
and East European countries (CEECs) into a global capitalist market means that the 
former Soviet Union states feel increasingly isolated from the ‘new’ Europe. This 
isolation is not only geographical, but also isolation outside a newly built political and
3 This includes democratisation, state and market building -  the ‘triple’ transition, as described by Claus 
Offe (1991).
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economic ‘Schengen Wall’. This sense of exclusion especially amongst the borderland 
countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, has begun to manifest in an emerging 
conflict of identities - such as pro-European versus pro-Slavic Russian - and in an 
understanding of the limited opportunities that the ruling elite might take in this 
structurally constrained environment4. The situation is aggravated by Russia 
strengthening its control measures over the borderland countries, primarily through 
demanding debt payments and limiting energy supplies to the dependent CIS states. 
Belarus therefore appears to be a suitable candidate for analysis as it is quintessence of 
the difficulties associated with third wave transition and the CIS in particular. Its 
transition to democracy has been slow and disruptive. In 2001, Belarus was in its 
eleventh year of ‘transition’ from the old to the new regime, and its democratic progress 
remains unsound; economic restructuring has not been initiated, parties remain weak 
and powerless, and the prospect of dictatorship is looming.
An overview o f  Belarus
The Republic of Belarus formally declared independence from the former Soviet system 
on the 25 August 1991 and became - for only the second time in its history (a short­
lived National Republic having been established in 1918) - an independent sovereign 
state. However, its move to democracy appears to be a long and unsuccessful detour. Its
4 This will inevitably be a painful choice. If the ruling elite’s orientation is towards a wider Europe, a 
country has to embark on lengthy and unpopular reforms, which are non-profitable and costly in a short­
term. If it is a pro-Russian choice, it will imply short-term economic sustainability with an inevitable
first parliamentary elections in March-April 1990 resulted in a short-term success for the 
democrats, who established the first ‘Democratic Club’ with nearly one third of seats in 
parliament. However, the communist majority overruled and continued a counter-reform 
course similar to that of the pre-perestroika period. In 1992 the nationalists initiated the 
call for new parliamentary elections, which was widely supported by the electorate, but 
contemptibly ignored by the old-fashioned parliament. The latter was replaced only in 
1995 by a new multi-party legislature after the first relatively competitive elections. 
Whilst changing its external appearance, parliament internally remained unchanged. 
There was still a relative majority of non-partisan (48) and left-oriented candidates 
(communists (22) and the agrarians (17)) and very few others5. Its democratic tenure 
was brief and in most respects ended with the introduction of the presidency in 1994. 
The first President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, dissolved the 
parliament in 1996, following an alteration to the 1994 Constitution. Nevertheless, 
parliament continued to meet and was still recognised by all major international 
authorities on the basis of the 1994 constitution. President Lukashenko’s term of office 
should have expired in July 1999, however he did not accept this, and altered the 
constitution by referendum accordingly, allowing himself two more years in power. 
Consequently, parliamentary elections took place in autumn 2000; however, none of the 
existing opposition parties expressed a desire to participate in them6, and thus did not 
attempt to negotiate with the authorities via democratic means. At present the country is
prospect of pending system collapse. The situation is such that the CIS are essentially centred on Russia, 
both structurally and economically, and may not have much the freedom to make their own choice.
5 See Appendix 2 for more details.
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preparing for the forthcoming presidential election, however, it remains unclear which 
opposition candidate will emerge to challenge President Lukashenko, and whether 
parties will use this opportunity to reinforce their ‘fading’ mandate7.
Historically Belarus possessed the structural foundation on which democracy could be 
built but this appeared to be insufficient for national consolidation. This foundation 
included a relatively stable economy8, vast intellectual capital, existing political
divisions, an emerging opposition, and eager voters. However, structural and
institutional settings9 - as well as the decisive intervention of the ‘elite factor’ - have
delayed democratisation. Notably, political parties - the basis of a strong democratic 
system -  have failed twice to gain office and to sustain the momentum for change: first 
in the 1995 parliament and second, to win votes and seats in the 2000 parliamentary
6 PCB and LDPB are the only exception to this pattern. They at least nominated their candidates for the 
elections 2000.
7 There are presently two ‘frontrunners’ (S. Domash, and V. Goncharick), which consider themselves as 
the joint opposition nominees. This decision, nevertheless, has not yet received an approval of the CCDF 
(Coordination Council of democratic Forces). See for details, recent news on
http://www.belarusnews.de/news en/index.shtml retrieved June 2001
8 See Appendix 5 for detailing economic statistics.
9 Such structural factors include the persistence of the ‘Soviet’ power elite and their total control over the 
decision-making process, the lack of electoral practice and an outdated electoral code, pending economic 
crisis with a limited reform programme, a strong presidency wielding the precedence of decree over law, 
state-owned and controlled mass media, and the non-existent independence of judicial and legislative 
bodies from the state. The ‘elite factor’ includes lack of organisational unity amongst the opposition, and 
their ill-articulated ideological and programmatic profiles, as well as Lukashenko’s unprecedented 
impact, and political interference from Moscow in the decision-making process in Belarus.
elections. Petty disputes, lack of co-operation and arguments between and within the 
parties lead to a pessimistic prognosis about their future potential. For their continuing 
inability to win seats in parliament, parties have become increasingly disregarded by the 
electorate, who would rather enjoy short-term benefits from the state, than long-term 
promises of parties. The populist president, Alexander Lukashenko with his appointed 
loyal administration and system of clienteles continues to control the ‘representative’ 
institutions of Parliament, as well as the Constitutional Court, mass media and the state 
bureaucracy. Paradoxically, the regime in Belarus remains sustainable, as in many other 
post-Soviet democracies, with the power balance heavily weighted towards the 
presidency and away from the legislature.
Party system formation in Belarus seems to reveal common and simultaneously unique 
features of new transitions. Nevertheless, there has been little academic discussion of its 
development vis-a-vis third-wave democratisation. This research initiates discussion 
regarding party transition and democracy building in Belarus, and attempt to explain 
why these developments have followed a different to democracy course. Political parties 
will be the principal focus of this research, on the grounds that parties:
... articulate interests, aggregate interests, recruit leaders, make government 
policy, transmit policy decisions to the people, carry out policy, adjudicate 
disputes, and educate or coerce entire peoples. Of course, other institutions, public 
and private, also perform these functions. But what distinguishes parties from all 
the rest is their emphasis on linkage. Parties are seen, both by their members and 
by others, as agencies for forging links between citizens and policy-makers. Their
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raison d'etre is to create a substantive connection between rulers and ruled 
(Lawson et al., 1988:1).
Due to shortage of space, this analysis will explicitly focus on parties, and the 
structural/institutional aspects of democratisation associated with them. Other no less 
important tools for building democratic polity, such as civil society and non­
governmental organisations (NGOs), elites, state bureaucracy, and mass communication 
will only be briefly mentioned. Parties’ role in sustaining democracy, and the quality of 
regime that weak parties entail in Belarus, will raise additional discussion in the 
concluding chapters of the thesis.
Thesis structure
The thesis will proceed in five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief descriptive 
analysis of third-wave democratisation, including the CIS. It will be suggested that the 
emerging democracies considerably differ not only from prior waves of democratisation 
of the twentieth century (Huntington, 1991), but also from each other -  across regions 
and nations. Research of distinguished scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Philip 
Schmitter, Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, Robert Dahl, Peter 
Mair, Stephen White and others will be consolidated to identify both unifying and 
dividing features of the third-wave turnover. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
analysis of the differences in development of the former Soviet states (CIS) vis-a-vis 
Central European democracies (CEECs). In a grotesque way the CIS represent a new 
‘quality’ of emerging polyarchies. They may formally lack institutionalisation, but,
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nevertheless, continue to function in a structured and passively sustainable way. The 
generic feature of these regimes is that public democratic expectations may cohabit 
successfully with dictatorial forms of governance and be expressed in the form of full 
delegation of representative powers to the chosen leader -  in a desperate hope for 
change and stability. This is argued to be a dangerous mixture of ‘dual legitimacy’ when 
the presidency may contest the legislature’s natural rights on the basis of supreme 
legitimacy of power. The issue of ‘the outsiders’, which the borderland countries of the 
CIS are becoming, with the dual expansion of the EU and NATO, and the process of 
globalisation of finance, will be raised respectively to underline the complexity of their 
transition.
With the purpose of finding an adequate analytical framework for analysis of Belarus’ 
party system, critical research of existing transitional theories will be given in Chapter 
2. By and large contemporary transitional literature may be differentiated in two 
principal frameworks - structure and process-oriented. Although, these methodological 
divisions are more speculative than real, they will, nevertheless, aid understanding of 
the explanatory logic of both traditions. The structure-oriented framework will 
emphasise the static strength of structures and institutions that set benchmarks for 
further system development. This will primarily include neo-institutional, cleavage- 
oriented, and cultural analyses. The process-oriented framework will offer a dynamic 
outlook on democratisation, and highlight the importance of agency, which develops 
existing constraints into a structure of opportunities for decision-making. Elite analysis 
and rational choice theory will be at the heart of discussion. Likewise, path-dependent 
analysis can be termed as a ‘middle-way’ approach, which combines standpoints of both
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traditions. In conclusion, a joint ‘structure-agency’ approach will be summarised in an 
attempt to reflect the complexity of transition in the new democracies. Elster’s et al 
(1998) tripartite approach of structures, institutions and decisions, cross-referenced by 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages, will be adopted for the analysis of Belarus’ party 
system formation.
The following chapters will form the central part of the thesis and present research 
findings of party system development in Belarus, from the ‘structure-agency’ 
perceptive. Chapter 3 will analyse recent historical developments in Belarus from both 
structural10 and institutional perspectives, and highlight the ‘inherited’ complexity of the 
developing post-Soviet regime. Historical overview allows the mapping of ‘forward’ 
and ‘backward’ linkages in time, in order to understand the impact of structures and 
agency on national decision-making process. Section 3.1 will view party system 
developments from a cleavage-oriented perspective. It will be, nevertheless, established 
that the most common problems for Belarus, such as limited elite rotation, indecisive 
and disintegrated opposition, unprecedented scale for populist leadership, public 
tolerance and effective absence of choice, are not merely consequences of the existing 
conflicts and legacy structures.
10 The structural approach adopted in this research utilises a broader understanding of ‘structures’. It 
refers to such variables, as state, vested interests, interest organisations, cultural legacies and social 
divisions - as well as the economic factors outlined in chapter 1- to demonstrate their interdependence 
and a joint impact on the decision-making process in Belarus.
This will be complemented by the examination of institutional constraints (presidency, 
electoral code, constitution-making) in section 3.2. Scholars, such as Shugart and Carey 
(1992), Linz (1994), Geddes and Lijphart (1996), note that a strong presidency can be 
particularly ‘undermining’ for party settlement in new regimes. However, policy-makers 
acting according to enduring traditions, and institutional settings, may also have a 
debilitating impact on the system. It will be argued that in order to avoid immobilism in 
decision-making and to secure their survival, the ‘old-style’ nomenklatura crafted the 
presidency in Belarus by having the ‘right’ people placed in office. However, with 
Lukashenko’s coming to power, this scenario was radically altered. A poorly written 
constitution allowed enough leeway for the new president to manoeuvre and to create a 
regime of his own design. The outcome of the political game -  the infamous 1994 
constitutional crisis -  was the establishment of the super-presidential democracy with a 
‘pocket’ parliament, a malleable Constitutional Court, powerful executives and state- 
owned mass media. The electoral code was such that it did not allow smaller or 
opposition parties to pass the vote threshold and to obtain seats in parliament.
Nevertheless, the regime in contemporary Belarus can be described as a polyarchy 
(Dahl, 1971), which practises semi-institutionalised elections, and from which people 
expect accommodation of their interests. However, the undercurrent of the democratic 
facade is lowering public contestation and inclusiveness in the national decision-making 
process. This has been occurring through the power accretion by the president and the 
respective decline of parties, and the limited influence of other interest organisations. 
The organised practice of election campaigns is an example of such policy-making. At 
present this implies a foregone conclusion in favour of the authorities in the so-called
‘equal and free’ election race. This section will conclude by demonstrating that informal 
institutionalisation has strengthened, and a more sophisticated system of patronage, and 
loyalty has been introduced with Lukashenko’s succession to power.
Chapter 4 will focus on the analysis of agency -  that is to say political parties, and their 
role in the process of building democracy in Belarus. Their three-dimensional 
organisation -  in public office, in central office and on the ground -  will be the subject 
of empirical research. In section 4.1 it will be argued that global trends in contemporary 
party politics such as declining partisanship, candidate and capital centred campaigns, 
flexible membership, and limited regional networks, have also affected new 
democracies. Although new systems operate in a different set of circumstances, they 
nevertheless, tend to adapt more efficient survival strategies. This may explain why so 
many parties tend to ally with the state, and why so few follow a ‘mass party’ route. 
When applied to the case of Belarus, these new developments in party politics take a 
grotesque form, reinforced by unfavourable institutional and structural settings. In the 
continuing struggle with a strong presidency, Belarus’ legislature has surrendered its 
rights and power to the incumbent leader, Alexander Lukashenko. Many parties have 
been forced to relegate themselves into a ‘parallel society’ and become increasingly 
‘forgotten’ by voters seeking short-term benefits. Some parties, despite a vibrant start, 
have died; and the remainder has been compelled to capitulate their partisanship to the 
president in exchange for seats in parliament. Parties in parliament and their ways of 
sustaining and promoting themselves will be the focal point of this chapter. The author 
has used a new and non-standard analytical technique based on single ballot voting by 
members of parliament to receive an informative picture of the 1991-1999 legislatures’
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structural development and the formation of policies of coalition and factions in 
Belarus. Comparison with the Russian Parliaments between 1991-92, based on a similar 
technique, will give additional strength to the explanation of the ominous development 
of Belarus’ semi-parliamentary democracy.
Parties’ organisational faculty in central office and on the ground will be examined in 
section 4.2. It will be argued that parties that grew from mass movements or successor 
organisations are presently moving away from mass type organisations. They, along 
with newly emerged liberal and social democratic parties, are attempting to adapt a 
more flexible mode of existence. The specificity of the style of ten out of seventeen 
registered parties in Belarus will be discussed.
In section 4.3 voters’ perception of parties will be analysed. Examination of the general 
trends in voting behaviour such as voters’ profiles, attitudes, preferences, and choice 
volatility, helps to approximate public perception of parties in Belarus and to add 
understanding of their initial success and consequential failure on the national political 
arena. Particular emphasis will be given to the examination of the differences in 
electorates of anti-system and pro-governmental parties, as well as of the anti-system 
parties and the president.
Chapter 5 will draw on Belarus’ experience of building democracy and hypothesise 
various forms that the new regimes may take. It will be subsequently discussed what 
type of regime and mode of representation might develop in Belarus; and more 
importantly, what role, parties and the party system will play in society in an attempt to
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provide sustainability of reform. It will be argued that the new polity in Belarus can be 
described as a delegative regime (O’Donnell, 1993). On the surface it meets Dahl’s 
(1971) minimalist criteria for democracy, but inwardly is characterised by low-intensity 
citizenship, limited representation and delegation of the public mandate to the elected 
leader of the nation. In addition, section 5.2 will discuss the issue of differentiating a 
regime that may nominally fulfil democratic requirements - from a state as a mechanism 
for power realisation. The state reinforced by certain institutional arrangements cannot 
operate in a democratic manner, and draws on existing structural properties of the 
previous regime. This halts further democratisation. With reinforcement of democratic 
institutions, this dilemma may successfully resolve in a semi-presidential form of 
governance, associated with a strong leadership controlled by mechanisms of public 
representation. A discussion in relation to plausibility and sustainability of this type of 
regime in Belarus will be raised in the concluding chapters.
Research
The author has developed a novel technique for analysing party system performance in a 
new democracy. It is based on a three-dimensional inquiry into party politics, and uses a 
combination of methods to achieve the required understanding of parties’ interactional 
configurations.
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First, for the analysis of parties in public office the author applied the technique of 
single ballot voting using SPSS package11. The study of MPs’ voting positions over time 
was based on their response to ‘hot’ issues presented for discussion in parliament. While 
voting, deputies should unequivocally express their own opinions by voting ‘yes’, ‘no’ 
or ‘undecided’ to the issue discussed. Time series analysis is used to aggregate their 
discrete preferences into a coherent picture of voting patterns and coalition behaviour. 
Single ballot voting is a unique source of information, provided it is run on a broad 
database, and there is no strict partisan discipline within the legislature, which can limit 
dispersion of opinions. This method gives a fuller picture of latent and evident political 
bonds between the members of parliament, as well as helps to draw an accurate image 
of political actors in parallel to their rhetoric and communicative skills. In order to 
receive an adequate structure of MPs’ positions in political space, an extensive database 
needs to be collated. This research is unique as it allows the structure of the Belarusian 
Parliament to be viewed dynamically. The research utilises the results of single ballot 
voting published in parliamentary bulletins (13 sessions) from 1990 to 1999, and 
includes at least 30 issues (questions) debated on a daily basis by approximately 345 
members of parliament.
The informative value of the above method, which was relevant for the analysis of 
parties in public office, has been improved by a series of cross-interviews, conducted by
11 The initial method was developed and tested by the Centre for Applied Political, Economic and Social 
Research (INDEM), Moscow. See Rossiiski Monitor: Arkhiv sovremennoi politiki [Russian Monitor: 
Archive o f Contemporary Politics], 1992-1995. The author has replicated the technique for the analysis
xxvii
the author with major political figures and experts. In order to illustrate the 
organisational faculty of parties in Belarus, interviews were deemed more important 
than other sources of information. They were held twice, in 1996 and 1999, and 
reflected the most controversial time in the political development of Belarus and 
involved at least two members of party leaderships.
In the final stage of analysis, electoral response was deemed to be important for 
understanding party system development, and hence, was examined along with party 
structural analyses. Such variables as voter volatility, and public attitudes towards 
various modes of the changing system have been estimated. The data was collected and 
analysed with the author’s direct involvement in the projects12 conducted by the Centre 
for Social and Political Research, BSU. An experimental method of Multiple 
Classification Analysis (MCA), developed by A. Russell et al (1992) in their analysis of 
voting behaviour of the British electorate, was replicated for this research to outline 
voters’ attitudes to social and political change in the transitional society. In addition, the 
calculation of voters’ electoral volatility, based on the outcomes of the opinion polls 
rather than election results, in application to the new democracies, gives a new insight
of Belarus’ parliaments between 1990 and 1999, and added extra value to the method -  a dynamic 
comparative outlook on the evolution o f structures, and patterns of voting behaviour in parliament.
12 These projects include ‘New Democracies Barometer: Belarus’ in 1994, 1996, 1998 in co-partnership 
with The Centre for Strategic Development, Institut for Advanced Studies, Vienna, and Strathclyde 
University, Glasgow; INTAS 99-245 on ‘Charismatic Political Leadership in Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine: its emergence, mobilisation, and sustainability’, coordinated by the University of Bath for 2000- 
02 period; and many domestic sociological reviews with the author’s direct involvement in the project 
management.
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and an extra strength to the applied research methodology13. Altogether these methods 
help to develop a more holistic view of parties and their potential with voters, as well as 
to identify their prospects for further development.
In conclusion, the aim of this research is to develop an understanding of party system 
operation in a transitional state and parties’ contribution to fostering democratisation. It 
is hoped that this research will benefit political science with both country-specific 
information, and a tested methodology of analysis of political systems of the new 
regimes.
13 This method of calculation of voter volatility has been debated by the author in her publication entitled 
“Electoral volatility in post-Communist Belarus: explaining the paradox”, Party Politics, 6(3): 343-358.
1Chapter 1. Democratisation in the CIS compared to other third wave transitions
This chapter will emphasise a distinctive nature of the third-wave transitions14 in 
CEECs, CIS and Latin America. More importantly, it will highlight specific features of 
post-Soviet regimes for the study of party system development in Belarus, as part of the 
CIS framework.
Section 1.1 examines what makes new democracies different from the preceding waves 
of democratisation during the twentieth century. It will be argued that third-wave 
democratisation is a sui generis process, primarily associated with the need for radical 
and wholesale transformation of polities, and the consequences of continually non­
institutionalising systems. Research of leading regional experts will be consolidated to 
, identify distinguishing features of the third-wave turnover.
In section 1.2 the analysis of transitions within CIS will confront general patterns of 
development in the new regimes. It will be premised on such factors as (i) economic 
externalities and elite strategical considerations; and (ii) structural and cultural settings - 
to identify the CIS path as dissimilar to other third wave transitions. It will be argued 
that, primarily, because of their economic, political and cultural closeness to Russia, the 
dual expansion of Europe15, and the process of globalisation of national economies16,
14 In this research only Latin American, CEECs and CIS transitions are included for comparison.
15 This implies the inclusion of the new members in NATO, and the eastward enlargement of the
European Union. In relation to the latter, a two-tier system of accession has been adopted ‘Regular 
Report from the Commission on the Progress towards Accession. . . ' , 13 October 1999,
2these countries are becoming “a new borderland between full members of the European 
family and the rest of the Eurasian landmass” (White et al., 2001: 1). New international 
trends naturally affect the prospects of developments for the CIS, which grow to be 
increasingly excluded and isolated by an emerging ‘Schengen wall’17 from the rest of 
Europe and the global community. They seem to have ultimately stuck in their attempt 
of simultaneous restructuring of state, nation and economic markets; they are presently 
characterised by a fragile balance between an authoritarian presidency and prospects of 
dictatorship; and their party systems are noted for a continuing impairment of function.
Belarus appears to be an enlightening summary of the CIS problematic development, 
especially in terms of problematic settlement of such representative institutions as 
parliaments and party systems. It reflects not only a mixed style of reformation, 
comprising intensive state intervention and slow liberalisation of the national economy;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 10 99/intro, retrieved March, 2001. This in the first 
instance included such CEECs as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and in the second, Slovakia, 
the Baltic countries, Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta.
16 Third wave democratisation provided financial capitalism with new opportunities for the alleviation of 
internal problems of over-accumulation by the advanced societies. The emergence of new regimes was 
taken as the emergence of new markets for a global capitalist economy, and, hence, the opportunity for its 
geographical expansion. These developments, however, were also marked by the increasing vulnerability 
of new states to re-current global economic crises. Russia and its neighbourhood was one of the worst 
examples hit by financial crisis of 1998. If CEECs were able to structurally and institutionally foresee 
potential implications of the global economic decline; for Russia, and dependent CIS, recent financial 
stagnation in contrary had disastrous repercussions.
17 Presidency conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting, 7-9 December 2000: 
http://europe.eu.int/coucil//off/conclu/dec2000/ retrieved March 2001.
but also the CIS cultural and structural particularities that turn these new regimes into 
the outsiders of the process of globalisation. Parties are traditionally deemed as 
important channels of representation of public will and popular control over the 
government decision-making in a democratic state. Hence, their formation, 
organisational capacity and access to policy-making in Belarus will be the primary 
concern of the further analysis.
In conclusion it will be noted that due to the unprecedented nature of third wave 
transitions, a more elaborate and complex methodology will be required to enable a 
holistic analysis of the new regimes, and their party systems. Various analytical 
frameworks and theories of transitions will, therefore, be explored in the next chapter 
for the purpose of adopting a multifaceted approach to examine developments in the 
new transitions.
1.1 Particularities o f the third-wave democratisation
There were only a few dozen democracies in the world until the late 1970s. Since then 
the number has grown considerably, and many excellent analyses of the distinctive 
nature of what Huntington (1991) terms ‘third-wave’ democracies have been 
undertaken. In his seminal work, “The Third Wave: democratisation in the later 20th 
century”, he offers a well-defined classification of democratic changes over the span of 
a century. However, Huntington particularly focuses on the third wave that took place in 
Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s, moved to Asia, and a decade later 
spread across East Central Europe. The beginning of the 1990s, consequently, saw an
4unprecedented number of democratic elections in many Latin American democracies 
and in all new CEECs and the CIS.
Huntington (1991) noted that the generic character of third-wave democratisation 
frequently collides with the distinct individualism of democratic reforms in the newly 
emerged states. For example, one can observe five different patterns of regime change 
within the third-wave turnover: cyclical change, second-try change, interrupted 
democracy, direct transition from non-democratic regime and decolonisation. These 
regimes also differ in their mode, length and the pace of transition, structural changes, 
the people primarily responsible for bringing about change, and their prospects for 
survival.
Nevertheless, they all associate with some transition features that go beyond their 
national contexts and that bring them into one league of newly democratised states. For 
example, in all democratic regimes, principal government officials were chosen through 
competitive elections, in which the bulk of the population could participate. As 
Huntington (1991:174) states, all new regimes have invariably learnt that elections may 
not be necessarily the life of democracies, but they are frequently the death of 
dictatorship. Another demonstrable feature is that no matter what transitional 
mechanisms had been used18 almost all new democracies were achieved by non-violent
18 Huntington (1991: 114) singled out three major types of transition mechanisms: these are 
transformation, replacement and transplacement. Transformation occurs when elites in power take the 
lead in binging abut democracy. Replacement occurs when opposition groups take the lead in regime 
change. Transplacement takes place from a joint action of government and opposition groups.
means of negotiation, compromise and agreement. Furthermore, the ‘globality’ of 
change is also a ‘specific’ quality of third-wave democratisation. This implies not only 
numeric occurrence of changes around the globe19, but also their global character in 
political and economic terms, which advances the implantation of capitalism, as well as 
the formation of various military-strategic and political alliances on transnational levels 
through cooperation with the developing economies.
Apart from some generic features, the third wave transitions are also characterised by 
some analogous conditions, which have mobilised change. The five most significant 
conditions include:
1) deepening problems of legitimacy of non-democratic systems where democratic 
values become widespread, and economic failures obvious;
2) the global economic growth and its influence on living standards throughout the 
world, education values, and a greatly extended middle class in many countries;
3) changes in the doctrine and activities of the church as opponents of non-democratic 
regimes;
4) changes in the policies of external political actors, including the attitude of the 
European Community towards expanding its membership;
5) ‘snowballing’ or effect of democratisation by stimulating and providing models for 
regime change in other countries (Huntington, 1991: 40-108).
19 As Huntington emphasizes, democratisation took place in almost thirty countries between 1974 and 
1990, not considering later developments in the former Soviet bloc countries.
6The enormity of tasks, the new regimes have to achieve, and conditions within which 
they operate, undoubtedly differentiate them as sui generis transitions from prior waves 
of democratisation. As many scholars note, in third wave turnover, change occurs in a 
situation of “[an] unprecedented degree of social destructuring, volatility and fluidity” 
(Batt, 1991: 50). Having limited prior democratic experience, new states have to attempt 
a wholesale transformation, which takes place in the situation of ongoing economic 
crisis, worsening living conditions, and growing crime and despair amid the general 
population. This heavily burdens reformatory initiatives, and the prospects for stability 
in these countries. The majority of the new regimes are facing a “triple transition” 
(Offer, 1991: 14) -  a process, which involves not just democratisation, but also 
marketisation, and state building itself, including regulation of state resources, 
settlement of territorial issues, and definition of national identities; and not all 
democracies are successful on this path.
Democratisation in itself is a challenging task for the new regimes, which necessarily 
involves, according to Dahl (1971: 1-16), a parallel development of the two dimensions 
-  public contestation and participation. In early twentieth century Europe, 
democratisation advanced in the direction of extending the right to participate in 
elections and office, where the principle of contestation had already been established. 
By contrast, the third-wave regimes have to accommodate de novo the two mentioned 
dimensions. As Dahl (Ibid: 8) states that regimes20 nevertheless, may only be conceived 
as democratised when they are “substantially popularised and liberalised, that is, highly
20 Dahl names these regimes as polyarchies and emphasises that fully democratic regime may not be 
possible, but only approximated. See Dahl (1971: 9), footnotes.
7inclusive and extensively open to public contestation”. This process, having taken over 
a century to occur in many industrialised democracies, is marked by four crucial stages: 
“[first] the formal incorporation of strata and categories of residents kept out of the 
system under the original criteria; [second] the mobilisation of those enfranchised 
citizens in electoral contests; [third] their activation into direct participation in public 
life; [fourth] the breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of 
nationally organised parties into municipal elections, what we call the process of 
politicisation” (Rokkan, 1970:227). The new regimes, in opposition, did not result from 
or through a long-term process of democratisation, but were created in the aftermath of 
collapse of the naturally competing socialist systems, and in which citizens had already 
been effectively ‘incorporated’, ‘mobilised’, ‘activated’, and ‘politicised’ under the 
previous regimes (Mair, 1997: 180). Furthermore, new achievements of the global 
economy and acceptance of the idea of supra-national state by many European nations 
place additional constraints on the process of assimilation of the new regimes into a 
global community. Hence, it is questionable whether in a short time and a highly 
pressured international environment the bias towards a desirable stability in the new 
regimes may emerge at all, to be buttressed by equally important representative 
infrastructures, such as party systems. Mair concludes:
The potential instability at the level of electorate and within the context of 
competition already makes for an uncertain and volatile mix, which in itself, 
would seem to exacerbate the potential for conflict between different elites. If we 
then add to that mix the fact that, in this triple transition, these elites are playing 
for very high stakes, both substantially and strategically, then it is difficult to
8avoid the conclusion that these newly emerging systems will also prove 
significantly more competitive than in the case of established party systems... The 
danger then is of instability and uncertainty encouraging competition and conflict, 
which, in turn, encourage even greater instability (Mair, 1997: 196-7).
It is a seeming paradox that these new systems show no tendency for complete 
institutionalisation, but nevertheless, prove sustainable, and relatively structured in their 
own domestic ways.
The second crucial challenge for the third wave regimes is an immediate task of state 
and market building. There are a few repercussions that such requirements might entail. 
The weak state is inclined to oversee the redistribution of wealth, and in itself is the 
source of great wealth. Nominally it owns firms, lands, and natural resources, which 
during transition suddenly become available for competition of external elites. Hence, a 
weak state creates powerful incentives for political players to access the state 
mechanism, and they play an exceedingly high-stake game to achieve power control 
over the nation. Furthermore, because markets and states are being simultaneously built, 
there are fewer formal political and institutional constraints both on the state, and the 
private business. Many interest organisations emerge in an attempt to influence the 
process of decision-making at a state level. However, the multiplicity and specificity of 
the private interests are not often conducive to the public mandate: they tend to cause 
manipulation of state resources, and leave politicians vulnerable to various clienteles, 
who become wealthy early in the transition. The particular implications of this 
dichotomy between weak state and powerful vested interests can be twofold.
9First, in transition, political competition and elite changes naturally promote economic 
reforms and weaken the power of vested interests. As it appeared in practice, powerful 
interests intend to capture key elements of public policies and manipulate reforms to 
their own advantage. Many of the transitions, especially further east in the CIS 
(Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Moldova)21 were led by the same 
political elites that ruled the country in the communist era. These countries have shown 
the index of liberalisation and privatisation22 during the first years of transition twice as 
low as in those countries23 where political executives were replaced. Placed under 
pressure, the successor incumbents often implemented reforms in such ways that 
preserved or even extended privileges available to certain elites, as was the case in 
Albania, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.
In the absence of a strong commitment to reform and lack of institutional coercion, 
powerful vested interests, i.e. nomenklatura, impose a heavy imprint on the content of 
reforms and their timing. The redistribution of assets prior to transitions tends to create 
powerful interest groups that constrain progress of economic reforms at a later stage. 
This inefficiency of state to organise initial policy choices often results in an elite- 
centred and power-coagulation effect on the process of democratisation; and implies 
further alienation of the population from the decision-making process. Hence, the
21 For fuller reference see Transition report 1999: Ten years o f transition, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). London. Chapter 5.
22 Transition Report 1999, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 1999. Section 
for Country assessments, p. 181.
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evidence of reforms in the new states suggests an important dimension for assessing the 
quality and prospects of democracy.
Second, developing states may allow excessive penetration of global capital in national 
economies, interest manipulation, and as a result continuing destabilisation of these 
regimes in short and medium-term financial reform. For example, financial liberalisation 
and privatisation, as the CEECs and Russia’s experiences suggest, increase their openness 
and incorporation to the global market, and ensuing advantages of this process. This, on 
the other hand, may over-expose developing markets24 to the shocks of international 
finance, and recurrent global crises, and form grounds for the emergence of the 
‘prosperity-versus-stability’ divide within the new nations. Massive and rapid privatisation 
by foreign strategic capital tends to bring prospects of capital concentration, and interest 
accumulation, dependence on foreign investments and capital speculations, and 
consequently, the narrowing of channels for domestic economic control.
Building respective institutions to effectively sustain reformation is a complementary 
task to the process of achieving stabilisation within the transient states. Many of the new 
democracies chose constitutions that prescribed an elected president, an independently 
elected parliament, and an independent judiciary. Yet, the realities of practical politics 
in both regions have been quite different from the formal constitutional arrangements.
23 These are first of all Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary.
24 Russia’s example is the most educating. For more details see Nesvetailova, N., & Korosteleva, J. 
(2001) Dependent development in the modern Finance Capitalism, paper presented at BASEES, 7-9 
April.
11
The adoption of electoral codes in many regimes often followed the interests of 
dominating elite groups at the outset of transition25. The judiciary and mass media have 
not been an efficient means of providing greater protection of human rights, which can 
help to break down the stranglehold of interests restricting the competition. 
Furthermore, the office of president has dominated the politics of most Latin American 
democracies, ex-Soviet bloc countries, and the Southern Tier of East Central Europe 
(Romania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR), Bulgaria, Slovakia), 
regardless, whether or not the president came to power through free elections or through 
force of arms. For many years scholars have been debating the role of ‘presidentialism’ 
in the process of democratisation (Linz, 1996; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Geddes, 1996; 
Lijphart, 1996). Discussion revolves around such principal issues as the relative merits 
of presidential over parliamentary arrangements in fostering democratic consolidation. 
A strong presidency, which is culturally natural to many CEECs, CIS and Latin 
American transitions, raises three major enquires in relation to the system stabilisation:
i) the extent to which the design of national electoral code can influence power
distribution in society;
ii) the real prospects for balancing executive-legislative relations;
iii) the degree of dependency of party system development on the strong presidency
in society.
25 Commonly, the communist nomenklatura was remaining the dominant interest group in public offices 
of CEECs and CIS. This often stipulated the promotion of majoritarian electoral systems to sustain their 
control over the process of national decision-making.
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Some scholars observe that there is a connection between weak parties, undeveloped 
state and strong presidencies; and that a parliamentary as opposed to a presidential 
system, is seen as more supportive of democratic consolidation. Other scholars tend to 
defend the presidential system, or at least, its ‘mixed’, ‘semi-presidential’ alternative, 
that combines an individually elected president and a prime minister subject to 
parliamentary confidence. For example, Linz (1994) believes that presidential power 
could be controlled in new democracies, if legal institutional arrangements are met, and 
a democratic code is followed. It is also frequently argued that a long-established 
historical tradition of strong leadership cannot merely cease, and therefore, it is popular 
rationale to accept and to control ‘presidentialism’ as a ‘homing pattern’ of electorate 
and elite behaviour. It is also assumed that presidential authoritarianism can be a 
survival mechanism for new democracies during times of social, political or economic 
crises. At the outset of transitions, this however, often comes at the expense of 
democratic institutions and civil society, and may not be easily eradicated with further 
democratisation of society.
In terms of marketisation, the guidance and monitoring of economic and state reforms 
by various international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the European Union (EU), and NATO have had a dual effect on democratic succession 
of the third wave regimes. On the one hand, monetary and fiscal regulations reviewed 
by the IMF; and common strategies and programmes of cross-border cooperation and 
partnership developed by the EU, and NATO, have created powerful incentives for 
countries to reform. On the other hand, this has also produced greater pressure, social 
inequalities and decreasing opportunities for those at the bottom to develop the human
13
capital or skills needed for survival in the new structure. This may be seen as a natural 
law of survival; however, for the ex-Soviet countries with ‘overstated’ socialist welfare 
system, this course of action may be disastrous. As Nagle and Mahr observe:
...to the extent that these nations remain, as they are at the moment, on the 
periphery of the capitalist core, the dilemma of achieving mass consent for a 
system of great inequality and scant material gains for the majority may block the 
democratisation process, and lead to bouts of instability and retreat from 
democratic norms (Nagle and Mahr, 1999: 245).
As Pridham (1998) argues, processes like Europeanisation, in the case of post- 
communist countries, or Americanisation in the case of Latin America, provide systemic 
pressure, both in formal and qualitative terms, in that the established form of the 
political regime in advanced democracies becomes the royal model for a new regime. 
There are two forms of ensuring the continuity of this pressure: the first is a diffuse 
sense o f following European or American models of system development, which can 
occasionally be detrimental for a developing nation. Second, it is transnational 
cooperation that provides a pertinent and a more stimulating mechanism of 
advancement for the third wave countries. For example, countries close to the EU can 
benefit from the process of regional integration though the ‘democratisation effect’ 
arising from trade with western partners and through political cooperation. This issue 
draws upon a closer relationship of the new democracies with the West and the USA, 
and imposes certain strengths on the young economies, which some scholars 
characterise as a “new western remote-control colonialism” (Nagle and Mahr, 1999:
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273). The level of integration into a wider economic community, the geopolitical 
location and the experience of economic reforms by the new regimes stipulate their 
diversity and success on the path towards democracy26.
The most striking feature of the third wave democratisation, nevertheless, proves to be 
their tardy and perpetually incomplete institutionalisation. After ten years of reform, 
many new transitions appeared to demonstrate no tendency towards further 
consolidation of their regimes. Laurence Whitehead (1992) observes that democratic 
institutions in many new states simply do not comply with the supposedly classic 
patterns of Western democracies. Among the countries that for the past two years 
achieved considerable economic growth are, nevertheless, many of those, which remain 
politically vulnerable and unbalanced27. Political scholars agree that many new regimes 
may fit the minimal criteria of polyarchy (Dahl, 1971), but as “a type not yet theorised” 
(O’Donnell, 1993). Third-wave democracies are often cited as ‘democracies by default’
26 There is, nevertheless, growing discussion in relation to the ‘core/semi-periphery/periphery’ divides in 
economic development of new transitions. Their integration into a global economy is often seen as 
dependent on bigger economies, and as a result presumes their ‘secondary’ role on a global market. For 
detailing, see Panitch and Leys (eds.) (1999). Socialist Register 1999: Global Capitalism Versus 
democracy. London: Merlin Press. Boswell, and Chase-Dunn (2000) The Spiral o f Capitalism and 
Socialism. London: Lynne Rienner. Burbah, R et al (1997) Globalisation and Its Discontents. London: 
Pluto Press.
27 These are firstly Tajikistan, Bosnia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Croatia. Fore more information 
see Transition Report 1999, EBRD, “Changes in transition indicators 1998-99”, pp. 26-30.
or ‘facade democracies’28 (Whitehead, 1992; O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986), 
which implies little system change, entrepreneurial politics, and lowering of public 
expectations of what may be achieved through political action, and this leads 
consequently to low-level participation and delegated forms of electoral politics. If 
representative mechanisms remain undeveloped, the states may face a lingering prospect 
of legitimate dictatorship, as currently they operate within the context of a strong 
leadership and no legal framework. These new types of regimes are, paradoxically, 
sustainable and can be characterised by various degrees of non-institutionalisation, 
under-representation and limited political competition.
Comparison with established regimes might offer some explanation of the problematic 
emergence and development of the third-wave democratisation. It allows estimation as 
to what degree new democracies are different, but it cannot constructively explain why 
they are different and what their finale would be, given that after a decade they remain 
largely non-institutionalised. In addition, the global political modality has changed, and 
what was relevant for an explanation of party formation four decades ago, does not fit 
the contemporary complex party agenda29.
28 Whitehead uses a synonym phrase in Portuguese ‘para os ingleses \ e f  to describe ‘fafade democracy’ 
which implies the old habit of holding elections ‘for the English to look at’ (1992:150).
29 A wide discussion o f the relevance o f cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to the party 
formation may be recalled. It sharply divided academic community in the late seventieth (Bartolini and 
Mair, 1990; Mair, 1997 versus Franklin et al, 1992). Later debates revolved around such issues as 
disruption of traditional voter alignments, non-partisan tendencies and single-issue agenda in 
contemporary party politics.
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An overwhelming supply of empirical data is available for political scientists to draw 
conclusions regarding new types of transitions. Nevertheless, it appeared to be 
impossible to ‘match’ the novelty of research findings in a ‘straightjacket’ of existing 
analytical frameworks. Theoretical and methodological deficiency has been revealed 
whilst discussing such issues as:
i) typology of new party systems, which appears to be different from the ones used 
for advanced democracies;
ii) analytical framework that needs to go beyond individual conclusions of 
cleavage-oriented, institutional, cultural, or elite approaches; and
iii) the joint impact of structures and agency on sustainability of the emerging party 
systems and regimes.
Notably, in search for an appropriate methodology to study new regimes, many 
traditional typologies of party systems have been applied to describe developments in 
changing societies. A numeric criterion has been one of the most conventional and 
frequently adopted means of party system classification. With the notable exception of 
Dahl (1971) who built his typology on the form of competitiveness of opposition, for 
assessing the degree of stability, Duverger (1954), Blondel (1968), Rokkan (1970) and 
Sartori (1976) base their research on the principal distinction between the two-party 
versus multiparty type systems. Sartori (1976), nevertheless, attempts to supplement a 
numeric party categorisation with ideological distance that separates parties in the 
system. His typology, focusing more on inter-party competition, has captured more 
efficiently the diversity of party system institutionalisation in new regimes.
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Nevertheless, Sartori’s methodology, as with many others, failed to differentiate the 
existing variety of ‘polarised pluralism’ in the new multi-party regimes, and to classify 
them within the league of non-institutionalised party systems. It is consequently noted 
that the Latin American experience of party politics, for example, cannot reveal any 
clear relationship between the type of party system (or degree of internal party system 
fragmentation) and democratic stability.
The degree of institutionalisation, representation and competition may play a more 
informative role in defining party systems in the new democracies. For example, in both 
Latin America and Eastern Europe, the two-party systems that are supposedly secure, 
range from stable to volatile democracies. Moreover, new democracies often 
demonstrate an extraordinary proliferation of parties with entrepreneurial and 
profiteering motives. Mainwaring (1999), Kitschelt et al. (1999), Norden et al. (1998) 
and others insist on adopting a more resilient view of party politics that offers not only 
‘modified’ dimensions for analysis, but also a more complex explanation of transitional 
processes.
Mainwaring (1999) suggests that institutionalisation may offer a better axis for analysis 
of the newly emerged party systems. It is not the number of parties or their ideological 
diversity, but the degree of party system institutionalisation that structures the political 
process. “In inchoate systems, parties are important actors in some ways, but they do not 
have the same structuring effect” (Mainwaring, 1997:8). A poorly institutionalised 
system is characterised by considerable instability in patterns of party competition, 
weak roots in society, comparatively low legitimacy of parties, and weak party
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organisation (Mainwaring, 1999). Lower institutionalisation thus means that the levels 
of uncertainty in nonetheless functional systems would be higher than in 
institutionalised systems. Such factors as the number of parties and ideological distance 
would have less predictive power under conditions of constant flux. As long as parties 
remain sustainable even when less institutionalised in the new democracies, this 
parsimonious means of analysis can be useful for comparative analytical purposes.
A second dimension of analysis of party systems may be the form of representation 
(Norden et al., 1998). Degrees of public representation are used to determine whether or 
not a political system is authentically democratic. There are various forms of 
representation, and parties are traditionally one element. However, the new democracies 
reveal the magnitude and the variety of forms of representation, pointing to the apparent 
trade-off in govemability of the system. For example, new democracies are often cited 
as highly entrepreneurial; especially when:
...some flamboyant leaders emerge from almost nowhere, capture the majority of 
the vote on the basis of the vaguest of slogans and the loosest of commitments, 
and then proceed to govern arbitrarily without restrain from party structures, 
parliamentary processes, legal or bureaucratic norms, until popular support is 
exhausted and another equally ill-prepared and erratic takes his place (Whitehead, 
1992:: 151).
These forms of representation, when one receives a full popular endorsement to sway 
national destinies, has been widely termed as ‘delegative democracy’ (O’Donnell,
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1994); or movimentismo which emphasises direct mass participation in sustaining the 
system; or ‘cesarismo democratico’ (Linz, 1994). Belarus, for instance, may be referred 
to as a ‘delegative’ type of regime, associated with a publicly elected president who, 
nevertheless, has accredited a dictatorial right to decide what may be ‘suitable’ for his 
country. Hence, identifying new forms of representation helps to understand and explain 
why a system is able to reproduce so effectively despite the apparent lack of 
institutionalisation. This may also help to foresee possible implications of unequal 
power distribution for the future stability of new regimes.
A third dimension suggested by Norden et al. (1998) for the comparative analysis of 
emerging party systems are the patterns of party competition. Deborah Norden noted that 
even if parties are not explicit in most definitions of new democracies, competition still 
remains, and that competition eventually tends to take root in a developing polity. It is not 
the degree of institutionalisation of party competition, the party format, or their number, 
but the way, parties compete in weakly institutionalised systems, that permits an 
understanding of survival mechanisms in new systems. A number of cases demonstrate 
the influence of combative, moderately competitive, and collusive inter-party relationships 
on regime stability. (Norden et al, 1998: 429-30, Table 1). For example, regimes with 
combative competition, when elites seek alternative ways of defeating opponents have 
proved destabilising for the system. Collusive behaviour characterised by high cooperation 
of competing political actors may prevent access for new players to public office, and by 
that limit the scope of representation. As Norden suggests, the most stable regimes are 
likely to be regimes with moderate party competition, such as Chile prior to 1964 and 
Venezuela in the 1960-70s. It has also been noted that there is a strong correlation between
balanced legislature-executive relations and pace of reforms. Democracies may break 
down when governments gain too much power at the expense of a legislature, or when 
parties turn their competition into a battle against the president, as have occurred in 
Belarus. Alternately, there may be inter-party relations emerging from a ‘disloyal’ 
opposition, whose purpose is to hinder the government’s efforts to implement policies, as 
happened in Latin American30 (UCRI and UCRP in 1958-66 Argentina) and East 
European (LDPR in 1996, and KPRF in Russia, 2001) regimes.
In conclusion, one has to recognise the unique and unprecedented nature of the new 
democracies that needs theorising. New democracies do not necessarily relate to the 
experience of established regimes, and should be examined on the basis of what they 
possess and may potentially acquire, rather than what they lack. They may not necessarily 
be institutionalised, but may well be sustainable and functioning, which implies existence 
of certain structural, institutional and elite arrangements behind the scene and requires new 
dimensions for analysis. The following section will demonstrate the diversity of the new 
regimes within the CIS, and emphasise the importance of a more resilient approach for 
understanding multidimensionality of the third wave democratisation.
1.2 CIS vis-a-vis other third wave transitions: what makes them different?
Despite a shared inspiration for change, new democracies, nevertheless, demonstrate 
much regional dissimilarity. Due to their geo-political location and economic position,
30 Radical parties in the legislature, in an attempt to overthrow or diminish the influence of the leading 
party, or government, can often stipulate this situation.
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the newly emerged states within the ex-Soviet Union appeared to have a more complex 
transition than that of East Central Europe and Latin America. For these regimes “it has 
proved much easier to dismantle communist rule than to construct a democratic political 
system in its place” (White, 1997b: 19). Volatility and increasing ‘privatisation’ of 
official policy-making by powerful vested interests, impenetrable bureaucracy, corrupt 
government, economic and political stagnation, continuing national impoverishment, 
and waves of mass protest are only a few features characteristic of the post-Soviet 
environment. Not attempting serious reforms, the CIS countries are becoming the 
‘outsiders’ of the general course of democratisation within the new Europe: they are no 
longer totalitarian states, yet they are still distant from any stable form of a democratised 
state. In addition, with political and economic globalisation and the involvement of 
CEECs in transnational framework of cooperation31, the position of the CIS on the 
international arena rapidly attains the quality of self-contained regimes situated beyond 
Europe’s new ‘Iron Curtain’32. As Light (2001: 1) notes33, “there is an increasing belief
31 There is a wide range of economic, political and military strategic policies that the EU and NATO offer to 
sustain stability in the regions with their expansion eastwards: from Partnership for Peace, Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreements, common strategies to modest programmes of cross-border cooperation and aid.
32 The theme of ‘outsiders’ is being presently developed by Light, M., White. S., and Lowenhardt, J. 
under the ESCR research project (L213252007) entitled “The Outsiders: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova and the New E u r o p e For details, see Light, M., White. S., and Lowenhardt, J (1999) 'A wider 
Europe: the view from Moscow and Kyiv’; White, S. (2001) ‘Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: Looking 
East or looking West?’; Lowenhardt, J. (2001) ‘Two forgotten countries: Belarus and M o ld o v a Light, 
M. (2001) ‘ Ukraine: Between Russia and the West', papers presented for BASEES Conference, 7-9 
April.
33 Light, M. (2001) ‘Ukraine: between Russia and the West’, paper presented for BASEES annual 
conference, Cambridge, 7-9 April.
22
in the outsider states that being ‘between’ is not just a physical reality, but implies 
having to chose between Russia and the West”. A feeling of exclusion has also been 
reinforced by gradual economic progress of the CEECs, contrary to the CIS 
performance, lagging far behind in their development, despite the shared legacies of the 
Soviet past.
After a decade under a new regime, at least a ‘minimal’ definition of democracy may be 
applied to the majority of the new states within Central and Eastern Europe. This firstly 
presumes a number of freely contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of 
massive fraud; secondly, effective guarantees of civil liberties (freedom of speech, 
assembly, and association); and finally, government accountability and system legality 
(Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1996; O’Donnell, 1993). Nevertheless, the CIS regimes 
display an apparent conceptual ‘stretching’ of the definition of democratising 
polyarchies behind their democratic fagade. They can be regarded as polyarchies 
inasmuch as they have an institutionalised practice of elections, which is nevertheless, 
embodied by poorly functioning institutions of representation. Stephen White comments 
on the Russian case:
Russians are evidently committed to the electoral process, and the forms of 
representative democracy have so far been carefully observed. But their 
experience shows the limitations of any changes of this kind so long as there is no 
rule o f law, no coherent system of parties, a media that is generally beholden to 
the government, and a government that is not itself accountable to elected 
institutions (White, 2000a: 321).
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As noted, the CIS group countries can be formally described as regimes moving towards 
‘democracy’ as a state counter-posed to socialism. However, even their ‘move to 
democracy’ has to be carefully applied within the area: despite their fa9ade features, 
some countries, “fall short of democratic practice” and “go beyond a competitive 
struggle for the popular vote” (White, 2000a: 322).
Economic, institutional and structural developments in these countries remain unsound. 
In comparison to their western neighbours, the post-Soviet states in the majority have 
not fully embarked on economic restructuring; they are heavily dominated by the 
presidency; and have administratively controlled political competition. Furthermore, 
they all lack legality and an effectively functioning state, and nevertheless, the CIS 
group remains relatively sustainable due to the existing infrastructure of informal and 
‘patrimonial’ rules and regulations.
Some scholars explain the difference in the CIS protracted development by referring 
to their missing structural and institutional incentives, which include the non­
existence of the pre-totalitarian democratic experience, absence of the pre-empting 
cleavages for party competition and of the pre-communist constitution, in opposition 
to those in the Baltic states, and other Central European democracies. Notably, the 
availability of a prior democratic experience, associated with partially competitive 
elections and representative mass politics, has vividly stipulated a more advanced 
pace o f  reformation within the CEECs. The length of communist rule, and the 
occurrence of democratic ‘ruptures’ during the communist term also matter for
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structural and ideological reinforcement of the mode of transition. In this sense, the 
ex-soviet republics stand less favourably in advancing democratic reforms, having 
been a seat and a stronghold of state socialism for seventy years. If Poland (1918- 
1926), Hungary (1945-47) and Czechoslovakia (1918-38) enjoyed a few years of 
democratic experience and served a comparatively small period under the socialist 
regime, it becomes clear why CIS, having seventy years of building communism on 
their shoulders, are presently lagging behind.
The relative strength of civil society and its contribution to the process of 
democratisation can be another cause for differentiation. For example, the ever-lasting 
legacy of totalitarianism in post-Soviet countries had left little understanding by the 
population of the need for civil society. The practice of democratic centralism and 
pervasive state control resulted in a political environment in which little value was 
attached to the notions of personal opinion, diversity, dissent and political tolerance -  
the necessary prerequisites for the emergence of a pluralistic political system. In 
addition, these countries displayed little understanding of the ‘stimulating role’ of the 
opposition, even in the late 1990s. Soviet ideology has been carefully cultivated on the 
principles of antagonistic dichotomy ‘we-they’, where ‘they’ implied the westernised 
world. In addition, the modes of extrication from communist rule clearly make a further 
impact. In most CEECs the socialist exit involved mass social movements and counter­
elite participation, rather than the limitation of regime transformation to decision­
making of like-minded individuals. Ex-soviet countries had an elaborate state machine 
with full access of the communist elite to state resources and power. This has largely 
remained intact, thereby causing an extended ‘farewell’ to the old rule, everlasting
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accommodation for some vested interests and a continued state of non­
institutionalisation.
The following analysis of (i) economic externalities and strategic elite considerations; 
and (ii) structural and cultural settings, will aid fuller identification of diverse and more 
complex conditions for building democracy within the CIS. Belarus is singled out for 
reference as a cumulative medium of transitional problems within the CIS, and third 
wave transitions in general.
1.2.1 Economic externalities and elite strategic considerations
The principal difference between the CIS and CEECs lies in the protracted economic 
development of the former, which, in turn, is the consequence of their structural and 
cultural diversity34.
Many CIS regimes have not yet seriously considered the wholesale restructuring of their 
economic systems. The relatively enthusiastic initiation of reforms at the outset of 
transition seems to have stalled towards the end of the decade, and after the 1998 
financial crisis in Russia went into continuing recession. The average index of 
transitional progress in the new European democracies varies from 2.3 in the CIS (1.5 in 
Belarus), 2.7 in the Balkan countries, 3.2 in the Baltic countries, to the highest 3.5 score
34 This in the first instance includes the CIS geo-political and -  economic locations; lack of pre- 
democratic experience of reforms; high strength of the communist legacies; patriarchal cultural mode; 
and strategic dominance of power elites over foreign policy-making.
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in East Central Europe within the 0-4.3 interval (EBRD, 1999: 24). However, as some 
scholars note, these ‘raw* data measured with equal intervals, will demonstrate even a 
more significant downfall of the average CIS score35. In economic terms the majority of 
CIS, with notable exception of Russia, are characterised by a slow process of 
privatisation of large-scale enterprise, which often do not exceed 25% of the overall 
national assets, though a substantial number of smaller companies have been privatised, 
especially former communal properties36. Improvements in corporate governance have 
been minimal; also little progress has been made in the spheres of promoting legislation 
on competition and institutions; providing security of investments, and price 
liberalisation. Nevertheless, despite the existing bias towards state intervention, 
privileging state over private output, and maintaining a dominant state sector in the 
majority of the CIS, there is no evidence to suggest that economic reversal to the system 
of full central planning of the past will be possible.
The immediate scope of market expansion across the CIS looks limited, and the long-term 
capacity of the system is highly compromised by a low record of foreign investment, poor 
credibility of national currency, barter pay-offs and consequential ‘dollarisation’ of the 
systems. However, the slow pace of reforms has had some positive implications for the 
CIS regimes. As Colin Lawson (1999:7) notes, “the inflation performance is now much 
better than in their hyperinflationary period of 1992-95, but is still significantly worse than
35 See Colin Lawson’s argument in his paper “Path Dependence approach and the economy of Belarus: 
the consequences of late reforms”, presented for the conference ‘Belarus: The forgotten heart of 
EuropeV, University of Bath, ERI, February, 1999.
36 For more details see Transitional Report, EBRD, 1999.
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most of the CEECs states”. This is particularly correct for the case of Belarus, which 
inflation in 1999 was 182% against a CIS median of 18%.
The unemployment rate is rather low in comparison to the CEECs, and was about 6.2 in 
average across the CIS in 199737, which is twice as low as the average in CEECS that 
year. This reflects political, social and economic policies of the CIS (low wages, regular 
payments, full employment, etc), but nevertheless hides a significant amount of under­
employment and structural problems, which are respectively mirrored by a monthly 
poverty line income per capita of $21 on average, in 1998-99 (EBRD, 1999:16). 
Accordingly, the life expectancy in the CIS in 1997 was lower than that recorded in 
1989, and decreased to 54-61 years for males in 1997 (EBRD, 1999: 7). Belarus 
demonstrates a balanced medium in relation to the above-mentioned developments38. 
The republic has been classified as a lower middle-income country according to World 
Bank Classification39. Nevertheless, even if some of the transition indicators in Belarus 
presently demonstrate no economic decline, there are grounds to question the
37 The rate of unemployment in CEECs is much higher, and equals on average to 12.8 in 1997 across the 
CEECs. For more details see Transition Report, EBRD 1999, country by country.
38 In accordance to the EBRD’s indicators, the transition is about 39% complete for the CIS as a whole, 
and it is 15% complete for Belarus. Belarus’ score of transition progress is 1.5 out of 2.3 of the CIS in 
average. During 1997-98 the CIS received $27.6b in direct foreign investment, of which Belams 
accounted for $444m, which is per capita terms Belams’ $44 compares to a CIS average of $69. 
Corruption index in Belams reaches 3.4 (58th) against Moldova and Ukraine of 2.6 (75th accordingly). In 
other words, Belams typifies an average score of transition progress amongst the CIS. For more details, 
see Transition Report, 1999; Lawson, C. (1999) Path dependence and the economy of Belarus”, Bath 
University, ERL
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sustainability of its growth and progressive development in the future. Belarus’ 
cumulative level of direct foreign investment per capita has been rated as “the lowest of 
its former centrally planned neighbours”40. In addition, its private sector contribution to 
GDP was 20%, compared with 70% in Russia, 55% in Ukraine; and 45% in Moldova 
(Ibid). Belarus has not progressed far in any of the main transition indicators, including 
(i) macro-economic stabilisation; (ii) private sector development; (iii) liberalisation of 
prices and trade; (iv) enterprise reform; and (v) development of financial institutions 
(see Appendix 5). Hence, analysis of Belarus’ controversial progress in transition will 
be illustrative of the CIS development in the whole.
There are a number of possible explanations for such diverse patterns and poor 
economic performance of the CIS. The geo-economic and political positions of the 
CEECs determine their more advanced pace of reform. Notably, the degree of exposure 
to Western market culture and principles of capitalist economy prior to transition has 
affected the extent to which transitional countries accepted market-supporting 
institutions. The CEECs’ proximity to Western Europe has clearly benefited them in 
this regard. The pre-communist economies of many CEECs (Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic) were fairly advanced and had cross-border ties with western countries. In 
addition their people had more opportunity for travelling and interaction with 
Europeans, which obviously widened their attitudes to the common prospects of 
development. Furthermore, market-oriented reforms were introduced in many CEECs at
39 World Bank Development Report, 1996.
40 Economic Trends, quarterly. January-March Report, 2000.
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the beginning of the 1990s. In the CIS the same period was marked by confrontation 
between communist forces and the growing influence of democrats.
At the other extreme, is the CIS structural and cultural dependency on Russia’s resources, 
especially energy supplies, goods market and allegedly foreign policy-making. This is of 
particular importance for smaller satellite countries of the Russian Federation, such as 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, which found them caught ‘between’ the expanding influence 
of the EU/NATO and weakened, yet very ambitious Russian state. Their geo-political 
location and structural legacies of economic interdependence within the former USSR 
dictate a more complex agenda for the restructuring of the CIS states, and is the matter of 
elites’ strategic foreign policy-making.
The Commonwealth of Independent States41 was initially created in an attempt to bolster 
economic development of disintegrated new states; and to bring a sense of security to 
the emerging nations. For smaller countries, integration with Russia was sought to 
provide substantial economic rewards to their national economies, and most notably 
cancellation of their debts to Russia, subsidised fuel supplies, and access to ex-soviet 
goods and service market. The policy of re-integration was particularly vital for Belarus,
41 The CIS was designed to become the Commonwealth of Slavic nations, i.e. Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine. On 8 December 1991 (Belaveza Treaty) Russia, Belarus and Ukraine formed the CIS, and the 
Soviet Union came to a vital end. Later it developed into a union between all NIS within the former 
USSR, with other eight republics joining the grouping. The CIS is neither a state, nor federation or 
confederation. Its developing structure aims to emulate that of the EU (Rontoyanni, 1999), and establish a 
single economic and legal space involving a monetary union; and provide common foreign and defence 
policies.
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which was designed as an intellectual basis and a manufacturing arena for the former 
USSR, and had high-level dependency on energy supplies from Russia.
The superior standards of western economies are likely to keep western markets closed 
for the newly emerged independent states, at least in the medium term perspective. 
Hence, many CIS members have seen the recovering Soviet-era customers as an 
alternative means of expanding trade, and balancing national economies. In addition, 
trade of smaller states was initially oriented towards the Russian market and that of 
other CIS. For example, in 1998 Belarus exported over 73.7% of its goods to the CIS 
and 65% to Russia alone. Because of Belarus’ inability to pay in hard currency, 74%42 
of its payments to Russia (i.e Gazprom) have been made through barter arrangements 
since 1997. Moldova has been exporting 80% of the value of all exports to Russia, and 
its energy debt to Russia amounts to about 11% of its GDP43. Ukraine exports to Russia 
equalled 56.9% in 1998 and included mainly ferrous metals, machinery and food. 
Respectively, 68.8% of its imports from Russia were gas, oil and petroleum products44. 
Estimates of Ukraine’s debts to Russia equals to US$2b45. Presently, Russian main 
exports to the CIS are oil and gas, which forms a lucrative industry for the former, and 
keep satellite states under control due to their limited natural energy resources.
42 It has increased to 92% in 1999. Selivanova, I (1998) Economic Integration of Russian and Belarus, 
http://www.vabloko.ru/rhemes/Belarus/belarus-25.html.retrieved in 20 October 1999.
43 Lowenhardt, J. (2001) Two Forgotten Countries: Belarus and Moldova.
http://www.gla.ac.uk/extemal/basees/Lowenhardt.pdfretrieved 19 March, 2001
44 For more details see EBRD, Transition Reports, 1999; http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefmg/Ukraine/trade.htm: 
retrieved April 2001.
45 See Jamestown Foundation, 18 October 2000 monitor. Vol. 6, Issue 194.
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Table 1.2.1-1. The share of oil and gas in Russia’s exports to the CIS
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
The share of oil/gas 
in total exports, %
51.4 36.1 49.7 53.6 58.5 59.2
Value, billion US$ 7.3 5.3 6.2 6.4 5.3 4.0
Source: Gosudarstevnnii Tamozhennii Komitet [State Customs Committee], 1996, 1998, 2000.
Following the establishment of the Russia-Belarus community and especially after the 
conclusion of the ‘Treaty on the Formation of a Union State’ (December 1999), 
Gazprom reduced the price on oil/gas to US$15 for Belarus as the most loyal ally to 
Russia within the CIS, and to US$26 for Russian regions bordering Belarus46, against 
US$78 for Ukraine. Lack of internal resources for the initiation of economic 
restructuring and paying their debts, and limited foreign investments have created 
mutual dependence of the CIS on the foreign policy-making of Russia in the first place, 
and then, each other’s strategic programmes. Belarus’ example is the most enlightening. 
Since signing a mutual ‘zero-sum’ agreement in 1996, Russia’s debt to Belarus of 
US$300m for exit and service of nuclear machinery, and usage of Belarus’ military 
bases, was written off in exchange for a similar procedure with the Belarus’ debt to 
Russia of US$470m for received credits in 1992-93, and 1995. Belarus’ GDP (% 
change) has grown from (-10.1%) in 1992 to +10% in 1997; the rate of unemployment 
went down three times, and the deficit of the state budget was surprisingly small. These
46 Selivanova, I. (1998) Economic Integration o f Russia and Belarus, 
http://www.yabloko.ru/Themes/Belarus/belarus-25.html, retrieved 20 October 1999.
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Russian concessions to create the ‘Belarus’ miracle’ of 1996-97 have been carefully 
weighted by government elites of both countries. Part of it was Russia’s growing 
interest in keeping Belarus at short hand as a geo-political and strategical buffer 
between the expanding West and a still weak East. The integration of national air forces 
had a particular significance for Russia, as its security was clearly threatened by the 
incorporation of some CEECs into NATO and their aircraft ventures to the central part 
of the Russian Federation47. There have also been security considerations for keeping 
‘tight control’ over the CIS against the enlargement of NATO in CEECs, and such 
recent episodes as NATO bombing campaigns against Iraq and Yugoslavia without the 
explicit sanction of the UN Security Council, and the western reaction to the second 
Chechen campaign48. In addition, Georgia and Azerbaijan have announced their 
intentions to join NATO, and Ukrainian leadership is tom apart between the opportunity 
of immediate benefits from trading with Russia, or a prospect of a periphery role and 
financial losses, which its membership in NATO might entail.
As one can witness, Russia’s policy-making towards the CIS has naturally determined 
these countries’ (willing or unwilling)49 orientation towards the East (Russia) and the 
Slavic union, by that forming a grouping of the EU ‘outsiders’. Simultaneously, there
47 See RIA-Novosti Daily Review, DR012599, 25 January, 1999:10.
48 See development of the argument in Rontoyanny, C. (2000) A Russo-Belarusian ‘Union State’: a 
defensive response to a western enlargement?, working paper, ESRC project ‘One Europe or several?’
49 There is much debate regarding the multi-directionality of the CIS foreign policies. Countries like Ukraine and 
Moldova seem to be willing to cooperate with the West, however their internal resources and high economic 
dependence on Russia preclude further implementation of their intentions. For more details see, www.one- 
europe.ac.uk, www.one-europe.ac.uk/events/2000/conference/Ldwenhardt.pdf retrieved March 2001.
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have been some stipulations by some CIS states (Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan) oriented towards sustaining strategic cooperation and various aid 
programmes with the EU, which nevertheless, had very limited effect, and proved to be 
a rather costly exercise. It appears that the situation of ‘the outsiders’ develops with the 
potentially difficult necessity to make a clear choice by the CIS states: European or 
Slavic. This becomes a real dilemma for the CIS when Russia actively tightens its 
control over their independent decision-making, which randomly tends to favour some 
western options and available opportunities for restructuring the CIS economies.
1.2.2. Structural, institutional and cultural diversity of the CIS
To economic dependence from Russia, structural, institutional, and cultural factors may 
be added, that reinforce the CIS gravitation away from  the expanding Europe. This 
firstly relates to a limited elite rotation within the CIS and the full engagement of the 
former soviet nomenklatura in the policy-making process. EBRD data confirms that 
progress in regime stabilisation at the outset of reforms was higher in the countries 
where political executives were replaced. In contrast, the CIS states, especially Belarus, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Moldova display little reforming progress over the past ten 
years of transition, keeping the same elite echelons in power. As Belova (1999: 5) 
suggests, in Belarus there has been no significant elite change until 1994, and even with 
Lukashenko’s succession to power, the move happened to be from regional elites 
upwards and horizontal shifts amongst the former corps. The effective system of 
patronage created by Lukashenko, and full presidential control over the national 
decision-making process have resulted in economic stagnation, and pending collapse of
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the entire system. Even when protracted periods of liberalisation took place (mainly 
between 1989-1992) in some of the CIS states, access of controlling vested interests to 
power have limited the effect of democratisation, and helped even more to consolidate 
the control of incumbents over the state/private revenues, blurring distinction between 
private benefits and bureaucratic regulations. In Russia, for example, not only has the 
income inequality substantially risen, but also spending on social benefits has actually 
become regressive over the course of transition.
The issues of state, territory and national identities come to play no less important role 
in fostering ‘philosophy’ of the outsiders. The self-identities are defined in a lesser 
degree within the CIS than those in the CEECs, which leaves these countries unstable 
and vulnerable to the process of the enlargement of the EU and international 
community. This protracted self-identification has also been largely centred on the 
policies of Russia towards the neighbouring states, as well as the century long disputes 
over historically partitioned territories. Natasha Kuhrt comments50, . .as long as Russia 
is doubtful of its own ability to maintain supreme authority within its own territory, it 
will be sensitive to interventionist practices elsewhere”. This is effectively true not only 
in relation to Russia’s regional separatist tendencies, but also to the continuing disputes 
over ‘Russian-speaking’ territorial spots in satellite countries51. These cases include 
Moldovan Dnestr Republic with Russian military majority, in Moldova; Crimean feuds
50 Kuhrt, N. ‘State Sovereignty as a Factor in post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy’, paper presented for 
BASEES, 2001, 7-9 April, www.gla.ac.uk/extemal/basees/kuhrt.pdf retrieved March 2001
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over Russian military bases in Ukraine; and Belarus’ claiming back over IbRUS debt 
from Russia for using its military bases in 1998-99. In addition, as appeared from recent 
opinion polls, many CIS states operate within the contexts of mixed identities: on the 
one extreme, there is a ‘European versus Slav’ cleavage; and on the other hand, - 
‘national versus supra-national, pro-Russian’ conflict. The table below vividly 
demonstrates great confusion by the public over the issues of national identities: The 
majority of the population in three countries indicates their mixed priorities towards the 
West/East prospects of development and cooperation.
Table 1.2.2-1. ‘European versus Slav’ cleavage
The question: Would you support a president who believes that the Union of Slavs is 
beneficial to the nation?
Yes (percentage) No Undecided
Belarus 55 13.7 31.1
Russia 65.1 11.8 23.1
Ukraine 60.7 12.7 26.7
The question: Would you support a president who will seek a closer union with the EU?
Yes (percentage) No Undecided
Belarus 75.7 3.9 20.3
Russia 79.6 6.3 14.1
51 The Dnestr Moldovan Republic, a separatist regime, controls over 12% of Moldova’s territory and 
almost all of its heavy industry. See Lowenhardt, J. (2001) Two Forgotten Countries: Belarus and 
Moldova, www.gla.ac.uk/extemal/basees/Lowenhardt.pdf retrieved March 2001
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Ukraine 71.2 7.1 21.8
Source: INTAS research project (99-00245), opinion polls, December-January 2001. Representative 
nation-wide samples in Russia (19000), Belarus (1200) and Ukraine (1600). Author is a project network 
coordinator.
This closely corresponds with Stephen White’s data assessing public and elites’ 
attitudes to a wider Europe52: 55% in Belarus strongly or somewhat favour their 
country’s membership in the EU; 69% in Moldova; 57% in Ukraine and 47% in Russia, 
with quite substantial share of undecided votes (31% in Belarus; 24% in Moldova; 32% 
in Ukraine; and 41% in Russia). The growing public perception in themselves as the 
European ‘outsiders’ and the emergence of the ‘West versus East’ conflict, have been 
already manifested by the divisions within the social structures of the CIS. As White et 
al. note, European-oriented segments of the population are mainly those who support 
pro-market parties, have experience of travelling, are of younger generation and speak 
national language at home. They are confronted by pro-communist party supporters, and 
those who have relatives in Russia and across the CIS.
Another feature that brings the CIS states into a separate transitional group is a dominating 
public attitude towards a strong leadership, embodied by the presidents and subordinated 
to them governments. Recent public opinions, conducted in three borderland countries, 
reflect popular belief in a president as the most powerful institution in the country: these 
are 23.7% in Russia, reinforced by 20.1% of those who believe that Russian government is 
also influential. In Belarus 75.1% believe in Lukashenko, accordingly reinforced by
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23.2% of those who positively regard Lukashenko’s government and 30.4% - the police. 
In Ukraine 60.2% consider the president as powerful, 54.4% - the government and 34.3% 
- the national parliament53. People in the CIS also favour the governance by decree (nearly 
50% in Russia; 30% in Ukraine; and surprisingly only 24% in Belarus). These tendencies 
and popular attitudes are reflected in policy-making of these countries, and the existing 
controversy between their often-unruled leadership and public support for interest 
contestation. Institutions of parliament appeared to be poorly functioning in the majority 
of the CIS, largely controlled by either pro-presidential party supporters (total majority in 
Belarus) or the communist umbrella parties (Moldova -49.9%; Ukraine -  40.9%; Russia -  
29.4%). The effective number of parties in parliaments ranges from 6.89 in Russia to 
23.06 in Ukraine as opposed by 3.5 on average in CEECs (Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic, and Bulgaria) in 1996. Parties in places proved to be weak, fragmented and 
disorganised (with the notable exception of communist successor parties). There are no 
class or ethnic divides, considerable enough to stipulate the growth of the opposition. Civil 
society is largely undeveloped, discouraged by a weak legislature, often state-owned mass 
media, and incapacitated constitutional court. The case of Belarus remains illustrative in 
relation to the truncated representative powers bestowed to democratic institutions. For 
example, the president fully controls the legislature, appoints six members of the 
constitutional court, whose chairman became to have a limited term of office in 
accordance to 1996 amendments to the constitution. Mass media are epitomized by the
52 For more details, see White, S (2001) Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: Looking East or Looking West? 
www.gla.ac.uk/extemal/basees/white.pdf. Retrieved March 2001.
53 INTAS research project on charismatic political leadership in Russia, Belams and Ukraine (99-00245), 
university of Bath, ERI: www.bath.ac.uk/~mlpeak
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state run BT, the only nation-wide channel; Belarusian Radio 1 is unchallenged; and state- 
owned press has about 3 million circulation against 300 000 of 53 privately owned papers.
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter was to give a general introduction to the 
phenomenon of third wave transitions, and the CIS in particular, for the future analysis of 
Belarus’ party system development. It was observed that CEECs, CIS and Latin American 
democracies considerably differ from prior waves of democratisation, including those of 
early stages of third wave turnover. This firstly relates to the tasks they face -  triple 
transition of state, market and attitudes; and then their continuous non-consolidation 
collided with their paradoxical sustainability. In certain cases this might even suggest an 
emergence of the new type of democratic polyarchy -  under-representative and non­
competitive regime with a popularly delegated leadership. The CIS states appear to pursue 
a more complex transitional path that was predestined by their historical past, existing 
structural and economic problems and international pressure of expanding global 
community. With these developments they feel increasingly isolated and form a new 
phenomenon for analysis -  the case of ‘outsiders’ within a wider Europe. Belarus appears 
to be in the centre of the CIS transitional turmoil simultaneously accumulating problems 
common to a wider process of democratisation.
For analysis of the party system development in Belarus, a suitable analytical 
framework is required that will be able to draw on the aforementioned transition 
dilemmas of the CIS states and third wave democracies in general. Chapter 2 will 
undertake this task.
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Chapter 2. Theories of democratisation: in search of a complex explanatory 
framework of the party system development in Belarus
Third wave democratisation poses a major theoretical challenge to students of political 
science, since its nature differs from that what explanatory theories anticipated. New 
systems are largely characterised by limited pre-democratic experience, enormity of 
transitional tasks, intense pressure of the international environment, vague cleavage 
structures, rapid proliferation of ‘fringe’ interest organisations, and a leadership 
‘market’ flooded by populists. The challenge therefore is to understand, explain and 
predict the course of political change in the new democracies, and notably in Belarus. 
For this purpose a methodological inquiry into existing theories of transition will be 
undertaken in this chapter.
Developments, especially with democratic advancement into Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s, were incongruous to any transitional theory, as they mainly portrayed 
democratisation as the outcome of a contingent and country-specific set of structures 
and institutions, or otherwise patterns of interactions between political actors. They 
failed to fully explain the infinite paradoxes relevant to individual countries, and 
continuity of third-wave transitions per se. The wholesale transformation of economic, 
political and cultural environments, and their global character invites urgent revision of 
the existing theories in relation to third wave transitions, which, it is argued, will 
become ‘the deepest, broadest, and the most durable transformation in world history’ 
(Remmer, 1995: 104). The aim of this chapter will, therefore, be to adopt, through a
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critical analysis of existing theories, a multifaceted methodological framework that will 
be able to explain prolonged party system development in Belarus.
Many students of comparative socio-political science have begun to experiment with a 
variety of new approaches to study third-wave democracies, including party system 
formation. Despite their diversity, they all reflect the novelty of the situation, and are 
inevitably impregnated with analytical eclecticism. Nevertheless, existing transitional 
literature can be differentiated in two principal frameworks -  a structure-oriented and a 
process-oriented one54. Methodological frontiers between the two analytical traditions 
are superficial; especially given the novelty of the subject55. The message is however to 
demonstrate the difference in driving forces used by both frameworks. The structure- 
oriented tradition focuses on the static side of transition, which provides the system with 
both constraints and opportunities for functioning. The process-oriented tradition 
emphasises its dynamic side, which is more dependent on the procedural decision­
making and readily available strategic opportunities for agency. In an attempt to capture
54 This division is offered by the author, expressing her vantage point on the difference between systemic 
outlook of structural, institutional and cultural theories on building democracy, and procedural 
understanding of change, reflected by rational choice and elite decision-making theories. The path- 
dependence analysis lies somewhat in-between the two, however, it will be treated within the second 
grouping by the author, on the grounds that it views change as originally stemming from elites’ actions, 
which are secondary circumscribed by a system of constraints and opportunities.
55 The path-dependent approach is the most vivid example of growing eclecticism, and can be termed as a 
middle way theory, along with neo-institutionalism, and rational choice theories. Nevertheless, it will be 
examined within the process-oriented approach to substantiate its fundamentals, high-level contingency 
and reliance on decision-making process, which are occurring in a pre-constituted environment.
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in full, the versatility of the third-wave world, modem approaches often gravitate 
towards balanced convergence, and use complex methodological explanations for this 
purpose.
Most notable efforts have been made in the direction of the structure-oriented 
framework, which will be analysed in the section of the chapter. This will include the 
following approaches:
• Neo-institutionalist analysis of Huntington (1991), O’Donnell (1993, 1994), 
Mainwaring (1994; 1999); Shugart and Carey (1992); Linz (1994,1996);
• Historical-structural approach, introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and 
further developed by Agh (1993, 1994), Kopecky (1995), and Mair (1997), 
Kitschelt (1992, 1995, 1999), Evans and Whitefield (1993, 1998), Cotta (1994), 
Bielasiak (1997), and Markowski (1997, 1999);
• Cultural theory presented by Gibson & Duch (1994); Inglehart (1996); Schopflin
(1996); Jowitt (1992); Toka (1995); Sakwa (1997) and others.
In the second section, the process-oriented framework offered by Higley and Burton 
(1989); Collier & Norden (1992); Offe (1991); Pridham (1995, 1999); and Przeworski 
(1995, 1998) will be outlined. It views new regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America as highly contingent on the situational configurations of human resources and 
their decision-making during the process of their development. Within this tradition, the 
rational choice theory including elite approach, as well as path-dependent analysis will 
be examined.
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There are certainly many other directions of the investigation of modem realities such as 
modernity and post-modernity approaches, globalisation analysis and contingency 
studies56, which, nevertheless, are beyond the scope this research, as space and logic do 
not permit the development of these arguments. The goal of this research is to delineate 
a framework that will be sufficiently explanatory for portraying the process of party 
system development and democratisation in Belarus as a newly emerged state.
In conclusion of the chapter, a complex approach to the analysis of party system in 
Belams will be recapitulated. It is based on the multifaceted involvement of structures 
and agency into the analysis of the versatile nature of the transient world. The method
56 Within the modernity approach and its post-modem developments more notable works belong to 
Antony Giddens (1990) The Consequences o f Modernity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
(1991) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and society in the Late Modem Age. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press; Ulrick Beck (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage; and 
Zygmunt Bauman (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Contingency theory focuses more on how the organisation’s structure fits the environment, and their 
interdependence. For details see Greenwood, R., et al (1980) Patterns o f Management in local 
Government. Oxford: Martin Robertson; Perrow, C. (1986) Complex Organisations: A critical Essay. 
N.Y.: Random House. Within the neo-institutional tradition, a policy network approach is becoming 
popular, which studies policy-making behaviour within institutional contexts. Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R., 
(1992b) Implementing Thatcherite Policies: Audit o f an Era. Milton Keynes: Open University Press; 
Gamble, A. (1990a) ‘Theories of British Politics’, Political Studies, XXXVIII, 3: 404-20. On 
globalisation see Cammack, P. (1999) “Interpreting ASEM. Inter-regionalism and the new materialism”, 
Journal o f the Asia Pacific Economy, 4:1; (1998) “Globalisation and the death of liberal democracy”, 
European Review, 6(2): 249-63; D. Potter et al (eds.) (1997) Democratisation. Cambridge: Polity 
Press/Open University.
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attempts to surmount the one-sidedness of existing theories and is essentially based on 
Elster’s et al. (1998) view of structures, and institutions vis-a-vis decision-makers, of 
which parties are part. Adaptation of eclectic methodologies seems to be a 
contemporary response to the complexity of modem realities. Mainwaring (1999), for 
example, in his later works suggests a three-dimensional outlook that amalgamates 
comparative macro-analysis, institutionalism and rational choice theory in his 
examination of the Brazilian party system. Kitschelt et al. (1999) moved beyond a 
structural-historical analysis to adopt a more multifaceted view of political parties, and 
their institutional and cultural linkages. Elster et al. (1998) likewise offered a synthetic 
approach that includes all three aforementioned elements - legacies, institutions and 
decisions -  as well as forward and backward linkages, to allow a fuller picture of 
transition in Eastern Europe.
The chapter will proceed in three parts. A critical analysis of the existing methodologies 
will be given in sections 2.1 and 2.2. They will outline the principal advantages and 
cmcial drawbacks of the structure-oriented and process-oriented approaches in 
application to the transient societies of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Finally, 
Chapter 2.3 will summarise the ‘structure-agency’ framework utilised by the author in 
an attempt to form a complete picture of party system development in Belams.
2.1 The structure-oriented framework
By and large all modem research can be divided into two principal areas of analysis. 
The first theoretical perspective is a structure-oriented approach that understands
44
democracy as a political system, which is firmly embedded in social structures, 
institutions, cultural traditions and enduring legacies of the past. Within this analytical 
framework the following approaches will be identified:
a) neo-institutionalist approach (often cited as a mobilisation-institutionalisation 
approach) views weak party systems as a dysfunction of the institutional 
environment which fails to provide a complex realisation of political participation 
and to meet rising public expectations of the modem world;
b) historical-structural approach (often cited as a cleavage-oriented approach) focuses 
on the analysis of cleavages, legacies and other structural factors which form the 
basis for the emergence of the oppositional politics; and finally,
c) cultural analysis, which regards political systems as expressing the ‘ethos’ of a given 
social milieu, and by that dependent on the cultural ‘mode’ and long-lasting 
traditions and legacies of society in the process of building democracy.
Before moving on to the analysis of existing analytical approaches, there is a line of 
reasoning that needs highlighting. Theoretical frameworks frequently refer to the 
process of democratisation as a whole, often without specifically mentioning parties and 
party systems, which are, nevertheless the locus of this research. The default assumption 
is, however, that parties, as essential part of building democracy, are implicitly included 
in the theoretical quest of all modem theories of transition.
2.1.1 The neo-institutional approach
The neo-institutionalist approach emphasises the powerful role of formal institutional 
arrangements in determining the political behaviour of self-interested politicians, 
regardless of their social and cultural context. It is rooted in a systemic view of society. 
From this perspective, societies are seen as networks of interrelated sectors or sub­
systems, where the ‘outputs’ of each sector serve as ‘inputs’ into others. Social change 
must be balanced, in the sense that the development of one sector cannot far outpace the 
development of others. Social change must also be cumulative or self-sustaining, in the 
sense that development of one sector stimulates the development of others. In other 
words, this approach presumes a priori advancement of institutional settings within a 
given society that should enable further development of parties and other political and 
social forces.
The most notable attempt to explain the problematic emergence of the new regimes and 
party system formation in Eastern Europe and Latin America belongs to Huntington 
(1991); O’Donnell (1993,1994); Mainwaring (1994, 1999); Linz (1994); Shugart and 
Carey (1992); and Fish (1995). Samuel Huntington notes, “ ...the primary problem of 
politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic 
change” (1991:5). More specifically, a delay in development of party systems in the 
new democracies seems to be conditional on two elements: social mobilisation and 
political response. The first signifies the process in which major clusters of prior social 
commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of 
socialisation and behaviour; however new institutional structures are not yet available. 
The second element follows on from the first, with the formation of political and social 
organisations that binds and expresses public interest on an official level. Deutsch
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(1961: 501) stresses, . .if the government fails to meet the increasing burdens put upon 
it by the process of social mobilisation, a growing proportion of the population is likely 
to become alienated and disaffected from the state”. In other words, regime
transformation involves the realisation of high levels of social forces, which poses an
immediate threat to political order; and if the existing regime lacks institutional capacity 
to respond effectively to assimilation of the freed social forces, the situation is likely to 
become volatile and unmanageable. As Huntington (1991: 79) notes, “political 
stability... depends upon the ratio of institutionalisation to participation”. That is to say 
the greater the gap between institutionalisation and participation, the greater the 
likelihood of political instability.
Hence, the two principal forces of political modernisation, identified by Deutsch, 
Huntington, Sigelman and others, are social participation, realised through various
interest-organisations, and institutionalisation of the system. The former implies
incorporation of the freed mass energy and strategic action of the populace into 
established social structures. The latter means the construction of institutional rules, 
procedures and formal organisations to constrain and simultaneously enable political 
behaviour. When society is transient, public aspirations released during the process of 
social mobilisation, may find no political forces or institutional incentives to bind them, 
and hence, emerge volatile. If society can afford plurality of political opinions, these 
frustrations are unlikely to be displaced against the new political order. Energies will be 
devoted to an individual or group advancement and the establishment of legitimate 
political institutions. However, in order to avoid anarchy in legitimising various 
interest-organisations, certain institutional arrangements need to be made. They must
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form a context of constraints and opportunities, which will stream strategic actions of 
the agency.
If the infrastructure of effective political institutions has developed, government can 
absorb mass participation and can respond to the demands for change. If infrastructure is 
missing, political participation on a mass level will prove highly destabilising 
(Sigelman, 1979). By infrastructure, a combination of various political and social 
organisations is implied, where the leading role in absorbing the conflict is given to 
political parties. The higher the level of organisation in political institutions, the more 
chances the system will have to survive and develop further. Therefore, 
institutionalisation of parties and other organisations, by which Huntington meant 
“acquisition of value and stability” and “playing within the established rules by 
available means”, will foster power balance and the prospect for democratic stability in 
the new democracy. In contrast, if the infrastructure proves to be ineffective in 
satisfying public needs, the released mass energy will be delegated to the executive level 
of the state and this may result in popular alienation, non-participation and apathy 
towards any political discourse.
Huntington specified four criteria for gauging institutionalisation, conceiving each as a 
continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-subordination, and 
coherence-disunity. He posited further that the closer an organisation aligns to the first 
term in each pair, the more institutionalised it would be. At the same time, Huntington 
does not deny the importance of political actors as independent forces, and this makes 
his approach more eclectic. He suggests that the prospect of successful democratic
48
consolidation depends upon the position of the previous power-holders in the post- 
transitional environment, as well as the determination of the new actors playing the 
game. In advancing this eclectic agenda, Huntington suggests examining both actors’ 
choices and the institutional context, within which choices are made. This is not to say 
that actors have choices with random outcomes of their decision-making, or that actors 
are equally likely to introduce any set of institutional designs. He implies that the 
difference in institutions is achieved by the relative power of actors involved in the 
process of institution building.
In summary, to understand the logic of the institutional approach of the late 1970s, one 
must emphasise the role of the hierarchical institutions that provide much needed 
structuration, constraints and opportunities for political forces. The overall stability of 
the system and, hence, prospects for democratisation (in case of the newly democratised 
states) depends upon the level of institutionalisation of the existing political 
infrastructure, which is aimed at popular mobilisation and the provision of 
representative channels for mass participation. The major drawback of this approach 
seems to be in the concept of ‘institutionalisation’ itself. As new democracies show little 
sign of further stabilisation, but prove nevertheless, sustainable, this posits the question 
as to whether ‘institutionalisation’ is essential for explaining party system development. 
Later theories attempted to surmount this controversy by differentiating degrees of 
institutionalisation in the new democracies. The new additions developed by O’Donnell 
(1993, 1994, 1996), Mainwaring (1994, 1999), Fish (1995), Moser (1995, 1998), Linz 
(1994, 1996), Shugart (1993, 1996) and others appeared to be even more eclectic than 
that of Huntington. Their approaches include analysis of the human factor as equally
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complementary (rather than contributory, according to Huntington) element in the 
process of regime institutionalisation.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) were captivated by the idea of the impact of the human 
factor on the institutional setting, and suggested that transitions from one regime to 
another occur due to the emergence of a schism between hard-liners and soft-liners. 
Thereafter, however, transition advances through a series of bargains between elites57 
adapting the institutional environment to their own needs. O’Donnell (1993), 
nevertheless, sees the institutional factor as the driving force of change, where the 
concept of the state58 becomes dominant. Accordingly, the state conflates three 
important dimensions that provide a functional background for the existing order - 
organisational/bureaucratic, legal and ideological. As mentioned previously, an 
ineffective state may result in a tendency for personalistic rule of precedence in regions, 
which is open to arbitrary practices and populism, and which does not allow party
57 This and the previous statements overlap with some postulates of the rational choice theory. The 
problem is that both approaches, the institutional and the rational choice, may be seen as closely related 
and complementary. However, in order to underline, what is the driving force in both theories, the author 
has placed them under the two different analytical frameworks, i.e. the structure- and the process-oriented 
respectively.
58 Theories of the state and its impact on transition increasingly develop. The mainstream contemporary 
studies include pluralism (Dunleavy and O’Leavy, (1987) Theories o f the State. London: Macmillan), 
elitism, especially corporatist studies (Cox, A. (1988) “The Old and New Testaments of Corporatism”, 
Political Studies, 36: 294-308); modem Marxism (Jessop, 1982; Skocpol, T. et al. (eds.) (1985) Bringing 
the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); the convergence theories (Etzini-Halevy 
(1993) The Elite Connection. Oxford: Polity Press).
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system institutionalisation59. The lack of a well-functioning state leads to power 
concentration and manipulation in the hands of powerful elite groups. This may be 
associated with the national leader, as in the case of Belarus, and rival elite groupings, 
as in case with Russia. In both cases ‘privatised’ power may formally allow legitimate 
forms of governance; directly elected politicians, and constitutionally written liberties. 
At the same time, these structures of power imply alienation of citizenry from the 
policy-making process, lack of transparency in the decision-making process, and low- 
level representation, which naturally impedes the process of party system settlement.
It is essential to note that the state in O’Donnell’s definition is a ‘modus operandV 
rather than a mere conglomerate of the three-dimensional constituents. He argues that in 
some cases, poorly organised states with high power concentration lead to unequal 
social protection and provision of citizenry with basic rights and freedoms. This, 
consequentially, may result in the system of informal rules and structures, which can be 
functional, but have no stimuli for system institutionalisation. The failure of the state to 
provide an efficient institutional framework may not directly affect the operation of the 
regime, but it definitely does not contribute to its stabilisation. The consequence of an 
ineffectual state combined with the process of regime transformation is long running 
and decisive. Depending on the mode of leadership, the state may serve as a benchmark 
or a stepping-stone to power institutionalisation or abuse. The consequences of the latter 
may be a dictatorial monopolisation of power, or power dispersion on regional levels in 
the form of ‘sultanistic’ governance. The country may well have a democratic regime or
59 The best examples of this kind of developments are Russia, and the other CIS, especially those where 
there has been little or no rotation of political elites in power.
51
at least the potential for one, but it cannot be a democratic state if it has weak law and 
informal infrastructure. In other words, the country may be described as democratic, if 
the conclusion is based on fagade features of regime, i.e. free elections, competitive 
parties, proclaimed liberties, and institutions of law and representation. This, however, 
may ‘successfully’ coexist with authoritarian governance and non-democratic policy­
making; and may eventually lead to a dictatorial state.
O’Donnell (1993, 1994) makes valuable points, which may be readily applied, to 
Belarus. Nevertheless, his institutionalism proves limited in explaining the role of the 
‘human factor’ in decision-making in post-communist politics. For example, the 
structural environment of Belarus presupposed a semi-parliamentary system with 
optimistic prospects for further institutionalisation. The president, however, altered this 
course, and eventually succeeded in introducing a system of a personal rule. This 
demonstrates strategic selectivity of decision-makers in a relatively structured 
environment. The role of political actors operating in uncertain and opportunistic 
institutional settings appeared to be as significant to democratic consolidation as 
institutions themselves.
Mainwaring (1993) offers a more balanced approach for the explanation of the process 
of building new democracies. He argues that:
...institutions create incentives and disincentives for political actors, shape actors’ 
identities, establish the context in which policy-making occurs, and can help or 
hinder in the construction of democratic regimes (1993: 198).
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This leads to the conclusion that despite the significance of the human factor, 
institutions still mould the system and dictate the mode of development for party 
politics. Interestingly, Juan Linz (1994), and Shugart and Carey (1992) arrived at a 
similar conclusion in their research of new democracies. However, in his later study of 
Brazil, Mainwaring (1999) uses a more complex approach that combines comparative 
macro-analysis, institutionalism, and rational choice. The first compares class structures, 
states, political regimes, and patterns of economic and political development across 
cases and time. This is complemented by historical institutionalism within which he 
believes “ ...institutions are relatively autonomous and are themselves important actors 
in political life” (1999: 7). He submits in conclusion that “ ...it is important to examine 
linkages between structural and ideational/cultural factors and formal institutions” in 
order to feature the new and versatile world (Mainwaring, 1997: 9).
In their study of institutional settings - presidential versus parliamentary democracies - 
in the new democracies, Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Shugart and Carey (1992), 
Shugart (1993, 1996, 1998) come to a common conclusion that institutions are 
important for providing a safe environment for the consolidation of democracy. This 
implies that whatever configuration of social forces the system may have, it is difficult 
to sustain democracy in the presidential system, and that it would have a greater chance 
of flourishing in a parliamentary system. As Linz argues:
The combination of presidentialism, a fragmented multiparty system, and 
undisciplined parties has made it difficult for presidents to function through party
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channels and has encouraged anti-party practices. It is not only personalities and 
political culture, but also political structures that explain why presidents have 
acted against parties (Linz, 1994: 36).
Shugart and Carey (1992) note that in Latin American democracies, there may be a 
correlation between weak parties and strong presidencies. They argue that inefficient 
legislatures made up of weak parties and egocentric politicians tend to delegate power to 
the president as a way of overcoming immobilism. When applied to Eastern Europe, 
Shugart suggests that communists, who were relatively powerful at the time when the 
institutions were chosen, particularly favoured strong presidencies. This was thought to 
control the legislature and to act as a brake on potentially unruly or unpredictable 
parliamentary delegates (Geddes, 1996:27). As evidence suggests, strong presidencies 
have entrenched in countries in which the president had the support of the strongest 
party and the legislature was relatively weak. Arend Lijphart (1996) in his analysis of 
Eastern European democracies suggests that strong presidentialism could also be a 
response to the uncertainty of the future and an attempt to secure stability. Belarus, 
however, demonstrates an exception to the rule when the presidency was sought by all 
political forces as a panacea from the fear of uncertainty and responsibility.
Stephen Fish’s (1995) study of party formation in the waning years of the Soviet regime 
demonstrated that in the context of formal institutional rules, which left considerable 
material power to the Communist Party and its successors and very little leeway for the 
entrenchment of other representative institutions, Gorbachov’s glasnosf and perestroika 
could only generate uncertainty and disparagement. In the aftermath of demokratizatsiya
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in 1991-1993, Yeltsin’s administration failed to make a realistic breakthrough whilst 
operating within the ‘old Soviet’ constitutional framework. Only after 1993, with 
changing institutional settings, had Russia definitely advanced on the path of 
democratisation. One, nevertheless, could be simultaneously optimistic and negative 
about Russia’s democratic future. As Fish argues, with the adoption of the new 
constitution, establishing the State Duma, which is elected through a mixed proportional 
representation and single-member district system, new prospects have opened up for 
Russia. The country, in his eyes, indeed developed ‘a genuine multiparty political 
system, albeit a fluid and inchoate one’ (1995b: 340). The environment, nevertheless, 
continues to be volatile and unpredictable, prone to extreme administrative centralism 
and autocratic leadership bequeathed by the former regime. The institutional 
environment appears not to allow Russia to irreversibly break away from the past, 
which takes effective decision-making and respective amendments within the structures. 
Hence, such occurrences as extreme political movements60, the rise and fall of one-day 
politicians, the superficiality of parties, and their paradoxical survivability in the highly 
unstable and detached electoral milieu, need more complex explanations than the merely 
institutional.
Robert Moser’s analysis of party system formation in Russia also underlines the 
importance of ‘new institutionalism’ (1998: 72). His findings suggest that the effect of 
electoral institutions is paramount to the consolidation of the political system. Russia’s
60 The movement of Russian National Unity [RNE, Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo] is the best example 
of this kind.
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plurality and PR single-member district electoral system have been exceedingly conducive 
to the effective presidential election of 1996. At the same time Moser states that:
.. .consolidating effects expected of majoritarian electoral systems operate only at 
the presidential level in Russia because of the undeveloped state of Russian political 
parties and their failure to recmit a country-wide network of well-known local 
candidates to contest elections in districts across the country (Moser, 1998:72).
Moser’s research suggests that there is a cross-national effect of various political 
structures. He states that consolidation of the party system in Russia is “ ...partly a 
consequence of electoral systems and [partly of] the political and social structure” 
(Moser, 1998: 73). Further institutionalisation is only possible through the combination 
of institutions and the conscious efforts of political elites and masses.
In conclusion, the neo-institutional approach offers a valuable comparative explanation 
of why the process of party system institutionalisation varies under certain institutional 
configurations. This highlights the controversial point of the theory: institutions reflect 
strategic actions of the agency by that enhancing the awareness of structures, and of the 
constraints/opportunities they impose. In other words, institutions provide the basis for 
further action, simultaneously being a result of this action -  a permissible environment 
for political actors. When ‘fixed’ into place, institutions tend to have a long-lasting 
effect on party system development, until the moment when they are improved by 
respective decisions. The principal disadvantage of this approach can be described as a 
‘chicken-egg’ dilemma: the contextualising role of institutions is quintessential, but
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nevertheless, they were brought into being by individuals, whose strategic actions 
initiated transition, and in addition keep them in motion.
2.1.2. The historical-structural approach61
Since the 1960s and especially after the influential work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
the cleavage-orientated approach, based on the analysis of social and political conflicts 
and legacies, has become dominant in the explanation of party system formation. It 
regards ‘cleavages’ as long-term structural divisions, which give rise to opposing 
opinions that competing political organisations represent. Obviously not all 
social/political divisions may produce cleavages, as well as not all cleavages may find 
their representation by political forces, especially in the new democracies. Nevertheless, 
once existing divisions have been electorally ‘mobilised’, they tend to have a profound 
effect on a structure of the party system, and the process of democratisation. Although, 
cleavages and legacies do not solely determine the outcome of transition, they do have a 
structuring impact on the course of events. Therefore, despite many challenges, in recent 
decades the ‘social cleavage’ approach remains important for studying party system 
formation.
In their analysis of the structure of party competition within west European countries, 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that political parties emerged in a form, which is 
decisively marked by primary social divisions as those democracies moved towards 
universal suffrage. They identified four basic ‘social cleavages’, which had been
61 This will be viewed from a cleavage-oriented perspective as central part of the structural framework.
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particularly important for determining the programmatic structuring of later party 
competition. These are:
a) the centre and periphery;
b) religious believers and secular citizens;
c) urban and rural strata;
d) capital and labour.
The particularly valuable asset of the theory is its historical outlook on existing party 
configurations. Lipset and Rokkan (Ibid: 2) argue that “ ...parties do not simply present 
themselves de novo to the citizens at each election; they each have a history and so have 
the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate”. This also helps to 
understand the mechanics of party system settlement, termed as the ‘freezing’ 
hypothesis, which includes encapsulation of political conflicts into the societal fabric by 
existing parties and full public mobilisation.
There is much controversy in studying party system formation based on cleavages, as 
the latter may not necessarily exist or be a formative basis for party political 
competition in the new democracies. In this respect three sub-approaches can be 
visualised within the historical structural analysis. The first sub-approach insists that 
there is no continuity with the past and hence, the role of cleavages must be limited and 
party formation slow and unstable in new societies. The second sub-approach suggests 
that even if historical linkages are broken, new cleavages can emerge in response to a 
highly controversial transient environment, and by that foment new party politics. The
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third approach submits that despite periods of war and totalitarianism, a brittle 
continuity with pre-authoritarian cleavages can be found, and this may offer a slow but 
certain impetus for party system development.
Within the first analytical tradition, Agh (1993, 1994), Kopecky (1995), and Mair
(1997) advocate little connection with the past in party political development, rather 
emphasising the sui generis nature of their emergence. Indeed, new East European 
democracies when compared to those in Spain, Portugal and Greece, are transitions, 
which show little tendency for settlement and “ .. .[are] still relatively weak and suffering 
from all kinds of infantile disorder” (Agh, 1993: 242). Supported by evidence of the 
extraordinary multiplicity of parties and their frequent dissolution and re-alignment, 
some scholars suggest that “ ...to build and maintain a stable electorate of loyal 
supporters, sharing the values and ideology of the party, they must look extremely 
demanding, if not impossible” (Kopecky, 1995: 519). This is however, not to conclude 
that the stabilisation of electoral behaviour is entirely impossible as the new party 
systems consolidate. It seems to be a long-term and far-reaching process of framing the 
political environment of Eastern Europe. Only a handful of newly enfranchised voters 
may have entered mass politics with pre-existing partisan loyalties. Civil societies are 
undeveloped, mass party politics are largely inchoate, and electoral markets are open 
and available. As Mair (1997:187) states, “ ...it seems plausible to conclude that, at least 
in the medium term, the post-communist democracies will be unlikely to develop strong 
cleavage structures...”, which implies limited prospects for party system stabilisation.
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Within the second tradition, Kitschelt (1992, 1995, 1997), Evans and Whitefield (1993, 
1998), Cotta (1994), Bielasiak (1997), and Markowski (1997, 1999) suggest that new 
profound conflicts may appear from the great variety of relationships existing in the re­
structuring societies, stipulated by the aftermath of the post-communist period. They 
may have the potential to stabilise the politics of given systems by anchoring party 
loyalties and polarising the party universe. As Kitschelt states:
...[the] economic institutions and resources that deceased communist systems 
bequeathed to the democratic successor regimes will have a powerful influence on 
emerging political preferences, interests, and party strategies (Kitschelt, 1992: 10).
Termed as a ‘middle-way’ theory, this approach implies intensive formation of cleavage 
structures, followed by party posturing and collective electoral response under the guise 
of deep social/political conflicts and controversies of transition. Bielasiak (1997: 26) for 
example, notes, “ ...[that] the absence of past cues and party loyalty as determinants of 
voting behaviour necessitates a novel determination of the issues that are most salient to 
the transition”. This implies that “ ...old structures and old struggles are being left 
behind, and from a multitude of new options, the political field is narrowing to a more 
manageable dimension” (Bielasiak, 1997: 41). To summarise, these scholars place the 
major emphasis on the role of contemporary cleavages, which do not reflect the 
conflicting ‘historicity’ of the full-suffrage period, but express the highly controversial 
issue agenda of transition societies.
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Maurizio Cotta (1994) offers a mixed approach to the cleavage-based emergence of 
party systems, which can be seen as a two-step inquiry. First, he states that pre­
communist party systems do not provide the relevant background for the formation of 
new party systems; and their legacies are on the whole marginal (Cotta: 1994). A new 
regime cannot merely resume on the basis of the existing pre-authoritarian cleavages. 
Non-democratic and post-communist periods may be more stimulating for party system 
formation. They may either provide favourable conditions for the survival of the 
previously dominant party or foment the emergence of an ‘illegal’ opposition or multi­
interest politics. As Cotta (Ibid: 118) states, “...new parties can develop on the basis of 
[existing] conflicts that have the potential for sustaining a broad and durable political 
mobilisation”.
Accordingly, Evans and Whitefield (1993: 535) argue that in the absence of well- 
formed party loyalties, single issues and present social divisions associated with them 
may be the focus for party mobilisation. Voters’ identification with parties that follow a 
single-issue agenda may facilitate a tendency for the party system to eventually 
consolidate. As Evans and Whitefield comment:
...even though in many cases these parties were still in their infancy, they may 
have provided electors with a way of understanding political disputes and a basis 
for voting decisions (Evans and Whitefield, 1993: 535).
It is also suggested that market experience, ethnicity and security of nationhood may 
intensify the emergent patterns of social cleavages, along which political parties
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compete. In most transitional countries, they insist, marketisation is more likely to 
polarise the citizenry, and therefore, to . .provide a plurality of political identities from 
which parties can derive stable support” (Ibid: 522).
In a similar vein, Kitschelt (1995: 448) argues that “ .. .it is plausible to question whether 
post-communist party systems organise around lasting lines of conflict that are based on 
rival political programmes and value commitments”, or simply around clientelistic 
favours and people’s personal attraction to a topic field. This suggests that the existence 
of manifest incentives at the early stage of post-communist democratisation may be of 
greater salience than profound divisions of interests for motivating people to vote and 
binding them to a party.
The emergence of programmatic parties, along clear-cut divides, and with strong 
collective identities, is costly. This requires that voters possess cognitive skills and the 
ability to make an intelligible choice between competitive party alternatives. Kitschelt
(1995) believes that this led some scholars to deny the possibility of programmatic party 
competition and post-communist democratic consolidation in the future62. In contrast, he 
asserts that it is highly plausible for post-communist countries to develop 
programmatically structured party competition over time, due to the salience of 
transitional conflicts, based on certain pre-conditions63. These conditions may vary
62 This is the actual meaning of the tabula rasa approach, articulated by Mair (1997) and others.
63 These conditions for party programmatic structuring include the following variables: (1) pre-communist 
heritage: (i) timing, profile and extent of economic development and (ii) inter-war democratic experience; (2) 
patterns of communist mle: (i) communist regime mode and (ii) mode of democratic transition; (3) democratic
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across time and space, and hence, differently influence the speed of party formation. 
According to Kitschelt, the ‘system time’ variables, i.e. the length of the electoral game 
and democratic experience, as well as the number of effective parties, most immediately 
correlate with party system settlement.
In their recent work Kitschelt et al. (1999) suggest using a more complex approach. This 
includes historical legacies as well as actors’ strategic choices, inasmuch as the former 
cannot fully explain the process of party formation in new democracies. They (Ibid: 19) 
state, “ ...legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors 
to define their interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power”. 
Simultaneously, they insist that choices of political actors also matter. Actors have to 
make decisions under conditions of great uncertainty, because unique constellations of 
institutions and transient conditions make it difficult for participants to define their 
preferences and select more advantageous strategies to outplay their opponents. Thus, 
more recently Kitschelt et al. (1999) have taken a more flexible view in order to 
understand and explain the unpropitious societal environment for building a strong party 
system in the new democracies.
Finally, the historical approach pursued by Rose and Urwin (1970), Bartolini and Mair 
(1990), Rivera (1996), suggests that there is both uniqueness and continuity in the 
development of party systems when compared with the past. This approach relies on a 
substantive evaluation of the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) thesis of party system
institutions, i.e. the structure of (i) executive power and (ii) electoral system; and finally (4) number of effective 
parties and number of elections run after the collapse of communism (Kitschelt, 1995:454)
63
formation. Emphasis is placed on a continuity of cleavage structures, which will persist 
and regain their strength and influence over party development after a non-democratic 
period. This continuity is conditioned by the degree of conflict encapsulation in society, 
which cannot be simply replaced by change of political discourse, and will find a means 
to be expressed by political forces.
To recapitulate, the main thesis of the historical-structural approach is that emerging 
party competition is stipulated by political conflicts that either revived or emerged de 
novo in transition, by that framing possible directions of party system developments. 
The speed of, and the potential for, structuring cleavage-based parties vary widely 
across post-communist countries, depending on their historical and institutional 
conditions.
New research and developments in party politics in emerging democracies have 
demonstrated that cleavages have effect on party system consolidation. However, it 
appears to have limited reference to past structures, and is not an influential basis for 
present party configurations. Kay Lawson’s (1999) research of East Central Europe 
concludes that it is possible to identify clear-cut cleavages in the earlier histories of new 
European nations, although most of these received only limited partisan representation 
and did not endure. There has been little or no freezing effect: the twentieth-century 
wars and totalitarianism destroyed the foundations for the emergence of new 
oppositional politics. This research demonstrates that in the majority of new 
democracies, existing political divisions appear to play a limited role in determining the 
formation of new parties. She nevertheless, notes that one division seems to exist
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everywhere, unambiguously assuming the guise of a true cleavage. That is between the 
minority, who benefit from transition and the majority who are not benefiting and want 
to maintain or re-establish some measures of pre-transitional social security. Parties 
seek to reassure the majority, but in office they tend to follow, out of faith to its eventual 
efficacy or hope of personal gain, the will of the minority (Lawson, 1999, Chapter 2).
In summary, the conclusion of many contemporary scholars in relation to historical- 
structural theory is that it does not fully correspond to post-authoritarian and post- 
totalitarian realities. Such scholars as Lawson, et al. (1999), Kitschelt et al. (1999) and 
Mainwaring (1999) observe, that parties in the new democracies do not form necessarily 
in response to structured cleavages, but for the chance of gaining power. The major 
cleavage -  conservative vis-a-vis reformist -  shapes neither the party system nor the 
parties' programmes in or out of power; and voters have no clear-cut partisan home.
Nevertheless, the cleavage approach is still informative for the analysis of new systems, 
as it provides an insightful standpoint for the formation of political oppositions, and 
emerging social divisions. For example, structural analysis of Belarus, explains the 
evolution of the party spectrum and the principal undercurrents of party politics between 
1990-1996 at the outset of transition. It also may be useful for transcending the impact 
and consequences of the emerging divide in the ‘outsider’ countries, such as Belarus, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and other members of the CIS. It primarily relates to the existence of 
mixed identities (pro-European vis-a-vis Slavic) amongst the CIS, and their prospects
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for development and democratic consolidation64. Their contemporary policy-making 
placed crucial emphasis on strategical programmes for the oppositional sides, and may 
well form the basis of political competition in the future. Nevertheless, the cleavage- 
based approach cannot solely define, why a strong presidency, for example, outplayed 
existing factional divisions within the 1996 parliament; or why super-presidentialism 
has endured despite the efforts of the opposition and a suitable cleavage background in 
Belarus. This therefore requires methodological broadening.
2.1.3 The cultural approach
The cultural approach emphasises differences in the social and historical conditions of 
the new democracies. In application to the CIS this assumes the influence of past Soviet 
traditions and East European mentality, and the strength of civil society in explaining 
diverse forms of democratic transition and the pace of democratisation in the newly 
emerged states. Gabriel Almond (1956: 396), a pioneer of the cultural approach, defined 
political culture -  the key element of the cultural approach -  as “a particular pattern of 
orientations to political action”, a “set of meanings and purposes” within which every 
political system operates. Political culture therefore refers to beliefs, values, and 
expressive symbols, which convey the ethos of a given culture.
64 See Chapter 1 for more detailed discussion.
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The notable work belongs to Gibson and Duch, Inglehart, Schopflin, Johnson, Toka, 
Sakwa, and others65. They all base their analysis on the assumption that cultural context 
is paramount for understanding contemporary curves in democracy building of the 
newly emerged states. Many of them are not surprised by the politics of extremism, 
ephemeral parties, short-lived populists and despondent electorates. They regard present 
developments as one of many political indicators of crisis, in cultural identity and 
doctrine of living, left by the collapse of socialism, prolonged totalitarianism and 
limited democratic experience. From this perspective, the post-communist milieu is a 
‘genesis environment’, in which no stable frameworks for orienting social actions exist, 
and in which therefore, as Jowitt states (1992), “ .. .wholly unprecedented forms of social 
organisation may eventually emerge”. In addition, the legacy of cynicism, alienation 
and despair inspired by decades of communist rule have left the post-Soviet public 
largely unfamiliar with the western norm of civic participation and tolerance, and highly 
susceptible to demagogic and charismatic appeals. Focus on cultural factors may 
explain why there are so many political parties that form and disappear. Party instability 
simply reflects the general post-communist confusion about political loyalties, disarray
65 Gibson and Duch (1994) “Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy”, Political Research 
Quarterly, 47; Ronald Inglehart (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton 
University Press; Rasma Karklins (1994) “Explaining regime change in the Soviet Union”, Europe Asia 
Studies (46): 29-45; Schopflin (1993) Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 
Johnson (1992) ‘Some thoughts on democracy and its cultural context’, Ethnic and International Affairs 
6: 41-55; Jowitt (1996) ‘Dizzy with democracy’, Problems o f Post-Communism 43 (1); Sakwa, R. (1998) 
‘Left or right: CPRF and democratic consolidation’, in Lowenhardt (ed) Party Politics in Post-communist 
Russia. London: Frank Cass; White, A (1999) Democratisation in Russia under Gorbachev 1985-1991: 
the Birth o f a Voluntary Sector. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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and uncertainty of the future66. Richard Sakwa underlines the following features of the 
‘Soviet culture’ as influential:
This syncretic ‘communism of transition’ is oriented towards the state and has few 
authentic roots in the transformative processes in society, yet it gives voice to the 
suffering of millions and by grouping its programme in an idiom that responds to 
the traditions and needs of a large part of a disoriented society (Sakwa, 1998: 154).
A major issue for cultural theorists is the involvement of civil society, which is deemed 
to be modus viviendi for the new state. It encompasses issues of mass politicisation and 
public participation in national life. Civil society is argued to be an arena of politically 
active citizens that orders their relations according to the system of law (Kumar, 1996).
Defined as a polity of self-organised groups of individuals that are relatively 
autonomous from the state and attempt to advance their interests by assembling into 
organisations and solidarities, civil society, thus, reinforces the ‘human’ side of 
transitional process. The idea of civil society is to involve interested individuals into 
policy-building and the decision-making process of the state. Its capacity also extends to 
the level of people’s mobilisation in an attempt to express their support or opposition 
and challenge to the established regime.
66 The emerging philosophy of the outsider countries, noted by White, S., Light, M., and Lowenhardt, J. 
in their research of cultural identities amongst the populace and elites in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and 
Moldova, seems to be fundamentally rooted in their cultural predisposition towards the expanding
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Some scholars suggest distinguishing civil society from political society, as a 
democratic setting is specifically arranged to contest the legitimate right of exercising 
control over public power and the state apparatus (Linz and Stefan, 1996:8). They argue 
that civil society may challenge regimes, whereas political society aims at creating 
conditions for regime composition and consolidation. This involves activity of those 
core institutions of a democratic political society — political parties, elections, rules, 
leadership, inter-party alliances, and legislatures — by which society constitutes itself 
politically, in order to choose and monitor democratic government. On the other hand, 
the segregation of societies into politically active and socially oriented has no particular 
importance during the early stages of democratisation, as both might be either nascent 
or non-existent legacies of the pre-democratic period.
The mode of political participation, its patterns and symbolic meaning prior and during 
regime change determines the pace of democratic transition. Yet the roots of political 
participation and the potential for voters’ mobilisation lie within civil society, and in the 
norms, values and attitudes held by ordinary citizens. Understanding the role of 
opposition, the necessity of democratic institutions in sustaining the balance of power, 
and the articulation of political tolerance and dissent, forms the basis for the emergence 
of pluralistic and institutionalised political system.
international environment, and structural/cultural dependence on Moscow-centred policy-making. See 
Chapter 1 for more details.
69
It is, however, questionable whether new democratic states could accommodate a 
delicate balance between mass political involvement and a growing apathy and despair 
among the general population. Cultural theorists attempt to delineate perspectives for 
national democratisation by analysing social and historical pre-dispositions of a given 
country. The legacy of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe seems to 
have left little incentive for developing a civil society. The practice of democratic 
centralism and pervasive state control has resulted in a political environment in which 
little value was attached to personal opinion, diversity, dissent and political tolerance — 
prerequisites for the emergence of a pluralistic political system.
There are, however, two opposing views submitted regarding the development of 
political participation during Soviet times that accordingly influence an understanding 
of the prospects of democratisation. The first interprets political participation as largely 
consistent with the style of authoritarian or totalitarian system, i.e. existence of popular 
involvement, associated with coercion, conformist and regime-directed mobilisation. 
Mass mobilisation, however, had a generally alienated and depoliticised character, to the 
extent that people’s formal acts of participation, such as voting in elections, or their 
membership of work-related groups, had only a symbolic or career-oriented meaning 
and conveyed little about their true sense of loyalty and attachment to political system 
(Gitelman, 1992). An alternative view (Bahry, 1987; Friedgut, 1979) is that political 
participation was far more complex than it may have appeared on the surface. At the 
individual level, participation fulfilled a variety of social and political needs, and at the 
aggregate level it met essential systemic requirements, providing a degree of elite 
responsiveness to policy issues -  the basis for stability. There is little doubt that in the
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previous regime formal voting acts had had few consequences for the political system. 
There have been, however, considerable debates about the nature and form of other 
types of political participation. At the local level, citizens could have made their own 
choices about the composition of various interest groups.
With democratisation, the political system and civil society offer new opportunities for 
mass participation. Bahry (1987: 841) argues that the patterns of civil society and 
political mobilisation uncovered on the eve of democratisation may well develop at the 
local level, while activism at the aggregate level may remain limited to a smaller 
number of citizens. Transitions are characterised by a release of mass energy, as well as 
a great potential for mass mobilisation. Democratisation, nevertheless, depends on 
whether emerging institutions can provide a respective arena for realisation and 
alteration of cultural cliches. If there are no adequate representative mechanisms for 
channelling public needs, people’s collective choices may become deconstructive or 
apathetic allowing the emergence of delegative politics. In the words of Larry Diamond:
...civil society must play a significant role in building and consolidating 
democracy. Its role is not decisive... However, the more active, pluralistic, 
resourceful, and institutionalised is civil society, the more effectively it balances 
the tensions with the state (Diamond, 1994:16).
Johnson and others have modified John Locke’s standard notion of civil society and 
suggest that emphasis should be made on “ .. .the protection and / or self organisation of 
social life in the face of totalitarian or authoritarian state” (Johnson, 1992: 45). He (Ibid:
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46) argues that civil society is created in opposition to the government in order to 
sustain a balance in society, and hence, it depends on mutually reinforcing patterns of 
responsibility and interconnectedness. This implies that for the creation of a democratic 
society there must first be a democratic culture, and in this culture there exists 
independent, free associational groupings. It is, therefore, a phenomenon that arises 
from the community as a whole rather than being imposed by a particular elite, or 
directed by certain institutional settings. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly difficult to 
prioritise attention in explaining some extraordinary occurrences in the course of 
development of new democratic states. As cultural theorists suggest it is important to 
understand the context in which political society operates. Ronald Inglehart explains his 
‘culturalist’ position as follows:
People have a variety of needs and tend to give a high priority to those, which are in 
short supply. This concept is similar to that of marginal utility of the consumer in 
economic theory. But it is complemented by another equally important hypotheses: 
that people tend to retain a given set of value priorities throughout adult life, once it 
has been established in their formative years (Inglehart, 1990: 249).
In a similar vein, Gabor Toka argues that democratic consolidation may not require 
systemic variables like ‘hyper-institutionalised’ parties: “The quality of democracy is a 
great enough stake to justify the development of a strong party system even if that 
would not contribute much to the consolidation of democracy” (1997:62). For example, 
newly democratised states of East Central Europe are generally regarded as no less 
institutionalised than some consolidated democracies in Latin America (Chile,
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Venezuela, Argentina, etc.). Toka (Ibid: 62) argues that “ ...laying the stress on 
‘democracy’ rather than on ‘consolidation’ suggests different priorities”. It attaches 
greater importance to societal forces and ideological ‘readiness’ of political actors to 
follow their beliefs. Thus, he continues, that ideological polarisation in society may 
compensate for lesser institutionalisation. In order to test his proposition, Toka 
examined the undercurrents of choices of those voters who displayed relatively long 
lasting loyalties to parties in the new democracies. It appeared that voters, who relate 
their party preferences to attitudes of issues, are the least likely to change their party 
choice over time. Other factors, such as style of organisations, party fragmentation, 
degree of stability of inter-party competition, or institutional background paradoxically 
appeared to be less important for determining the level of democratic consolidation. 
This speaks more about the ‘quality of democracy’, which may survive “ ...in the 
absence of relatively cohesive and persistent parties” (Toka, 1997: 31), provided that 
civil society is ready to receive democratic change. Toka notes that parties are more 
likely to be by-product of democratic development rather than its creators. This may 
explain why election outcomes in some advancing democracies may be volatile and 
sudden, inciting the rise of new actors and disappearance of the old, and nevertheless, 
not jeopardising national prospects for democratisation.
The cultural approach operates within a historical framework, and offers explanations of 
why contemporary political development occurs in one way rather than another. It, 
nevertheless, gives little consideration to the system perspectives under strategic action 
and transformative decision-making of the agency. This leads to the central downfall of 
this tradition. Its practitioners appear to forget that culture is the product of many and
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various influences, and that its use as an explanatory variable should never be other than 
that of an intervening, complementary factor. The actual relationship between the 
normative order and political or social or economic structure is likely to be one of 
mutual reinforcement over time, and this interaction makes it hard to decide which, if 
any, factor is most important. Political culture must form part of any explanation of the 
performance of political systems, but eventually one must analyse how cultural 
orientation came to be formed.
In summation, the above three approaches have been examined within the structure- 
oriented analytical perspective, which offers a great number of positive arguments and 
emphasises the primordial influence of ‘structural’ factors, such as legacies, cleavages, 
institutions and cultural traditions. They undoubtedly set the context for democracy 
building, but not directly and solely determine its outcome. As Dalton (1988:128) notes 
“...contemporary party politics stands in the shadow of past events”. One may still 
question not the validity but the sufficiency of the ‘structure-oriented’ framework. 
Individually these theories cannot capture the full diversity of the developing regimes, 
which are also much dependent on agency, collective strategy and contingency factors. 
The advantages of this framework will be integrated further into a complex ‘structure- 
agency’ methodology.
2.2 The process-oriented framework
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Another analytical tradition - the process-oriented approach - views the mode of 
transition and its outcomes as path-dependent and subject to a variety of opportunities 
and availability of means. Huntington eclectically notes:
.. .a democratic regime is installed, not by trends, but by people. Democracies are 
created not by causes but by causers. The motives of political leaders are varied 
and variables, mixed and mysterious, and often unclear to themselves. Leaders 
may produce democracy because they believe democracy is the end in itself, 
because they see it as a means to other goals, or because democracy is by-product 
of their pursuit of other goals (Huntington, 1991:116).
Within this tradition, rational choice theory, including elite decision-making67, and path- 
dependent analysis will be critically analysed. The former sees political actors (elites, 
interest organisations, individuals) as responding rationally to the opportunities 
provided by formal institutional settings within a given social environment. The latter 
suggests that implications of transition are the matter of contingent collective choice of 
strategies.
The process-oriented approach is based on the assumption that:
67 There are many directions that contemporary elite theory takes, and, hence, only a summary view will 
be presented here. Most notable works are power elite studies (Wright Mills, 1956) which look at closed 
policy networks and contingent elite circulation; revisionist pluralism (Dahl, 1958; 1971), which focuses 
on multiple pressure groups and their bargaining role in policy-making; corporatism studies (Schmitter, 
1979; Cox, 1988;) centred on state-group intermediation; and neo-corporatism (Held, 1991; Birch, 1993) 
which places the emphasis on identifying powerful social and economic interests in policy networks.
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...the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected 
events, insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about 
motives and interests, plasticity and even in-definition of political identities as 
well as talents of specific individuals are frequently decisive in determining 
outcomes (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986: 5).
2.2.1 The rational choice theory
The key concept of this approach rests on the idea of ‘crafting’ (Di Palma, 1990), which 
implies a purposful set of actions undertaken by political actors in order to initiate 
trasformation of a political regime. ‘Crafting’ democracies is a creative process that 
demonstrates the domination of the human factor in the process of polity transformation. 
The major elements of political crafting include coalition building, forging 
compromises and making commitments, mobilising electoral support, and inspiring 
adequate public perceptions. Regardless of national context, the emphasis in this 
approach is made on the fact that the change of regime is not only subject to the 
mechanical influence of structures, institutions and traditions. It is rather a process of 
creation in which relevant structures and institutions are reciprocally involved.
A growing body of literature is dedicated to the process of ‘crafting’ of the new 
democracies (Rose and Mackie, 1988; Rose and Mishler, 1996; Pridham, 1995; Higley 
et al. 1998; Lijphart, 1996; Collier, 1991 and other). Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter 
argue that:
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...searching for the causes of democracy from probabilistic associations with 
economic, social, cultural, psychological or international factors has not so far 
yielded any general law of democratisation, nor is it likely to do so in the near 
future, despite the recent proliferation of cases (Philippe and Schmitter, 1991: 
269-284).
Hence, they reject the quest for “ .. .a set of unique and identical conditions” in favour of 
“ ...a contingently sensitive understanding” of political-cum-economic interaction of 
actors, subsequently reflected in structures and institutions (Philippe and Schmitter, 
1991: 270). Their process-oriented approach seeks to generalise the ways, in which 
variations in the mode of democratic transition shape democratic outcomes.
There are two principal elements within rational choice theory, which determine the 
course of action in the newly emerged states. These are elite decision-making and 
electors’ strategic acting in the process of system institutionalisation. As Rose and 
Mishler surmise:
.. .if people cannot elect politicians to represent their views, then the regime may 
be effective but it is not democratic. However, a regime in which elected leaders 
are weak risks being an ineffectual, broken-back democracy (Rose and Mishler, 
1996:224).
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The most notable efforts in the direction of elite analysis and electors’ strategic choice 
belong to John Higley et al. (1989, 1998) - the elite compromise approach; Barbara 
Geddes and Arend Lijphart (1996) - the rational institutional choice; Adam Przeworski 
(1991; 1996) - the decentralised strategic choice model; and Claus Offe (1991) - the 
economic ratio model68.
In its original form rational choice theory was somewhat complementary to the neo- 
institutional framework, accounting for the reciprocal influence of both institutional 
factors and individuals, as well as the role of elites in the process of polity building. The 
principal assumptions relate to utility maximization, the structure of preferences, 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty, and, more broadly, the centrality of 
individuals in the explanation of collective outcomes (Green and Shapiro, 1994). 
Traditionally the ‘rational choice’ approach was seen within economic theories that 
operated by categories of costless mobilisation, self-interest and sufficient information 
(Downs, 1957; Robertson, 1976; McLean, 1991; Budge and Keman, 1993; and so on)69. 
As Green and Shapiro assert:
68 There are obviously many other directions of elite study. The above-mentioned, in author’s view, more 
adequately reflect the task outlined in this research -  to explore the impact of structures, institutions and 
decisions on the party formation in a transient society. The role of elite decision-making is subject to 
discussion in this chapter.
69 Full description can be found in Downs, A. (1957) Economic Theory o f Democracy. Addison-Wesley 
Publishers; Robertson, D. (1976) A Theory o f Party Competition; McLean, I. (1989) Democracy and New 
Technology. Cambridge: Polity Press, etc.
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...rational choice theorists agree on an instrumental conception of individual 
rationality, by reference to which people are thought to maximise their expected 
utilities in formally predicted ways (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 17).
Recent contributions extended the ‘economic-oriented’ view in the direction of voting 
behaviour, societal co-operation and leadership analyses applied to the new regimes.
Rational choice theory was initially conceived as an economic-oriented model. Despite 
the multiplicity of various approaches where rational choice theory is used as a key 
methodology, they all have a common departure point that can be summarised as 
follows. First, rational behaviour is typically identified with ‘maximisation of some 
sort’ (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 14). Second, there should be some consistency in the 
rational action, when ‘individual units act in conformity with some rational pattern’ 
(Ibid: 14). Third, rational choice theorists routinely assume that each individual 
maximises the expected value of his own payoff, measured on some utility scale (Ibid: 
15). Fourth, there is a widespread agreement among rational choice theorists that the 
relevant maximising agents are individuals, through which collective outcomes must be 
explained. No matter what collectivity is involved in the real world -  party, bureaucratic 
agency, state -  actors of the game are treated as super individuals, with one set of goals 
and outlooks that can be described as, “ .. .selfish maximization of gains and reduction of 
losses” (Downs, 1957). Fifth, they assume the existence of a sufficient informative 
framework for the operation of political actors.
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Ian Budge (1993) and Hans Keman (1993) have attempted to widen the pure rational 
economic outlook of democratic development and apply it to the political science of 
newly established states. They also suggest that rationality has some moral 
connotations: “ ...to recognise someone as rational is to recognize that his/her choices 
are considered ones worthy and ethical” (Budge 1993:89). Downs’ (1957) initially 
argued that parties competing for voters could array themselves by means of policy 
pronouncements on a range of alternatives along a left-right continuum. They sought to 
be situated as close as possible to major concentrations of electors. This implies that 
parties, in principle, could alter their placements on the continuum in order to attract 
voters, because they are exclusively motivated by a desire to win office. In contrast, 
Keman et al (Ibid: 94) argue that this does not normally happen with political actors, 
especially during the early stages of popular mobilisation. Whatever desire for office 
they may have, political leaders are also attached to their party’s ideological stances, 
presumably by the same rational token and in order to be identified by voters in the 
long-term. In addition, electors may also act rationally seeking continuing articulation 
by parties on some timely and specific issues. Uncertainty, along with party 
competition, makes parties’ actions moderate and ‘fuzzy’ referring to the context of 
limited institutional environment. Vice versa, a more structured environment may 
heighten immoderation and benefit-seeking opportunities. To put it differently, as 
Geddes notes:
...those who make the changes... that is, the members of roundtables, constituent 
assemblies, and legislatures...pursue their own individual interests above all else, 
and that their interests centre on furthering their political careers.... The extreme
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fluidity of the East European political context does not preclude explanations 
based on individual interests of politicians, but it does require incorporating 
timing into the explanation (Geddes, 1996:18-9).
Josep Colomer (1995) offers a rather different interpretation of rational choice theory in 
his analysis of the Spanish model of democracy. He submits a supportive argument 
highlighting the complementary nature of neo-institutionalism to rational choice theory:
[Democratic] consolidation does not mean that democratic institutions are socially 
efficient, but simply defines a situation in which, given the bargaining strength of 
the political actors, none of them find it advantageous to risk new political 
changes of the rules of the game (Colomer, 1995: 125).
Colomer acknowledges that after applying a rational choice framework, his research 
outcomes received more meaning and value:
A framework defined by the analysis of decision-making as derived rational 
calculations, the relevance of institutional constraints, and attention to the 
frequently unintended consequences of actors’ choices has proved very useful for 
explaining real behaviour of voters, parties, governments and other policy-makers 
in a democratic regime (Colomer, 1995: 125).
He summarises that newly established institutions demonstrate a high degree of ‘path- 
dependence’, or in other words, dependence on negotiations and compromises between
81
rational actors of the transitional political game. As the by-products of rational choice, 
institutions in turn determine strategic behaviour:
...frequent logrolling among parties, shifting coalitions without elections, 
migrations of representatives to groups different to those by which they were 
elected, and non-representative power distributions within institutions (Colomer, 
1995: 128).
Hence, one may conclude that the rational choice of individuals is bound to the existing 
institutional setting, which in itself was constructed by their rational behaviour.
In summary, this approach offers the major point for discussion -  the impact of 
decisions and collective strategies on structurally constrained environment. This is to 
say that (i) politicians have ideological as well as office-seeking motivations. They will 
not say or do anything to serve their immediate advantage, which can totally repudiate 
their long-term rationale. What is uppermost in a particular situation depends on 
circumstances, however ideological and strategic motivations are never absent, (ii) This 
can effectively be applied to electors who aim at seeking immediate benefits from the 
operating system and cast their votes in accordance with their rationale, and approval of 
the leadership.
The new generation of scholars of rational choice theory offer a rather different outlook 
focusing mainly on elite theory, and underlining the importance of political consensus 
and co-operation in contemporary decision making. In their collection of studies Higley
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and Burton (1989) address the issue of elite compromise, which is seen as, “ ...the 
essential precondition for consolidating democracy” as well as, “ ...a parsimonious way 
to confront the complex reality of multiple causation” (Ibid: 339). The roots for elite 
compromise are sought as a process of ‘elite settlement’ and ‘elite convergence’, which 
are in turn linked to historical legacies of conflict, traditional echelons of leadership, and 
economic prosperity. As Karen Remmer (1995) notices, the variables that may give rise 
to elite consensual unity are not well elaborated and conditions under which elite 
consensus leads to democracy are not yet specified. Nevertheless, the resultant 
framework highlights the importance of elite consensus and co-operation, based on a 
rational choice between opportunities and constraints, of which the decision making 
process is part.
2.2.2 The path-dependent approach: a middle-way approach
This methodological approach appears to be difficult to define within either the 
structure-oriented or the process-oriented perspectives, as it includes elements of both: 
institutional settings and decision-making. It can be equally termed as a ‘middle way’ 
theory, as it offers a dual view of reality: (i) from a decision-making perspective 
circumscribed by, (ii) a structure of constraints and opportunities, where the main role 
belongs to the factor of contingency. As long as the leading part of this approach relates 
to the decision-making process, which takes place in unknown and often unpredictable 
circumstances, it seems to be better described within a process-oriented tradition. This 
approach provides the relevant grounding for an introduction to the complex analysis of 
Belarus’ party system.
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Adam Przeworski (1991) offers an abstract formula for understanding the diversity of 
conditions associated with building of party system and democracy. He defines 
democracy as “ ...a  system of ruled open-endness, or organised uncertainty”, and 
addresses the issue of democratic sustainability in terms of contingent collective choice 
and decentralised strategic compliance. He believes that political democracy is not the 
political system of a particular level or historical pattern of development, but a 
consensual framework or co-operative equilibrium between rationally acting elites, 
available institutional arrangements and the political choice of electors, and can be 
achieved in a variety of ways. As Przeworski continues:
What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular 
system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives... A 
regime does not collapse unless and until some alternative is organised in such a 
way as to present a real choice for isolated individuals... If legitimacy is in fact 
efficacious in maintaining a particular regime, it is precisely because it constitutes 
organised consent (Przeworski, 1991: 51-3).
Przeworski stresses that in order to understand transitions to democracy it is important 
to define them as a process of creating specific institutions with their effects upon the 
capacity of various groups to realise their interests. The important fact is that individuals 
create these institutions during the process of collective bargaining. One can find 
Przeworski’s approach rather eclectic, as he continues emphasising the co-operative 
influence of structures and agency, contextualised in time.
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He raises a debate about legacies and prospects of system consolidation. Przeworski 
finds little connection between the modality of transition and the features of the 
emerging regime (1991: 94-99). In his opinion, democratic consolidation entails a new 
process and distinct dynamics that differentiates it not only from the former regime but 
also from the transitional process. Stable party and economic systems, thus, emerge as 
by-products of transition rather than its initiators. Once established, the durability of 
new regimes depends upon their economic ‘performance’ and:
.. .profound economic reforms must be undertaken if there is to be any hope that 
the deterioration in living conditions experienced by many nascent democratic 
countries will ever cease (Przeworski, 1991: 189).
Przeworski addresses this problem in terms of the attitudes of three types of actors -  
politicians, technocrats, and the voting population -  and their resulting choice of 
strategies. What emerges as the optimal strategy, however, is the adoption of reform 
programmes, regardless of electorate support. This naturally does not bring a desirable 
equilibrium to society, and a new formula is required. Przeworski pessimistically 
acknowledges that the factors conducive to such an optimising policymaking style do 
not appear to be present in most new democracies.
Barbara Geddes (1996) begins her rational choice theory by stating that neither the 
commonly used neo-institutional approach nor economic explanations of the 
institutional changes are relevant or sufficient for understanding transitions in Eastern
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Europe and Latin America. Her principal assumption is that democratic policy reflects 
elite decision-making in the institutionally shaped environment that requires 
‘incorporation of timing’ inn the explanation (Geddes, 1996: 91).
By ‘timing’ she implied first of all a set of pre-existing institutional arrangements that 
have been negotiated/chosen by certain decision-makers. Furthermore, democratic 
transitions must not be viewed as either purely people’s strategic choice on the one 
hand, or a favourable set of institutions on the other. It is a combination of factors that 
advances elite power, reinforced by a set of structural circumstances that have made 
negotiations possible:
Where decision makers can best assure their own personal security and 
advancement by using funds efficiently to implement programs or by hiring 
experts and following their advice, they will do so. Where they can best further 
their own interests by exchanging the resources under their control for political 
support or by simply appropriating them, they will do this (Geddes, 1996:19).
Drawing upon game theory, historical evidence and comparative data analysis, Geddes
(1996) argues that the dilemma confronted by politicians is essentially a collective 
action problem. Its solution depends on a specific set of democratic institutions and 
reform initiatives. Arend Lijphart notes in a similar line with Geddes that:
.. .the consolidation of democracy is governed by the logic of mobilisation. The 
political context of a new democracy renders the mobilisation of those affected by
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economic liberalisation more likely because of the lowering costs of political 
action in relation to the case in the pre-democratic period. Moreover, new 
democracies create incentives for entrepreneurship, for in the new political 
conditions labour and political activists must secure and organise social and 
political forces. Economic liberalisation presents them with an inventory of 
grievances that easily translates into a political agenda (Lijphart, 1996: 236).
In other words, a combination of economic factors, collective strategic choices and 
political leadership can present enough incentives for democracy to consolidate. 
However, this is only possible when some advancement has been achieved in the 
institutional settings of a given socio-political milieu.
In a similar vein, Claus Offe (1991) advances a proposition that new democracies have 
to undergo a ‘triple transition’ -  a process, which involves not just democratisation and 
enhancement of a collective strategic choice; but also marketisation and wholesale 
economic transformation. Hence, one must traverse three crucial stages in the process, 
which, as Offe (1991: 867) points out, “ ...were mastered over a centuries-long sequence 
in the case of the ‘normal’ western European countries.”
He concludes with a somewhat pessimistic prognosis regarding the establishment of 
consolidated regimes in Eastern Europe. His logic renders the sequence of formative 
measures that should be undertaken by a newly emerged state to promote democracy. 
First, a market economy must be introduced, however, this has to be set in motion only 
under pre-democratic conditions. “Only a developed market economy produces the
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social structural conditions for stable democracy and makes it possible to form 
compromises within the framework of what is perceived a positive-sum game” (1991: 
881). However, the introduction of marketisation is a political project, which may not be 
necessarily successful, and may not acquire enough public legitimacy. As he stresses, 
this is where problems begin, and where every theory of transition including rational 
choice strategy, must fail. His argument also emphasises the importance of the duality 
of structure-agency in the analysis of contemporary transitions, as single categories 
cannot adequately explain ongoing transformations.
Green and Shapiro (1994) suggest that whatever may be said on behalf of the analytical 
elegance or heuristic value of the process-oriented tradition, empirical applications have 
tended to suffer from two classes of methodological infirmities. The first encompasses 
what may be described, “as pedestrian methodological defects”, (1994: 33) when 
statistical techniques are misapplied, or incorrect hypotheses are used to measure 
empirical facts. These methodological errors are common to any theory, and should be 
taken as principal shortcomings of the approach. The second class of error is more 
fundamental and rooted in universalistic aspirations. As Green and Shapiro state, 
“ .. .these concern the ways hypotheses are conceptualised, the manner in which they are 
transformed into testable propositions, and the interpretation of empirical results when 
tests are conducted” (1994: 33). This type of errors is method-driven and may be 
pathological to the theory. In the above scenario, a biased view on what scholars call the 
reality of strategic action, asserting their subjective interpretation regarding the degree 
of contingency of events, as well as the rationality of choice, may be argued as
erroneous. This is what the rational choice and path-dependent theorists do not often 
account for, and where they become the determinists of human action.
To sum up the overall argument, two juxtaposing frameworks -  the structure-oriented 
and the process-oriented approaches -  appeared to offer a narrow-focused view of 
democratic transition in third wave democracies. Individually they highlight some 
valuable and relevant points conducive to an understanding of the extraordinary 
occurrences that take place in the new Europe. However separately they cannot fully 
encompass structural, institutional, cultural and contingent strategic policy-making 
aspects of the wholesale transformation of the new regimes. A more complex 
framework is discussed in the third section in an attempt to combine the beneficial 
insights of the submitted theories and to surmount deficiency of information caused by 
uncertainty, and past-dependency of transition, on the one hand, and agents’ strategical 
thinking, on the other.
2.3. Parsimonious analytical framework: structure-agency debate
The structural and process oriented frameworks individually emphasise the importance 
of structures, institutions and decisions in the process of building democracy. This 
cannot by itself explain the versatile nature of the newly emerging regimes. As Elster et 
al. (1998) observe, structures, of which legacies and cleavages are part, by definition, 
are determinants of the present outcomes connected to the past that include inherited 
endowments of political actors with material resources, mentalities and traditions. The 
mode, in which they operate, simultaneously constrains and enables agency to future
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strategic action (individual or collective). In contrast, institutions are subject to 
‘crafting’ by policy-makers, and implicate both ‘direct effect’ upon structured contexts, 
within which actions take place, and through which their partial transformation occur, 
and ‘strategic learning’ on the part of the actors involved, enhancing awareness of 
structures and the constraints/opportunities they impose. Once established, they operate 
in a manner to profit some politicians and discourage others from certain motions under 
institutionalised rules. They may explain the implications of political discourse, but by 
themselves, they are subject to alteration by decision-makers in a volatile and semi­
structured environment. Finally, decisions are most directly concerned with fostering 
the desired outcomes of the decision-maker, and can be amended if necessary at short 
notice. As Elster et al. (1998: 294) recapitulate, “...durability [of a democratic regime] 
decreases from ‘legacies’ to ‘decisions’, and intentionality increases, with ‘institutions’ 
being placed in an intermediate position on both of these dimensions”.
Structures and agency logically entail one another, as “ ...a social or political structure 
only exists by virtue of the constraints on, or opportunities for, [the] agency that it 
affects” (Hay, 1995: 189). This implies that structures do not exist independently of the 
activities they govern, i.e. agents’ intentions and strategies, and vice versa. Dualism and 
interdependence of structure and agency has been widely reflected in a dialectic view of 
this relationship by social and political sciences. Theories of structuration (Giddens, 
1976), and critical realism (Jessop, 1990) underline the idea of mutual dependency and 
internal relatedness of the social structure and human agency. Giddens (1976: 121), for 
example, stresses, “.. .social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet, at 
the time are the very medium of this constitution”. In continuation, Jessop (1990: 129)
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argues that, “ ...the form of the state is the crystallisation of past strategies as well as 
privileging some other current strategies. As a strategic terrain, the state is located 
within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies”, and needs to be analysed from 
this perspective (vantage point). Structures do not determine outcomes directly, but 
define the limits of options and strategies for actors. Structured constraints also imply 
resources and opportunities, which may be selectively realised by actors. Hence, 
strategic action is a dialectical interplay of intentional and knowledgeable, yet 
structurally embedded actors and the pre-constituted (structured) contexts they inhabit. 
Actions occur within structured settings, yet actors have the potential to transform those 
structures through their actions (Hay, 1995).
A balanced account of the transition, the process of party system building, and the 
determinants of their institutionalisation, hence, should include the above 
considerations, and emphasise the joint effect of, “ ...the residues of the past, the 
configuration of rule-making actors...and a future-oriented strategic actions” (Elster et 
al, 1998) on the process of democratisation. Consequently, many scholars, explicitly or 
implicitly, arrived at a similar conclusion that encompasses causality and consequences 
of democracy building and involves the structure-agency debate. The works of 
Mainwaring (1999), Elster et al.(1998) and Kitschelt et al (1999) are examples of this 
genre. Elster et al (1998), nevertheless, provides a more accommodating explanatory 
model, which has been partially included in this research.
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Elster et al. (1998) argue that this synthetic approach offers a more inclusive explanation 
of the problematic development of third wave transitions, and therefore, may be better 
equipped to capture its controversy. He continues:
Rather than opting for one of the three types of the independent variables, such an 
approach would have to allow for backward and forward linkages, and other forms 
of complex interaction. Forward linkages occur when structures select agents and 
institutional settings, and the latter in turn select choices and decisions. Backward 
linkages would be cases in which choices put agents and institutional rules in their 
place, and these new arrangements alter or nullify the determining force of 
structural legacies or replace them with newly created legacies (Elster at el, 1998: 
295, my emphasis in italic).
In their research of some CEECs democracies, Elster et al. argue that many new 
democratic institutions such as parliament, parties, trade unions, other interest 
organisation, and labour and capital markets, are often forced to amalgamate the 
properties of the socialist state in their transitional context; and by that their progressive 
development may be jeopardised. This ‘forward linkage’ causally shapes the mode and 
the legitimacy of political authority, which, determined by the past, is often based on the 
belief of “ .. .the sanctity of time-honoured rules and powers” (Weber, 1978: 226). Elster 
et al (1998: 302) note that these conditions generate a personalistic view of authority, 
which is rooted in the power of the master, and not in the overall reasonableness of an 
order, which is governed by the rules and embodied in the institutions.
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The ‘backward linkages’ can be identified between choices, which create institutions 
and agents, which in turn alter inherited structures. As in the case of Belarus, the 
rational choice of the legislature and the public’s desire for strong leadership resulted in 
the introduction of a presidency in 1994 with the purpose of controlling a developing 
crisis. This, however, soon became a stepping-stone to a plebiscitarian dictatorship 
imposed by the president elect, Alexander Lukashenko.
The differing effects of ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages may be observed over time, 
determining the degree of involvement for structures and agency. As it was initially 
noticed, the durability of structures decline with decision-making, and in opposition, 
strategic selectiveness increases with a move from decisions to institutions, as a 
definitive set of constraints and opportunities becomes operational. As Elster et al 
conclude:
... whether decisions or structures have a dominant influence on the shape of the 
societies in transition seems to depend largely upon the robustness of the extant 
institutions which in turn is mainly determined by the overall structural affinity of 
the respective societies to the soviet-type communism (Elster et al., 1998: 304).
In other words, there is a definitive relatedness between structures, institutions and 
creative agency, which tends to have a joint effect on the process of democratisation of 
the new regimes.
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The structure-agency approach appears to be more beneficial and encompassing for 
understanding party system developments in the new democracies. As a consequence, 
the methodology used for this research comprises many features of the three- 
dimensional method, offered by Elster and often found in works of many other scholars 
studying the new regimes. The proposed framework, hence, will include elements of 
rational choice theory in conjunction with structural and cultural conceptions; and will 
offer a more elaborate outlook of the post-Soviet environment. The following 
suppositions can be submitted in support of a joint analytical framework for the analysis 
of the party system formation in post-soviet Belarus.
First, democratic transitions are structurally framed by many factors left over from the past 
that may have both stimulating and inhibiting effect on the process -  ‘forward linkage’ 
(Elster et al, 1998). In Belarus’ case, one may think of the enduring Soviet mentality with 
high economic and political dependency on Moscow, low-intensity citizenship and 
subdued national consciousness. This certainly determined the slow break away from and 
the hidden agenda of a union with Russia. To this range there may be added old-fashioned 
and ‘impervious’ bureaucracy; limited elite rotation and therefore, continuing communist 
domination in power; public fear of the opposition; economic crisis and the national 
choice for strong leadership. Altogether this has led to the alteration of a semi- 
parliamentary regime into a super-presidential republic, with the eventual domination of 
the president’s will over the law in Belarus. This is not to say that there were no cleavages 
that could provide a background for a more democratic scenario. The ‘identity-based’ and 
power related conflicts existed in parallel with other structural arrangements, but failed to 
consolidate into definitive oppositional forces due to non-democratic decision-making of
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the legislature between 1990 and 1994. Not altering the electoral code, and not having 
feasible programmes for economic and political reforms stipulated the emergence of non- 
democratic institutional rules in Belarus, which were consequentially reflected in existing 
structures and elite decision-making.
Second, these alterations are undoubtedly linked to the public’s cautious attitude to 
newly acquired independence, burdened with inherited legacies and societal conflicts -  
‘backward linkage’. This accelerated the process of power concentration in hands of the 
president, and approved crucial alterations in the constitution in favour of the incumbent 
and at expense of other democratic institutions (legislature, constitutional court, mass 
media, parties and non-governmental organisations). In addition, vertical governmental 
control (‘presidential vertical’) put constraints on various level authorities and offered 
them no other alternative than compliance to the president. The lack of accountability 
by the ‘Soviet old guard’ bureaucracy; tacit ‘seat guarantees’ for conformist candidates 
in parliament; state controlled media; a Constitutional Court appointed by the president, 
and economic inaction demonstrate how the interaction between existing structures, and 
human agency can eventually stipulate a tendency for a plebiscitarian dictatorship in the 
country.
Third, public strategic choice is also an independent factor in the game. Both structures 
and institutions have created enough leeway for the realisation of populist agendas, and 
opportunities for non-partisan politics. Alexander Lukashenko was simply an example 
of such a scenario, whose rise to power cannot be individually attributed to his 
personality, or cultural traditions, or lack of the constitutional order. On the other hand,
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parties’ decline cannot be a mere consequence of their self-preserving actions or 
institutional limitations. These are parts of a joint ‘structure-agency’ effect that 
determine an overall course of events. As Gerardo Munck (1994: 370) states, “ ...the 
importance of choice lies not only in the choices that start a transition and move it long, 
but also in the shaping of new institutions”.
In summary, placing actors in structured institutional settings will aid an understanding 
of the implications for non-consolidating new regimes. Rather than assuming that either 
institutions or political actors individually play a leading part in building democracy; a 
view offered in this research, insists that one can learn about transitions only by 
considering a combination of forward and backward linkages between structures, 
institutions, and agency. As Munck (1994: 371) notes, “ ...if  we are to show that 
transitions are moments open to agency, we must show that particular outcomes would 
not have been the same without the intervention of actors”.
Cleavage-oriented structural and institutional arrangements, such as the presidency, 
electoral code and constitution making, will form the essential part of the analytical 
inquiry into the party system development in Belarus. Parties, on the other hand, will be 
regarded as the principal agents of the political game, and will be viewed from a three- 
dimensional perspective comprising a public level of representation -  parties in public- 
office; internal and grassroots levels -  parties as organisations and in the electorate. This 
should enable an understanding of developments in party ‘policy-thinking’ on elite and 
mass levels (Ilonskii, 1998). Finally, the level of electors’ expectation will be included 
into the analysis. This is hoped to give a full picture of parties’ functioning in society,
and hence, an estimation of the level of system institutionalisation and prospects for 
further democratisation. As Herbert Kitschelt writes:
Electoral party competition has been supplemented and, in some instances, even 
displaced by other modes of political involvement and collective decision-making, 
especially corporatist and plebiscitarian forms of interest intermediation. 
Nevertheless, universal suffrage, competing political parties, and legislative 
bodies remain central distinctive features o f modern democracy. For this reason, 
the configuration of party systems and their stability profoundly influence the 
effectiveness and popular acceptance of a democratic order (Kitschelt, 1992: 7; 
italics is original).
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Chapter 3. The impact o f structure on party system development in Belarus, 
between 1988 and 2000
In previous chapter it has been established that in order to capture uniqueness and 
controversy of the third wave democratisation, complex analysis of structures, 
institutions and agency is required. In this chapter the impact of structure, which will 
include political conflicts and inherited legacies, and existing institutional arrangements 
will be analysed in relation to the party system formation in Belarus.
The chapter will proceed in two sections. Section 3.1 will focus on the realisation of 
legacies, potential conflicts and cultural cliches in Belarus between 1988 and 2000, and 
their influence on party development. As further discussion will demonstrate, legacies 
and cleavages have a considerable impact on party system formation, but cannot fully 
explain the complexity of its development in modem society. For example, 
parliamentary elections in 2000 displayed major systemic controversy over parties’ 
functioning, when opposition parties had the capacity to win votes and seats in public 
office, but were limited in their institutional choice by existing constraints in society. 
Internal undemocratic control of elections in Belarus prevented parties from further 
participation in the political game. Elections were ‘organised’ to serve the interests of 
authorities, when all principal financial, institutional and human state resources were 
mobilised to aid pro-governmental organisations to win seats. Local authorities, under 
the control of the presidential ‘hierarchical structure’, motivated people to vote for 
predetermined candidates. A similar situation occurred in the state-owned enterprises, 
institutions and other governmental bodies. This was purely based on informal
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canvassing and unofficial mechanisms of pressure; and could not be verified by 
independent observers. In addition, media resources, formally available to all 
candidates, soon became sidelines in assisting the president’s loyal subjects70. This 
situation clearly demonstrates the powerful role of both structural and institutional 
elements, which can often have a more enduring effect on the party system operation 
than collective strategies of political ‘dissidents’.
Therefore, the effect of structures will be the primary concern of section 3.1. In section 
3.2 the impact of institutions on the process of party system development will also be 
brought into highlight. This will include such issues as presidentialism, constitution 
making, and the electoral code as the principal elements of the institutional structure, 
which can variably affect a newly emerged party system.
Belarus ’ overview
Belarus has been chosen for analysis amid other post-Soviet republics due to its 
demonstrative and simultaneously unique mode of transition. There has been very little
70 The Belarus’ Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship and 
monopolisation of mass media (Article 33). Citizens of Belarus are also guaranteed the right to obtain, 
store and distribute ‘full, reliable and timely information about the activities of state agencies, public 
associations, political, cultural and international events, etc.’(Article 34). Simultaneously Article 34 
specifies that ‘the use of information can be limited by the law, in order to protect citizens, and to allow 
the exercise of their rights in full’. These limitations are enumerated in Article 5 of the Press Law, and 
give much leeway for authorities to use their control over the information, especially on the eve of 
elections.
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scholarly discussion of Belarus’ political and economic development, either in the West 
or in Belarus itself. Nevertheless, it is a typical example of the problematic transition of 
the post-communist systems and accumulates most of the generic features of the ex- 
Soviet states. Belarus experiences economic hardship and pending social and economic 
decline. In this collapsing order, halfway policies and the effective absence of any 
economic programmes have drawn the country into a situation of inaction as the best 
option. Institutional and structural incentives, like the introduction of a majority run-off 
electoral system, bicameral parliament, strong presidency, powerful executives, lack of 
legality, superfluous parties seem to be similar to the developments in other post-Soviet 
states. The surface configuration of political conflicts also shows signs of similarity, 
being characterised by reformist and national movements, in opposition to the successor 
and conservative activities of the old-guard elite. There is also a long-lasting tradition of 
governance by decree and political volition, attributive to neighbouring states. 
Culturally they share a common public expectation of a strong leadership that may 
possess exceptional powers and a political vision, which is needed to surmount 
economic and political hardship. Charisma, for example, becomes a substitute for 
legitimate authority and is ‘authority’ in itself. Belarusian president, Alexander 
Lukashenko, is an example of a surviving charismatic leader in an uncertain and 
malleable environment. His actions and background have secured his role as a hero for 
the majority of the population, namely the urban working class and rural peasants. With 
this support, and by skilfully exploiting Slavic passivity, tolerance and sentimentality, 
Lukashenko continues finding ways to distract people’s attention from economic 
disasters and even more so from the inadequacies of the ‘new democratic regime’. In the 
absence of any concrete measures to deal with inflation, poverty and black market
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activity, the slogans of ‘jailing the thieves’ have become part of his rhetoric. 
Lukashenko is particularly good at publicly castigating ministry officials and 
representatives of local governments. Nonetheless, the deteriorating economy cannot 
but threaten his position as President. Lukashenko has used the project of the union of 
Belarus with Russia as a hint to return to the prosperity, stability and faith of the ‘old’ 
Soviet system. The execution of the union depends on whether this issue is included in 
the policy agenda of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and Russian political elites, 
which are split in regards to its realisation71.
Populist activities and empty pledges by the leadership and power-seeking opposition 
can be found elsewhere within the former Soviet Union. Legitimate but ineffective 
parties and still incipient party systems reveal other features of Belarusian politics, 
which are common to the other states. For example, Pammett and DeBardeleben 
observed the extreme influence leftover authoritarian legacies and unaccountable styles 
of governance have upon the poor status of parties in the case of Russia, which is in turn 
effectively true for any other ex-Soviet republics:
Opportunities for parties to perform their major functions of holding government 
accountable, effecting policy and distributing benefits have been extremely 
limited. The pervasive atmosphere of corruption and profiteering has involved a 
number of party leaders, shown up the powerlessness of others and generally
71 The project realisation allegedly depends on whether Russia is willing to see Lukashenko as part of the 
process. His leadership in the Belarus-Russia Union is subject to vehement debates amongst Russian 
political elites.
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made it difficult for the public to trust politicians (Pammett and DeBardeleben
2000: 382).
Populist presidents, their unlimited authority, the flagrant past of the Communist party, 
powerful executives and puppet legislatures in the ex-Soviet countries continue 
reinforcing the perception of parties as ‘second-order’ preferences by the general 
electorate.
At the same time, Belarus considerably differs from other post-Soviet states by 
demonstrating some unique features of its transition. Belarus was deemed to be a ‘well- 
qualified’ candidate for democratisation, but appeared to be its ‘own worst enemy’ by 
halting democratic consolidation. Belarus has accidentally adopted a ‘third way’ of 
socialist development, which is different from that of the New Labour or Schroeder’s 
Neue Mitte polices. It means nothing else than an, “old-style attempt to reconcile state 
ownership and markets, but has no intention to construct a market economy or harden 
its soft budgets” (Nuti, 1999: 3). This might be a suitable solution in the medium term, 
but is fraught with inevitable system collapse and further isolation of the country from 
the global economy and benefits of cooperation with the EU.
Belarus can be described as a command economy without central planning. State 
enterprises are still dominant, and there is widespread administrative control over outputs 
of large state enterprises. Prices, exchange rates and subsidised credits and employment 
are centrally controlled. Its geographical location should have been beneficial, however, 
instead it appears to be a burden. Belarus is a ‘black hole’ between its ‘westernising’
102
neighbours, such as Poland, Lithuania and partly Ukraine, and self-styled ambitious 
Russia on the east. Politically, Belarus is a combination of ‘old-style’ strong leadership 
and idealistic endeavours to improve people’s life. It can still be described within the best 
Soviet traditions. Most notorious examples would include nationally organised subbotniki, 
collective street sweeping, monthly reports by the state bureaucracy, public purging of 
‘clumsy’ bureaucrats by the president, a well paid KGB and militia staff, and public 
parades. There are also presidential directives that have precedence over the constitutional 
law; media censorship, collective responsibilities of government officials for harvesting, 
organised elections and obligatory public sports events.
In addition, Belarus’ relations with the European Union and the USA have increasingly 
faltered. Negotiations over Belarus' application for full membership of the Council of 
Europe were delayed following concerns over the conduct of the parliamentary elections 
in 1995. In January 1997, subsequent to the referendum on changes to the Constitution 
and the extension of Lukashenko’s term in office by two years, Belarus’ ‘Special Guest’ 
status in the Council of Europe was suspended, and international dialogue was ceased. 
Further expansion of the European Union eastwards, and the encapsulation of Poland, 
and the Baltic States, as well as the Ukraine’s application for a membership in NATO 
may eventually draw a modem ‘iron curtain’ with Belarus becoming a buffer between 
Russia and the West.
As a small transient polity, Belarus is facing an inevitable dilemma of striking a 
partnership for the purpose of further development. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, 
Belarus’ choice is structurally biased towards Russia, which allows her pursuing an
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incremental strategy of reform at a relatively low cost. Inclusion of the western ‘vector’ 
in Belarus’ foreign policy-making seems to be a remote perspective, as it will require 
radical re-consideration of its relations with Russia, and a policy of multiple 
compromises on Belarus’ side, which the incumbent leadership is not prepared to 
undertake.
Hence, it seems that Belarus, as any other transient economy, is able to pursue existing 
opportunities to the extent that the structurally constrained environment permits. It is 
nevertheless believed that incremental and consistent policy-making by the agency has 
the advantage of formulating a more successful strategy to undertake a partial 
transformation of the structured context.
3.1. Structural analysis o f Belarus ’political history
3.1.1 The road to independence
In this section the impact of cleavages, and cultural and structural legacies72 including 
the continuity of power by vested interests and their manipulation of the weak state, will 
be viewed from a historical perspective. A brief disclosure of Belarus’ history will be 
advantageous to the strategy outlined in Chapter 2, which allows establishing ‘forward’
72 The economic factor as part o f the structure inherited from the ‘Soviet’ past has been analysed in 
Chapter 1 to underline the degree of dependency of Belams on Russian policy-making, and its low 
credibility on the international arena.
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and ‘backward’ linkages in order to understand the modality of transition and reasons 
for parties’ decline.
Belarus formally declared independence from the Soviet Union on the 25 August 1991 
and became for only the second time in its history (a short-lived National Republic having 
been established in 1918), an independent sovereign state. However, her independent path 
to democracy appeared to be a long and unsuccessful detour. It is a common assumption 
that Belarus’ post-communist party politics did not have enough structural, cultural or 
institutional incentives for democratic advancement. Some scholars suggest that national 
conflict divisions were subtle and hence, failed to produce a viable background for the 
formation of the cleavage system and party competition based upon them. Due to 
traditional tolerance, popular conservatism and leftover legacies, mass political 
mobilisation was minimal, and representation has easily acquired a delegated form of 
govemance-by-decree reinforcing traditions of a strong leadership (Furman, et al, 1998; 
Marples, 1999; Lubachko, 1971; Szporluk, R, 1979, etc.).
The aim of this research is to examine the course of party system formation from a 
structural perspective. The provisional hypothesis is that Belarus’ political development 
was subject to a complex interaction of factors, in which the structural fabric played a 
determinant, but not a solely role in de-fostering democratisation. Equally causative 
have been populist and self-profiteering elite decision-making, and institutional 
arrangements introduced in the course of transition.
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Unlike other newly emerged states, Belarus had a limited pre-authoritarian experience, 
which did not aid the development of institutional and participatory skills for independent 
existence and democratic policy-making. In addition, authoritarian legacies of a Moscow 
centred system, inactive civil society, mixed population demographics, a lack of natural 
resources, and a strategic geopolitical position pre-determined Belarus’ role within the 
operation of the CIS. Nevertheless, the resources and incentives in Belarus to stimulate an 
independent and democratic path of development did exist; and comparative analysis 
suggests evidence of the concealed power of political/social conflicts that could have 
predisposed the emergence of opposition forces and mass mobilisation73. Paradoxically, 
neither the conflicts, nor elite bargaining inspired political forces to follow the path of 
democratisation. This analysis will demonstrate that despite existing cleavage structures 
and initial institutional incentives (semi-parliamentary regime), the process of building 
democracy has taken an alternative route.
At the beginning of the 20th century the centre-periphery divide in Belarus was associated 
with nationalist calls for independence and sovereignty and had dominated the pre- 
totalitarian ensemble of political conflicts. Other conflicts became ‘subordinate’ in their 
salience, spreading along the ‘nation-building’ line as the central axis of party 
competition. Independent nationalist movements formally started in 1902 with the 
emergence of the Belarusian Revolutionary Hramada, which was subsequently renamed as 
the Belarusian Socialist Hramada in 1903. Apparently, the idea of nationhood had become 
dominant long before the beginning of the century with the emergence of mass nationalist
73 See Korosteleva, E.A. (1998a) Political Cleavages and Voting Behaviour in Belarus 1991-1998: an 
Evaluation o f the "Freezing Hypothesis”, unpublished MA thesis. Manchester: Manchester University.
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movements such as ‘Land and Freedom’ and ‘Talk’. The Belarusian Socialist Hramada, 
though, was the first exclusively Belarusian party, with a definite programme and a clear 
nationalist stance. In alliance with the communists (to secure national statehood) it 
mobilised most of the population of Belarus, of which 74,6% considered themselves 
Belarusians (Guthier, 1977). During the Revolution period other nationalist political 
parties and organisations emerged like the Belarusian People’s Hramada, the Belarusian 
Autonomous Union, and the Christian Democratic Union.
The interwar conflict in Belarus covered two major periods: pre-Soviet Belarus (including 
a year of independence), and West-versus-East Belarus (1919-1939). After Belarus’ 
partition between Poland (Western part) and Russia (Eastern part) in 1921 (Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty) and the formation of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922, the politics 
of both parts of the nation diverged geographically rather than ideologically. In the eastern 
part of Belarus (BSSR) the New Economic Policy of the 1920s rendered concessions to a 
national revival, known as ‘Belorussification’. For example, the extent of the official use 
of the Belarusian language by the early 1927 was almost 100% amidst the legislature and 
most of the executive, and 30-50% among other commissariats (Lubachko, 1972: 85). 
81% of the population recognised Belarusian as their native and official language. With 
Stalin’s succession to power, a purge of Belarusian National-Democrats was organised, 
and by 1937 “Belarusians comprised only 15% of the professional staff of the higher 
educational institutions of BSSR” (Ibid: 111).
In 1922 the Belarusian Peasants’ and Workers’ Association, a popular peasant movement 
representing the western part of Belarus under the Polish government, was founded: It
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held 11 seats in the lower House and 3 in the upper (Zaprudnik, 1993: 238). It was the 
largest political party with an anti-Soviet and pro-Belarusian ideological background at 
that time. Its nationalist stance deepened later with the repression of national minorities in 
Poland. The second largest political party was the Belarusian Christian Democratic Party 
(BCD): its adherents were almost exclusively Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox 
Belarusians. The official programme of the party nevertheless was based on the principle 
of unification of Belarusian lands and of recognition of its independence.
It is important to note that Belarusians were the least urbanised national group within its 
ethnic area: in 1913 86% of the population lived in the countryside. The urbanisation 
factor appeared to have played a significant role in Russification of the nation. By 1939 
25% of the population became urbanised, being dominated by the spreading influence of 
Russia. The relation between occupation/social status and nationality may be regarded as a 
signpost in these conflicts. For example, in 1897 “fewer than one-fifth of 1% of 
Belarusians was engaged in professional occupations” (Guthier, 1977: 46). This was due 
to the low level of literacy and education amongst the population. By 1926 only 15.7% of 
the Belarusian population was classified as office and professional workers, among them 
were 8.4% urban Belarusians. With the growth of urbanisation and industrialisation the 
division between rural/nationalists and urban/workers/socialists reached its height. Guthier 
(1977: 283) notes, “as Belarusians have entered into an urban and mobilised environment 
they have displayed a high susceptibility to Russianization... In the Soviet Union 
urbanisation and Russianization were marching together”.
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As one can witness, the advent of a multi-party system in post-Soviet Belarus was based 
on a few profound conflicts, of which the centre-periphery conflict became the most 
prominent. It was steered by the sense of political inequality and was mainly associated 
with calls for freedom and autonomy from Moscow on the national level; and on the 
regional level -  with urban/rural frictions between the regions and the Minsk capital. 
Paradoxically, this configuration of conflicts remained relatively intact until the time of 
perestroika, and the post-authoritarian period became tinged by a dilemma between 
national independence and post-Soviet commonwealth. As Vakar (1956: 125) notes that 
with Belarus’ reunification, since the late 1930s Belarusian partisan loyalties were 
divided between communism and nationalism as the dominant cleavage. This 
constellation of conflicts consequently developed into a left-right linear spectrum of 
party alternatives in the early days of democratisation, with the communists/socialists, 
who were generally pro-union, on the left, and the nationalists, liberalists and 
democrats, who were West-oriented, on the right of the national spectrum. What is more 
extraordinary is that these *perestroika’ conflicts had persisted relatively unchanged 
until 1994, when the presidential period began in the country.
After the collapse of socialism in the early 1990s, a new era of mass democratic 
movement began with the establishment of the Belarusian Popular Front movement 
(BNF), and was inspired by examples of victorious Popular Fronts in the Baltic countries 
and in Poland (Silitski, 2000). Unlike its neighbours, Belarus was considerably less 
powerful in mobilising mass public support for an opposition based on the demands of 
independence and revival of national culture and language. The nationalist movement was 
initiated by a small group of Minsk-based Belarusian intelligentsia. Perhaps the politics of
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‘Bohemian’ intelligentsia would have found more appreciation among the general 
population if it had not been extreme radicalism of some of its leaders with Zenon Pozniak 
at the helm. Valentina Tregibovich, the former member of BNF Soim (high council), in 
her interview commented on party failure at the 1995 elections:
There was no comprehensible programme for electors. We were obsessed by the 
national idea without realising that the average voter was not ready for it. When we 
came to the second round of elections, the majority of the population did not 
understand our extreme and passionate calls for independence, and obliteration of 
the soviet past. We were strangers to the people. We were not ready to agitate, as we 
did not know what to say in the end (Tregubovich, from interview, March, 1999).
The national movement started with the emergence of informal youth organisations in the 
republic in the late 1980s, which preceded the 1988 mass open protest on the Day of 
Remembrance for the victims of Stalin’s genocide74 in Kuropati. This was a topical theme 
in post-Soviet times and brought immediate popularity to the BNF. In addition, BNF 
based its nationalist rhetoric on a broader basis and included such issues as implications of 
the Chernobyl’ disaster, and persecution of the officials-in-charge in the aftermath of the 
disaster. In opposition to other post-soviet states, Belarus was the only republic that
74 Among them the most well-known were the following: the Talaka club, emphasising Belarus’s socio­
political and national uniqueness; the Spadchyna (Heritage) club, concerned with artistic problems of 
national culture and history; the Krynichka (Springwell) club, advocating for national revival; Switanak 
(Dawn) Association, concerned with ecological problems and national uniqueness; Suchasnik 
(Contemporary) Club and the Minskaya Altemativa (Minsk Alternative), characterised by extreme right 
views and high level of politicisation (Zapmdnik, 1989: 41).
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remained relatively prosperous, stable and homogeneous, despite the gradual deterioration 
of its economy, and continuing political turmoil. Hence, newly emerged parties found it 
uneasy to include issues of market liberalisation and state building in their manifestos, as 
the people did not feel this urge as in the CEECs at that time.
BNF successfully promoted some democratic-orientated independent candidates for the 
USSR parliamentary elections in 1989 and for Belarusian elections in 1990, wherever it 
failed to nominate its own candidates. Having elected only 25 MPs in the 360-strong 
Belarusian Supreme Soviet75, BNF nevertheless fostered the organisation of the 
Democratic Club, comprising more than 100 ‘soft-line’ MPs. Still ‘old-fashioned’ in the 
majority, the parliament had to make certain concessions to the democrats who were 
increasingly supported by the population. This included the election of Stanislav 
Shushkevich (a university professor, promoted by the BNF in its election campaign) as 
the first deputy Chairman of the Parliament, and the agreement to adopt the Declaration 
of State Sovereignty in July 1990. The Club supported many incumbent politicians, 
including Alexander Lukashenko himself, today - the acting president of the country. A 
part o f the democratic opposition united into a new party, the Social-Democratic 
Assembly and established a faction of the ‘brave twelve’ in parliament. Despite the fact 
that the democratic wing of the parliament comprised only 28% of members of the 
1990-parliament, it held the initiative for change. As Furman et al. (1998: 112) state, 
“they were style gurus for the rest of the parliament”. The appearance of democrats and 
their growing influence in parliament is an example of a ‘forward’ linkage in Elster’s et
75 See Appendix 2 for details on results of parliamentary elections. Additional information can be obtained 
from Zaprudnik (1993) Belarus: at a Crossroads in History. Chapter 6. Boulder: Westview Press.
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al terms (1998), which only was made possible through the existing conflicts and 
nuances of the post -perestroika structures.
The political showdown that followed the August 1991 events (coup d'etat in Moscow) 
resulted in suspension of the Communist party, appointment of Shushkevich as a 
speaker of parliament, restoration of national symbols, and proclamation of Belarus’ 
independence. The opposition took the initiative in these changes but failed to 
decisively push the old nomenklatura out of power. The latter retreated from the party 
cabinets to the institutions of the executive power, and largely infiltrated the Council of 
Ministers as the top decision-making body in the country. Together with parliamentary 
supporters, ‘hard-liners’ formed the Party of Power headed by the Prime Minister 
Viacheslav Kebich. This nomenklatura’s motion might be noted as a ‘backward’ 
linkage, when structures determined the choice of the agency, and triggered a new effect 
of structuration, such as realisation of the idea of the presidency, non-alteration of the 
national electoral code, and re-allocation of state resources in such ways that national 
privatisation cannot be possible outside the system of clienteles.
Like other post-communist states, Belarus did not avoid the extraordinary party 
proliferation at the beginning of the 1990s76. In November 1990 the liberal United 
Democratic Party (OGP) emerged on the basis of a parliamentary faction of like-minded 
deputies, and Alexander Dobrovol’skii, a prominent opposition politician, became its 
leader. In 1991 the liberal farmers’ party, the Belarusian Peasant Party emerged, but
76 Parties and interest groups’ proliferation is another vivid example of ‘forward’ linkages, characteristic 
of all new regimes.
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‘died’ soon after the 1996-7 political reshuffles. The existence of the Social Democratic 
Assembly in the 1990-parliament inspired many smaller right nationalist democratic and 
liberal movements in Belarus. In June and July 1991 the radical National Democratic 
Party of Belarus was registered; and the Belarusian Christian-Democratic Union held its 
first congress. At the end of 1991 a group of pro-Russian and market oriented 
intellectuals organised a movement called Democratic Belarus, and registered 
accordingly in 1992. Subsequently, part of its support united with the United Civic 
Party, and another part launched a sister-branch to the Russian party ‘Yabloko’. In total, 
the years 1991 and 1992 were prolific for the emergence of many alternative and 
influential party and non-governmental organisations that gave a solid basis for the 
settlement of contemporary opposition. Smaller but no less important parties should also 
be mentioned such as the People’s Accord, which was led by Gennadz Karpenko 
(deceased). Another pro-Russian patriotic oppositional party was Slavic Union ‘White 
Russia’, which was established in 1992 with the major goal of achieving a union of 
Slavic nations. The People’s Movement (NDB) united both communists and pan- 
slavists, and was analogous to the red-brown bloc in Russia. Sergei Gaidukevich headed 
the centre-left Liberal Democratic movement, which later became a mirror organisation 
of the LDPR in Russia. The leadership of PCB and LDPB played a significant role in 
discharging the moderate democrat Shushkevich from his position of parliamentary 
Speaker. By 1992 the Agrarian Party had registered its leader Semion Sharetskii. On the 
left of the spectrum the Communist successor party was named as the Communist Party 
Belarusskaya (of Belarus). It was rejoined in 1993-1994 by a group of some smaller 
satellite parties of socialist orientation: Belarusian Labour Party, Party of Labour and 
Justice, Socialist Party, Republican Party, Party of All-Belarusian Unity and Consensus.
113
As one can witness, the existing structural divisions made their impact on the formation 
of the opposition politics, as ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages took place. There may 
even be an impression that by 1992 Belarus’ political spectrum had finally moulded, 
and public interests found representation through various parties, along the linear 
cleavage line -  from anti-reform socialist on the left to liberalist nationalist on the right. 
This, however, was not the case. In the early days of democratisation Belarus seemed to 
have had a choice of political parties, but not the effective political players to alter the 
course of the game. The inherited soviet institutional environment did not support the 
politics of developing opposition77. The parliament was still dominated by the 
communists, the government and regional executives were represented by the old style 
nomenklatura, no laws were passed or economic actions were taken to reinforce 
democracy, and finally, no serious coalition actions were made to secure a democratic 
alliance in parliament. A combination of a structurally constrained environment and 
incapacity of democratic forces to sustain the balance of power had a dual effect on the 
course of democratisation. If one compares Belarus with its ex-Soviet neighbours, 
Russia and Ukraine, it becomes obvious that parties did not have distinct policies, or
77 There have been no reforms undertaken in regard to regional legislature-executive powers. The 
structure of local ‘Soviets’ was adapted to the needs of the ‘new’ system. In addition, from 1996 the 
heads of all-level regional executive committees were appointed by the president [Art. 85]. This 
phenomenon was subsequently named as the ‘presidential vertical’. Reformist political parties have 
limited influence in regions, which provides elected MPs in local councils with pro-communist, and often 
pro-Lukashenko’s majority. Local deputies appoint executive committees headed by Lukashenko’s 
nominees. As a result, contemporary power distribution in regions exerts well-structured control over 
decision-making by president and ‘old-style’ nomenklatura.
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profiles, individual or ideological platforms or recognisable party leaders -  anything 
that could have helped them entrench in people’s minds during the first years of 
democratisation. As Furman et al. put it adroitly:
.. .if in Belarus there were real opponents of communism in power, like in Russia 
and Ukraine, both camps could have accumulated various means of battling each 
other. In contrast, in Belarus there was ‘nobody’ in power, and mass protest has 
taken a different shape (Furman et al., 1998:124).
The structuring effect of cleavages, especially the ‘centre-periphery’ one78, has not been 
fully sufficient for the decisive formation and sustainability of the opposition. In 
addition, the impact of formal institutional settings, legacies and ‘old-style’ decision­
making also had implications for the protracted course of events.
The opposition led by the BNF failed to account for the national specificity of the 
Belarusians, of which tolerance and discretion were the principal features. Furman et al. 
(1998: 115) argue that ‘the principal paradox of Belarusian nationalists was that they 
wanted to be ‘the same as others’ or at least ‘not worse than others’, like the Baltic 
nations, or Poles. However, if  the latter were raised on a crystallised national 
consciousness and memories of a democratic past and they fought for a pre- existing
78 The ‘centre-periphery’ cleavage encompasses many issues, of which union with Russia versus Belarus’ 
sovereignty is the primary. It also includes a cultural-political division between Minsk and the regions, 
and urban areas versus periphery. This cleavage proved to have a structuring effect on the formation of 
public attitudes and choices of political candidates.
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independence, for the Belarusians it was a struggle for the unknown -the idea of 
nationhood and the reality of a nation state. If the idea was captivating, the reality was 
disenchanting, as it was connected to the Slavic past and a notion of the ‘great Soviet 
people’, as well as interwoven family ties, cultural heritage, memories of the Second 
World war, and a collective survival of Stalin’s repression. Unlike Ukraine or Poland, 
where a strategic compromise between parts of the nationalist opposition and the 
nomenklatura took place to ensure the viability of reforms and national independence, 
Belarusian politics of the period was characterized by a confrontation between the Party 
of Power (the government and its allies in parliament), and the BNF-led opposition, 
which was radical minority. The BNF, having limited chances to base its policies on 
historical memories or national consciousness, had to conceptualise their own idea of 
Belarus’ history, and promote aggressive images of imperialist Russia. The BNF leader, 
Zenon Pozniak had followed this principle when structuring his organisation. The party 
had an inviting democratic fa9ade, but appeared to have a hierarchical and highly 
centralised structure with leadership having the sole prerogative of decision-making.
BNF radicalism and incongruent attempts of other democratically minded MPs could not 
resist the pressure of the old-guard elite. Their dialogues in parliament were conflict- 
ridden and frequently resulted in impasse. As a consequence, the BNF chose an "all-or- 
nothing" strategy and started campaigning for a referendum on the dissolution of the 
Parliament in December 1991. About 440 thousand signatures were collected in favour of 
the motion within three months. Using technicalities, the government and the 
parliamentary majority postponed discussion of the issue until the autumn of 1992, and 
then refused to authorise the vote on the ground of violation of signature collection
116
procedures79. The failure of the referendum proved that the BNF had not yet accumulated 
sufficient resources to unilaterally counterweight the Party of Power. Self-destructing 
strategies of some democratically minded MPs, lies and frauds and internal conflicts led 
them to the eventual failure to publicly demonstrate their ability of gaining power. The 
government outplayed the opposition by striking a sort of social contract with the public, 
having kept abundant cheap food as a means of securing compliance with authority.80
After the failure of the democrats with the referendum campaign their fragile unity 
fatefully fractured. The democratic forces also hoped to find support from their protege 
in the legislature, Stanislav Shushkevich -  the Parliament Speaker, who on the contrary, 
after gaining power had chosen to collaborate with the incumbent government. 
Speaking in favour of reforms, he lacked an institutional capacity (and the political will) 
to ensure their implementation, pursuing instead fruitless efforts to find "accord" among 
increasingly antagonistic factions in parliament. To some extent his position, cautious 
and ambivalent, reflected his status as a democratic speaker in a conservative 
parliament. Nevertheless, many democrats considered his behaviour as betrayal, and the 
whole campaign as a failure of democracy.
79 This is additional evidence of the effective impact of ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages: Opposition 
failed to unite and decisively resist nomenklatura’s advancement - ‘forward linkage’. Ideologically it was 
not prepared to use public opinion to its advantage, which gave strategical precedence to the Party of 
Power - ‘backward linkage’.
80 Public support for the referendum was dramatically low. If according to the sociological service of the 
Council of Ministers, 42% were ready to vote in favour of dissolution of Parliament in February, 1992, 
and 34% against; their numbers swapped places by March and became accordingly 32% and 38%, in 
«Smenit’ Rukovodstvo Netrudno...» Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 3 April 1992, 1.
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The rejection of the referendum petition gave an incentive to a hard-line reaction on 
behalf of the Party of Power. Within a few months, an independent TV-station was 
closed, privatisation was suspended, and a ban of the Communist Party was lifted. 
These actions freed previously suppressed pro-Communist support. The Party of 
Communists of Belarus (PCB) quickly restored its regional organisations with help 
from loyal supporters, and became the largest political party in the country. Finally, in 
March 1993 Kebich suggested that Belarus should create an economic union with other 
CIS states and abandon its neutral status in favour of joining the CIS military alliance. 
The motion to join the CIS collective security treaty was sharply opposed by 
Shushkevich, who again became an opponent of the pro-government majority. This 
generated a tension that grew into confrontation between the parliamentary speaker and 
the Prime Minister. The battle was over in January 1994 with the Party of Power 
seemingly taking the lead81, as the Speaker was removed from the office and replaced by 
compliant and politically ‘faceless’ Miacheslav Gryb. This is where decision-making 
and new institutional arrangements come to the fore, entailing a number of 
consequences that have fatally altered the course of democratisation in the country.
3.1.2 Lukashenko’s rise to power
There was a growing confrontation and inevitable stalemate between the democratic 
opposition and an increasingly re-active government. Worsening economic conditions 
led to a rise of apathy and disaffection of the population in representation of their
81 This is an additional example of the ‘forward’ linkage, when ‘Soviet’ structures empowered the 
agency, i.e. the Party of Power, to make the right strategic choice in a selective environment.
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interests by political players, and neither democrats, nationalists, nor the Party of Power 
and communists enjoyed much public support. The situation of fragmentation of 
political forces and increasing distrust and alienation of the population created a 
remarkable opportunity for the rise of a ‘new type’ politician, namely Alexander 
Lukashenko82.
Lukashenko was young and eager to use power to his advantage, which was a symbol of 
unruly freedom and unlimited resources within the former USSR. At the same time, he 
was a layman who initially wanted better prospects for his people. He has subsequently 
been one of the most controversial maverick figures in contemporary politics of Eastern 
Europe. He is known for his sympathy to Russia, ‘common-sense’ strategy to unite with 
Russia, and open nostalgia for the Soviet times. Ready to surrender his country’s 
economic independence, he nevertheless, is willing to ‘play it back’ politically, as a 
future president of the Belarus-Russia Confederation. His first years in politics were 
marked by an uncompromising fight with the old-fashioned nomenklatura, which later 
became his most loyal ally in the formation of the system of patronage83. He criticised 
democrats for their inability to address economic and social problems, and never had his
82 This is the best example that provides evidence to a ‘forward’ linkage, i.e. a structural opportunity for a 
Lukashenko-type politician to rise, favoured by disappointed electors, underestimated by powerful 
nomenklatura, and supported by democratic forces as a ‘less of two evils’ candidate. Simultaneously it 
shows that nomenklatura failed to control a changing environment, and to account for new developments 
in structures -  ‘backward’ linkage.
83 Alexander Lukashenko formed a system of executive control -  ‘vertical’ -  over the process of 
decision-making at regional levels. This, in combination with the unaltered regional structures, and the 
conservative majority on the periphery, gives overwhelming support to the president.
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own programme for surviving the economic crisis. In the early 1990s Lukashenko even 
advocated the introduction of "a state of economic emergency," warning the public 
about the imminent advance of nomenklatura’s dictatorship.84 He contributed to a split 
within the Party of Communists by participating in the formation of the faction 
"Communists of Belarus for Democracy" in the 1990 Parliament (Silitski, 2000). In the 
mid-1990s he became known as the most notorious opponent of party politics, 
considering it as an ineffective and destructing means of seeking power.
In 1991 after the August coup d'etat in Russia, he joined the conservative majority in 
parliament, and supported the policy of his initial opponent, Viacheslav Kebich -  
nomenklatura’s mighty. In the summer of 1993, he visited Moscow to demonstrate his 
adherence to the anti-Yeltsin opposition in the Russian Parliament. A few months later, 
Lukashenko addressed the People’s Movement of Belarus, an umbrella organisation of 
Communists and allied groupings, with the call to fight for the restoration of the USSR. 
His political fortunes grew from his remarkable skills of manoeuvring, as well as from the 
mistakes of his opponents. They underestimated him as a political player; and overlooked 
his talent to speak as the voice of the common man. Subsequently, on the 1st of July 1994 
Lukashenko was elected by 80% of the vote as the first president of Belarus85.
84 Alexander Lukashenko, «Diktatura: Belorusskij Variant?» Reprinted in Adbytae Hramadstva, no. 1/6 
(1999), 37-40.
85 See for reference, the site of world election results at http://www.agora.it/elections/election/belarus.htm. 
retrieved June 2001; http://iurix.iura.uni-sb.de/~serko/law pol/politics.html retrieved June 2001; Election Watch, 
Volume 5(1994) -  Journal o f Democracy: http://muse.ihu.edu/ioumals/ioural of democracy/election watch/v005, 
retrieved June 2001.
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As Furman et al. (1998:126) suggest, there were two components that helped 
Lukashenko to win the presidential election. First, in public perception he was the only 
one who voted against the dissolution of the USSR, supported the integration with 
Russia, and who was against the introduction of ‘wild capitalism’ and the BNF 
nationalism in Belarus. Second, Lukashenko was a representative of a new generation of 
politicians: young, charismatic and partisan free. He was bom to a poor family, and 
therefore, his succession to power made him a symbol of the new time. Being ‘a 
common man’, he was elected to serve the interests of common people in Belarus. His 
image and strategies in 1994 were even somewhat close to that of Timinskii in Poland 
in 1990, Zhyrinovskii in 1993-4 and Lebed’ in 1996 in Russia. The fact that 
Lukashenko, an unknown and single candidate, managed to defeat articulated forces of 
both the democratic opposition and authorities, embodies the essence of the politics of 
Belarus: populist, new, and party-free86.
Silitski (2000) suggests that the self-defeating strategies of Lukashenko’s major 
opponents also contributed to his victory. Both opposition candidates, Pozniak and 
Shushkevich, underestimated their own chances to win elections without finding new
86 A ’forward’ linkage demonstrates a strategic selectivity of structures. For example, it is useful to note 
that Lukashenko’s strategy was similar to that of his opponent Kebich -  the most powerful voice of 
nomenklatura. While rallying for presidential power he publicly promised to imprison Kebich for his 
corruption and betrayal of the national interests. The moment Lukashenko came to power, he offered him  
a position of a Parliamentary Speaker, and surrounded himself with the members of Kebich’s 
nomenklatura and advisory team. They both did not have any feasible political doctrine, both were 
political chameleons and both were allegedly Moscow proteges. Age was the main difference in electoral 
appeal between the two candidates: Lukashenko, the younger, was also shrewder and more competitive.
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allies among the voters or within elites. They failed to address the most important issues 
of the election campaign -  a balanced freedom, free of nationalism at one extreme, and 
economic dependence at another. BNF became more militant in its nationalism. As 
Silitski (2000) notes the non-BNF democrats have frequently been accused by Zenon 
Pozniak of being Moscow puppets. The fact that BNF attempted to imitate victorious 
Popular Fronts of the Baltic States in a country with a weak sense of national identity, 
restricted their electoral support to ethnically conscious voters -  the demonstrative 
impact of a ‘backward’ linkage that ‘put’ the initiative of democrats into an environment 
of subdued nationalism.
Linz and Stepan (1996: 17) argue that national revival is an important dimension of 
democratisation in as far as it provides a basis for consolidation of the state, without which 
‘no modem democracy is possible’. In a country with broken national traditions, like 
Belarus, the approach to forging the idea of nationhood, and a revival of culture and 
language by parties must be moderate, appealing and broad. The radical and 
uncompromising demands of the nationalists moved them away from the mass voter. 
Equally inefficient was the presidential campaign of Shushkevich, the former Speaker of 
Parliament. He and his campaigners counted on his prior popularity and sought to regain 
it. However, as Silitski (2000) comments, Shushkevich’s election platform was extremely 
narrowly focused and consisted of a lengthy lecture on economic and political reforms that 
appealed only to highly educated constituents in cities, and primarily in Minsk. Vladimir 
Novikov, a communist candidate, was another captivating figure, but his campaign could 
not offer anything better than the camouflaged retreat to the USSR and socialist economy, 
of which doctrine he was rather vague. Finally, hopes on Kebich and his Party of Power
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were promising, but groundless even with the support of Russia. The latter provided 
support to Kebich by extending cheap credits and selling fuel at discount prices,87 which 
was far from being enough to save his ‘colourless one-issue campaign’ (Silitski, 2000).
Lukashenko’s campaign, in opposition, was more efficient, and multi-dimensional. His 
pledges included eradication of corruption, bringing down inflation, and development of 
closer ties with Russia and other CIS states, i.e., the issues of foremost concern for the 
majority of voters, some of which were overlooked by the opposition for the reason of 
maintaining the ideological purity of their platforms. Capitalising on the growing 
antagonism between the Party of Power and the opposition, he placed himself as a 
centrist “wisely opposing the extremes of irresponsible partisanship” (Silitski, 2000). He 
blamed the failure and chaos in the country on the selfish and irresponsible elite in 
power. He drew a clear line between himself, as a moderate progressive, and those who 
were in power or seeking power at that time:
Why is our life what it is? It is because politicians who represent themselves or 
their parties had always lied to the people. They broke down the Soviet Union 
under slogans of unity and economic integration. They announced reforms and 
robbed the country. They promised prosperity in the market paradise and reduced 
the people to misery (A. Lukashenko, «Otvesti Narod ot Propasti,» Narodnaja 
Hazeta, 14 June 1994, 2).
87 Alexander Starikevich, «Sensacionnyj Rezultat Vyborov v Belorussii,» Izvestia, 26 June 1994, 1.
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3.1.3 Aftermath of the new presidency: 1996-2000
The New Constitution of the Republic of Belarus was adopted on March 15th, 1994, and 
was designed to support a ‘strong presidency’ at the initiative of the Party of Power, 
which sought to prolong its political life by electing Kebich as President. The majority 
of MPs, who later became members of the Belarusian opposition, nevertheless 
supported the decision to endorse unlimited authority in the future president. 
Miacheslav Gryb, Petr Kravchenko, Victor Gonchar and others claimed that the country 
would be washed over by chaos and economic demise unless a strong presidency was 
introduced. Interestingly, the ‘new democratic generation’ in parliament thought so as 
well, and was hoping to benefit from the introduction of a presidency88.
Members of parliament failed to envisage the threat that the new Constitution in its 
support of a strong presidency, may inflict on a weak state, tom apart by nomenklatura’s 
interests. Silitski (2000) comments that apart from institutional and stmctural 
deficiencies, the country did not have lasting traditions of civil society and local 
government. Regional authorities were politically and financially weak, and confined to 
central power. Since there was only one centralised state TV broadcasting station, one 
Central Radio station, one state publishing house, and one State Committee on the Press 
(SCP)89, all campaigns through the mass media channels were heavily censored. In
88 A ‘backward’ linkage puts MPs’ initiative in a traditionalist framework of individual governance, and 
demonstrates both institutional and structural effect on the process of decision-making.
89 It has been the sole agency in Belarus for registration of mass media. It has also been empowered to 
monitor the media and issue written warnings if the Press Law is violated. It can also suspend a media
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addition, the President was granted by the 1994 Constitution the right to appoint 
middle-rank judges and to hire and fire ministers, except for the Prime Minister and his 
deputies, which meant that a system of personal authority began to coalesce even before 
the 1996 referendum.
Lukashenko’s arrival in power sharpened the political situation. He immediately put 
himself into conflict with parliament, whose dissolution he might have wished for, 
nevertheless, at that time was inappropriate. Parliament suggested the introduction of an 
electoral system similar to that in Russia (mixed plurality with PR to correct the 
proportion of parties in parliament), that Lukashenko strongly opposed. He in turn 
issued a special decree about ‘The provision of equal opportunities for citizens during 
preparation and election campaigns of MPs’, which in reality limited opportunities for 
campaigners to canvass. The president also decided to initiate a referendum on the day 
of the parliamentary elections. This action put an end to a promising start of economic 
and political reforms, and incidentally granted the president power to follow the course 
of painless ‘inaction’ rather than radical reforms. The referendum was centred on the 
four principal questions: giving the President the right to dissolve the Parliament, 
approving closer ties with Russia, introducing Russian as the second state language, and 
replacing the post-independence national symbols with Soviet-era ones. These questions 
allowed agitation of the pro-Russian and pro-Communist vote in the elections into the
outlet for up to three months for any violation of the Press Law. If a media outlet receives more than on 
warning in a year for violation of Article 5, the SCP or a prosecutor can initiate its closure through the 
courts. Provided that the SCP is mainly composed of Lukashenko’s appointees, headed by Vladimir 
Zametalin in 1997-8, the impartiality of its decisions may be questioned.
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13th convocation of the Supreme Soviet, whose date coincided with the referendum. 
Positive answers on all four questions guaranteed another victory for Lukashenko over 
the developing party system and democratic representation. As a result, and despite high 
activity of the factions in parliament, political coalitions were non-existent. The BNF 
formed an alliance with four less known nationalist parties. The liberals attempted to 
form a bloc called "Civil Accord" that would unite the United Democratic Party, Party 
of People’s Accord, and the Civil Party, which were labelled by Pozniak as the ‘agents 
of Moscow’ in Belarus. The Civil Accord, however, was never formed, and candidates 
from three parties ran against each other as well as against the candidates from the BNF- 
supported bloc. As a result, BNF and United Democrats failed to elect a single MP, 
whereas the Social Democrats elected just one. Unlike the democrats, the Communists 
and their allies (the Agrarian Party) managed to unite and through that gained about 50 
seats in the new Parliament. As Silitski (2000) states, “the 13th Supreme Soviet appeared 
to be even more pro-Communist and reactionary than its predecessor”. Election 
outcomes were in accord with the unsuccessful efforts of democratic forces. 27 
Communists and 30 Agrarians, 5 representatives of the Party of People’s Accord, and 1 
Social Democrat -in  total 119 out 260 entered the 1995 Parliament90. There were not 
enough MPs to activate parliament, and Lukashenko proposed to have a second election 
run-off in November and threatened that if unsuccessful, he would introduce direct 
presidential rule.
90 See Appendix 2 for details. Otherwise, consult the site of world election results at 
http://www.agora.it/elections/election/belarus.htm, retrieved June 2001.
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In spite of the obstruction by the president, the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation 
was elected. New trends were noticed during the second run-off period. A new political 
party, the United Civil Party, was created through the merger of the United Civic Party 
(OGP) and the Civic Action (GD). Furthermore, BNF and OGP agreed to combine 
efforts in campaigning for their joint candidates. As a result, they won a majority of 
constituencies in the by-elections in Minsk. Success of the opposition in the second 
election run-off helped to balance uneven forces in the pro-communist parliament, and 
drew them closer together91. The organisation of factions began in the new Supreme 
Soviet. 44 Communist MPs united into one group. The Agrarian faction comprised 48 
MPs including 34 members of AP. Pro-democratic Civic Action in turn gathered 18 
MPs including non-partisan Stanislav Shushkevich and as many as the faction of the 
Social Democratic Union, with 12 PNS members, and 2 BSDG. At the beginning of 
1996 non-partisan and pro-president oriented MPs formed their own faction ‘Zgoda’ 
(Accord), which comprised of 59 pro-Lukashenko supporters92. A democratically 
minded MP and a leader of AP, Semion Sharetskii was elected as a Spokesman of 
Parliament. The Parliament soon found itself in a disagreement with Lukashenko over 
his moves to concentrate power in his hands at the expense of the Parliament. Even the 
communists, however ideologically close they were to Lukashenko’s third-way-socialist 
policies, soon realised a difference in their position. As a consequence, political parties 
and parliamentary factions from the Communists to the Agrarians, and Civil Action
91 This demonstrates a creative impact of the agency on a structurally constrained environment.
92 See Ygrinovich, K. (1996) Analiz Politicheskoi Structuri 13-go Verkchovnogo Soveta Respubliki 
Belarus [Analysis of Political Structure of the 13th Supreme Soviet], Minsk: NISAPI
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moved closer together. Only 60 members of the "Accord" faction and some non-partisan 
MPs appeared to support Lukashenko in the 1995 legislature. As Silitski (2000) stresses, 
“across-the-board consolidation allowed the Parliament to bring forward a remarkable 
opposition to Lukasenka’s efforts to establish one-man rule”.
Lukashenko, in reply to the growing power of parliament, initiated a second 
referendum. He proposed the formation of a bicameral legislature that would at best 
rubber-stamp presidential decrees and the transfer of many parliamentary functions 
(such as appointment of members of the constitutional court, central election committee, 
and even of some MPs) to himself. The constitutional amendments, if supported, would 
have de-facto endangered still fragile and unstable institutions of democracy in Belarus. 
The parliament opposed and offered its version of the law. It included such questions as 
rejection of extra-budgetary funds, nationalisation of government finances; and 
introduction of popular elections of the heads of local administrations. A vigilant body 
of seven major oppositional parties (from PCB to BNF) was organised to control 
Lukashenko’s activity. Victor Gonchar was appointed to be a head of the Central 
Election Committee responsible for preventing irregularities during the referendum.
The concerted efforts of the opposition and legal support of the Constitutional Court 
forced Lukashenko to certain concessions. For example, he agreed to reschedule the 
date of the referendum from November 7th to November 24th, and to include MPs’ 
questions into the referendum ballot. In practice, however, he continued acting above 
the law and visible consensus. He overruled decisions of the Constitutional Court, put 
the mass media under tight control, and unilaterally declared a referendum to have legal
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power to transfer responsibility for conducting the referendum to local authorities. In 
violation of the law, voting started two weeks before the due date, which was normally 
allowed only for itinerant voters on Election Day. Victor Gonchar was expelled from the 
Election Committee and the opposition lost control of the voting process. The final 
united action by the opposition was to proclaim impeachment of the acting president 
Alexander Lukashenko. The case was supported by 70 MPs (about 40% of the 
parliament) and was passed to the Constitutional Court.
This moment marked mysterious actions and a demonstrative retreat by some 
‘revolutionary’ opponents. First of all, and suddenly, Sharetskii and Karpenko, a deputy 
speaker of the Supreme Soviet, called the crowd that gathered in front of the parliament 
in support of impeachment, to disperse and go home peacefully. They claimed that the 
conflict had subsided and the parliament would be able to negotiate with the president. 
Then, the Constitutional Court was strangely slow in dealing with impeachment 
proceedings, allegedly under pressure and blackmail of the presidential office. On 
November 21st, a high-ranked delegation of Russian leadership, including Prime 
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and speakers of both houses of the Russian Federal 
Assembly arrived in Minsk to broker a compromise. Naively, part of the opposition 
hoped that Russian intervention would be a panacea to the situation of chaos and 
illegality; and that the Russian democratic leadership would not allow the establishment 
of a super-presidency in Belarus. As Silitski (2000) observes the opposition 
underestimated the extent, to which the Russian government would be pro-Lukashenko 
oriented, especially with NATO moving eastwards, against Russia’s consent.
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The eventual compromise between the president and the opposition foresaw the 
advisory endorsement of the popular vote (referendum) and its subsequent consideration 
by the Constitutional Assembly, which was given the mandate of amending the 
Constitution on the basis of referendum results. It appeared to be, though, that 
Lukashenko was in control of the 2/3 of the Assembly by having one third of his 
supporters from parliament and commanding another third by appointment. This 
Moscow deal forced the opposition to formally ‘surrender’ their antagonistic position to 
the president93. 87% of electors officially voted in favour of Lukashenko’s Constitution, 
which was signed in to effect on November 27th94 On November 28th, the parliamentary 
chamber was shut, the Constitutional Court dismissed, and the House of Representatives 
composed of 110 members were invited by Lukashenko to commence. This de-facto 
inaugurated a system of personal rule in Belarus behind a democratic facade. The Lower 
Chamber was composed of 70% of members of the ‘Zgoda’ faction of the prior 
parliament; as well as about 50% of the communists and agrarians, and a few percent of 
members of the Social Democratic Union from the prior parliament95. No member of the 
Civic Action faction entered the new legislature. Anatolii Malofeev, the first secretary 
of the Communist Party of Belarus during 1990-1991, was appointed Chairman of the 
new parliament96. The 1996 institutional crisis had debilitating consequences for many
93 The opposition claimed gross violations in the voting procedure and refused to recognize the results of 
the vote.
94 For details see British Helsinki Committee Report on 1996 Referenda, at 
http://www.bhhrg.org/belarus/belarusl997/referendum.htm. retrieved June 2001.
95 Parliament: the National Assembly o f the Republic o f Belarus, Minsk 1997
96 This symbolises a ‘reversal’ of prior structures to their ‘places’, in Elster’s (1998: 295) words -  
example of a ‘backward linkage’ in action.
130
parties, including the PCB, which split on Lukashenko’s supporters -  the Communist 
Party of Belarus headed by Victor Chikin, and those who remained in opposition to 
authorities led by Sergei Kaliakin. The former PCB lost about 50% of its membership, 
and the Agrarian Party ceased to exist. However, as recent evidence suggests the pro­
regime party core was revamped by the presidential endorsement in spring 1999. There 
also was a break within the BNF, which led the party to a split in 2000. Furthermore, 
many smaller political organisations, i.e. parties, NGOs, and new-wave trade unions 
quietly disappeared from the Belarus political scene.
The alteration of Belarus’ transitional path did not occur merely due to either 
Lukashenko’s excellent skills of manoeuvring or incongruent strategies of his opponents, 
including ill-prepared opposition, which lacked internal unity, and fought petty wars with 
each other. At the other end, as ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages demonstrated, there 
were structural ■ factors, such as resourceful opportunities for the old-guard elites, 
censorship, and public adherence to a strong leadership, that stipulated non-democratic 
political change. The whole situation had opened up a window of opportunity for the rise 
of Lukashenko-type politician and formed a paradoxically sustainable regime based on a 
combination of a strong leadership, and truncated representation of public interests -  a 
delegative type of polyarchy. This presumes unlimited authority of the popularly elected 
leader, juxtaposed by limited representation and low intensive citizenship (O’Donnell, 
1993). Despite its democratic fa£ade, this type of regime may lead to a dictatorship, when 
not reinforced by functional representative institutions.
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The 1997-98 political years were characterised by continuing party decline, and their 
further disintegration. The new pro-presidential parliament proved to be compliant and 
non-initiative, living up to Lukashenko’s orders and his promises of support for the 
parliamentary elections in autumn 200097. The opposition have begun the politics of 
coalition and trust to each other, which spectacularly failed in April 1999 during their 
campaign for an alternative presidential election. Petty disputes, internal disagreements 
between the members of the opposition; and profiteering individualism let them down 
again. As Silitski (2000) notes:
...the November 1996 referendum looked as a fair and civilised process compared 
to the opposition elections in 1999. A well-known leader, Pozniak, who ran as 
BNF’s candidate against Michael Chigir98, withdrew from the race in the last days 
before the vote in order to prevent Chigir’s rising to political prominence99 
(Silitski, 2000: 27).
97 Lukashenko’s pledges to ‘defend’ his loyal deputies were fully fulfilled at the parliamentary elections 
2000. The first run-off was passed by the majority of non-partisan candidates, two members of the 
Communist Party of Belarus, 3 from the Agrarian Party, 1 from Party of People’s Accord (PNS) and 1 
from Social-Sport Party -  all pro-governmental organisations. See Appendix 2 for details. Otherwise, 
consult http://www.rec.gov.bv. retrieved November 2000 (subject to administered access by Belarus’ 
authorities); or http://www.agora.it/elections/election/belams.htm. retrieved June 2001; or British 
Helsinki Committee Report on 2000 elections at
http://www.bhhrg.org/belams/belams%202000/startpage.htm, retrieved June 2001.
98 Michael Chigir was a former Prime Minister, who was dismissed by Lukashenko for his liberal views.
"See: ZenonPozniak, “Praekt Cyhir,” Naviny, 12 March 1999, p .2
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Pozniak’s behaviour eventually led to a split within the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) 
in September 1999. When the majority of the BNF congress disapproved of Pozniak’s 
tactics and did not re-elect him for another term in office, his loyalists attempted to form 
a new party, which they called the Conservative Christian Party. The United Civil Party, 
of which Victor Gonchar was a member, was also close to a split over his maverick 
tactics. With a younger generation of leadership coming to power, party profiles as well 
as their tactics and popularity are gradually changing for the better. Nevertheless, 
despite their efforts, today’s opposition failed to unify and oppose illegitimate actions of 
the president. Moreover, in some cases, the opposition seemed better at discrediting 
themselves than Lukashenko’s propaganda.
The population had made their rational choice by supporting the president in hope for 
short-term benefits. The newly introduced institutional structures moulded the 
president’s authority and public choice. The rest was the matter of cosmetic politics and 
nurturing of autocratic will. Lukashenko consequently introduced a ‘command 
hierarchy’ of his loyal appointees to control authorities at various levels. This helped 
him curtail developing trends of de-centralisation and regionalism. The fact that 
regional elections of representative bodies went on without scandalous interference of 
the opposition proved how well trained the presidential bureaucracy had become. 
Furthermore, Lukashenko’s decree Number 2 on ‘Compulsory registration of political 
parties and non-governmental organisations’ passed in January 1999, facilitated further 
decline of the incipient party system in Belarus.
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Always active, trade unions were also wisely curbed on the eve of the parliamentary 
elections. The leader of traditional trade unions, Nikolai Goncharik, who might have 
become one of the bright contestants for the presidency in 2001, was forced to a deal 
with the president. The compromise was motivated by the president’s voluntary 
decision to take a ‘holiday-making’ privilege away from the unions and appoint a 
special procedural committee to do it. Furthermore the president had decided to 
decentralise the method of payment of the unions’ membership fees, forcing the unions 
to collect them individually. Traditionally, 1% of membership fees was debited 
automatically from workers’ wages and hence, was a ‘non-painful’ procedure for both 
sides. After a presidential decree, it would become a procedure similar to club 
membership, when members had to pay individually to the unions’ treasurer. It is 
obvious that in the situation of national impoverishment not many unions’ members 
would have agreed to accept the new deal. Hence, trade unions had to opt for a 
compromise with the president on the eve of parliamentary elections 2000.
Presidential policy towards the main education institutions in the country is also worthy 
of mentioning. Knowing that the opposition targets universities as large pools for their 
potential recruits, especially of the Belarusian State University in Minsk, the president 
appointed a new rector, Viacheslav Kozulin100. He suddenly decided to play by 
democratic rules and even organised his own election, being the only candidate on the 
list for nomination within the university.
100 Subsequently, Kozulin has received a Ministerial portfolio, parallel to that held by Vasilii Strazhev, 
the Minister o f Education, to control universities’ policy-making in the country.
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3.1.4 International standpoint and further discussion
Teresa Dumasy (2000) observes that Belarus’ position has worsened on the international 
arena with the introduction of presidency. Over the last few years, the lack of significant 
economic and commercial interest in Belarus from Western Europe has allowed the 
European Union to pursue a consistently tough line on democracy and human rights in 
Belarus. Nevertheless, beyond sporadic periods of dialogue and optimism, this has 
produced little consistent improvement in relations or in the level of democracy in 
Belarus. In 1999 hopes for progress were raised when Lukashenko, frustrated by Russia’s 
foot-dragging over the Union, indicated that he wished to improve relations with the West. 
Rather than heralding a shift in policy however, it soon became clear that this was 
intended to push Russia into speeding up the process of integration. There was also 
optimism last September when the Belarusian government agreed to begin preliminary 
round-table talks with the opposition and non-governmental organisations, mediated by 
the OSCE101. Lukashenko appointed Mikhail Sazonov as his official representative at the 
talks, which were aimed at establishing agreement on the conditions and procedures for 
free and fair parliamentary elections in October 2000. These were to include a revised 
electoral code, access for the opposition to the state media, and determination of the 
functions of the future parliament. While a set of arrangements was accepted for 
opposition access to the media on 5 November, before the end of the month they were 
rejected by Lukashenko and on 7 December, the day before the signing of the Union 
Treaty with Russia, Sazonov was dismissed. Lukashenko has since decided to abandon
101 See OSCE report on the assessment of the electoral code in Belarus: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/belaOO-l-adooted.htm, retrieved June 2001.
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OSCE-mediated talks, and proceed with direct dialogue between government and 
representatives of civil society, including some opposition parties. However, the majority 
of the opposition parties already refused to participate directly.
Such false moves and about-turns by Lukashenko have instilled scepticism in the West 
towards the sincerity of Belarus’ desire for rapprochement with the EU. In the eyes of 
some Western commentators, Lukashenko is both unwilling and unable to change. He 
has identified himself so closely with unification with Russia, and harbours such deep 
mistrust of the West, that it is impossible for him to redress the balance in foreign policy 
and to permit an internal move towards a policy based on Western values. Clearly, 
however, such an attitude leaves little room for dialogue or improving relationships with 
the West, who adopt a passive policy awaiting a more democratic leadership.
Belarus has survived for over ten years -  the longest period in its history -  as an 
independent state. It has often been stressed that the country occupies an important geo­
strategic position at the very centre of Eastern Europe. To its northwest and west side 
are such states as Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania that have clearly taken on economic 
reforms and developed, albeit with varying degrees of success, as new democracies. To 
the South and East are countries such as Ukraine, and Russia that have embarked on 
reforms, but have run into difficulties of both a political and an economic nature. They 
have not given up the struggle, but are facing questions potentially as serious as those in 
Belarus today. Belarus is a relatively homogenous republic, and it has a highly educated 
workforce. Its lack of natural resources might be considered as an impediment but it is
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not an insuperable one for a modem state, as the example of Japan has shown. Thus in 
some respects, Belarus might have significant advantages as a developing nation state.
Belarus is facing serious alternatives, but there is nothing inevitable about the decisions 
to be made. Either it can take its place as one of the European states that recognizes 
human rights and a pluralistic political system (as stipulated in the 1994 Constitution), 
or it can become a political and economic outsider. As such it will remain isolated from 
its neighbours through adherence to a state-controlled society and economy, with 
diminishing democratic and human rights, and with all power vested in its president. 
This latter alternative also entails the increasing impoverishment of its population with 
potentially devastating social consequences. As David Marples observes:
.. .the western democracies can facilitate change and a path of democratic reform 
first and foremost by recognizing that whereas the opposition has clung fastidiously 
to the mles of law set forth in the Constitution, the presidential administration has 
violated and continues to violate those laws at will (Marples, 2000: 57).
Until western policy, as epitomized by the OSCE and the European Union, 
acknowledges that international assistance is necessary for the Belarusians to understand 
what is required of them then there cannot be much hope of progress in any dialogue 
between the major antagonists in Belarus. Instead Belarusians will continue to 
experience the demagogic and erratic rule of Alexander Lukashenko, self-proclaimed 
“Orthodox atheist” and “president for life” (Marples, 2000).
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As one has witnessed:
(i) Structural legacies, of which a weak state, fully exploited by nomenklatura, 
ineffective law, system of patronage, and structural dependence on Russia 
remain the principal predicaments to party system institutionalisation;
(ii) This has been also reinforced by public traditionalist adherence to a strong 
leadership, medium nationalist stance, and pining for prior stability, which was 
usefully deployed by Lukashenko on referenda;
(iii) In addition, existing but subtle political divides, of which centre-periphery, as 
well as European/Russian identity are primary, -  appeared to have both positive 
and negative effects on the consolidation of the opposition.
Forward and backward linkages have demonstrated that a new regime in Belarus was 
structurally driven to amalgamate the properties of the socialist state. New 
developments were bound to occur in a situation dominated by former structures, and 
pervasive agency, i.e. nomenklatura. The effect of backward linkages can be identified 
when institutional choice takes place, bringing alterations to existing structures. It will 
become more evident with a detailed analysis of institutional engineering in Belarus 
presented in the next section. It will be demonstrated that institutions as well as 
individuals are the other significant driving forces to affect system settlement and 
prospects for democratisation.
138
3.2 Analysis o f institutional environment in Belarus
This section will investigate how the institutional environment may jeopardise the 
development of a newly emerged party political system. Theoretical debate about the 
impact of presidentialism on the consolidation of parties will precede the analysis of its 
implications for Belarus. The issues of constitution-making, electoral code, and 
delegated decision-making in the new state will also be examined. The logical question 
whether a strong presidency can co-exist with competitive parties, will be at the core of 
discussion in this section.
Political parties are a necessary component of a democratic polity (Epstein, 1967: 8), 
and their emergence is fundamental to achieving political stability in the newly emerged 
democracies. Yet, there is much evidence to suggest that political parties are having 
trouble establishing themselves as credible institutions in the post-communist regions. 
Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics are good examples of such 
behaviour. As Pammett and DeBardeleben (2000: 373) point out “while political parties 
and other electoral groupings have emerged in abundance, they may not form important 
reference points for citizens nor fulfil many of the functions commonly attributed to 
parties in the western literature”.
The experience of established democracies suggests that political parties are key 
institutions linking citizens with a broader political process. They fulfil this function in 
several ways: by aggregating and representing diverse public interests in the political 
arena; by orienting voters’ choice at elections; and once in power, by affecting a policy­
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making process that allows citizens to hold governments accountable for their actions 
(Ware, 1996; LeDuc and Norris, eds. 1996; Duverger, 1954, 1980; Sartori, 1976, 
Lawson et al., 1988, etc.). In order for parties to do so, there must not only be the 
agents’ will, but also the appropriate institutional structure, which will allow existence 
of competition and full representation of interests.
East European transitions to democracy appeared to be more complex than transitional 
theories could have foreseen. The paradox is that legitimate parties may not necessarily 
lead to a democratic settlement of the system, and adequately channel public interests 
within power institutions. Some democracies may have relatively structured parties, which 
may enjoy stable public support, have recognisable names, an identifiable leadership, and 
even resources to compete. Nevertheless, the anticipated consolidation or even a tendency 
towards it, never occurred, as experience of many CIS states reveals102.
The political situation in Belarus is such that, the party system remains incipient, and 
legitimate national parties are powerless. This is undoubtedly conditioned by leftover 
legacies and cultural norms, which provide emerging parties and other interest 
organisations with already a non-favourable environment for their settlement. This 
primarily includes weak state, dominated by communist nomenklatura, economic 
decline, non-transparent bureaucracy, state-owned media, and public historical
102 See debate regarding ‘incomplete democracies’ by Rose and Shin (1998) Qualities o f Incomplete 
Democracies: Russia, the Czech Republic and Korea compared. CSPP, 302. Glasgow: Strathclyde 
University; Rose and Mishler (2000) Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist versus 
idealist theories and measures. CSPP, 333. Glasgow: Strathclyde University.
140
adherence to a strong leadership. In addition, widespread hostility to the very idea of a 
political party has been the negative legacy of the past associated with 70 years of 
single-party rule and lack of any opposition.
However, the institutional background plays no less important role in structuring the 
opposition and their representation on the political arena. This is to say that there are not 
only structures, and cultural legacies, but also institutions that determine party system 
development and national prospects for democracy. The perpetual question here is why 
legitimate parties cannot surmount their ideological diversity and result in a coherent 
system -  a vital part of democratic institutionalisation. Instead, one witnesses parties’ 
internal weakness and self-seeking politics, which are ‘demoralised’ even further by the 
institutional structure within which they operate. As some scholars insist, apart from 
parties’ organisational weakness and lack of experience, a strong presidency and its 
implications are the other key for protracted system consolidation in third wave 
democracies. Let us pursue this argument.
Duverger (1954: xxxiii) notes, “the development of parties seems to be bound up with 
that of democracy, that is to say with the extension of popular suffrage and 
parliamentary prerogatives”. This suggests that parties first, are “a necessary though 
insufficient condition for consolidating democracy and governing effectively” (Ibid); 
and secondly, they are also inevitable by-product of democratisation.
The level of party development and performance, hence, must be causally linked to the 
degree of democratic maturity of the nation. The latter implies ‘embedded-ness’ of
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parties into the societal fabric, and thus some regularity in the patterns of inter-party 
competition and thus relative predictability of the outcomes of the electoral game. This 
also suggests that “party organisations are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious 
leaders; they acquire an independent status and value of their own” (Mainwaring, 1997: 
23). As one can see there is a degree of reciprocity between building party system and 
building democracy. However, the logic of the argument does not entirely reflect the 
complexities of political transition of the new states. When democratised, new regimes 
may not necessarily contain stabilised parties or settled constituencies, but nevertheless, 
acquire some degree of democratic irrevocability103. There also may be an opposite 
tendency when parties may be legitimate and electorally recognised players of the game, 
which is not necessarily democratic in nature. What is clear is that parties need 
institutional incentives to form a ‘habit’ of representation amongst the populace, to 
express their right ‘to be heard’ and to challenge the government when necessary. This 
lawful ‘habituation’ is essential to ensure the irreversibility of the process of 
democratisation for the country via popular support.
Sartori (1976: 268) defines a structured party system as “a state of the system in which 
the major parties become ‘solid’ and more ‘real’ than the personalities”. This definition, 
however, does not establish the difference between ‘structured’ parties and a 
‘structured’ party system. Sartori (1994:108) suggests that party systems actually enjoy 
an inherent bias towards stability, as parties consolidate: “Once electorates had become
103 This occurred in Russia, and implies a situation of public awareness and expected participation in 
political life of the country. At least Russian people can expect to be heard and, if disagree, have a right 
to manifest against regime.
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fully mobilised, and once the institutional structures of mass democracy had become 
consolidated, a crude equilibrium became established; thereafter, and at least to a larger 
extent, the laws of inertia could take over” (Ibid: 108). This may not necessarily be the 
case, as many new democracies demonstrate, however, what is true, is that the 
institutional environment that produces an inertia effect, is indeed essential for 
maintaining stability. Institutions foment the ‘quality of democracy’ and determine 
parties’ ‘freezing into place’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), with which democratic 
equilibrium and party system institutionalisation tend to establish.
The issue of strong presidencies amid the institutional structures is of particular 
importance for the newly emerged democracies, and it assists the answer of why structures 
or agency are not individually sufficient for the consolidation of a democratic regime.
3.2.1 The impact of a strong presidency on party system formation
Democracy allows different forms of democratic government. It rests on the idea of 
legitimacy and accountability of the rulers vis-a-vis the ruled. Two basic concepts that 
underlie the rich variety of institutional patterns of democratic government can be 
distinguished here. One system aims at expression of the sovereign unitary and 
homogeneous popular will through the legislative institutions (parliamentary 
sovereignty). Presidency is another alternative for the expressions of the public will 
(executive sovereignty). Government systems may range between the two extremes, 
from the legislature with full power of decision-making to the reverse case where the 
parliament is a mere addition to the popularly elected (executive) president (Elster et al.
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1998: 94-5). It is frequently argued that presidential systems are less stable and therefore 
particularly perilous for settling democracies that are usually overloaded with economic, 
social and political problems and inherited legacies of the authoritarian past.
Shugart and Carey (1992) note, in their study of Latin American democracies, that most 
presidential democracies are characterised by weak and unstable party systems. They 
argue, for example, that inefficient legislatures, made up of weak parties and egocentric 
politicians, tend to delegate powers to the president as a way of overcoming 
immobilism. Shugart also submits that in the case of Eastern Europe where the past 
legacies provide strong incentives for the communists to remain in power or to re-assert 
their influence, the presidency would be the optimal solution to meet their demands. 
This is thought to control the legislature and to act as a brake on potentially unruly or 
unpredictable parliamentary delegates. Barbara Geddes (1996) argues that the 
delegation of power to a president may indeed take place, however the legislature in 
these circumstances tends to have a different rationale. Geddes (Ibid: 29) suggests that 
this happens because weak and fragmented parties undermine the legislature’s ability to 
develop and by that contribute to the accretion of presidential powers. As evidence 
shows, strong presidencies have been maintained in those countries, in which the 
president had the support of the strongest party, or was a popular figure in his own right, 
and the legislature was relatively weak. On the other hand, Arend Lijphart (1996) argues 
a strong presidency may also be a response to uncertainty and crisis, as an attempt to 
bring stability and reassurance. In any event, a critical debate about the merits and 
liabilities of presidentialism and its consequences for new democracies has become
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widespread. This necessarily highlights the impact of institutional settings and 
constitution making on party system formation.
Juan Linz (1994), the main opponent of presidentialism as a suitable form for a sustainable 
democracy, defines it as a regime in which, the president is a popularly elected104 chief 
executive with a fixed term in office. Under ‘pure’ presidentialism, the president also 
possesses the right to appoint ministers regardless of the composition of the congress. Linz 
believes that a presidential regime has more vices than virtues for the advancement of a 
new democracy. ‘Dual democratic legitimacy’ and ‘rigidity’ of the system are regarded as 
the principal ‘perils’ of presidentialism that may endanger the prospects for stability of a 
new democracy, and undoubtedly inhibit party system development.
Przeworski (1996: 49) notes, “parliamentary systems in the poorest countries, while still 
fragile, are almost twice as likely to survive as presidential democracies”. Linz (1994) 
grounds his analysis on a historical overview of newly established democratic regimes, 
and concludes that presidential systems are potentially fated not to develop into a stable 
and flourishing democracy.
First, since both the president and the assembly have competing claims to legitimacy, 
and both, “ .. .derive their power from the vote of the people in a free competition among 
well-defined alternatives, a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt 
dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it” (Linz, 1994: 7). In a 
parliamentary democracy, if the majority of the assembly approves a change against the
104 Or elected by the Electoral College.
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will of the president, it can replace the government by exercising a no confidence vote. 
In opposition, presidentialism is fraught with stalemates and revolutions.
Second, the fixed term of the president’s office may cause rigidity, “ ...that makes 
adjustment to changing situations extremely difficult; a leader who has lost the confidence 
of his own party or the parties that acquiesced his election cannot be replaced” (Linz, 
1994: 9-10). In contrast, by virtue of their ability to promote changes in the cabinet and 
government, parliamentary systems afford greater opportunity for survival.
Third, presidentialism “introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into democratic 
politics with rules that tend toward a ‘winner-take-all’ outcome” (Ibid: 18), which may 
imbue the presidents with a feeling that they do not need to undertake the tedious 
endeavours to construct coalitions and make concessions to the opposition.
Fourth, the style of presidential politics is less propitious to democracy than that of 
parliamentary politics. As Mainwaring (1997: 450) argues the sense of being 
representative of the entire nation may lead the president to be intolerant of the opposition.
Finally, political outsiders, entrepreneurs or non-partisan candidates are more likely to 
win the chief executive office in presidential systems with potentially dangerous effects. 
As Mainwaring (Ibid: 451) writes, “individuals elected by direct popular vote are less 
dependent on and less beholden to political parties. Such individuals are more likely to 
govern in a populist, anti-institutionalist fashion”. In conclusion Linz submits:
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.. .the basic structural characteristic of a presidential system makes it more likely 
that they will encounter serious difficulties and that, under certain circumstances, 
they might contribute to the breakdown of democracies that, with adequate 
parliamentary institutions, might have had a better chance to survive (Linz, 1997: 1).
Other scholars (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; LeDuc and 
Norris, 1996; Taras, 1997; Moser, 1998) add complementary institutional elements, such 
as electoral incentives, concurrency of elections, psychological effect of elections, and 
constitution making, to the conditions that may strengthen the ‘perils of presidentialism’. 
For example, proportional representation, and district magnitude tend to foster multi-party 
systems, which may be beneficial for developed democracies, but fraught with 
overrepresentation and interest dispersion in the legislature of the new regimes. As a 
consequence, weak coalitions, party disputes, factional conflicts will dominate and the 
politics of non-resistance to presidential power accretion may entrench. The president may 
even gain the majority of the mixed vote in the legislature105.
Concurrent elections106 may have a dual effect (van der Eijk, 1996) on those who vote 
‘with the boot’ by expressing anger and dissatisfaction with incumbent authorities, or 
acting parties and ‘with heart’ by placing hopes and endorsing a leader of the nation 
with full power to govern. A psychological effect as Moser (1998: 58-9) describes, “is
105 For example, as happened in Belarus, non-partisan faction may form the core of the president’s 
supporters in Belarus.
106 This also includes effect of concurrent political events such as the 1995 parliamentary elections and a 
referendum, initiated by the president in Belarus.
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much like the assumed consolidating effect of single-member district electoral systems”. 
Since only one individual can occupy a presidency, voters tend to refrain from 
supporting marginal candidates out of fear of wasting their vote, and support more 
popular candidates who are capable of winning office and governing with better effect, 
even if they are not their first choice.
Another obstacle for advancing democracy in a presidential system relates to the 
procedure of candidate selection. To become elected, candidates for the presidency need to 
assemble a broad multi-party coalition in multiparty systems, and, hence, they are obliged 
to take supra-party postures or to distance themselves from parties (Mainwaring, 1995). 
Candidates with anti-party proclivity are, therefore, more likely to be elected. In office, 
they continue pursuing supra- or anti-party policies, having powerful incentives for doing 
so: they need parliamentary support for decision-making or they tend to circumvent the 
legislature, feeling no need for consensual decision-making.
Finally, constitutions often create favourable circumstances for promoting strong 
presidencies. New and inexperienced legislatures frequently do not take into account 
outcomes of the presidential office if they are not reinforced by other controlling 
mechanisms (separation of powers, non-confidence vote, right of the referenda, 
independence of mass media and so on). In some cases presidencies may be produced 
“by the tailor for the tailor” (Elster, 1998), or simply to escape the straightjacket of 
governing by rules.
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Linz (1994: 34) notes ‘perils’ of presidentialism: a tendency to produce a rather 
enduring effect on the system, which is associated with (i) perpetually weak parties; (ii) 
ongoing legislative-executive conflict that tends to settle down into one of the extremes, 
and often, as a result (iii) increasing power of president. He states that one of the 
features of presidential regimes in new democracies is the evidence that parties are 
weak, lack discipline and representatives behave in parochial and self-interested ways. 
These characteristics of parties and their parliamentary representatives, in turn, make it 
possible for strong presidencies to flourish, especially in multi-party systems. To 
support this argument, Lijphart (1996; 240) argues that a president’s power depends on 
more than his/her formal constitutional prerogatives and the prestige conferred by direct 
elections. Presidential power may be enhanced under the two different conditions: a 
strong pro-presidential party in the legislature or a large number of weak and ineffective 
parliamentary parties.
According to Linz (1994: 35), a president without a clear majority in a multiparty 
situation with ideological and disciplined parties finds it difficult to govern, and even 
more difficult with an opposition majority in congress. This tends to perpetuate a 
vicious circle in party and presidential system development. Disintegrated parties 
initially enhance a strong presidency, which does not allow effective party system 
stabilisation, even if parties thrive afterwards. Linz points out that the situation with 
fragmented legislatures, thus, gives a president the possibility of:
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...convincing individual legislators, of producing schisms within the parties, and 
forming local clientelistic alliances that enables him to govern and enact his 
program without a majority [in parliament] (Linz, 1994: 35)107.
He concludes that the idea of a more disciplined and ‘responsible’ party system is 
structurally in conflict, if not incompatible, with pure presidentialism, especially in the 
process of its accretion. In the situation of a multi-party system with highly competitive 
parties, further developments are likely to be in the direction of limitation of party 
activities. Thus, it is not only personalities and political culture, but also political 
structures that explain why presidents act against parties.
The consequences are likely to be the continuing weakness of the party system even if 
parties attempt to surmount their organisational inefficiency, and the effect of ‘second- 
order’ preferences by the electorate of parties in favour of the president. The implication 
is that a balance of power in the country would not really be altered by the results of 
parliamentary elections or activities of parties-in-office, nor would the composition of 
government or the efficacy of reforms. Voters’ perceptions of parties as lacking power 
tend to distort the process of establishing party system equilibrium.
One has to agree that the spectre of presidentialism looms over the newly established state. 
In their critical analysis of Linz’s argument against presidentialism, Mainwaring and
107 This is exactly what happened in Belarus over the years. Parliament was rather fragmented which 
allowed the president to find an ‘individual approach’ to most of the deputies (110 out of 156), and 
finally to ‘call’ for obedient and loyal parliament in 1997.
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Shugart (1997: 451) however, state that parliamentary systems may well possess similar 
incentives for the breakdown of fragile democratic regimes: “to a lesser degree than in 
presidential systems, conflicting claims to legitimacy also exist in parliamentary systems”. 
In consequence, they argue that presidentialism affords some attractive features:
.. .that can be maximized through careful attention to constitutional design’ and they 
partially offset the liabilities of presidentialism. This includes a greater choice for 
voters at elections: ‘voters can support one party or candidate at the legislative level 
but another for the head of government (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 460).
This, however, may have a dual effect. Van der Eijk and his colleagues (1996) in their 
analysis of European elections observed a paradox when voters tend to promote more 
‘important’ parties as more effective in decision-making, on the national level, and less 
known parties on the European parliamentary level. This may be related to the situation 
of presidential elections, when voters having ‘a greater choice’ can treat a president as a 
more effective ‘investment’ and indifferently cast their votes for parties at other 
elections. Firstly this can occur when two institutions possess unequal powers to 
arbitrate the process. A second feature, Mainwaring and Shugart identify (1997), is 
electoral “accountability and indentifiability” where the latter refers to the voters’ ability 
to make an informed choice prior to the elections based on their ability to assess the 
likely range of post-election governments (Ibid: 461). This, however, can be equally 
applicable to parliamentary systems, when parties nominate individuals to act for and be 
identified on parties’ behalf prior to elections. Finally, the congressional independence 
of presidents from parliaments in legislative matters may allow the resolution of
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deadlocks without antagonism. At the same time this can be fraught with political 
volition of the superior side -  the president, and consequently, with inaccuracy and even 
irresponsibility of decision-making.
Party system stabilisation depends on structured institutions and institutionalised 
procedures. Mainwaring (1997: 391) notes that democracy cannot thrive on the kind of 
erratic personalised political life that results from the absence of such institutions. 
Presidential systems are less favourable to an institutionalising democracy than 
parliamentary systems (Linz, 1994), especially in the case of multi-party systems. 
Multi-partism increases the likelihood of the executive-legislative deadlock and 
immobilism in decision-making. It also increases the likelihood of ideological 
polarisation, and interest fragmentation. Finally, as Mainwaring (1993: 212-3) submits, 
with multi-partism, presidents need to build inter-party coalitions to get measures 
through the legislature, which are less stable and more difficult to form than in the 
parliamentary form of governance. Nevertheless in his article with Shugart (1997: 467) 
they suggest that “extreme multi-partism does not doom presidential democracies, but it 
does make their functioning more difficult”.
As analysis suggests, presidentialism may be a ‘slippery’ path for a young democracy, 
fraught with danger of reversal course and dictatorial politics. Nevertheless as history 
indicates, if ‘treated’ carefully on the constitutional, institutional and electoral levels, it 
may survive and lead democracy to stability (USA model, France, contemporary 
Finland, Switzerland). Apart from the USA, the named examples are semi-presidential 
or hybrid systems, which, as many argue, causally makes it possible for them to survive.
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Realising the potential danger of the pure type of presidentialism for democracy, 
Duverger developed the concept of semi-presidentialism108. This presumes a popularly 
elected president holding considerable powers and in opposition a prime minister who 
possesses executive and governmental powers and can stay in office only if parliament 
does not express its opposition to him (Duverger, 1954: 122). As Bamo, Bayerlein and 
Veser (1998) assert, semi-presidentialism can be commonly regarded as a more suitable 
regime for newly emerged democracies, which are transforming from authoritarian 
political systems associated with non-existent or weak party structures, and need a 
decisive guidance.
It has been argued that stable and firm governments can be guaranteed by an executive 
presidency with a democratic appearance, but without too much interference from 
parliament. In general terms what semi-presidentialism allows is the strong governance by 
the head of state, and by which the prime minister is fairly independent and forms a third 
angle in disputes. This may eliminate extreme cases and stalemates in development of new 
democracies, inasmuch as the Prime Minister possesses enough power to arbitrate the 
conflict. This mechanism of semi-controlled presidency could be archetypal for new 
democracies opting for strong leadership and representative governance.
There are no existing regimes to refer to for descriptions of semi-presidential regime; 
and the experiences of the French Republic, and the Weimar Republic, are the only 
historical examples available. Nevertheless, Sartori (1994:110) asserts that semi-
108 Shugart and Carey (1992) termed it as ‘premier-presidential’ system that implies some limitations of 
presidential powers.
153
presidentialism as well as semi-parliamentarism can improve the pure types of regime: 
to quote Sartori “our best hopes lies in mixed solutions” (Ibid: 115). Potential danger 
may be that transient semi-presidential regimes can move to their extreme, i.e. the fully 
presidential form of governance, if not reinforced both institutionally and culturally. 
Again, Belarus is an example of this kind of development: it was launched as a 
sustainable semi-parliamentary republic associated with the supreme power of 
parliament and the president was to fulfil the duties associated with the head of state. 
Nevertheless, with the conflict o f ‘dual legitimacy’, weak coalition incentives for parties 
in office, and other factors, constitutional configurations were eventually altered in 
favour of presidentialism. Consequently, the Republic is presently moving toward a 
super-presidential regime that has a danger of sliding into dictatorship due to the lack of 
controlling mechanisms in society.
3.2.2 Belarus’ institutional environment
Belarus is a useful candidate for analysis of a failing democracy, in which the power of 
the president dominates weak and fragmented opposition parties and an explicitly 
‘tamed’ legislature. What becomes particularly clear is the continuing connection 
between the past and the future; that is, when individuals operating within certain 
structural environments make choices (‘forward linkage’), which in turn originate from 
the ‘mist of the past’ (‘backward linkage’) (Elster et al, 1998). Whatever scenario was 
initially planned or ‘tailored’ for the country, the outcome has nevertheless been 
triggered by a combination of factors, in which constitution making and electoral 
arrangements play an important role.
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In Belarus the strong presidency was self-tailored by the ‘old-guard’ communist 
majority in parliament, to secure their position in a changing society. Barbara Geddes 
(1996: 23) adroitly notices that, “stronger presidencies and more majoritarian systems of 
legislative representation tend to be associated with Communist parties that were 
relatively strong at the time the institutions were chosen”. In all cases of East European 
democracies, communist negotiators favoured a strong presidency, since they still 
possessed relative popularity and power, and were expected to win the post and by that 
strengthen their power and legitimacy. As Geddes (Ibid: 22) asserts communists’ 
preferences for majoritarian systems had three sources. These are [1] overestimation of 
their own popularity; [2] the desire of many successor party politicians to run as 
individuals unhampered by the party label; [3] and their control of the grassroots, intact 
in most cases, which provided them with a pre-existing local political machinery and 
patronage network. So, when it comes to a discussion of the issue of the presidency, two 
questions become apparent: (i) why should the parliamentary republic need a 
presidency; and (ii) what design it will have.
In Belarus, a republic that was tom with conflicts and petty wars between politicians, 
the Presidency was seen as the best means to establish order and authority over disputes. 
The downside, though, was to secure the position of the Party of Power, as the 
conservative majority in parliament led by the Prime Minister Viacheslav Kebich. As 
Silitski observes:
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...the adoption of a new Constitution that established the position of a ‘strong’ 
President was a continuation of the hardliners’ march that started with the removal 
of Suskievich. The “Party of Power” sought to consolidate its grip on power by 
electing Kiebich as a President (Silitski, 2000: 17).
Many members of parliament, who later joined the anti-system opposition, had 
supported the initiative of the Party of Power to concentrate unlimited authority in the 
hands of one man. One of them was the parliamentary speaker Miacheslav Gryb, who 
claimed that unless a presidency was introduced, the country would stay ungovemed109. 
Another was Viktor Gonchar, a popular deputy of the Supreme Soviet and in the future 
Lukashenko’s enemy, who recently went missing. Although parliamentary in origin, a 
new democratic regime was deemed to become arbitrary if  the presidency, culturally 
agreeable with the traditions and authoritarian attitudes of the elite and compliance of 
the electors, were instituted in the changing society. Economic decline and political 
disarray reinforced the choice of the presidency. Sartori (1994: 108) argued that the 
general disagreement of “people who endorse presidentialism, is that effectiveness is to 
be preferred to paralysis, and the parliamentary systems are immobilist and inefficient”.
109 “I believed that the authority in Belarus should have a certain force, because Parliament could not 
decide anything. The speaker and the prime minister had no power, for they could be appointed and 
removed at any time. The Parliament is split on clans, groups, such as agriculture, defence industry, 
electronics; there was no chance to decide anything. We have a normal constitution, but people were not 
ready for a democracy. If there were a normal President, the Constitution would work. But he is a sick 
man.” Interview with Miacheslav Gryb by Vitali Silitski (2000).
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14 March 1994 was the turning point in the democratic history of Belarus. According to 
the new constitution, the republic was designed to be semi-parliamentary with a bulk of 
power belonging to the parliament, and accordingly ‘balanced’ by presidential authority. 
The Supreme Council was the highest representative, standing and sole legislative body 
of state power. Amongst others, it had the principal right to (i) call national referenda;
(ii) adopt and amend the constitution; (iii) call elections; (iv) form the Central 
Commission on Elections and Referenda; (v) elect the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court, the Procurator-General; and (vi) indict and remove the president from 
office, by no less than 2/3 of the elected members of parliament, if he/she violated the 
law, or committed crime110 [Article 86].
According to the 1994 constitution the president was the head of state and the Chief 
Executive. He had the right (i) to ensure the cooperation of executive bodies with the 
legislature; (ii) to appoint and dismiss, with the consent of the Supreme Council, the 
Prime Minister, his deputies, ministers of foreign affairs, finance, defence, and other;
(iii) to introduce to the Supreme Council candidates for election for the post of the 
chairman of the Constitutional Court, chairman of the Supreme Court, and so on; and 
finally (iv) to be a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces [Article 100]. It is worth 
mentioning that the president did not have power to dissolve the parliament.
110 Belarus’ Constitution 1994, http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/, retrieved June 2001. The analysis of 
constitution-making in Belarus can also be found at
http://www.tourolaw.edu/Publications/interationallawrev/vol6/part3.html. retrieved June 2001.
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This was a situation where the ‘perils of presidentialism’ started undermining the 
government and parliament. On 24th June 1994 Alexander Lukashenko received 44.82% 
of the popular vote in the presidential election, Kebich finished second with 17.33%, 
Pozniak third with 12.82%, and Shushkevich fourth with 9.91%. In the second round of 
voting which took place on 10th July, the conservative communist forces capitulated: 
Lukashenko won 80.4% over Kebich who respectively received only 14.2% from voters 
(voter turnout was estimated about 70%)’u. The psychological effect of the presidential 
election with the majority run-off in a single member district had an impact as well. In a 
‘winner-take-all’ election people invested their votes in Lukashenko as against Kebich -  
the better of the ‘two evils’. His image as a young, enthusiastic, corruption-fighter, and 
non-nomenclatura recruit had its effect. In addition, some electors obviously came to 
vote, ‘with the boot’ having negative pre-dispositions for Shushkevich as a loser- 
democrat and Pozniak as a ‘Nazi supporter’ as the media portrayed him. V.Kebich, V. 
Novikov, and A.Dubko were seen as ‘shadows’ of the past, to which the majority of the 
population did not want to retreat. Alexander Lukashenko took office already with plans 
to fully restructure power institutions to his advantage. As a result the eventual 
breakdown of semi-parliamentary regime into a system of personal rule occurred due to 
a combination of factors, of which parties, public attitudes, existing structures and 
institutions were part. As Linz (1997) posits, a strong presidency depends on the support 
of other institutions, or otherwise, their malfunctioning.
The ‘mechanical’ effect of the presidential election was such that voters were 
encouraged to focus on individuals and endorse their trust in non-partisan candidates -
111 See for information http ://www. agora, it/e lections/e lection/bearus .htm. retrieved June 2001.
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political entrepreneurs -  rather than party members. As Mainwaring (1997: 22) 
suggests, “in the inchoate party system, the space for populists is greater because party 
affiliations do not structure the vote... Voters are more likely to respond to personal 
appeals than to the candidates’ party affiliation”. Lukashenko was elected as a populist 
figure and he continued acting as an ‘anti-party’ man, and in so doing, he violated the 
rules of the game which was thought to become the only ‘game in town’ -  semi- 
parliamentary democracy. The situation of dual legitimacy immediately occurred, 
causing more impasses in decision-making than ever before. At this time Lukashenko’s 
personality played an overwhelming role in the politics that brought him popular 
support in a system of weakening parties and a non-productive, conservative and 
confrontational legislature.
While actions of the legislature might have facilitated Lukashenko’s rise to power, his 
policy has been to reduce its powers significantly so that the parliament would become a 
compliant and uncritical tool in president’s hands. His first major conflict with 
parliament transpired in 1995 when he proposed to call a referendum, which coincided 
with the parliamentary elections for the 13th Supreme Council. Lukashenko wisely 
counted on the psychological effect that the questions might have on electors while 
voting for the parliamentary candidates112. These questions were related to the approval 
of closer ties with Russia; the introduction of Russian as a second state language; the 
replacement of the post-independence national symbols with the Soviet-era ones; and 
giving the President the right to dissolve the Parliament. In other words, by introducing
112 Once again, Lukashenko carefully deployed the impact of cultural norms and classic ‘homing’ patterns 
of voters’ behaviour in his campaign for super-presidential power.
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these issues for the referendum, he aimed to provoke public nostalgia and destroy 
voters’ emerging nationalist stance in one movement. As McMahon (1997: 131) 
records, eighteen BNF deputies led by Pozniak went on hunger strike to protest at the 
referendum. The parliament agreed to accept only one of the four questions, which was 
on closer ties with Russia. Lukashenko responded that if the parliament refused his 
offer, he would dissolve it on the basis of the violation of the Constitution. The police, 
on the grounds of a bomb search, forcibly removed opposition deputies from the 
parliament building. Parliament had eventually to agree to accept three questions 
proposed by Lukashenko, except the one, which was allowing its dissolution by the 
president. This power conflict indicates how fragile the balance of dual legitimacy was 
in society, and how more assertive the politics of one man could be in order to out-play 
fragmented parties and a weak parliament.
The 1995 parliamentary elections were held twice, due to the failure to produce sufficient 
quorum from the 174 elected MPs for convening the legislature, according to the 1994 
Constitution. More crucially, in the interim period Lukashenko governed by decree, which 
enabled him to acquire even more power. Soon after the first referendum, and on the 
pretext of the ineffective legislative-executive relationship that inhibited the operation of 
both, Lukashenko proposed to call another referendum to vote on his version of the new 
Constitution. As Margery McMahon (1997: 132) notes, “although still largely composed 
of conservatives and neo-communists, the parliament tried to resist and obstruct 
Lukashenka’s decrees and the gradual accumulation of power in his hands”. Parliament in 
reply to the president’s draft of the new constitution designed their own, offering a tighter 
control of presidential powers. Both versions were presented for public consent in a
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referendum on 7th November 1996. Due to his popularity, which was opposed by an 
awkward ‘president-dumping’ campaign led by the opposition, Lukashenko’s version of 
the constitution won overwhelming support of 70.5% of the vote, whereas the 
parliament’s version received only 7.9%113. This demonstrates once again the effect of 
‘liabilities’ or ‘perils’ of presidentialism, in which the president always aims to expand his 
power and avoid tedious compromises over the ‘dual legitimacy’.
Another peril -  system rigidity -  came to the fore when Lukashenko’s version of the 
Constitution was accepted. His tenure in office was now extended by another two years 
(until 2001), and he also received the right to set the date of elections, call parliamentary 
sessions and dissolve the legislature [Art. 84]. The parliament was divided into two 
chambers. The lower chamber -  the House of Representatives- was composed of 110 
MPs from the 13th Supreme Soviet, who recognised Lukashenko’s constitution. The 
upper chamber comprise the Council of Republic with 68 members, eight of which are 
directly appointed by the president and 56 elected by secret ballot of deputies of local 
soviets in the country’s regions114.
More specifically, with the altered Constitution the president became the sole Head of 
State. He also altered the nomination procedure for the presidency [Article 81]. 
Previously a candidate had to collect 100,000 signatures from the electorate for a 
nomination, or alternatively he could be recommended by no less than 70 MPs of the 
parliament. Lukashenko, by cancelling the latter, eliminated the possibility of the
113 British Helsinki Committee Report on 1996 Referenda, at 
http ://www.bhhrg.org/belarus/belarus 1997/referendum.htm. retrieved June 2001.
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parliament to nominate a presidential candidate. Apart from other responsibilities, the
president has also obtained the right to [Article 84]:
(i) call regular and extraordinary elections to the House of Representatives, the 
Council of the Republic and local representative bodies [used to be a prerogative 
o f the parliament];
(ii) dissolve the chambers of the Parliament;
(iii) appoint six members of the Central Commission on Elections and National
Referenda [used to be a fu ll prerogative o f the parliament];
(iv) form, dissolve and reorganize the Administration of the President -  the 
presidential ‘vertical’ that also has control over activity of the local councils in 
the regions and Minsk [and hence, has control over the election procedure into 
the upper chamber o f  the legislature];
(v) appoint with the consent of the Council of the Republic the Chairperson of the 
Constitutional, Supreme and Economic Courts from among the judges of these 
courts [which previously used to be an advisory function o f the president];
(vi) appoint with the consent of the Council of the Republic the judges of the
Supreme and Economic Courts, Chairperson of the Central Commission of the
Republic of Belarus on Elections and National Referenda, the Procurator- 
General, the Chairperson and members of the Governing Board of the National 
Bank [used to be the sole prerogative o f the parliament];
(vii) appoint six members of the Constitutional Court, and other judges of the 
Republic of Belarus [used to be the sole prerogative o f the parliament];
114 Parliament: The National Assembly of the Republic o f Belarus. Minsk, 1997.
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(viii) dismiss the Chairperson and judges of the Constitutional, Supreme and 
Economic Courts, the Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of 
Belarus on Elections and National Referenda, the Procurator-General, the Chair­
person and members of the Board of the National Bank [used to be a sole 
prerogative o f the parliament];
(ix) appoint and dismiss the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [used to be a 
sole prerogative o f the parliament].
In summary, by amending the constitution Lukashenko has not only changed the 
arrangements of governance - with popular consent he also shifted power away from the 
legislature and formed a regime of supreme presidential authority115. The implication of 
this restructuring was the alteration of the course of democratisation, which could no 
longer be called ‘representative’. With some stretching, Belarus’ transitional fa?ade can 
be defined as a ‘delegative’ type of democracy; however the balance between this 
democracy and echoing dictatorship is very fragile. The autumn 2000 parliamentary 
elections could have ‘saved’ the situation from a looming prospect of plebiscitarian 
dictatorship if opposition parties had participated in campaign. This however, did not 
occur, and the country presently finds itself on the path, remote from democracy.
There has also been an effect of “a zero-sum game” during the regime’s turnover. 
Lukashenko proved that it is quite possible to outplay institutional limits and to tailor
115 The 1996 constitution has a similar design to that of the Russian Federation, 1993 (S. White, 2000. 
Ch.3). The difference in regimes’ development, then seems to lie in the strength of political players, the 
initiation of reforms and power restructuring.
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the constitution for the tailor’s needs, if personal ambitions and available resources 
permit. In order to achieve such stunning results, one must play ‘the game’ as forcefully, 
devotedly and under the principle of ‘winner-take-all’ or ‘all or nothing’ as the president 
does. Belarus is presently characterised by a malleable parliament, and even weaker 
parties. Behind this fagade there appear to be not only agents, but also agency that 
allows unlimited public tolerance of political volition and demagoguery; and structural 
loopholes for these outrageous moves in politics.
Lukashenko managed to avoid the showdown, which Yeltsin faced with the Russian 
Congress of People’s Deputies in autumn 1993. He, nevertheless, achieved greater 
results associated with a ‘pocket’ legislature, a defeated opposition and full power in his 
hands, by relatively peaceful means, and without bloodshed or military intervention. 
The Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, attempted a similar reshuffle, but failed to 
outplay the legislature in 1995-6. In fact, the regime in Ukraine can presently be 
described as a ‘tryarchy’ (or semi-presidential) based on shared power between 
President, Prime Minister, and Chairman of parliament. (Wilson, 1996: 95). As Wilson 
notices, Ukraine is much ahead of Belarus on the way to the real constitutionalism, 
which occurred with the consensual “passing of the 1996 constitution” which 
demonstrated “the willingness of politicians to allow their behaviour to be guided by 
constitutional norms” (Wilson, 1996: 95).
Lukashenko has successfully created a protective mechanism for his presidency -  a 
system of patronage, clientelism and patrimonialism. It works for the majority of the 
population based on a well-laid infrastructure and public relations. The president
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regularly meets with the people, he listens to their needs, and organises public hearings 
of parliamentary sessions to demonstrate his power and commitment to his electors. 
Lukashenko is rarely interviewed on television, but he is regularly mentioned in the 
news; and he is always at the heart of national central events (marathon, special 
Olympic games for children in need, etc.). He uses the lever of ‘Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet’ as a scapegoat for his policy-making failures. Two Prime Ministers and their 
Cabinets116 have been dismissed during the past five years not to mention minor 
‘domestic’ government reshuffles.
When Mainwaring enumerated the ‘appealing features’ of presidentialism, he perhaps 
meant its realisation within a reasonably institutionalised system, where each 
aggrandising attempt of the president over the legislature, is rebuffed by the latter in 
accordance with the law. Therefore, according to Mainwaring (1997), features such as a 
‘greater choice for voters’ which allows the electorate a clear choice of leaders on both 
governmental and parliamentary levels, or ‘electoral accountability’ of the elected 
policymakers who should feel “responsible to the citizens” (Ibid: 461), and 
“independence of representatives in legislative matters”, have little applicability to 
transitional systems of Eastern Europe. Under high uncertainty and economic pressure, 
they move from one extreme in power to another; and are still crafting their legal 
systems to optimise their effectiveness.
As McMahon (1997: 135) observes, “Lukashenka’s actions have given rise to concerns 
that he is building a dictatorship, and that the country’s shift to totalitarianism is under
116 These are M. Chigir (dismissed in 1996) and S. Ling (1997-9).
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way”. Paradoxically Lukashenko himself invited analogies with fascism when he 
‘discovered’ some appealing features of Hitler’s governance of Nazi Germany. A 
comparison with the Weimar Republic, as a historical parallel between patterns of party 
systems’ development, may be relevant to the current situation in Belarus. At the same 
time, this parallel has its own limits and, hence, must be treated carefully in comparison 
(Sakwa, 1996, Hanson, 1997; Feldman et al., 1994). As Richard Sakwa (1996: 371) 
argues, despite some apparent parallels between the two cases, “.. .references to Weimar 
... should be tempered by the fact that the world of the 1990s was a very different one 
from that of the 1920s or 1930s”. However what is true, is that Belarus, as well as 
Russia, Ukraine and other ex-Soviet republics “[face] the Old Weimar dilemma of how 
to run a democracy in the absence of a sufficient number of democrats”, and that its 
leadership is “repeating the mistake committed by Weimar -  giving absolute freedom to 
the enemies of democracy” (Hanson and Kopstein, 1997: 252).
Hanson and Kopstein (1997) used a three-dimensional approach in their comparison of 
the Weimar Republic and Russia after perestroika. They assessed:
(i) the degree of completeness of the revolutionary break with the prior imperial 
regime;
(ii) the degree of international pressure to marketize the economy; and
(iii) the degree of institutionalisation of a system of programmatic and 
representative political parties.
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Hanson and Kopstein (1997: 256) found that the Weimar republic was bom out of a 
weak revolution, in the sense that it never broke decisively with its pre-revolutionary 
past either sociologically or culturally. The commitment of the old imperial elites to the 
new democratic order was minimal and far from enthusiastic117. As Dahrendorf (1967) 
commented, “ .. .military officers and large agrarian interests still had undue influence on 
political discourse, while the social guarantors of democracy, the bourgeoisie, remained 
hopelessly weak and not very committed to constitutionalism.” The result was a utopian 
backlash that captured the state at the earliest possible convenience (Turner, 1975). 
Secondly, Germany in 1918 and later was exhausted by war. Its endeavours to develop, 
‘...organised capitalism’ was under pressure from the uncertainty of the post-war 
situation. As a result, state protection of declining industrial enterprises, cartelisation, 
agricultural subsidies to large estates in the East, subsidies to the armed forces, and to 
the conservative academia continued unabated (Hanson and Kopstein, 1997). 
International pressure was also very high. Scholars note that:
.. .the failure of the Weimar government to fully reform Germany’s heavily statist 
and protectionist economy might not have been sufficient to undermine 
democratic consolidation in the absence of significant and simultaneous pressures 
from the international market (Ibid: 259).
What is certain is that the burden of reparation payments and the strains of maintaining 
currency parity after 1929 reinforced the credibility of the extreme right who claimed a 
‘special path’ for Germany without international interference. The revolution of 1918
117 These developments are particularly similar to those at the outset of transition in Belams.
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might not have altered much of the social structure of the republic, but it did create an 
entirely new set of political institutions in Germany that channelled these social interests 
in a new way. Hanson and Kopstein (1997) commented, ‘although the Reich had 
possessed a parliament, it did not have parliamentary government. Parties in the 
Reichstag did not actually determine national policy.’ This was altered in 1923 with the 
introduction of proportional representation. The head of the state was a president, 
popularly elected for the seven-year term by the principle of the majority run-off. This 
was the route by which Hindenburg came to power in 1925. The system was initially 
designed as a semi-presidentialism. The president had rather limited powers and could 
only exercise them with the consent of the chancellor and his cabinet; he could govern 
by decree only in emergency cases. The Weimar party system displayed striking 
continuity with the past, and was characterised by established and identifiable political 
parties. The spectrum was essentially composed of five-parties ranging from the 
conservative right to the socialist left. It must be noted that the Weimar had a very 
articulated party system, in which the dimensions of party competition were clear to the 
citizenry. This involved the existence of ideological parties with clear group loyalties, 
which were potentially dangerous for the newly developing democracy. As Hanson and 
Kopstein (1997: 262) argue “each party ended up standing fast for its own principled, 
particularistic version of the public good and refused to compromise. This was a recipe 
for gridlock”. In summary, the Weimar republic in the 1920s and 1930s was 
characterised by the legislature being a superior articulator, but an extremely poor 
arbiter of social interests. The gap between the legislature and the executives was 
widening, and eventually allowed the country to slip into a semi-dictatorship by 
presidential decree. As Linz notes:
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...it was this combination of presidential power to dissolve the Reichstag and 
freedom to appoint a chancellor who would countersign the dissolution that led at 
the end of Weimar Republic, to the fateful elections in which the Nazis gained 
strength and finally, in the semi-free March 1933 election, a majority (Linz, 1997: 
48-49).
With Hitler’s becoming a chancellor of the Weimar Republic and his further succession 
to power in 1933, the fall of democracy and the dawn of dictatorship began.
If one compares the initial development of the two republics, Weimar Germany and 
post-Soviet Belarus, certain similarities can be observed. Both countries had protracted 
and incomplete ends to their prior regimes; both had stalled economies with inherited 
legacies from statist and protectionist styles of management, and both did little to deter 
economic demise. With minor differences, the style of political governance also has 
much in common: power-seeking legislatures; an arising dilemma of ‘dual legitimacy’ 
between the parliament and the president, which was rather a duel between the 
chancellor and the parliament in the Weimar republic.
The difference between the two republics is not in party strength, but rather in the 
partisan affiliation of the chosen leaders. In any case this led to a lack of compromise 
and demise of representation in both republics. In the Weimar republic Hitler had 
partisan support from the nationalists, which was a necessary catalyst for the promotion 
of individual governance. Lukashenko, on the contrary, is a non-partisan popularly
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elected leader who, nevertheless, managed to set up a puppet House of Representatives, 
appoint a Council of Republic, and Constitutional Court. In other words, he has full 
power, but with one difference. There is a fragmented, underground, but nevertheless, 
existent opposition to the incumbent, which still offers Belarus a chance to develop the 
fragile path towards democracy. In addition, international environments are different. If 
Belarus can be structurally prepared to take a chance of re-orienting itself towards the 
West and global economy, it may avoid wasteful feuds over the power distribution in 
society. This will be the argument of the next section.
3.2.3 Institutional requirements for building democracy
This section will investigate, whether there is a connection between presidentialism and 
weak party systems, and what requirements are necessary to sustain a strong presidency 
under control. In Belarus the general population allowed the introduction of supreme 
presidentialism over a semi-parliamentary regime, by that reducing their access to a 
decision-making process, and prospects for rapid recovery. It is obvious that with 
presidentialism, elections have a winner-take-all basis, which means that even when a 
presidential candidate wins the majority, a huge proportion of the population will go un­
represented. In addition, in a transient regime, the choice of a candidate may often be the 
lesser of two evils, especially reinforced by a two-round majoritarian code, in a single 
member district. Presidentialism is also fraught with dictatorial politics -  a phenomenon 
that post-communist nations wanted to avoid so much. Nevertheless, people happened to 
favour strong leadership and endorse their presidents with unlimited support as the ones 
who appeal to them directly and can make decisions faster and more efficiently than any
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possible coalition of weak and dispersed opposition. As Mainwaring (1997) notes, 
imaginative accountability and identifiability is what matters for a suffering nation.
Unfortunately populist leaders do little to improve structural and economic conditions, 
which may be painful in the medium term, and which, nevertheless, present the core 
solution for furthering democratisation. As Przeworski pessimistically argues:
...institutional choice offers a partial escape from the trap. Yet since it appears 
that poor countries are more likely to choose presidentialism, little solace is 
offered by the possibility of institutional engineering. Equally little solace is 
offered by political learning. Most countries returning to democracy usually go 
back to whatever constitution they had in the past, even if it never worked 
(Przeworski, 1996: 49).
Despite the pessimistic prognosis of Przeworski, institutional engineering still matters. 
As one can witness from the above analysis, when the president is legally endorsed with 
unlimited power, it is difficult for the party system not only to break through the vicious 
circle of public oblivion and weakness, but also to counteract the increasing authority.
One can trace some enlightening parallels in the development of legislative-executive 
relations in Belarus’ democracy with that of the European Union. Experience of the 
European Parliament in re-gaining power balance from executive authority may be of a 
particular use for this analysis. First, one has to mention that the European Parliament 
has many similarities with national parliaments of the member states, and the people of
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Europe directly elect the European Parliament. It is made up of party representatives, 
which express different ideological and programmatic positions. It is also similar to 
national parliaments in that it is able to discuss and form opinions on all European 
Union legislation as well as being able to debate topical and urgent matters. The 
European Commission is designed to be the High Authority in the structure of the 
European Union. The Council of Ministers is the main executive body.
If the structure of the European Union (EU) were ‘related’ to a national-level structure, 
the closest resemblance it could have is a semi-presidential democracy. Initially, the 
European Parliament was on a fundamentally weak footing. It was not envisaged to be 
the European Coal and Steel Community’s legislature, as this position was to be granted 
to the Council of Ministers. The Parliament’s focus was to be a discursive committee, 
which would debate policy but not make final decisions. As a result, the balance of 
power in the European Union was highly overweighed by the executive. The Council of 
Ministers lacked transparency, and the pillar structure allowed the Commission to have 
full control over decision-making. The deficiency of equality in power arrangements 
became obvious during the four elections to the European Parliament, 1979-1994. These 
vivid outcomes were:
(i) falling turnout of voters and unpopularity of elections as such;
(ii) under-representation, as there was a tendency for the larger national parties 
to do worse at the European elections, for the smaller to benefit, and for the 
incumbent national government parties to suffer losses (Reif, 1984; Eijk, 
1996);
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(iii) rising democratic deficit associated with the lack of accountability and 
transparency in the decision-making process.
There were many suggestions regarding the result optimisation at the European level. 
Lack of politicisation of the Union’s issues and motivation for voters to partake in 
elections are part of the discussion. In contrast, van der Eijk et al. (1996) suggests that the 
principal concerns of scholars should not be the formation of new attitudes to the ‘new 
Europe’ as a supranational state, or unification of the electoral codes, or allowance of 
Europe-wide media coverage, or creation of a single electoral system. The primary task is 
to give the legislature more power and by that balance the system of decision-making.
The effect of electoral voting that occurred at the European elections was defined as 
‘quasi-switching’, as voters did not mean to radically switch their choices from one party 
to another, but to vote rationally considering the consequences that both national and 
European elections can have for nations and individuals. Eijk and Franklin (1996) defined 
this type of strategic voting as a pseudo-change of preferences which was caused by:
(i) voting with the ‘head’ -  the first-order preferences for those parties who may 
have stronger chances to win and influence the system;
(ii) voting with ‘heart’ or ‘throw away’ -  a second-order preferences for smaller 
or less known candidates; and
(iii) voting with ‘the boot’ against the incumbent or poorly performing parties -  a
‘punishment effect’. This explanation helps to understand the paradoxical
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effect of European voting, the origin of democratic deficit in Europe, and 
what needs to be done in this respect on the level of general law.
Returning to the situation in Belarus, a comparison of the arrangement of legislative- 
executive relations indicates that the principle reason for popular support of the 
president in the republic lies within the weak powers of the legislature. As Linz noted, 
weak legislatures tend to behave in parochial and self-interested ways, allowing 
presidential power to increase and to create a vicious circle of such development.
Therefore, institutional engineering seems to be one possible solution for the presidency 
to stay in control, and the basic step is to revise the national constitution. Many scholars 
emphasise that the process of transition is concomitant with constant constitution 
making. Unfortunately, in Belarus the president is difficult to compromise with. This is 
one of the perils of presidentialism: once in power, and when the office has been 
tailored to his/her fit, the president will continue playing the ‘all-or-nothing’ game.
The international community recently described the situation with human rights and 
unlimited presidential authority in Belarus as ‘an authoritarian police state where human 
rights are routinely violated’ (the resolution of U.S. Congress of 3rd May 2000). The 
OSCE (AMG) offered to the president a series of compromises on the electoral code at 
the autumn parliamentary elections 2000118. These included giving the opposition access 
to the state-controlled media, expanding the powers of the current legislation on the
118 See OSCE report at http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/belaOO-1 -adopted.htm. retrieved June 2001; or 
OSCE Belarus homepage at http://www.osce.org/belarus/index.php3. retrieved June 2001.
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basis of the 1994 constitution, and to stop the persecution of the opposition. Lukashenko 
refused to compromise and allowed limited access of the opposition to the media. This 
obviously did not have any desirable effect, and the opposition parties remain out of 
power, with the new pro-Lukashenko parliament still in operation.
What is needed is a complex approach to institutions, structures, and agency, such as 
parties and other interest organisations. The introduction of a mixed system of voting -  
plurality voting with party list, PR -  is a necessity. In this case the opposition may be 
motivated to participate in elections, and voters could then receive a real choice for 
casting their preferences. Unfortunately, as it stands, the authorities refused to alter the 
electoral code for the fear of voters’ confusion on the eve of parliamentary elections. 
Those candidates or parties who allied with the state and ‘timely’ entered the 1997 
House of Representatives on Lukashenko’s invitation, have received unlimited 
presidential support for their campaigns to win office, which the majority of them did. 
Allegedly the president had a list of chosen deputies who were ‘assisted’ in the election 
campaign by local authorities, which has indeed predestined the structure of the 2000 
parliament. It is clear that unless the constitution is changed, and democratic institutions 
are given equal powers, the republic will be balancing between a fagade democracy, and 
plebiscitarian dictatorship.
In summation, the structural and institutional analyses of Belarus’ political history 
demonstrated that the party protracted development was indeed determined by the joint 
effect of ‘Soviet’ legacies and their embodiment in institutional structures. Communist 
dominance and public adherence to leave under decrees rather than laws, created a
unique structure of opportunities for the elected president, who then manipulated 
institution-making to his advantage. The super-presidential republic, however, may not 
survive long as a progressing polyarchy, unless it is counter-balanced by other 
representative institutions.
Chapter 4 -  the central part of research -  will focus on the organisational analysis of 
parties as the leading decision-making agency in the new regime. This should help to 
understand the role and contribution of parties to building democracy in contemporary 
transient regimes.
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Chapter 4. The role o f  agency: Parties and party system development in Belarus
As the previous analysis demonstrates, actions occur and acquire their meaning in 
relation to an already pre-constituted environment. Yet actors have the potential and the 
power to transform these structures through their actions. In the study of party system 
formation, the analysis of existing structural and institutional conditions is vital. 
Nevertheless, parties logically form the centre of this research: through their strategic 
learning they change structures and shape institutions in the new regime. Parties’ 
organisational capacity, and public realisation should help to establish, why a desirable 
consolidation of the party system in Belarus did not take place, as in many other post- 
Soviet regimes, and what will be the system’s prospects for democratisation.
There is an increasing tendency to view national parties in a global context of change, 
which, is thought to affect the development of emerging democracies. Since the 
begimiing of the 1970s, Western Europe has faced definite trends of decline in partisan 
support and identification. There has also been an increase in electoral volatility 
(Pedersen, 1979; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen et al., 1992), and a decrease in party 
membership (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Dalton et al, 1984; Katz, 1997). This goes in 
parallel with the extensive growth of single-issue groups and personalisation of politics. 
In addition, developing corporatist structures have been seen as gradually replacing 
parties as political agenda setters. From these observations, it was concluded that parties 
no longer function as they used to in established democracies. Two principal types of 
problems of party change can be identified: on the micro-level, re-definition of the 
relationship between parties and their electorates, and on the macro-level, re-
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consideration of the role of parties versus other political actors in society. Both 
problems inevitably lead to a discussion of whether parties decline as traditional 
channels of mass representation; or whether they merely adapt to a changing 
environment across the globe. This should include parties in new democracies, who 
naturally seek more accommodating forms of survival.
Changes in party systems occur with changes in voting patterns. When the general level 
of voter knowledgeability has risen in a global context, and politics became more 
accessible through new developments in mass communication, and voters begin to 
choose (Rose and McAllister, 1986). This implies such consequences as loosening of 
partisan ties and massive voter detachment from their socially determined group 
loyalties. Parties respectively have to undergo certain structural changes in order to 
survive in a highly fluid and competitive environment. Party organisations 
understandably, re-orient towards public office rather than follow costly traditional 
‘mass forms’ of existence. This trend of party organisational development may permit 
extra material sources, may give less dependency on membership and public 
recognition, and may ease the mechanism of governance by means of leadership 
supremacy in decision-making. Party campaigns have become more professional, issue- 
based rather than programmatic, and almost exclusively capital intensive. New 
developments seem to be resulting in a rational, more efficient and less costly model of 
party organisation that helps secure their continuing role in society. Some scholars argue 
that this is a new evolutionary stage of party development called ‘cartelisation’ (Katz 
and Mair, 1995, 1996), others are more inclined to take these ‘new’ features as 
proliferation or structured plurality of contemporary party types from the ‘catch-all
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party’ (Kirchheimer, 1966), the ‘electoral-professional party’ (Panebianco, 1988), the 
‘witness party’ and the ‘responsible party’ (Sartori, 1976), to the ‘programmatic party’ 
and the ‘modem cadre party’ (Kool, 1996), and so on.
The key argument of this preamble is twofold. First, developments in party politics as 
suggested, are global, and it is believed, they affect new party systems in post­
communist states. Second, no matter what type or stage of development contemporary 
parties are taking, it is important to develop an understanding of why a particular form 
of party organisation has entrenched, what modality it offers, and what are the prospects 
for its surviving the global electoral change. Although, party systems in the newly 
emerged democracies of Eastern Europe operate in a radically different set of 
circumstances, their development, nevertheless, is thought to be more susceptible to 
global changes in voting behaviour and party performance. This is conditioned by the 
fact that parties in emerging democracies learn to survive under extreme pressure from 
two sets of conditions: their own political environment, and global change. Therefore, 
whatever the national circumstances may be for advancing democracy within newly 
established systems, it seems sensible to argue that global party strategies (that is to 
survive more effectively and at lesser cost), will be adopted by the majority of new 
political players. This is especially true in the contemporary context of trans-national 
co-operation and international aid. Therefore, one may consider such ‘western’ issues as 
voter de-alignment, emphasis on the role of leadership, decline in membership, possible 
alliance with the state, and a tendency for non-partisan politics to be generic to any 
contemporary party system, no matter what stage of party organisation and party 
democracy they live through. Global changes applied to a singular country will,
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however, reflect national predispositions for change, and may, therefore, take a unique 
organisational form in each given society.
Though still developing, Belarus’ party system seems to emulate both the global mode 
of party adaptability and an East European transitional ‘uniqueness’. That is to say 
during its eleventh year of transition, Belarus faces a paradox that may be characteristic 
of many of the societies in the post-Soviet space. That is, the legitimate actors of the 
political game -  political parties - remain powerless and non-effective for their voters. 
They function for themselves and in a self-contained ‘virtual reality’ with no real 
representation, finance or ideological purpose. Voters in turn sensibly prefer to switch 
their preferences away from parties to the president as a more credible and resourceful 
opportunity for change. In these circumstances in order to survive, parties with ‘top-to- 
down’ organisation and with limited regional network, have to learn to collaborate with 
the state and international communities whenever possible. It is argued that state 
subventions assist party functioning, as do links with international families spirituelles. 
The dominance of leadership, flexible membership, and professionalized electoral 
campaign for non-committed voter can all help change the parties’ image for voters and 
secure their survival in the emerging democracy.
Paradoxically, these modem and mature features of party developments, nevertheless, 
do not foster party system consolidation and national democratisation, which has, in fact 
taken an inverse course in Belarus. Moreover, parties do not seem to matter much for 
voters in practical terms, and may decline further if institutional and structural 
configurations are not altered.
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Chapter 4 will analyse parties as essential agents of the political game in Belarus, from 
the three principal angles of party organisation, i.e. parties in public office, parties in 
central office and on the ground. Voters’ perception of parties will complement the 
analysis. The degree of cohesiveness and representativeness of parties in government; 
the level of their effectiveness as organisations; and whether there is an authentic 
linkage between parties and their voters, will be analysed. Further study will suggest 
that parties have begun attaining new qualities that may assist in their future survival. 
However, their breakthrough will depend on a consensual solution between agency and 
structure, of which paternalist public attitudes, the Soviet-style legislature, the lack of 
law and the elected president, Alexander Lukashenko, are the embodiment.
The chapter will proceed in three sections. Section 4.1 will focus on parties’ behaviour 
in the Belarus parliament between 1990 and 2000. Section 4.2 will provide analysis of 
parties’ organisational structure and their regional network. Section 4.3 will include a 
comparative outlook of the pro-government vis-a-vis anti-system electorates, in order to 
understand how a strategically selective agency operates in the system of constraints and 
opportunities.
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4.1 Parties in public office: between representation and autocracy
The nature of parties must be sought 
through an appreciation of their role in the 
process of governance.
(V.O.Key, 1964: 200)
Leading political parties traditionally gauge their performance in votes and seats; and 
their position in parliament tends to indicate the level of party identification by voters, 
and the strength of their partisan bonds (Gibson and Harmel, 1998; Janda and Goldman, 
1998). With the gradual decline of traditional voter alignments in established 
democracies, and intrinsic non-commitment of voters in new regimes, it became a 
priority for parties to secure their governmental position, and as such, place less 
emphasis on participatory linkages. This can be measured through the share of 
votes/seats, and parties’ coalitional behaviour in public office, their legislative 
achievements, and cabinet participation. This chapter focuses on the analysis of parties’ 
operation in the Belarus’ parliaments 1990-2000, based on the above variables.
As Koole (1996: 514) notes, all political parties are commonly oriented to the state, which 
seems to be a natural mechanism of party functioning. They design their programmes not 
only to represent voters’ interests but also to ‘conquer’ the state -  a symbol of power. 
Therefore, for example, since 1945 all major parties in established democracies have 
aimed to obtain ‘governmental status’, but not all of them have succeeded. In the last two 
decades this trend became widespread and resulted in a majority of leading parties
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acquiring ‘governmental status’ in all European democracies (Katz and Mair, 1996: 529). 
To be in power is not the only incentive for parties who aim for public office. More 
stimulating is the opportunity for rational collaboration with the state, and the ensuing 
financial and statuary advantages that this collaboration may entail.
With the expansion of the state, and its complex symbiosis with civil society, a new and 
more accommodating phenomenon of party existence has occurred - their ‘material’ 
cooperation with the state. As Kay Lawson et al (1988) note parties still claim to serve as 
agencies of linkage because that is one way to maintain legitimacy - to capture votes - 
which are the currency of the markets of power. However, when in power, parties place 
more emphasis on policy-making and self-seeking benefits than on transmission of policy 
decisions to the people and representation of their needs. For example, the opportunity for 
major parties to increase their income from the state by a simple act of a majority vote in 
parliament will make them less susceptible to signals from the grassroots, more financially 
independent and more efficient in their operation. The state in turn enjoys sustainable 
legitimacy through mutual collaboration with respective representative bodies.
This mutuality of interests between the state and parties has led to certain changes in the 
structural and institutional organisation of parties, i.e. strengthening of the leadership, 
simplification of membership, growing demand of managerial skills and of capital- 
intensive election campaigns, as well as eventual recognition of the dominant role of 
parliamentary party over extra-parliamentary organisations. Parties seem to be achieving 
a democratic quality, in the words of Duverger (1954: 182-3), which firstly associates 
with the precedence of parliamentary representatives over party leaders, and the
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members of the electorate over the members of the party. However, party alliance with 
the state appeared to be not idealistic but have a ‘materialistic’ nature, and the role of 
citizenry and parties in the decision-making process has considerably altered. The 
distinguishing quality of parties used to be their emphasis on linkage, when parties were 
seen, both by their members and by others, as agencies for forging links between 
citizens and policy-makers (K. Lawson et al, 1988). Their contemporary task is more 
adjusted to a policy-making function rather than to that of representation, which makes 
them more oblivious to people’s needs and interests, and more conscious about their 
‘self-seeking’ benefits. As Lawson et al. suggest:
.. .if parties have been reduced to a ‘keeper of the seal’ in developed nations, and to 
the rudimentary organization necessary for ‘the institutionalisation of participation 
from above ’ in developing nations, it may mean only that other organizations have 
replaced parties as agencies of democratic linkage (Lawson et al., 1988: 20).
Or at least there may be a tendency for the eventual demise of party politics in 
conventional terms.
New trends in party development are also present in transient democracies of Eastern 
Europe. This is to say that in the new regimes parties seek more expedient and less 
costly means for survival. National societal circumstances, on the other hand, put their 
own stamp on the nature of party system development. Therefore, it may be 
hypothesised that in the new democracies, the amalgamation of a national structural 
discourse with a global party initiative for survival, may produce a unique effect on
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party system development: consolidating parties seek to behave rationally over time, 
and may either overstretch their potential and remain non-institutionalised, or develop 
more consensual politics, if a structural-institutional background permits.
In transition, parties naturally seek a more accommodating balance between the state 
and society. When human and financial resources for the majority of parties are limited, 
the most adequate solution would be to ally with the state and place less effort on the 
mobilisation of increasingly uncommitted voters. The process of ‘cartelisation’, thus, 
seems, to be a timely response by parties to the difficulties of the transitional period. As 
Mair notes:
Particularly after the break-up of the forum or consensus parties that led the 
transition from Communist rule, parties have tended to show many features of the 
cartel model. They tend to have organisational structure of the mass or catch-all 
models (chairman, executive, geographically defined layers of organisation, national 
congress), but given widespread antipathy toward the idea of party and the absence 
of the social basis for mass parties, they generally have very small membership. 
They are heavily dependent on the state for their resources... (Mair, 1996: 122).
In other words by allying with the state and distinctly focusing on their parliamentary 
activity, parties may achieve two tasks at once: they can safeguard minimal 
organisational survival for the present and secure long-term benefits for the future. The 
potential danger of this policy line, however, is that parties may lose their support to a 
dominant pool of uncommitted voters.
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The situation in Belarus can be characterised by similar ‘accommodating’ trends in 
party political development. However, the peculiar form it often takes, illustrates the 
powerful influence of national circumstances on the process of party building. Parties 
are legitimate but increasingly less influential players in the political game, and 
demonstrate continual signs of decline. Under the pressure of structural, institutional 
and cultural conditions, parties are seemingly losing their political vigour and public 
support. Although they have settled in numbers and have become better structured and 
ideologically refined, parties continue to be second rated119 by the people, and thus seek 
opportunities to survive both public and presidential disdain.
Two distinct periods of party development can be observed in Belarus. The first is 
associated with a slow but steady move towards democratisation between 1990 and 
1996; when the leading parties enjoyed public support as well as the benefits of public 
office. The second period is characterised by the retreat of oppositional parties into a 
parallel society and their self-preserving activities after the dismissal of the publicly
1,9 The term was introduced by Reif (1984) in his analysis of European elections in the article ‘National 
electoral cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984’, Electoral Studies, 3(3): 244-55. He implied that 
the ‘second-order’ elections have ostensible, a window-dressing nature, when ‘there is much less at stake 
as compared to first-order elections’, and hence, voters prioritise these elections less than those to 
national parliaments. There may be a parallel between voters’ attitudes to parties and the president in 
Belams; and the usage of ‘second-order’ preferences by voters to demonstrate their lack of interest in 
party politics seems to be adequate.
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elected parliament by the president in 1996. Whereas those parties who re-entered the 
new parliament, continued receiving benefits negotiated with the president120.
When in public office, new parties developed organisational links with the state (OGP 
and Social Democrats), and attempted to gradually shift away from the masses (PCB, 
BNF, LP, LDP)121. After failing to remain in office, the majority of parties went 
underground, experiencing dramatic structural and ideological change. They lost their 
financial, technical, media and, most important, human resources. The best example is 
the PCB, which split after the dissolution of parliament, and the splinter Communist 
Party of Belarus (CPB) emerged with Vladimir Chikin as leader. Sergei Kaliakin, the 
PCB leader believes official authorities initiated the split. Some party members were 
offered attractive positions in government, and therefore, left the oppositional PCB as 
an ‘ideologically untenable’ party, whereas others became weary and disappointed by 
the politics of opposition. Party membership decreased by 50% in one year, and 
presently comprises 9300 supporters122. The same happened to AP, which lost its human 
capital because party members could not afford to resist the pressure of regional 
authorities. However, it has recently ‘resurrected’ itself as a pro-presidential party, and 
received a ‘bonus’ of three seats in the first round of the 2000 parliamentary elections 
from the authorities for its zeal and loyalty. The parliamentary ‘Union of Labour’ had 
also split and the PNS emerged headed by president-oriented Leonid Sechko.
120 For more chronological details, see Marples, D. (1999) Belarus: The Denationalized Nation. Post- 
Communist States and Nations. Harwood Academic Publications.
121 Full list of party names is available in Appendix 1.
122 Ministry of Justice, Belarus, 1999.
Nevertheless, after counting losses, some parties, especially on the right (reformist 
wing), managed to re-structure and find other sources of finance by establishing links 
with western families spirituelles and receiving generous donations from their clientele 
and well-wishers. This pool of resources cannot last long and is largely conditioned by 
the party’s prospects for winning public office. Other, more traditional parties, like the 
communist and the labour parties, and in part the nationalists, were less successful in 
securing their reputation and finances with western help, and presently struggle for 
survival by attempting to maintain party discipline through promises and street 
democracy. Thus, party organisational efforts have always been sensibly directed at 
gaining public office -  a symbol of security and power; and adapting their internal 
structure to the demands of this reality. The latter, as practice demonstrates, is 
characterised by the gradual acquisition by oppositional parties of managerial skills, 
reduction of membership and members’ mutual autonomy, and finally, capital intensive 
and issue-based campaigns. Hence, global trends have impacted on national transition 
and party system development in the Republic of Belarus. There is, nevertheless, one 
problem, that is, these trends somehow do not stipulate party system institutionalisation: 
parties in Belarus remain legitimate, but powerless.
Therefore, in this chapter, the focus of analysis will be on parties in public office, their 
structure and leadership between 1990 and 2000. The task will be twofold: first, to 
identify the mode and prospects of party system development by means of assessing 
their activities in public office; and secondly, to establish whether parties in Belarus are 
really declining or whether they are subject to survival strategies. For these purposes a 
statistical and descriptive analysis of MPs’ voting behaviour was conducted.
188
4.1.1 Methodology and working hypotheses
The relatively new method of Multidimensional Scaling based on a single ballot voting 
has been specially adopted by the author for the analysis of parties’ structure in Belarus’ 
parliaments between 1990 and 2000.
Political structure of the parliament can be regarded as a combination of deputies’ 
individual positions and their spatial constellations. On the one hand, these positions 
should reflect the deputies’ political legacies, of which ideological stance, partisanship, 
political biography, personal ambitions and functional duties are the most salient. On 
the other hand, the distribution of deputies’ positions in space may reveal existing or 
potential conflicts, around which extra-parliamentary oppositions may emerge.
This study of MPs’ positions over time is based on their voting response to some ‘hot’ 
issues presented by parliament for discussion. While voting, deputies have to express 
their own opinions by voting ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘abstained’ to the issue. By using time series, 
aggregation of their discrete preferences into coherent voting patterns and coalitional 
configurations can be achieved. Single ballot voting is a unique source of information, 
provided it is run on an extensive database, and there is no strict partisan discipline 
within the legislature which could limit dispersion of opinions. This method allows a 
fuller picture of latent and evident political bonds between the members of parliament. 
It may help draw an accurate image of political actors, parallel to their rhetoric and 
communicative skills, which becomes evident from MPs’ interviews and the text below.
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Three principal approaches may be used to define parliamentary structure. First, 
traditionally MPs’ voting behaviour may be assessed on a comparative basis. In 
particular, the estimation of deputies’ positions in the legislature can be derived from 
the correlation between MPs’ expected and real voting behaviour, assessed by external 
expert organisations. The share of probability that ‘ideal’ judgment will coincide with 
MPs’ real behaviour will indicate the level of performance and functional fulfilment of 
the candidates. This method, for example, is widely used for observing Congress’ 
activity in the USA. Recently it has been applied in Russia for assessing the efficacy of 
the Duma (Parliament) (Sobyanin, 1997). The principal difficulty of this approach rests 
in its potential subjectivism rooted in expert opinions.
The second approach operates within a broader database providing statistical 
observations of issues in time series. It also gives an aggregate picture of existing and 
potential tendencies of deputies’ voting patterns, but is unable to operate with individual 
cases and interpret individual issues (Satarov, 1992).
In this research a third approach, initially introduced by the INDEM123 Centre (Satarov, 
1992) for structural analysis of the 1990-1992 Russian parliaments has been developed. 
It vividly combines advantages of the two previous methods and allows operation with 
objective data of smaller quantities of similar statistical precision. The method avoids 
previous shortcomings by building voting patterns on the basis of the real opinions of 
individual political actors. In multidimensional space a place is reserved for each deputy 
according to his/her voting pattern. Deputies with similar responses are clustered
123 Institute for strategic Economic, Social and Political Research, Moscow.
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together in space, and those with opposite views are scattered at a relative distance 
[Euclidean] from each other. Received through (i) interpretation of constellations of the 
disputed issues, and (ii) allocation of deputies’ names, their partisanship, the ideological 
dimensions designate existing conflict lines and provide a background for segregation of 
deputies into groups. Further group analysis, developed by the author, assists 
examination of levels of cohesion, activity, conformity, professionalism and interest 
orientation of deputies in factions.
In order to adequately structure MP’ positions in political space, an extensive database 
is required. This research is unique in this sense, that it allows dynamic analysis of the 
structure of the Belarusian Parliament, comprising the results of single ballot voting 
from 1990 to 1996 parliamentary bulletins124 (13 sessions), and includes at least 31 
issues (questions) debated by approximately 345 members of parliament125.
MPs’ choices were converted into ordinal matrices of numbers ranging from M ’ as a 
negative choice through ‘0’ -abstained/did not vote, to ‘+1’ as a positive option. Deputies’ 
absence was treated as a missing system variable. Factor and Multidimensional Scaling 
analyses within the SPSS package allowed results to be further interpreted. The most 
debatable issues like dissolution of the USSR, ban of the CPSU, or dismissal of the pro-
124 A major source of data is the annual parliamentary bulletins retrieved from the Presidential Library, 
Minsk, 1998. When missing, the author collected them from contacts with parliament.
125 The author has developed an original method for single ballot analysis by adding a dynamic outlook 
on MPs’ voting patterns in Belarus’ parliaments between 1990 and 1999. This gives not only a ‘snapshot’ 
of the deputies’ behaviour specific to a certain political year, but also outlines emerging conflicts and 
tendencies over time, and on a comparative basis.
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democratic Spokesman of the 1992 parliament, were chosen for analysis126. The issues 
must be such that they can generate a wide scope of opinion and maximal personal 
engagement into the argument. Application of Factor analysis helped to separate these 
conflict issues in statistical and literal terms, around which the deputies’ opinion 
considerably split. The method of Multidimensional Scaling helped to construct a coherent 
picture of MPs’ positions in space. Received conflict lines, as well as actors’ groupings, 
proved meaningful and revealing. The use of object-score analysis127 within the multiple 
scaling allowed segregation of MP’s into factions and examination of degrees of activity, 
cohesion, conformity and voting profiles of these groups128.
A similar technique was used for analysis of the political structure of the Russian 
Congress of People’s Deputies between 1990 and 1992129. This can form a basis for 
comparison of the former with the Belarus parliaments of 1990-1996. The first seven 
Russian Congresses of People’s Deputies were indeed the first indecisive attempt of the
126 This proved to be the most difficult part of the analysis. Each parliamentary session had a multifaceted 
agenda. In order to chose a number of issues, annual combined parliamentary reports had to be analysed 
fust (content analysis). When a list of issues was compiled, it was followed by individual analysis of 
voting results on each debated issue and its full contextual background retrieved from separate bulletins 
for each year from 1990 to 1999. The eventual matrix on a single year combined of about 345 cases 
against at least 31 issues (statistically significant), and was seven times more for the overall database.
127 This method, available within SPSS 8.5, was found by the author as very informative about the group 
structure of voting deputies, and hence, was utilised to receive a fuller picture of both MPs and factions.
128 Indexes were developed by the author (with a notable exception of la) in an attempt to achieve a fuller 
picture of factional activity in Belarus’ parliaments between 1990 and 1996.
129 Full description can be obtained from Special bulletins ‘Rossiiskii Monitor’ (Satarov, 1992-5) issued 
by INDEM, Moscow.
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democrats to break through the old Soviet mentality in order to establish a new course. 
Elected MPs had gone through a short but rich parliamentary experience before they 
were dismissed in September 1993 by president Yeltsin. The composition of the 
parliament was very similar to that in Belarus. The old-guard communist bloc 
dominated the parliamentary arena. Hesitant and dispersed democratic forces were slow 
to emerge and this caused an intensifying conflict between the parliament and the 
president, which resulted in a stalemate and eventual parliamentary demise in 1993.
Belarus’ parliament had undergone a similar ‘thorny’ path before its dismissal by 
president Lukashenko in 1996. The difference in life span, despite the obvious 
contextuality, has its own validation for comparison of the two national parliaments. For 
Belarus, as a newly emerged state with ‘imported’ rather than inborn democracy, it 
should take much longer to establish itself on a sovereign democratic path than that in 
Russia, due to various historical, economic and political reasons. Moreover, Congresses 
in Russia convened twice a year, ‘doubling up’ deputies’ skills in decision-making, 
whereas in Belarus parliamentary sessions took the normal annual routine. Unicameral 
at that time, both national parliaments had to act in the situation of political uncertainty 
and extreme time pressure. The working regime was extremely tense -  about 400 
decrees and law corrections had been processed each year by both Parliaments. Finally, 
the nature of parliamentary conflict -  between the old ‘conservative’ and the new 
‘reformist’ as well as between pro- and anti-presidential camps -  makes both 
parliaments valid for comparison, especially as data permit.
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Working hypotheses
The first parliament was elected in Belarus in 1990, and in the best Soviet traditions was 
dominated by a majority of communist nomenklatura. According to law, fifty places out 
of 360, elected on the plurality basis, were allocated to a group of veterans, which was 
normally in favour of the communists. In these circumstances, the Belarusian Popular 
Front (BNF), a nationalist movement and a party calling for organisation of a broad 
coalition of pro-democratic forces in parliament. The oppositional democratic Club of 
100 deputies was established soon after. It consisted of 25 members of BNF (not 
impressive compared to its Baltic neighbours) and of non-partisan, but democratically 
minded MPs, including Alexander Lukashenko, MP from the Mogilev region, and then 
a young director of a collective farm. The large force of party nomenklatura, 
nevertheless, had to make concessions to the democratic bloc. On a consensual basis 
and in opposition to Nikalai Dementei, a veteran functionary, the Chairman of the 
Supreme Council, Stanislav Shushkevich, a popular moderate MP from Minsk was 
elected as a first deputy. Viacheslav Kebich, a long-time factory manager and later a 
state planning supremo, was appointed to the position of the Prime Minister. Initially, 
Kebich had the reputation of a moderate democrat when compared to the majority of a 
reactionary Belarusian leadership. He supported the extended autonomy of Belarus from 
Moscow in economic affairs, and the initiation of mild economic reforms including 
some privatization. Thus, he became a promising candidate for the 1994 presidential 
election. Eventually, the Democratic Club broke up; and, as former members of the 
Club reveal, one of the reasons for its split was the fact that too many deputies wanted 
to be its leader.
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Muddling through the overcrowded issue arena, the domination of the conservative 
wing, fictional democratic blocs130, and indecisiveness of the three sequential 
spokesmen (Dementei, Shushkevich and Gryb), the parliament, nevertheless, made 
some decisive steps towards further democratisation. The ‘Party of Power’ composed of 
the government and its allies in parliament (with Kebich as head) soon emerged, 
although its political position at first was undefined. The toleration of freedom of speech 
and political expression by authorities was considerable; and moderate economic 
liberalisation took place. From 1993, however, the Belarusian political arena became 
characterised by a rather antagonistic, although non-violent, confrontation between the 
Party of Power, and the BNF-led opposition. This configuration of political forces was 
similar to that in Ukraine, where the party nomenklatura also maintained a strong power 
position, led by President Kravchuk, and was opposed by a moderate democratic and 
nationalist opposition. Based on consensus and compromise, the issue of independence 
facilitated political unity in Ukraine for a continuing period131, and this became the 
principal difference in politics between the two countries. The political attitudes of the 
governing elites in both countries were strikingly different as well132. The Belarusian
130 One example of fictitious democratic groupings was the creation of the pro-democratic faction 
‘Belarus’ in the 1993 parliament. It was headed by Viacheslav Kebich, and was formed for the 
presidential campaign before the 1994 election.
131 There is a large section of the major opposition party, the Rukh, and other nationalist movements, 
including the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP). Kravchuk supported the latter, even though URP 
opposed him in the Presidential elections.
132 Thus, in March 1991, the referendum on restoration of the USSR returned a ‘yes-vote’ from about 
82% of Belarusians and 70% of Ukrainians. The 12% difference by itself could not explain the 
divergence of political trajectories between two countries. Moreover, public opinion in both countries
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Party of Power was remarkably more conservative, even reactionary, than that in 
Ukraine or Russia in the Soviet era, and this conservatism seems to have helped to 
promote the conflict between the president elected in 1994, and the pro-democratic 
opposition. New and much freer parliamentary elections took place in 1995. However, 
the 13th Supreme Soviet appeared to be even more controversial than its predecessor. 
The communist and agrarian MPs of the newly elected Parliament declared their 
allegiance to Lukashenko. Yet, it was not clear whether the Parliament would have the 
chance to convene at all, as only 119 out of 260 deputies were elected. Lukashenko 
publicly declared that he would introduce presidential rule if parliamentary by-elections 
did not succeed. By December 1995 the 13th Supreme Soviet of 196 MPs was finally 
elected, despite the hindrances created by presidential authorities during the elections133. 
The new Parliament was still dominated by the Left - pro-government, Communists and 
Agrarians -  who held almost 50 seats, and together they could vote/promote almost any 
decision. The speaker of the new Parliament, Semion Sharetskii, was the head of a 
collective farm representing the Agrarian Party. The leftwing factions, however, soon 
found themselves in disagreement with Lukashenko over his attempts to concentrate 
power in his hands at the expense of Parliament. As a consequence, political parties and
was, perhaps, subject to “split consciousness.” In Belarus, for a number of years the majority of the 
people were in favour of both national independence and a union with Russia. Consequently, in 1997 
both issues were equally supported by large part of the population. In Ukraine, the same referendum 
produced 70% in favour of the union, while about 80% voted in favour of sovereignty of Ukraine. The 
referendum in Ukraine in December 1991 resulted with almost 90% for independence; while the 1995 
referendum in Belarus on a “closer economic integration between Belarus and Russia” ended up with 
about 80% supporting the issue (Silitski, 2000).
133 See Appendix 2 for details; or http://www.agora.it/elections/election/belarus.htm. retrieved June 2001.
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parliamentary factions, except for 60 members of pro-Lukashenko faction ‘Zgoda’ and a 
few others, moved closer to each other. As Furman et al state:
The political spectrum of Belarus began to take a strange shape. It seemed unclear 
how the parties succeeded in covering fully the political field (from the 
nationalists, social democrats, liberals to the communists, pan-slavists and 
greens). However, a new force, the President, had emerged. As this force grew, it 
began to pressurise the entire party spectrum. Because of pressure, parties 
naturally get closer to each other (Furman, et al. 1998: 135).
With the succession of Alexander Lukashenko to power, the newly elected parliament was 
soon ‘dissolved’ on the basis - in Lukashenko’s words - of its inefficiency and inability to 
make adequate decisions. The new parliament was enacted in January 1997, and was 
composed of 110 MPs from the previous Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation, which 
had convened on Lukashenko’s conditions. The new legislature became bi-cameral, non­
partisan, compliant and unanimous in the best Soviet traditions.
Based on their observations of unsuccessful party progress revealed by continuing 
features of decline in partisan support and identification, many scholars conclude that 
undeveloped parties have already failed in Belarus (Zaprudnik, 1993; Marples, 1999; 
Manaev, 1998; Silitski, 2000). The party system remains incipient; leaders’ political 
ambitions overstated, the general public under heard, and the power of the president 
dominant. The fact, that leading parties failed to remain in public office and to re-gain 
power in 2000, has also highlighted their downfall. Their activities in parliament
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between 1990 and 1996 were explicitly characterised by petty frictions, lack of internal 
unity, inability to coalesce and to promote their factional interests, and overestimation 
of their authority and public loyalty.
As Rose and Mackie (1988:536) note, if a party did not partake in more than two 
elections in a new democracy, it can be regarded as an ephemeral party. However, what 
can be said if parties did not partake in elections deliberately, and not because of their 
weakness or lack of resources? The case of newly emerged democracies cannot be 
summarised in one statement, but has to be ‘inclusively’ analysed. Even though there 
have only been two official parliamentary elections -  in 1995 and 2000, one presidential 
election in 1994 and one anti-presidential election campaign in 1999, it would still be 
misleading to make any assumptions regarding parties’ survivability -  and this is the 
peculiarity of Belarus as a new democracy! Parties were available for elections, and 
were identified and supported by voters. However, there were also a number of 
predicaments, both institutional and human, which parties failed to overcome. In the 
1995 parliamentary elections, for example, (i) voter turnout was extremely low (just 
above 50%)134, and those who turned up, demonstrated, in the majority, their traditional 
loyalty to the communists; (ii) parties canvassing strategies were over-ambitious and 
incongruent with their images; (iii) institutional (electoral code, constitution, 
presidency) and structural (government structure, economic crisis, state-owned media, 
scope for election fraud) contexts were not in favour of radically minded BNF or 
indecisive liberals and democrats; and finally (iv) culturally, the population in Belarus 
was not ready for a radical move to the wholesale re-structuring of their society.
134 http://www.agora.it/elections/electiorfbelarus.htm. retrieved June 2001.
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Conversely, in 2000 the oppositional parties simply boycotted the elections to protest 
against the gross violations of law by the president and his administration. This, 
however, has been one of the limited opportunities for the opposition to enter into the 
dialogue with the authorities, and to reinforce their mandate in voters’ opinions.
Parties’ continuing inability to win public office alienates their voters from them and 
makes them less influential game-players. Paradoxically, the majority of the population, 
in spite of their ‘practical’ ignorance of parties, undoubtedly support their presence in 
society, as an antidote against the tendency for authoritarianism and a sliding back to the 
USSR. Moreover, remaining parties have small but stable group loyalties, which may be 
only 1% of the entire population, but this is the most politically active and committed 
part. Recent events such as the March of Freedom 1 (1999) and 2 (2000) and 
Independence Day rally (2000) gathered thousands of protesters who willingly showed 
their dissatisfaction with the regime. At the fore of these events have always been 
political parties. Therefore, the simple verdict that parties are failing cannot fully 
describe the complexity of their political development and explain parties’ continuing 
upheavals. In this respect, the following tasks and hypotheses will be put forward:
First, party performance in the new democracy is heavily dependent on their position in 
government. The analysis of party behaviour in the Belarusian Parliaments between 
1990 and 1999 should shed important light on the issue of party failure and prospects 
for political rejuvenation. It will be suggested that initial indecisiveness of democrats 
and politics of self-preservation, considerably hindered the process of 
institutionalisation of parties in parliament.
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Second, inherited structures, including the pool of resources in the hands of the old-style 
nomenklatura, and public attitudes towards a strong leadership considerably decelerated 
the process of democratisation. The overestimation of external factors and unjustified 
beliefs in Russian or Western aid to promote democratic changes in Belarus did not 
benefit the opposition. In later years institutions and alterations in law have further 
stipulated the anti-oppositional politics and non-democratic changes.
The analysis below will demonstrate that the pre-1997 Belarusian parliament had the 
potential to remain in power, and to develop into a large democratic body that could 
have promoted the further democratisation of the society. However, it became clear that 
to have the potential for system institutionalisation is not enough, and evidently, does 
not of itself provide the basis for irreversible democratisation. Political actors do not 
solely define the rules of the game; there are also structures and institutional norms that 
stipulate the further course of events. The emerging democrats in Belarus were 
confronted by a conservative majority of Soviet-style functionaries who had the 
advantage of skills, electoral support and control over the state resources. 
Consequentially, the democrats were defeated by the nomenklatura, as well as by Soviet 
legacies, public attitudes, formal and informal linkages and institutions. Therefore, one 
can witness intensive vote interchange; legitimate, but voiceless parties; the tendency 
for the presidency to strengthen, and continuing political and economic stagnation. The 
logic of parties’ failure in parliament and possible mechanisms of its reiteration will be 
discussed in the text below.
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It must be noted that the issue of personal ambitions and commitment of party 
members to democratisation are important for an understanding of party system 
development in new states. Weak party bonds, members’ self-seeking benefits and 
lack of uniformity tend to bring a party system to stall. If, however, the party structure 
is operative, this can be subdued to a general goal of party activities. As Sartori notes:
... the existence of parties by no means eliminates selfish and unscrupulous 
motivations. The power-seeking drives of politicians remain constant. 
Nevertheless, even if the party politician is motivated by crude self-interest, his 
behaviour must depart—if the constraints of the system are operative—from the 
party motivation (Sartori, 1976: 25).
Therefore, the overall party structure, both internal and external will be subject to 
further investigation.
4.1.2 Belarus’ Parliament between 1990 and 1999: a general picture.
The 1990-1996 Belarusian parliaments accumulated the ‘cream’ of political society in 
the sense that the majority of the party leadership was elected into public office. This 
allowed some parties like PCB, BNF, AP, and ODP to settle down further, and others -  
GD, PNS, BSDG, etc -  to be centrally launched. Largely orientated towards public 
office, parties were top-down structured and had very weak links with their grassroots. 
While in public office, parties were financially supported by the state. All party 
representatives had their own office, staff, technical, financial and media resources.
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These accommodating developments strengthened a tendency for the domination of 
parliamentary party over extra-parliamentary organisations. In 1996 there was an 
attempt to create a joint party -  parliamentary office structure: ODP and GD merged 
into the faction ‘Civic Action’ (GD) and set up the United Civic Party, largely based in 
parliament. PNS in alliance with BSDG NG found themselves in a similar situation: 
they formed a social-democratic faction, ‘Labour Union’, v/ith the majority of their 
leadership in parliament. These tendencies have been concomitant with a reduction in 
numbers of party central office staff, and relocation of staff for public office by the 
majority of parties. By 1996 all parliamentary parties were using state resources to 
subsidise their own staff, including regional organisations: from technical equipment to 
free usage of communication sources and the state owned mass media. PCB and BNF 
were the only exception to a general tendency of the cooperation with the state. They 
based their principal ‘party machinery’ outside of parliament, and had a comparatively 
large proportion of staff attached to the central office (about 10-15 paid staff). They 
represented a distinctive mass type of party with an extensive regional network and 
relatively large membership of 16 000 for PCB and 7 000 for BNF135 in 1996. The 
situation with BNF in parliament was less favourable than that of any other party. It 
managed to promote 44 candidates during the parliamentary elections in 1995136, but
135 PCB had a compulsory membership fee -  1% of monthly wages. With the 1996 financial failure, it 
changed its policy towards a more flexible and affordable form of cooperation with its members, on the 
basis of free donations and voluntarily contributions. On the other hand, BNF initially had a non- 
compulsory membership fee largely based on donations. One of the modem features of the BNF 
organisation is membership flexibility: there is no clear-cut distinction between members and non­
members as long as the latter could contribute to the party legitimising myth.
136 See, http://iurix.iura.uni-sb.de/~serko/law pol/politics.html. retrieved June 2001.
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failed to have a single candidate elected to parliament during the second election run in 
November-December. This is thought to be due to the party’s radical and militant style 
of politics, especially during the election campaign, and reported fraud by authorities of 
adding non-existent (deceased) names to electoral lists in voting constituencies, and 
manipulating their vote to their own advantage.
The programmatic structure of 1990-1999 Belarusian parliaments demonstrates a two- 
dimensional polarisation, which can only be observed during the 1990-1996 period. It is 
based on identification of deputies’ names and their partisan stances, as well as 
interpretation of voted issues. Party competition is organised along two principal 
conflict lines, ‘conservative-reformist’137 and ‘power allocation’. The first divide 
highlights economic populism, authority, state social protection, re-union with Russia 
versus sovereignty, economic liberalism and support for EU integration. The second 
divide displays the conflict over power distribution in the new democracy: this revolves 
around power arrangements between the legislature and the executives in the first 
instance, and with the introduction of the presidency, develops into a ‘democracy- 
dictatorship’ dilemma. These developments seem to be similar to those in Russia and 
according to White and McAllister:
137 Scholars avoid naming this divide as ‘left-right’ due to the general confusion and the absence of clear 
interpretation of the issue. It nevertheless has a particular meaning characteristic of the CIS with 
communist successor, agrarians, and labour parties on the left, and in opposition to them, social 
democratic, liberal, and nationalist parties (see Kitschelt, H. (1995); Markowski, R. (1997); Evans, G. and 
Whitefield, S (1998); Janda, K. (1988).
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The dimensions of party competition are likely to follow two cleavages: a reformist 
cleavage and a communist cleavage. The reformist cleavage is complex, insofar as it 
is clearly divided between those who retain some communist sympathies and those 
who oppose communism in principle. Nevertheless, the evidence about the social 
bases of this dimension suggests that it may become aligned along an economically 
interventionist/ free-market cleavage (White and McAllister, 1995: 67).
There are similarities in voting patterns between 1990 and 1991, as well as the 1992-1995 
parliaments. The 1996 parliament was a watershed in conflict development between the 
legislature and the president, after which parliament was dissolved and reformed in favour 
of a more compliant one. If in 1990 and 1991 one could trace a centrifugal tendency with 
equal power weight in distribution of political forces, the 1992-1995 parliament displayed 
an opposite tendency. The reformists appeared to be on the left outside of the spectrum, 
being dominated by the communists on the right. This unprecedented situation can be 
explained by negative voting by the democrats on the majority of the issues advanced by 
the conservative bloc. The 1993 parliament is clearly pro-communist, with the policy­
making initiative in hands of the conservative majority, and its regular boycotting by pro- 
democratic forces. The stalemate was inevitable, and both blocs called for the 1994 
presidential election. The 1994 parliament proved an exception with the democratic forces 
breaking through and re-gaining the initiative. This was determined by the events of the 
political year: the unexpected victory of a non-partisan candidate Alexander Lukashenko 
during the presidential election, and the scandalous defeat of the old-style conservative 
forces that supported Kebich in his ‘back-to-the-USSR’ campaign for the presidency. The 
distribution of MPs’ positions during the 1992-1995 parliaments was characterised by
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their gradual re-location along the ‘power conflict’ line. In essence, the 1996 parliament 
marked the apex of power conflict in society.
From the general analysis of MPs’ positions in parliament one may notice that despite 
transitional political confusion and ideological vagueness, the communist bloc appears 
to be more unified than others. Historical legacies and institutional frameworks indeed 
had an effect on party discipline and structure. Furthermore, ideologically confused 
deputies, who voted inconsistently and rightward, can be more often found among the 
communists than any other party. However, the reformist wing had gradually solidified 
into a stable opposition by 1996. An analysis of the party coalition potential highlights 
the issues of professional immaturity and party leaders fearing to lose their ‘familiar 
spots’138. Developments in the 1996 parliament clarify that even though parties were 
under pressure from the pro/anti-presidential divide, they nevertheless became relatively 
unified. Their resistance to Lukashenko’s violations of law in October- November was 
indecisive and weak, and ultimately failed after brief negotiations with Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, one the Russian leading politicians.
Comparative analysis suggests that Belarus’ parliament between 1990 and 1999 was 
better structured in its political alliances, and more resistant to change, than that of the 
Russian Congresses between 1990 and 1992. According to the MPs’ voting positions, 
Belarusian legislatures, however, are characterised by a unified conservative, rather than 
a democratic bloc. Using methods of data reduction in assessing MPs’ voting results,
138 More to the point, the deputies were afraid of losing their ‘free ride’ from the government, and hence, 
moderately played their oppositional role in the political game.
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one can approximate parliamentary structure and establish possible patterns of deputies’ 
voting behaviour.
Figures 4.1.2-1. Positions of members of Belarus’ parliaments between 1990 and 1996
Notes: Graphics are based on the Multi-dimensional analysis of deputies’ voting 
behaviour received from parliamentary bulletins (13 sessions) between 1990 and 1996. 
Distribution of named cases reflects voting preferences of those deputies, who formally 
belonged to a democratic bloc in parliament. For full description of methodology see 
text (section 4.1.1).
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1990 parliament: According to deputies’ positions and voting tendencies on ‘hot issues’, 
a two-dimensional polarisation in the legislature was observed, with the communists on 
the left and the new democrats on the right and partially in the centre. The Y-axis is less 
intense and seems to accumulate less controversy according to the degree of dispersion 
of opinions. The issue of legislative power arrangement on the national level received 
much interest from the democratic group, and caused some degree of polarisation in 
discussion. The ideological controversy of mobilised interests in the 1990 parliament 
also generated factional activity among the deputies. The picture reflects crystallisation 
of the pro-democratic opposition.
If one were to compare these findings with the spatial distribution of MPs’ positions in 
the first Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (16 May -22 June 1990), elected after 
the declaration of sovereignty by Russia, there is little difference to be observed. Both 
plots are evenly distributed along the ‘conservative-reformist’ axis -  the main line for 
party competition139.
1991 parliament: A similar pattern of voting behaviour among deputies can be traced in 
the 1991 parliament. In the latter case, though, the democratic camp seemed more 
crystallised. According to the deputies’ configuration and issue distribution, the left- 
right division still persists, with pro-communists on the left and pro-democrats -  on the 
right. The distribution of MPs’ positions became ‘butterfly’ shaped, spreading more
139 The only difference is in labelling of the left and the right ends of the spectrum: in Russia the right end 
of the chart is conservative and the left end is reformist. The Belarusian parliament attained similar shape 
in 1993, and 1995.
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along the Y-axis -  ‘power allocation’ conflict. The principal controversy that steered the 
conflict, refer to such issues as the mandate and functions of the Supreme Soviet, the 
role of CPRB in Belarus, which was consequently banned that year, the dismissal of 
democratic-oriented Spokesman Stanislav Shushkevich; de-politicisation of the 
government; and transition to the market economy. The ideological disparity between 
deputies has sharpened. Each issue positively voted for by one camp, led the other camp 
sequentially to its rejection. Faction-analysis, however, suggests that the bloc of hard­
liners was more cohesive and consistent in their voting patterns, and fully subjugated to 
the parliamentary arena. This ideological polarisation between the communist- 
dominated majority and pro-democratic minority eventually led to a deadlock in 
decision-making. In 1992 the BNF encouraged the initiation of a signature-gathering 
campaign for a referendum with the purpose of dissolution of the old parliament and 
election of a new parliament.
1992 parliament: The left-right pattern in MPs’ voting behaviour attained a centripetal 
tendency. Ideological polarisation had dramatically subsided. Interestingly, existing 
ideological blocs reversed: The democratic opposition moved to the left end of the X- 
axis, which might have implied their defensive position, illustrated by negative voting 
on a majority o f the issues. On the other hand, this relocation of poles may suggest the 
communist advancement. At the same time, factional analysis confirmed consolidation 
of the democratic forces. There is a distinct democratic tail in the picture, which 
indicates a certain degree of polarisation of forces including the extreme positions of 
some democratically minded MPs. Figure 3 points out an increasing ideological divide 
along the ‘power line’. As an analysis of voting issues confirms, principal debates
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revolved around the reformation of parliamentary structure and the introduction of new 
procedural regulations.
If one compares the 1992 legislature in Belarus with the third Russian Congress, 28 
March-5 April 1991, an obvious significant difference becomes evident in performance 
of the two national parliaments. Both legislatures reached their crucial point when old 
communist forces advanced. In Russia the conservative wing convened an extraordinary 
session in order to ban Yeltsin from power, which was pro-democratic at that time, from 
governance. Parliamentary polarisation was razor-sharp: democratic forces in response 
to the conservative motion consolidated to defeat the attack. In Belarus the conservative 
camp in parliament also became intensively engaged, trying to secure benefits in 
relation to the introduction of the presidency. In reply, democratic forces within the 
nationalists and social democrats organised a campaign on vote collection to call for 
new parliamentary elections. Contrary to the situation in Russia, their endeavour failed, 
due to internal disagreements within the party leadership. This has signified a new era in 
party and parliamentary developments in Belarus.
1993 parliament: The distribution of deputies’ positions in the 1993 parliament is 
characterised by a high degree of dispersion and a further centripetal move. The 
parliament appeared to be more ‘centrist’, and MPs’ voting patterns lack any ideological 
or programmatic division. Competition lines also seemed blurred and faction analysis 
suggests no separation whatsoever. The general picture illustrates domination of the 
communists in parliament.
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1994 parliament: Voting patterns of the deputies began attaining some centrifugal 
features. Interestingly, the ideological ends of the spectrum have changed again: the 
reformists moved back to the right, and the communists formed a left orientated 
opposition. Pole change suggests that democratic forces re-gained their confidence and 
concomitantly their constructive initiative, which was reflected in their positive voting 
results. According to this picture there was no balancing centre. The communist bloc 
this time looks more consolidated and left centred. This may imply some uncertainty or 
moderation in communist voting behaviour. As results confirm, they either abstained 
from voting or voted rather hesitantly and inconsistently. A ‘power divide’ prevailed as 
the central line for party competition. The principal issues raised for discussion in 
parliament related to the introduction of the presidency and measures for economic 
revival of the country in a situation of crisis.
1995 parliament: The 1994 centrifugal movement gained in scale in 1995. There was a 
distinct lack of a balanced centre, with a very heavy communist tail on the right 
(spectrum ends have reversed again!) and rather dispersed democratic forces in defence 
on the right. The left-right divide has gradually sharpened, reducing tension over power 
allocation in society. Factional analysis suggests, however, that both conflict lines have 
contributed to party competition in parliament. The domination of traditional 
nomenklatura persisted.
The structure of Russian Parliaments, the fourth (21-25 May 1991), the fifth (10-17 July 
1991) and the sixth (6-21 April 1992) Congresses resembles that in Belarus. Both
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parliaments demonstrated a gradual loss of ideological profile by existing political 
factions and groups of interest.
1996 parliament: From figure 7 one can see that the centrifugal motion of political 
forces has resulted in their even distribution along the X-axis. Its linear form resembles 
that of the 1990 legislature. However, the composition of political forces is radically 
different. Disintegrated communists, pro-presidential faction ‘Zgoda’, and non-partisan 
candidates, represent the left pole of the spectrum. The centre is blended and represented 
by the moderately left agrarians and transient communists. Civic Action and Social 
Democratic factions complete the picture on the right reformist end. Individually 
positioned, the deputies did not display much controversy along the power allocation 
line. Party competition in reality, however, was characterised by high tension between 
parliament and the president, which resolved in favour of the latter. Only factional 
analysis indicates rising disagreements: factions, rather than individuals were engaged 
in the conflict. This marked a new development in party politics of Belarus.
If compared with the seventh (1-14 December 1992) Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies, a striking similarity in structure of both parliaments arises again, especially in 
the light of the forthcoming common finale: parliaments’ dissolution by the presidents 
due to the occurred impasse in decision-making. The only difference, though, is that 
democratic forces in the Russian Parliament were more unified, whereas in Belarus’ the 
right bloc was still obscure.
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Despite the consequent failure, both national parliaments had well-articulated factions. 
The Belarusian legislature had five factions: ‘Zgoda’ (57 members) with Vladimir 
Konoplev (the deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives), agrarian faction (45) 
with Michael Giryt’ as leader, communist faction (43) -  Sergei Kaliakin, faction of 
social-democrats ‘Labour Union’ (18) -  Leonid Sechko; and liberal faction ‘Civic 
Action’ (18) -  Stanislav Bogdankevich. The remaining 18 were independent non­
partisan members of parliament. In the Russian parliament in 1992 there were 10 well- 
defined factions, and six of them entered the new parliament on the basis of the 1993 
elections.
Factional analysis of parliamentary structure between 1990 and 1996 showed much 
similarity in configuration of ideological blocs. If parliamentary pictures reflected some 
degree of polarisation between deputies, the factional analysis proved the opposite, i.e. 
this polarisation occurred between individuals rather than ideological groups. 1994 and 
1996 parliaments stand aside from the general picture. The shape demonstrates a 
relative advance of the pro-democratic factional forces. Their detailed analysis will be 
provided later in the text.
Figures 4.1.2-2. Positions of factions in Belarus’ parliaments between 1990 and 1996 
Notes: Graphics are based on the Multi-dimensional analysis (object-score) factions’ 
positions in parliament, which were obtained from parliamentary bulletins (13 sessions) 
between 1990 and 1996. Factions are named. For full description of methodology see 
text (section 4.1.1).
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Shortly after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation in 1996, a 
new bi-cameral legislature was formed in Belarus. In January 1997 110 deputies entered 
the House of Representative of the National Assembly of Belarus. The upper house -  
The Council of Republic -  had 64 members; eight of who were appointed by the 
president, and the rest were elected from the six regions of the republic and Minsk.
The practice of single ballot voting was cancelled by a joint decision of deputies, as it 
“could have again caused a deadlock in discussion” (from interviews with members of 
parliament). This respectively did not allow further analysis of parties’ coalitional 
behaviour. The aim of the new legislature was to work ‘effectively’, without any 
‘ideological’ complications. Therefore, the voting procedure was simplified to the level 
of aggregate results only. This makes it impossible to draw a picture of personalised 
positions of the members in the new parliament. However, the unanimous way of voting 
in most cases can give a general impression of the parliamentary structure as such 
(Bulletins of 1-5 sessions of the House of representative of the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Belarus, 1997-1999). This unified voting undoubtedly had increased the 
efficacy of the new legislature. If the 1996 Parliament (9 January -  11 July) had 
considered only 59 bills, 399 decrees, and the quantity of rejected proposals was about 
600; the new parliament produced 261 bills and 836 decrees for the two-year period (20 
December 1997- 10 February 1999). Interestingly, 239 bills were ultimately approved 
by the president and only 22 were left for re-consideration by parliament140. According 
to the new regulations the president forms the parliamentary agenda and makes 
procedural suggestions. Nevertheless, the fact that the new parliament was more
140 Summary reports, Parliamentary Bulletins 1990-1999, Presidential Library, Minsk, Belarus.
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‘productive’ in its legislative activities had a negative contribution to a declining image 
of the oppositional parties.
As one can see the new parliament has radically changed: non-partisanship and 
compliance were peacefully negotiated between the president and the new members of 
parliament. The former obtained a trouble-free existence from parliament, and the newly 
entered MPs attained power and access to state resources, including relatively high 
salaries, and free accommodation in the capital of Belarus, Minsk.
4.1.3 Factional politics in the 1996 parliament
For the first time in Belarus’ history the parliament was formally divided into 5 party 
factions, two of which were pro-democratic (‘Civic Action’ and ‘Union of Labour’), 
another two -  left-oriented (‘The Communist and The Agrarian Factions) and the largest 
pro-presidential faction ‘Zgoda’; and 18 non-partisan members of parliament. The number 
of pro-democratic deputies could have been much higher if the amendment to the electoral 
law introduced by the 12th Supreme Soviet, had been enacted. It was designed to lower the 
threshold for the attendance of the parliamentary elections from 50% to 25%. Lukashenko 
suggested not enacting it to the Constitutional Court until after the next elections. Bowing 
to this pressure, the Constitutional Court revoked its judgement. As Silitski (2000: 21) 
notes, this decision considerably reduced the chances of the oppositional parties to obtain 
enough votes in order to win seats in parliament (second rounds were mostly carried out in 
urban areas where neither the Communists or Agrarians had strong support).
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The elected 1995-6 parliament, nevertheless, had well-defined political factions. As 
Multidimensional analysis and Crosstabulation show, the three distinct blocs can be 
observed in the 1996 legislature. The largest two factions, pro-presidential ‘Zgoda’ and non­
partisan deputies, were followed by the Communists (PCB) and the Agrarian Party (AP). 
Civic Action (GD) and Social Democrats (CDC) formed the opposite pole of the model. The 
principal issues that polarised the parliament were ‘to interpret whether the dissolution of the 
USSR was legitimate’, to approve further actions towards re-union with Russia, change of 
the state coat of arms, public right of ownership, new additions to the law on parliamentary 
elections and so on. There was a distinct ‘left-right’ demarcation on certain ideological 
issues, with ‘Zgoda’, non-partisan, PCB and AP on the left and the democratic bloc on the 
right. ‘Zgoda’ was the only faction that voted positively on the issues related to empowering 
presidential authority, being opposed by the rest of the parliament.
The major concern of MPs was to maintain separation of powers between the legislature 
and the executives. For the first time, most irreconcilable political opponents began 
working together. With Civic Action’s insistence many liberal economic laws were 
adopted, for which most factions, except the Communists, positively voted. Broad 
political coalition of oppositional forces resisted Lukashenko’s desire to establish one- 
man rule for at least a year.
The overall analysis showed that party competition in parliament was scattered and non­
partisan. Members of parliament frequently acted on personal grounds rather than from 
partisan or factional perspectives. The politics of factions was rather ineffective; only 
the 1990, 1992 and 1996 parliaments displayed some movement towards coalitional
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behaviour of deputies. Otherwise, the individual choice of faction-members dominated 
proceedings, rather than a concerted promotion of factional interests. As issues-analysis 
suggests the 1996 parliamentary factions displayed remarkable cohesion along the 
power line -  presidential divide141. Nevertheless, they failed to resist presidential 
pressure and were consequently dismissed from office. Existing polarisation in the 1996 
parliament could have resulted in fierce and long-term resistance by the democratic 
forces to the presidential volition. However, this has not been the case.
A closer look at the distribution of the deputies’ positions in space in accordance with 
their ideological profiles, demonstrates no principal division. Only the Social Democrat 
(CDC ‘The Labour Union’) and ‘Civic Action’ factions appeared to stand out clearly 
from a general factional bulk; the rest merged into a complex political magma. The 
findings confirm that the programmatic and ideological profiles of the majority of MPs 
were largely blurred, thus aiding Lukashenko’s victory.
Similarity and difference between political factions in parliament can be depicted using a 
number of indices. Index of voting (Iv) characterises the level of political engagement of 
deputies into the process of decision-making. Its score is determined by (i) ultimate 
response of the group members to raised issues; (ii) their crystallised position rather than 
‘vacant’ vote of abstention or absence; and finally (iii) the level of integrity of opinions 
within the group. Therefore, the higher the score, the more fully mobilised, active and
141 This can be illustrated by the manner of voting on the issue to give a vote of non-confidence to the 
Cabinet o f Ministers: the split occurred mainly between the left-oriented ‘Zgoda’, and the bloc of Civic 
action and CDC. The rest of the parliament remained neutral.
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deeply engaged the group in discussion. Index of cohesion (Ic) reinforces the meaning of 
the previous variable by indicating the level of dispersion of opinions from an average 
voter within a faction. It is measured as a mean of standard deviation deducted from 1 as a 
whole, and shows that with a higher score, a group becomes more cohesive and less 
controversial. Index of conformity (Ico) measures the level of resemblance of group 
behaviour to that of the entire parliament. It is counted as a relative share of mean opinion 
from that of the overall model. The closer the score is to ‘1’ the more the 
conflict/consensus relationship within the group resembles that in parliament. If the score 
is beyond the range [0; 1] this may indicate that the group actually exercises a radically 
diverse pattern of behaviour from the parliamentary majority. The last index -  the Index of 
activity (la) -  was introduced by Ygrinovich (1996, Table 6) in her analysis of the 1996 
parliament, and was calculated as a group average of deputies’ voting scores. The higher 
the score the more active a deputy’s behaviour is.
Table 4.1.2-1. Indexes of factions’ voting behaviour in the 1996 parliament
Factions Indexes
Of voting Of cohesion Of
conformity
Of activity
Zgoda 0.07 0.47 2.72 -1.59
The Communists 0.23 0.53 0.88 -0.98
The Agrarians 0.23 0.41 0.88 -0.32
Non-Partisan 0.26 0.38 0.77 +0.07
Civic Action 0.25 0.41 0.81 +1.34
CDC Union of Labour 0.32 0.41 0.62 +0.93
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Note: Further explanation can be found in the text.
Source: author
From the analysis of parliamentary factions it becomes clear that the 1996 parliament 
did not have distinctive factional divisions. The democratic bloc was increasingly 
engaged into political discussion, given the higher level of Iv and la; however it was 
less organised and more personified in the process of decision-making. The left, the 
Communist and the Agrarian factions in opposition, were more unified and disciplined, 
however their traditional compliance with the leadership led to their failure to resist 
Lukashenko’s accretion of power. The most persistent and decisive in its voting 
behaviour was the pro-presidential faction ‘Zgoda’. Its voting pattern (Ico) appeared to 
be radically different from the entire parliament, which reinforces the argument 
regarding the existence of a strong anti-Lukashenko divide between the parties in 
parliament. Non-partisan members of parliament, as anticipated, acted rather 
inconsistently by signifying a general mode of uncertainty, conformity and growing 
apathy towards ideology-based politics. Finally, according to Ygrinovich, the new 
legislature appeared to be composed of the least active and most compliant members of 
the previous parliament (1996:15-18). Moreover, after applying a discriminant method 
to determine MPs’ motives for entering the new parliament, Ygrinovich discovered that 
the factor of loyalty to President Lukashenko motivated 72% of pro-presidential MP’s 
and discouraged 68% of anti-presidential MP’s from joining the new parliament. 
Therefore, the president obtained the support of the less active and the most compliant 
part of the deputies’ corps and in so doing revived the ‘old Supreme Soviet’.
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Analysis of groups’ interest-orientation suggests that there was no major programmatic 
division between factions. They did not have clear policies; were inconsistent in their 
issue voting behaviour and did not deliver their promises to their electorates. However, 
ideological separation took place, despite declining party competition. As cross­
tabulation confirms the left-oriented factions PCB, AP, and to some degree, Zgoda often 
voted against the democratic right Civic Action and CDC simply on the basis of 
disagreements in form rather than in nature.
4.1.4 Further discussion
As it was hypothesised at the beginning of the chapter, the parliamentary arena is highly 
desirable for parties in the new democracies. It brings power, security and benefits by 
providing relatively independent existence for parties from the electorate. With global 
changes in party politics, strategies for co-operation with the state prevail, not only in 
established democracies, but also in new and developing ones. The initial hypothesis 
suggested that new parties would act in accordance to their rationale and ‘practical logic’, 
and therefore, would attempt to find less costly and more effective means for survival.
This analysis of Belarusian parties in public office, however, delivers an ambivalent 
conclusion. First, one can conclude that the parties in public office indeed had an 
opportunity for institutionalisation and successful survival. Belarus’ two pre-1997 
parliaments had developed into a structured body with well-defined cleavages and 
organised competitive forces. There was a certain degree of polarisation of interests, 
which under a moderate number of parties, with relative proportionality of forces, might
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have had the potential to result in a stable system. Moreover, contrary to the general 
opinion that Belarus had no incentives to generate oppositional politics and by that to 
condition democratic breakthrough, our study has confirmed that Belarus’ parliament in 
1990-1996 was better structured than that of Russia before its dissolution in 1996. There 
were two salient divides associated with ‘conservative-reformist’ and ‘power 
distribution’ conflicts. They included such traditional issues as populism and 
moderation on the left, to marketisation and liberalisation on the right. Issues of 
sovereignty were also at stake, as opposed to the communists’ idea of a happy return to 
the USSR. Power arrangements, as a second conflict line for party competition, came to 
the fore in 1992 and gradually reached its apex in 1996.
Over time the Belarusian legislature has developed well-organised and legitimate 
factions, and seems to have moved away from individual politics to the politics of 
factional coalitions. If in 1990 there was a moderate democratic minority opposed by 
the overwhelming majority of the communist nomenclature, by 1996 the situation was 
radically different. There was a formal division of the entire parliament into party 
factions, and the full engagement of members of parliament could be observed. Even 
non-partisan deputies have acted as if they belonged to a single group, having many 
parameters in common.
However, as analysis shows, the system potential does not in itself provide the 
motivation for irreversible democratic changes and party settlement. The 1996 
parliament ‘surrendered’ its legitimacy in favour of an individual governance of the 
president in peaceful cooperation with the newly ‘adapted’ House of Representatives;
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state owned mass media; newly appointed Constitutional Court, and pre-perestroika 
structures of regional powers.
Two equally important conclusions can be drawn from the received picture. The first 
and most obvious conclusion is that parties cannot fully sustain themselves in the 
unfavourable environment of Belarus, where institutional and structural conditions by 
proxy disregard opposition. Oppositional parties cannot bring together ‘fringe’ interests 
of civil society with the state, which in addition are entirely ‘blocked’ on regional levels 
by old-style nomenklatura. Governmental parties in turn have considerably reduced 
their efforts in linking the state with civil society, which occurred due to the availability 
of material resources and growing independence of the electorate. This leaves 
disillusioned voters with a choice to rationally switch their votes away from the parties 
who have increasingly become their ‘second-order preferences’, and to ‘delegate’ the 
president maximal authority to lead the country out of crisis. The issue of whether 
democracy can be possible at all, and without parties, is presently at stake and at the 
centre of political discussion.
On the other hand, if one evaluates party development, both oppositional and 
governmental, in terms of global change of party modality, it would be clear that parties 
are attaining a new quality, which may allow them to survive in the future. The 
‘presidential divide’ appeared to be both damaging and stimulating for the party 
political development. Governmental parties by allying with the state have negotiated 
their benefits for future parliamentary campaigns and by that secured their prospect for 
survival. It may be observed that the president has bargained with loyalist parties for
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seats in public office, which has led to a victorious electoral campaign for the 
parliamentary election:
The state is able to ensure an honest and fair election campaign for you. You are 
head and shoulders above the others. You have a huge parliamentary experience. 
Our people are decent and just. If they sit down [to think it over], they will decide 
that there is no need to change one pack of people for another [menyat shilo na 
mylo]. Why do we need other [deputies] if these have already learned [their job] 
and can do something? So be quiet over those howls from abroad. We have done 
everything to secure international recognition for our elections. We have done 
everything. (RFL/RE, Vol. 2, No. 15, 18 April 2000)
The situation of electoral and financial decline stimulated oppositional parties to seek 
new organisational, ideological and economic opportunities for survival. As the analysis 
demonstrated, successfully or not, they are developing a new image within civil society 
and the international community. The oppositional parties by and large have moved 
away from a mass type of organisation, and remain such only on paper. They utilise 
catch-all strategies for their political campaigning, and have a relatively stable core 
clientele of voters, mainly urban-based. Politics as such became more atomised and 
issue-oriented. Parties, knowing their poor grassroots potential, have re-oriented to a 
more professionalized (with considerable contribution from sociological and various 
consultancy groups) and more financially grounded electoral campaign. They became 
flexible in their membership: the best example is the Belarusian Popular Front. They are 
more centralised and leadership dominated, which is due to the absence of an
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appropriate regional network, limited financial resources and the necessity to act swiftly 
in a highly fluid and unpredictable environment.
In the light of the above discussion the logical question would be whether or not parties 
are failing in Belarus. The analysis of parties in public office between 1990 and 2000 
has demonstrated that parties are actually surviving. However what effect this can have 
on their future development, especially after the parliamentary elections 2000, is the 
question of their mobilisation and rationality. If the oppositional parties instead of 
boycotting elections as they did in the spring and autumn 2000 elections, fully and 
wisely engaged in politics of winning seats in parliament, and if the governmental 
parties took the challenge respectively, this could have created a productive opportunity 
for a ‘round table’ agreement between the opposition and the president, and given the 
former another chance for consolidation. This may certainly sustain the country on the 
edge of democracy, although fa9ade, and associated with a strong leadership, but 
nevertheless, sustained by representative politics. The parties in their majority did not 
take this opportunity and whether they will have another chance is the question of the 
uncertain future.
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4.2 Parties as organisations: central office and regional network
Party organisation is often cited as a key independent element in explaining party 
‘effectiveness’ (Duverger, 1954; Janda, 1980; Katz, 1996). The latter is conditioned by a 
number of factors, of which external elements such as electoral system, constitutional 
arrangements, and historical legacies are equally important. However, the way parties 
are organised and function, can determine their prospects for adaptation and survival, 
especially in the changing environment of the new democracies of Eastern Europe.
As an aggregate of individuals forming constellations of rival groups (Sartori, 1976: 
72), party organisation functions as a three-level political institution. The first level -  
party in public office -  was considered in the previous chapter as decisive for party 
survival in the process of democracy building. The second and the third levels -  party in 
central office and party at grassroots -  will be the focus of examination in this chapter. 
This analysis will contribute to an understanding of parties’ protracted development in 
post-communist Belarus.
Party central office includes party staff headed by the chairman or general secretary as 
well as representatives of various affiliated and ancillary organisations. As a rule the 
central office plays a leading role in party organisation for the purpose of maintaining 
tight control over such ‘organisational uncertainties’ as communication and resource 
allocation. However, with an increasing tendency towards more direct politics in a 
modem environment, party in public office becomes a dominant means for party 
adaptation and survival (Katz, 1996; Panebianco, 1988).
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The party on the ground consists of organised supporters nation wide. This level of party 
organisation, which is often cited as regional, may employ its own professional staff and 
include public officeholders; nevertheless, it is primarily composed of party volunteers -  
the basic units of party organisation. As Panebianco (1988) notes, the motivation for 
individuals at this level is conversely different from that in public office and is based on 
solidaristic and collective incentives, rather than that of electoral advantage and power 
seeking. An analysis of these two levels of party organisation, hence, will aid the 
explanation of the unsuccessful process of party system formation in Belarus.
4.2.1. Methodology and working hypotheses
Before discussing how parties are organised outside of public office in Belarus, the 
methodology of analysis will be introduced. Keneth Janda (1980:98) in his cross-national 
survey offered a popular definition of ‘party organisation’ as structured patterns of 
interaction that are prescribed by formal rules of procedures or by traditions and unwritten 
rules. Respectively, a higher degree of formalisation of party organisation should offer 
more complex patterns of behaviour and hence, increase chances for effective adaptation 
and survival of political parties. The significance of the organisational quality of parties 
has been considered by many prominent scholars and respectively described as ‘structural 
differentiation’ (Huntington, 1991), ‘party articulation’ (Duverger, 1954), ‘sub-unit 
structure’ (Sartori, 1976), or ‘party institutionalisation’ (Panebianco, 1988). These 
academic attempts were directed at establishing the degree of ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘sustainability’ of party systems in a changing society.
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Janda and Colman (1998) suggest four major criteria for analysing the degree of party 
organisation. These are (i) complexity, (ii) centralisation, (iii) involvement and (iv) 
coherence. Their classification largely coincides with Sartori’s checklist for the analysis 
of party factions as elementary units of party organisation (1976: Ch.4). These four 
criteria will be used throughout the chapter in order to delineate the level of organisation 
of parties in Belarus. (I) Party complexity involves regularised procedures for co­
ordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s strategy and tactics. 
Janda (1980) suggests the following parameters for its measurement: structural 
articulation, intensiveness, extensiveness and pervasiveness of organisation; frequency 
of local meetings; maintenance of records and organisation of labour. (II) For the 
analysis of ‘centralisation of power’ which has been theorised as the location and 
distribution of effective decision making authority within the party, the following 
components are named: nationalisation of structure; selection of national leader and 
parliamentary candidates; funds allocation; policy formation, control of communication; 
discipline; and leadership concentration. (Ill) By ‘involvement’ Janda and Colman 
(1998) mean the level of commitment of party activists to the party’s objectives and 
doctrine. This criterion includes membership requirements and participation; material 
and purposive incentives; and doctrinism. (IV) The last index assesses the level of 
coherence and factionalism within the organisation and will be employed to explain 
controversial party performance in Belarus.
Many scholars of party politics (Kitschelt, 1992; Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Pridham 
and Lewis, 1996; Szczerbiak, 1999; Kopecky, 1995; Mair, 1996; Kitschelt et al., 1999) 
have examined internal, structural and organisational issues of contemporary parties in
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the new democracies, and generally hypothesised that new parties are likely to be 
characterised by a weak grounding in civil society arising from a low membership base, 
weak organisation and the low priority assigned to building up local structures; a high 
level of dependence on the state for financial and material resources; together with 
centralised patterns of decision-making alongside a high level of autonomy given to 
basic and intermediate structures on local decisions. As Kitschelt (1992, 1995, 1998) 
argues new parties under these circumstances are, therefore, more likely to develop 
along the lines of the catch-all, electoral-professional or cartel party type, which have 
greater chances for survival in a fluid and highly uncommitted electoral environment.
Simultaneously, modified mass type parties, which are mainly successor organisations, 
may also persist because they have inherited a relatively robust membership, a well- 
established network with material resources, and they may have remained committed to 
their doctrine142. These parties are relatively well organised and extensive, but 
nevertheless, may have difficulty in adapting to a transient and increasingly depoliticised 
public environment, unless they move away from the costly model of ‘mass’ organisation 
and become more flexible. These two arguments will be tested in the context of Belarus; 
and consequently, a more adaptable party model will be depicted and theorised.
The analysis of parties in central office and at ‘grass roots’ will aid the understanding of 
the causes of gradual party decline in Belarus. If parties fail to act as organised interests 
in public office, one may accordingly assume that they place more emphasis on their
142 For a similar analysis see Derek Hutcheson “Parties and their members in Central Russia”, paper 
presented for BASEES, 7-9 April, 2001.
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extra-parliamentary activities -  for the purposes of survival and search for electoral 
advantage. Alternatively, parties’ bad organisation, and policies of self-preservation, 
reinforced by structural and institutional anti-party modality, may have determined their 
‘public’ failure. These and other hypotheses regarding more likely forms of party 
survival and organisational prospects of new democracies will be contested in this 
chapter using Belarus as an example.
Data collection and further analysis will include evidence from registered official sources 
of information (Ministry of Justice, published materials, and parties’ own sources) and 
from cross-interviews with party leadership, middle-rank members, and political experts. 
In order to depict the ‘real’ degree of party organisation in Belarus, interviews were 
deemed primary to other forms of information and were conducted twice, in 1996 and 
1999 involving at least two members of party leadership in conversation.
Context:
The years 1996 & 1999 reflect the most controversial time in the political development 
of Belarus. In 1996 the president overruled parliamentary authority and dismissed it as 
non-effective and disloyal. Many parties, which were in the 13th Supreme Council, 
went underground and began politics of resistance against the aggrandising power of the 
president. The beginning of 1999 was marked by a new conflict between parties and the 
president. Lukashenko signed decree No. 2, which required compulsory registration of 
parties and other organisations and by that imposed a political audit on existing parties. 
Interestingly, this happened on the eve of the local parliamentary elections, which were 
scheduled on the 4th of March, and obviously put not only parties’ participation in
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elections, but also their legitimate existence under threat of official closure. Another 
signal of the developing conflict was the forthcoming ‘anti-presidential’ election, which 
was legitimately declared by the underground opposition on the 16th of May on the basis 
of the 1994 Constitution. These two facts together had spurred new political debates and 
opposition.
Sampling—:
Interviews were face-to-face and on average lasted two hours. Although semi­
structured, the questionnaires allowed considerable leeway for initiating in-depth 
situational analysis. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed afterwards144. For the 
purpose of representation, interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
ideological/political profiles. Politicians were chosen on an equal basis from the two 
conflicting blocs -  official and oppositional. They were also selected on the criterion 
that they either play or have the potential to play an influential role in contemporary 
Belarusian politics. The selection method was three-tier, and included (i) the expert 
opinion of leading political scientists and journalists; (ii) analysis of the leaders’ 
popularity scores in opinion polls; and (iii) their accessibility145. The interviewees were
143 See appendix 6 for details.
144 Interviews were recorded and transcribed in Russian, and may be conditionally available on request.
145 This perhaps was the most difficult part of a selection procedure. For the purpose of comparison, the 
author naturally attempted to include those politicians who were interviewed in 1996, and are still 
relatively influential. This however, was difficult. For example, interviews with the president and some 
members of his administration were not possible in 1999, as they became less accessible and more 
‘cautious’ about public relations with ‘outsiders’. Nevertheless, the author managed to target about 90% 
of the previous sample, most o f which were party members of both political sides.
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initially contacted by phone, and if they agreed to be interviewed this was followed by a 
visit at their place of work. The samples of respondents in both years largely coincide, 
giving a rich background for comparison.
In 1996 interviews focused more on leaders’ Tife-stories’, and their analysis as 
individuals. In other words, an interviewee’s narrative description of ‘what I am, and 
how and why I have achieved this’ formed the basis for the qualitative analysis. 
Interviews included a wide range of topics, of which discussion of system of values, 
attitudes, and political dispositions were prioritised. Interviews were based on a 
biographical method that required an introspective analysis of self-development from 
the selected respondents. Twenty-six politicians were interviewed in 1996, including 
party leaders, and members of parliament and government146.
In 1999 interviews focused on the assessment of leaders’ ideological and political 
credibility, internal/external organisational relations and discussion of their strategical 
standpoints. 17 respondents were analysed, of which 12 were party leaders from the two 
conflicting blocs, and 5 were political experts. The number of parties had declined from 35 
to 28 and eventually to 17 by 1999, of which only a dozen may be considered credible on 
the national level. Amongst the interviewees of the oppositional parties were two members 
of BNF, Vintsug Viachorka (a liberal wing) and Anatol Krivorot (a radical wing); a leader 
of PT, Alexander Bukchvostov; the first secretary of the PCB, Sergei Kaliakin; two 
members of the OGP, Alexander Dobrovol’ski and Gennadi Karpenko; a leader of BSDG
146 Detailed information of the findings can be obtained from Korosteleva (1997) “Cotemporary agents of 
the political game in Belarus: a methodological inquiry”, unpublished thesis, BSU, Minsk.
232
NG, Nikolai Statkevich; and finally, Sergei Gaidukevich, a leader of LDPB. The pro- 
presidential bloc was represented by some members of parliament, such as a leader of SD 
PNS, Leonid Sechko, a leading member of the CPB, Vladimir Pletyukchov, deputy 
Spokesman, Vladimir Konoplev, and a non-partisan MP, Valentina Samuseva. Experts 
were chosen from academia, government and mass media. Amongst them were Professors 
David Rotman, and Oleg Manaev, the Minister of Education, Vasilii Strazhev, and media 
representatives, Valetina Tregubovich (also a former member of the BNF Soim), and 
Alexander Feduta, a leading political journalist. With prior agreement, the interviews with 
some experts were not recorded for personal safety reasons.
The results received, both from interviews, and other published sources of information, 
were informative for explanation of party system development in the new democracy, as 
well as complementary to the analysis undertaken in the previous section.
4.2.2 The ‘mass type’ party organisations in Belarus.
This enquiry is based on the analysis of ten out the seventeen publicly recognisable 
political parties. Five of them - PCB (Party of the Communists of Belarus), the 
parliamentary CPB (the Communist Party of Belarus), PT (Labour Party), a 
parliamentary AP (Agrarian Party), and partly women’s Party ‘Nadzeia’ (Hope) -  are 
successor parties with inherited organisational legacies from their communist 
predecessor. This includes relatively extensive membership and regional networks. The 
remaining five are ‘new’ parties of pro-democratic orientation, which in the majority 
have emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They include BNF (The
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Belarusian Popular Front) and CCP (Christian Conservative Party) -  a BNF splinter 
organisation since 1999; OGP (United Civic Party, liberals); LDPB (Liberal Democratic 
Party of Belarus); BSDP NG (Belarusian Social Democratic Party ‘People’s Unity’), 
and a parliamentary party SD PNS (Party of People’s Consent).
Not only do these party groupings differ ideologically, spreading from the conservative 
left to the reformist right of the political spectrum in Belarus between 1990 and 1996, they 
also differ in their organisational modes and loyalty to the incumbent president, which 
respectively determines their parliamentary status and prospects for survival. ‘Mass’ type 
party organisations are represented on the left by the PCB, and on the right by BNF and 
LDPB. The remainder follow contemporary trends in politics and have a highly 
centralised and regionally undeveloped organisation. They are oriented to gaining public 
office as this is deemed the major arena for political activities. Our analysis of party 
organisational structure will demonstrate whether their different modes (ideological, 
organisational, pro/anti-presidential) matter for party system institutionalisation, and what 
challenges and prospects various types of parties are facing in transition.
The ‘mass’ party organisations have significantly deviated from the original definition 
by Duverger (1954). Nevertheless, many have a relatively active grassroots regional 
network based on cells, clubs, and factions. Their membership considerably exceeds that 
of the new parties, and in the majority, have obligatory fees and related privileges. The 
most successful existing mass party organisations are PCB and BNF, and 1996 marked 
a major milestone in their subsequent developments.
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A major mass democratic movement was established in Belarus on 19 October 1988, 
when the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) emerged. The BNF followed the structural 
forms of nationalist movements in the Baltic States, and was led by a group of national 
intellectuals, including the renowned Belarusian writer Vasil Bykau (Bykov) and 
archaeologist Zenon Poznyak, the Front’s elected chairman. BNF declared a policy of 
achieving greater state sovereignty for Belarus and democratisation of Belarusian 
society as its goals. The legacies of the Soviet past, among which are Russification of 
Belarusian society, pro-union attitudes and greater tolerance of Belarusians, created 
considerable difficulty for the BNF when attempting to mobilise electoral support in the 
new democracy. The BNF, nevertheless, due to its originally inclusive political strategy, 
managed to extend its appeal beyond the core nationalist constituency, and to position 
itself as an umbrella movement for all democratic forces that existed in Belarusian 
society at the beginning of the 1990s.
The BNF as a party was established on 30th May 1993, on the third congress of the 
movement, and registered in August that year. As Poznyak stated, the party was 
organised in order to secure the movement in achieving its public goals. Officially they 
were separate organisations, however, their organisational structures (leadership and 
core membership) largely coincided.
The governing body of the party is the congress that meets biennially. Between 
congresses the party is managed by the Soim (council), which is appointed by 
congress. Soim in turn appoints an executive body to implement party strategy in
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practice. Before 1999 leadership was shared between the chairman147 and his six 
deputies: Liavon Borschevskii (who was an acting chairman until 1999), Stanislav 
Gusak, Yurii Khadika, Anatol’ Krivorot, Vintsug Viachorka and Sergei Popkov. The 
party was highly disciplined and organised as a totalitarian microcosm with a central 
collective decision-making body. However, Poznyak gained more power and 
established a system of personal rule within the party after his re-election in 1995. His 
governance in this sense closely resembled that of Lukashenko on the national level. 
This brought conflict and disagreements within the leadership especially concerning 
party strategies and tactics. Since 1995 the party divided into two factions, though co­
ordinated by consensus and discipline. The radical wing was dominant and headed by 
Poznyak. It pursued an extreme nationalist stance that offered no compromise and co­
operation between Belarus and Russia. It was also highly averse to the policy of 
coalition and consensus between like-minded parties and accused them of being 
‘agents of Moscow’ and having a limited ideology. This has obviously delayed the co­
operation between parties, in an attempt to oppose the growing power of the 
president. The liberal wing, headed by Vintsug Viachorka is more moderate in its 
policies and was inclined to compromise with other political actors. Disagreements 
eventually tore the party apart, and since autumn 1999 a splinter party -  The 
Conservative Christian Party (CCP) emerged led by Poznyak.
BNF is one o f the most complex and pervasive political organisations in the country. 
The party operates through cells in the regions, which have the right to assemble into 
territorial Rada (councils), and promote candidates for parliamentary elections, which in
147 After the 1996 crisis Zenon Poznyak went in exile to the USA and later to Poland.
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turn have to be approved by Soim. At the same time, the BNF is a highly centralised 
organisation. As some party leaders claim, the party ‘totalitarian’ structure is a 
temporary but an effective way to surmount the situations of crisis. The party also has 
satellite youth and women’s movements, and before the split in 1999 it had an extensive 
regional network with party cells in each region of Belarus, especially in its western 
part. Official party membership exceeded 5200 supporters before 1999. However, due to 
a new policy of a flexible membership, which allows party members to include anyone 
who could consistently contribute to the legitimation of its status, the number of party 
‘supporters’ reached over a million and involved 18% of the voting population. When 
the party split, the original BNF led by Viachorka, maintained a membership of 2500 
core supporters; and Poznyak’s group had just over 1000148.
The BNF is a well structured organisation. Prior to autumn 1999 it held regular leadership 
meetings, and once a month -  more inclusive meetings with the members of Soim. It has a 
permanent staff of 6-9 members in the national headquarters office, which are well 
equipped and possess good record-keeping facilities. It is engaged in wide publicity by 
printing magazines, bulletins, newspapers, books on history, human rights, world 
nationalist political movements, and on Belarus’ internal affairs. Strict rules and a strong 
organisational spirit have recently brought the party more support than when the 
movement first began. Previously it was a rather closed organisation: access to party 
leaders for an outsider was limited, and one had to go through several secretaries before 
being granted an appointment. Furthermore, the party has a very strong ideology, which 
was formulated by intellectuals who came into the party with existing democratic and
148 Ministry o f Justice, Minsk, Belarus 2000.
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nationalistic beliefs. As Liavon Borschevskii, deputy chairman, and a teacher of 
Belarusian literature and language in one of Minsk gymnasiums stated in 1996:
I personally would not want to be involved into politics. It is a dirty business. 
However, I have to do it in order to support my faith. Personally, I’d rather continue 
teaching. I now have so many scholars and followers. Teachers keep visiting me 
from all over the country. It is so important to know that someone needs you.. .(from 
Borschevskii’s interview, October 1996, at the BNF headquarters).
Notwithstanding internal frictions the party remained highly active between 1996 and 
1999. It was at the heart of such events as the March of Freedom 1 and 2 (Autumn 1999, 
and Spring 2000), and other demonstrations in Belarus. Moreover, electoral 
campaigning for the alternative presidential election in May 1999, was largely organised 
and delivered by the BNF: 60% of its supporters were in electoral commissions for the 
presidential campaign. However further developments, such as Poznyak’s last minute 
withdrawal from the electoral race in 1996 and 2000, and his accusations of betrayal by 
colleagues in opposition, have destroyed the BNF as a unitary organisation and led to 
the final debilitation of an already poorly performing opposition.
In 1999, from the interviews with Anatol’ Krivorot, Vintsug Viachroka, and Valentina 
Tregubovich, and other published sources of information149, it was revealed that there
149 Martinovich V. ‘Pozniak vse blizhe’ [Pozniak gets closer], Belarusian Business Paper, 17 September 
1998, issue 502; Kchodiko Yu. (1997) Problemi orgaisatsii I provedeniia publichniksh kampanii v Belarusi
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has been much controversy about the politics of coalitions within the pre-1999 BNF. 
Poznyak’s adherents did not generally support the idea of a joint political strike against 
the president. As Anatoli Krivorot affirms, the BNF does not need to form union with 
the opposition, as it is better organised and operates more effectively by itself. 
Conversely, Viachorka, Tregubovich and Kshodiko, noted that the BNF needed to act in 
accord with other parties, for which a good relationship with OGP, BSDG, BSDP NG, 
PT and trade unions could be a promising new start. The party split in this sense was 
fortunate as the liberal wing is now able to follow its own strategy in collaboration with 
other parties and NGOs. As Vintsug Viachorka states:
The more authentic instruments [for restoration of democracy in the country] can be, 
for example, the creation of a broad coalition between political parties, mass actions 
directed to resolving several social issues by these actions organised by political 
parties together with independent and even so-called official trade unions. This can 
also be used in the negotiation process. If there is enough pressure from society on 
the regime, it is possible to force the regime to hold free elections and so on, so there 
is a much more realistic scenario to solve our problems. This discussion was one of 
the main motivations of changes within the BNF (Marples, 2000b: 2).
Due to the policy of flexible membership the party has been experiencing financial 
difficulties. However, from informal sources, it became evident that the party presently 
survives on some generous donations, such as ‘donations-in-kind’ (second-hand
[Problems of organisation and implementation of public campaigns in Belarus], NISAPI News, 2: 9-11; 
David Marples and J. Shimko (2000) ‘Interview with Vintsuk Viachorka’, Spring, Belarusian Review.
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equipment or sponsorship of specific events) by wealthy party supporters, as well as 
from a pool of grants that became available to the party with Poznyak’s departure to the 
West. The party also attempts at establishing firm links with its families spirituelles 
abroad, especially in Poland, Ukraine, Baltic States, United Kingdom and USA.
The BNF is one of the very few political organisations in Belarus that retains a very strong 
doctrinaire nature. This was possible due to the faith and continuing efforts of the 
intellectuals who founded the Front. Poznyak’s militant nationalist stance has threatened 
the party’s balanced position in society. Not surprisingly, more people voted for the BNF 
itself rather than for Poznyak, who in addition, was portrayed by the media as an 
aggressive Belarusian chauvinist. Although, the party has a distinct policy programme, the 
1995 party conflict, when none of the BNF representatives was voted in parliament, made 
the party to re-assess its strategy. ‘New Belarus’ with orientation towards the European 
Union became more articulated in party campaigns. It may be possible that with growing 
despondency among people (especially younger generations) and party’s educational 
policy in regions, the doctrinaire approach by the new BNF could receive more support.
The second mass type party organisation for analysis is the PCB, and its splinter, the 
CPB. The Party of Communists Belarusskaia (PCB) was established in December 1991 
and registered with the Ministry of Justice a year later. As a successor party, the PCB 
inherited much from its communist predecessor CPRB, including its organisational 
structure, partisan loyalty and various material resources. It had 18542 official members 
in 1993, and was ‘over’-represented in parliament. However, with a gradual shift in 
public attitudes towards a more democratic style of governance, the original PCB had to
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undergo many ideological, structural and demographic changes. People’s attitudes to the 
idea of communism changed, as they did not want to go back to the USSR. In order to 
survive, the party has had to adapt a more flexible and moderate policy and shift away 
from the ‘old dogmas’ of Marxist-Leninism to a more indefinite and mixed doctrine of 
‘third way socialism’150. This implies a course of moderate reforms, state renovation, 
modification of the social security system and maintenance of public ownership of land. 
Furthermore, the party has been a primary agent for economic and political alliance with 
Russia, i.e. the fostering the Minsk agreement on CIS in 1991, the collective security 
pact and single monetary union in 1993.
However, over time the party began losing support and by 1997 had halved in number. 
During the crisis of 1996 the party split after the dissolution of parliament. Kaliakin, the 
party leader believes that it was official authorities that initiated the split. Some party 
members were offered attractive positions in government, and therefore, they left the 
oppositional PCB as an ‘ideologically untenable’ party. Party membership decreased by 
50% to 9300 supporters and it has experienced a generational shift. The ‘old communist 
believers’ as well as those who support Lukashenko have left the party; and, paradoxically 
enough, this was the turning point for revival of the party’s fortune. In 1999 15 000 party 
supporters were officially registered and whose location was evenly distributed between 
143 local, 6 regional (in each region of Belarus) and Minsk branches.
150 For more details on the third-way socialism see M. Nuti’s paper entitled “Belarus: A Command Economy 
Without Central Planning ” presented to CREES seminar series, University of Birmingham, February 2000.
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From 1996 interviews with party leaders, as well as from various documentary sources the 
PCB seemed externally to be a well-organised, pervasive and well-represented 
organisation, holding the majority of seats in the 1990 and 1995 parliaments. The two 
most prominent leaders of the party -  Sergei Kaliakin and Vladimir Novikov -  were 
elected into the legislature. Internally, however, the party was less unified and monolithic 
than it appeared on the surface. From 1994, the PCB comprised three main streams: the 
new communists (‘pink’), hard-line communists, and pro-presidential supporters. The 
latter, however left the PCB when the opportunity occurred. There was also rivalry 
between the three party leaders: Sergei Kaliakin, Vladimir Novikov and Victor Chikin. 
Kaliakin was moderately left, non-orthodox, and uncompromising. Novikov was flexible, 
well-spoken and, hence, he stood greater chances of winning votes at the next 
parliamentary elections. This was confirmed when he drifted away from the party being 
offered a lucrative position in government after the dissolution of parliament in 1996.
From the 1999 interview with Kaliakin it became clear that the party had developed a 
more flexible style. Contrary to the BNF and other oppositional parties, the Communist 
Party Belarusskaia was capable of political compromises and, being in opposition, 
nevertheless, decided to participate in regional elections. According to recent opinion 
polls, after the major split in 1996, the party’s constituency has radically renewed. The 
party increased its ground support by moving away from pensioners and old-style 
communists to middle aged party voters. It has adapted a catch-all strategy and at 
present enjoys a wide audience of supporters, amongst which representatives of private 
business and the self-employed can also be identified. The party also collaborates with 
youth communist organisations and aims at establishing closer links with both official
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and independent trade unions. However, trade unions are more reluctant to develop co­
operation with the PCB. Until recently, trade unions planned to promote their own 
candidates in the elections.
The party has regular meetings and convenes the People’s Congress -  the major governing 
body - triennially. The Congress was attended by 5 000 delegates and was last held in 
March 1999. It discussed changes in the party programme and organisation, and according 
to opinion polls the party became more cohesive and active. It has the potential to win 
seats at parliamentary elections, if there is a free and fair political game.
The party leadership is not generally open about funding, however, the major source of 
finance appears to be membership subscription at a local level. Larger donations, as 
Kaliakin noted, are irregularly available from their supporters. The party does not have 
paid staff, and operates with the help of volunteers. Nevertheless, its central office and 
facilities create the impression of a relatively prosperous organisation (PCs, 
photocopier, faxes, printers, etc.). Local party organisations generally receive very little 
organisational help and no material assistance from their national headquarters. One of 
the limited material resources for the PCB local branches is their publications, which are 
available on subscription (‘Tovarisch’[Comrade]; and others). Before 1996 the regional 
network had relied heavily on parliamentary support and has been experiencing much 
difficulty in opposition since the dissolution of parliament.
In 1996 a splinter party ‘The Communist Party of Belarus’ emerged, led by Victor 
Chikin, an ambitious and pro-presidential oriented politician. On registration in 1999
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the party had 7000 formal members151. Its policy is a sheer non-market stance and 
strongly supports the president. Some members entered the new parliament in 1997. It 
possesses a relatively extensive regional network having representatives in 90 district, 
regional and city branches. The party’s central organisation is well supported financially 
by their representatives in parliament and government. However, it pays less attention to 
maintaining its network compared to the PCB. Access to the leadership is very limited. 
Unfortunately the party secretary, Victor Chikin, who has been recently promoted to the 
position of the head of national TV and Broadcasting Company, was not available for 
interview due to his busy work schedule. However, party MPs appeared to be more 
accessible than its leaders.
In his interview, Vladimir Pletyukchov, a leading member of the CPB, and chairman of 
the Education committee in parliament, underlined that his membership in the party is 
secondary to his present position, and he has professional duties over his partisan 
interests. He stated that the major task for all members of parliament was to organise a 
successful joint repulse to the presidential opposition during the parliamentary elections. 
In this respect some parliamentary deputies organised the Belarusian Patriotic Popular 
Union with membership open to presidential supporters. Paradoxically, as a ‘non- 
partisan’ parliament, it became totally engrossed in the politics of forming a new ‘party 
of power’. Zealous deputies were stopped by a presidential decree, which required 
partisan homogeneity for party formation.
151 Official source o f information is the Ministry o f Justice, Belarus, 1999
244
Vladimir Pletyukchov considers political opposition to be real and ‘dangerous’. He 
believes that official authorities should not underestimate the strength and political will of 
the opposition, and must undertake 'firm measures to erase ’ the problem. On the question 
of why the parliament was presently non-partisan, he commented that this decision was 
collective and aimed at increasing the effectiveness of parliamentary work. He also added 
that the members of parliament ‘are not yet civilised enough to work within a factional 
structure’. Further, he underlined that the practice of single ballot voting which was used 
in 1990-1996 parliament and ceased to exist in 1997 parliament, was . .a pressure on free 
expression of one’s will and therefore, it was unanimously decided for it to be stopped. It 
is a populist’ desire to demonstrate how good one could be. We are here for work, not for 
demonstration” (interview with Pletuykchov, Parliament, 1999). On the question whether 
there is a party-of-power in Belarus analogous to that in Russia, he said that there was no 
such term, and all who are in parliament today with exception of very few members, are 
presidential supporters: “We are all a united party-in-power led by the president”. He 
added that the parliamentary work routine has been changed on the president’s request. 
Previously deputies formed a daily agenda, now it is the prerogative of the president, and 
MPs have the right to debate it.
Due to continuing presidential support, the party focuses very little on mobilisation of 
its voters to support its legitimacy. It is clear that pro-presidential parties currently 
benefit from allying with the state. At the same time, parties who are supported by the 
government, do not work with their core constituencies, and may face the danger of 
declining partisanship, and lack of recognition amongst the population, if power 
configurations were to alter.
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The Agrarian Party (AP), another mass type organisation, was registered in 1992 and soon 
grew into a uniform ‘class’ party representing Belarusian peasantry. Its membership 
increased from 250 in 1992 to over 12000 supporters in 1997. The party’s principal 
ambitions are to unite all those who are involved in the agrarian sector of the economy in 
order to undertake effective and radical reforms, although with moderate interference by 
the state. The AP’s chairman Semion Sharetski was elected as Spokesman of the 1995 
Parliament, and later became an active signatory of Charter-97152. He is presently in exile 
in Lithuania. The party had a modest central office, largely based in parliament, which was 
the principal means of existence for the party. Its ‘geography’ could be described as 
largely rural, especially concentrated in the south of Belarus.
With the 1996 crisis the party split and ceased to exist, having lost its human and 
material resources. Recently, with the encouragement of the president, the party has 
undertaken a revival as a new, pro-president orientated organisation. The first congress 
after nearly five years was held on 31st March and pledged loyalty to Alexander 
Lukashenko. Mikhail Shumanski, chief editor of the pro-government newspaper 
"Narodnaya gazeta," was elected chairman of the party and promised to “co-operate 
constructively with the government”. In his opinion, the party should defend the 
interests of peasants by entering all branches of government and taking an active part in 
the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Shumanski believes that the Agrarian Party 
may become the largest political party in Belarus. The new Agrarian Party will survive, 
as long as the existent power balance in society continues. Although it presently has
152 On political organisations and documentation of 1996-1998 see http://iurix.iura.uni- 
sb.de/~serko/law pol/politics.html, retrieved June 2001; and http://charter97.org/. retrieved June 2001.
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only a few thousand supporters, it looks like that having non-compulsory membership 
and access to governmental resources could safeguard both the party’s victory at the 
elections153 and a presidential seat for Lukashenko in the future.
The next mass type organisation for analysis is the Labour Party (PT). It was founded in 
1993, registered in 1995, and grew in the heart of the trade unions’ movement to represent 
their interests in parliament. The Labour Party is a left-oriented organisation, which 
pursues traditions and principles of international social-democratic and labour movements. 
Party chairman, Alexander Bukchvostov, was elected in 1996. Regional political clubs are 
the primary units of the party and are governed by the Regional Association of BPT and 
regional seminar of party clubs, which is called at least once a year.
Trade union based, the party has been effective in its interactions with the authorities. 
Party membership exceeds 1000 and it has largely inherited the network, structure and 
human resources from traditional trade unions. It is a publicly recognised political 
movement and apparently better organised compared to other newly established trade 
unions (they are now more 500) and related parties. It is urban based, with its main 
locations in Minsk and Gomel.
In his interview in 1996 A. Bukchvostov pointed out that all parties were important as 
long as they represent public interests. He sounded knowledgeable and confident when 
describing party goals and strategy, and principled when speaking about the danger of
153 This is what exactly happened: the AP obtained 6 seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections. See 
Appendix 2 for details.
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dictatorship in the country. However, as reality has demonstrated, since 1996 he has had 
few controversial compromises with the authorities, which led to the alteration of party 
policy by breaking agreements with his comrades-in-arms.
The interview revealed that the party did not undergo major changes. The leadership 
continues with its conformist policy. For example, as Bukchvostov stated, the party 
would abstain from participation in the regional elections and re-registration of parties, 
unless, “...official authorities would force us to do the opposite. We do not want to 
create any precedents” (Bukchvostov, interview at party headquarters, 1999). From the 
leader’s viewpoint the party should continue acting independently, as in his opinion, the 
majority of parties in Belarus are superficial organisations, with ambitious and self­
minded politicians. BPT has tried to establish alliance with the PCB, however, failed to 
reach a compromise on some ideological issues. As Bukchvostov insists, the BPT is a 
moderately left organisation and, hence, differs from the communists. As he states 
further, “We, by ourselves, are capable of solving the problems of regime and need no 
help from other parties in order to do so” (1999 interview, at PT’s headquarters).
The party’s central office has one paid member of staff and a party secretary. The party’s 
financial situation has worsened over time, and presently it survives on donations and 
occasional fees form its supporters and well wishers. It is a highly centralised organisation 
and can be considered as a mass party only on paper. Latest developments show that there 
has been a split within the party regarding its participation in regional elections. Some 
party members decided to ballot independently from the party and there was no decision
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reached within the party regarding a joint coalition with other opposition parties to run an 
alternative presidential election in May 1999.
The Belarusian Women’s Party ‘Nadzeia’ [Hope] has an approximated mass type party 
organisation, although it had a modest start, when it was established and registered in 
1994. The party leader, Valentina Polevikova, maintains very close links with official 
trade unions led by Viktor Goncharik. When interviewed in 1996, Polevikova did not 
deny that the party was created as an ancillary organisation to support trade unions in 
the 1995 elections. They did not have a formal policy, or mission statement, and seemed 
not to be sure of their future post-election plans. However, surprisingly, they survived 
and increased their membership from 200 in 1994 to 5000 in 1999. Primary units exist 
in some regional centres; however, the party’s major locations are Minsk and Mogilev. 
The party membership is flexible: anyone over 18 years of age can join the party, 
provided he/she is politically concerned. Its sources of funding are unknown, and the 
chairman refused to discuss the subject. Allegedly the party exists on a grant support 
scheme from the USA.
The ideology and structure of the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus (LDPB) is 
similar to that of the LDPR in Russia. It was regionally established in 1991, and 
registered as a party in 1994. It has a liberal nationalist orientation. With Zhyrinovskii’s 
new policy of increasing party legitimacy in the regions of Russia, the LDPB is 
presently working on developing their own regional network in Belarus. The party states 
that it has a membership of 18 000 registered supporters, and its leader, Sergei 
Gaidukevich ‘jokes’ that it could have been more, if more drink were provided! Its
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funding sources are unclear, however the mere fact that the party was ready to pay 
$2000, if  necessary, for the 1999 registration, indicates that the party may have enough 
money to support itself. Paid staff is limited, and the leader, unlike his colleagues in 
Moscow, avoids media attention. It is believed that if it were not supported by its 
families spirituelles, the party would not be able to undertake serious efforts to maintain 
steady electoral support in the republic.
In summary, mass type parties in Belarus appear to be organisations on ‘paper’. They 
prove relatively weak, and many depend on the state for material and financial 
resources. Only central decision-making structures enjoy some degree of financial 
independence. Formally some parties have extensive regional structures, which are not 
fully functional. In reality only the BNF and PCB can truly be considered as mass 
parties, with modem survival policies. The BNF and PCB assist their local branches in 
developing organisational infrastructure, and by that reduce their dependency on other 
financial sources. In the majority, anti-Lukashenko parties do not support policies of 
coalition, and hence, cannot organise themselves into a coherent opposition. Thus, they 
find it impossible to resist the increasing power of the president. They do not trust each 
other, and often pursue ineffective strategies against the current regime.
4.2.3 The ‘new’ type of party organisations
‘New’ parties are generally pro-democratic in orientation, and occupy the right end of 
the political spectrum in Belarus. As a mle, they are organised from the top down, with 
weak linkages to society, and a low membership base. They are generally located in
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urban areas and assign a low priority to building up local structures. Mathew Wyman 
comments in his analysis of Russian political parties:
Party leaders may continue to have incentives not to build their parties into mass 
organisations. Mass membership may indeed be a potential nuisance to leaders, 
restricting their freedom of manoeuvre and taking up time, which they wish to 
spend in other activities. The potential benefits of having mass membership can in 
part be offset as the state replaces membership as a source of finance and media 
access (Wyman, 1996:279).
Nevertheless, this scenario can be effectively applied to Belarusian political parties. 
Their campaigns are usually dependent on the state for material resources. The United 
Civic party (OGP), The Belarusian Social-Democratic Party ‘People’s Assembly’ 
(BSDP NG) and PNS are three examples of this new type of party organisation.
OGP is the leading liberal conservative party in the Republic of Belarus. It was established 
in October 1, 1995 as a result of a merger of two like-minded parties -  United Democratic 
Party (formed in 1990) and Civil Party (formed in 1994). It stands for an independent 
sovereign Belarus that pursues domestic and foreign policies according to its national 
interests. Before spring 2000 Stanislav Bogdankevich was party chairman. He is a former 
professor, ex-chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, member of the 
13th Supreme Council, and a leader of the parliamentary fraction ‘Civil Action’. There 
were also four vice-chairmen: Alexander Dabravolski, lawyer, deputy of the 1989-1996 
Supreme Council, and a chairman of the commission for mass media, religion, and
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connections with public organisations, chairman of the Executive Committee of the OGP; 
Gennadi Karpenko, doctor of technical science, deputy spokesman of the 1996 Supreme 
Council, former mayor of Molodechno, and a leader of the PNS in 1993; Vasilii 
Shlindikov -  former MP, chairman of the parliamentary Commission for Economic 
Policy, chairman of the Association for Economic Development, and Anatoly Liabedzka 
who recently succeeded to the position of the chairman; he is a former MP, acting 
chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, and a chairman of the Association of 
Young Politicians.
From official records it has been established that the party has 3500 members, of whom 
45% belong to the private sector of economy, 25% to a state sector, 20% are from 
science, education, art, 10% pensioners, students and other categories. 55% of members 
are university graduates and over 100 members have Doctoral degrees. The party has a 
Governing Body -  the Congress that is convened at least biennially. The National 
Committee (70 members) governs the Party in between Congresses, and the Political 
Council (20 members) manages daily party operations directly or through the Executive 
Committee. The party network consists of 6 regional, 28 city and 66 district branches 
with headquarters in Minsk.
As party leaders claim, OGP actively co-operates with independent trade unions that are 
members of the Congress of Democratic Trade Unions of Belarus. They also affirm that 
continuous education and training programs are held with party members and the public 
in the form of seminars, conferences, skills exchange, monthly publication of the party 
bulletin, the newspaper ‘Gramadzyanin’ (10000 copies weekly) and other analytical and
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educational materials. The party was a founder of the non-governmental organisation 
‘Adkrytae Hramadstva’ [Open Society] in 1993. ‘Open Society’ has its own specialised 
magazine published in Poland, which is also available electronically.
During the 1995 parliament, the OGP organised the faction "Civil Action", which 
consisted of 22 members, but presently has no representative in the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Belarus.
As documentary evidence and the results of the 1996 interviews suggest, the party 
leadership came from a highly intellectual background: at least one of the leaders’ 
parents had higher degree, all first-kin relatives had higher degrees, and so do their 
spouses. Three out of five leaders were noted for earnest study at school, and two of 
them have doctoral degrees. Personally, they think, they became leaders due to 
circumstances and had never played leading roles in an organisation before. They 
believe that knowledge and professionalism are a toolkit for achieving equilibrium in 
society. They nominated Stalin and Hitler as negative role models, and they espoused a 
low opinion of other parties’ potential in Belarus. Genadz Karpenko (deceased) stated 
that so far no party in Belarus had accommodated the people’s needs since the early 
1990s. The general impression of the party leadership concludes that they are an 
assembly o f autonomous individuals, rather than a group of like-minded party members. 
The party organisation was highly oriented on parliament and heavily centred on 
leadership decision-making.
253
Interviews with the same party leaders in 1999 reinforced the initial impression that the 
party was a political agglomerate of individuals, rather than a unity. Interviews revealed 
that party political leaders had different strategical approaches and had not 
compromised on a general ‘policy programme’ for the party as such. The party is an 
alliance of populists with a vague doctrinaire background and this can be confirmed by 
the lack of concerted programmatic appeal, absence of an ideological profile or concrete 
economic programme had they come into power. On the eve of the 1999 alternative 
presidential election they split into factions regarding the issue as which candidate 
should be supported. Furthermore, their actions for organising and co-ordinating 
opposition to the president appeared to be more like far-reaching ambitions of the party 
leaders than a potential reality. All party campaigns have focused on the one objective -  
to overthrow the president.
In contrast with party leaders’ statements, their network appeared to be highly 
undeveloped and they refused to give the exact number of party members in regions to 
an independent journalist. Party leaders unrealistically place their hopes on the working 
classes and peasantry (from their interviews) as their potential constituencies. As a party 
of intellectuals they hardly have access to the masses. Their major location is Minsk, 
and they operate with a very limited number of representatives in the regions:
It is true that we have limited influence on peasantry outside large cities. The 
problem is that the opposition is reluctant to go to the masses. As for the large 
cities we work mainly through trade unions (interview with Karpenko, party 
headquarters, March, 1999)
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Interestingly, party leaders state that they have established successful links with the trade 
unions. However, the New Trade Union (Bykov) appeared to be their only link to trade 
union’s support, which was discovered by the author after analysing a multitude of 
documents and correspondence. This trade union exerts negligible influence on workers. 
The party leaders also believe that they may be able to collaborate with the social 
democrats (Statkevich) and other parties and NGOs, including BNF. However, this seems 
to be a one-sided opinion, which was not confirmed by the other in their interviews.
Party finance is largely based on sponsorship, grants from the West, and voluntary 
membership fees. The party has many contacts and closely co-operates with the British 
Conservative Party. The party has a very spacious office, well equipped (about 6-9 PCs, 
some photocopies, scanner, and other IT products) with technically qualified staff and 
many volunteers.
A schism appeared in the party leadership over the choice of candidate for the 
alternative presidential election, and the issue of participation in the regional and recent 
parliamentary elections reinforced conflict within the party. However, the recent 
election of a new leader, Anatoly Liabedzka, may radically alter the party’s prospects. 
Liabedzka has wide contacts both in Western Europe and the USA, and is literate, well 
spoken, fluent in English and Polish, and supports consensual and coalitional policies. It 
is hoped this will bring an extra pool of party followers for the future elections, 
provided that institutional incentives are altered.
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The Belarusian Social-Democratic Party ‘People’s Assembly’ (BSDP NG) was founded 
in 1995 and registered in 1996 when it merged with the Party of People’s Accord 
(PNS). As BSDG it had existed since 1993 and was a successor to the ‘historical’ 
BSDG founded in 1902. Since the dissolution of parliament the two parties, the BSDG 
and the PNS, took different routes and as a result, split on this basis. Nikolai Statkevich, 
Doctor of technical science, presently leads BSDP NG. It has a party membership of 
around 1000 people and has a limited network of party supporters. The party survives 
exclusively on membership fees (1% of monthly wages) and donations. It has 17 local 
papers, however only two of them are profitable. The party Central Committee appoints 
an executive bureau, which is largely filled by Minsk activists (about 20). It has 3 paid 
members of staff in the headquarters -  a two-room flat that fulfils many functions. The 
party is relatively small, but very lively. Together with the BNF it organised a protest 
march in October 1998, having mobilised more than 3000 participants for the event.
In his 1996 interview Nikolai Statkevich mentioned that he would rather be a scientist 
than a politician. Nevertheless, his achievements as a politician are noticeable. He 
initiated a ‘Chernobyl’ rally in the early 1990s and organised a political movement to 
solicit a national armed force for Belarus. He was among the very few politicians who 
decided to ballot during the recent parliamentary elections, despite the fact the party 
boycotted them. He believes that a sensible compromise can be the only way for parties 
to survive conflict with the authorities and eventually this should bring a balance of 
power to society (from his interview, February, 1999). He supports the idea of coalitions 
and eagerly promotes co-operation with the Party of Labour to form the ‘Social 
Democratic Union’. His recent policy was to establish a formal union with the BNF and
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the OGP. When interviewed in 1999, Statkevich was rather disappointed by the position 
of coalition denial that the former BNF regularly takes. This gave basis for many 
disagreements in regards to the party internal policy and external relations. The 
leadership of the Labour Party when interviewed did not mention the fact of established 
collaboration with Statkevich’s party BSDP NG.
In conclusion, new parties find it difficult to survive in a society with weak roots and lacking 
financial resources. Their strong and inflexible anti-Lukashenko and anti-system feelings 
exacerbate their position even further. A sensible solution would be to negotiate with the 
state and to win votes and seats in the parliamentary elections. They, nevertheless, boycotted 
the autumn 2000 elections and disapprove of any compromise with the authorities154.
With structural and institutional incentives favouring the incumbent government, there 
can be little chance for them to be voted into office, and hence, there are limited hopes 
for delivery of their electoral pledges to electors -  their only ‘currency’ in the market of 
power. Somehow, the new parties do not fear losing their legitimacy in terms of votes. 
The new liberal and democratic parties seem to have found lucrative support from 
international organisations; and presently survive on grants, bursaries, and direct 
collaboration. Their connections have expanded over years: OGP has major support 
from the British Conservatives; BSDP NG obtained some aid from the south west of 
Europe and Moscow colleagues. BNF enjoys considerable support from the USA as
154 According to the President’s Decree No.8 (12.03.2001) ‘On some measures concerning the mles of 
receipt and utilization of foreign gratuitous aid’, parties will find it more difficult to survive and to fully 
prepare for the presidential election in autumn 2001, because of their high reliance on western sponsorship.
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well as from neighbouring countries. This international co-operation remarkably altered 
parties’ style of management and stirred their ambitions for cartelisation. Parties 
become increasingly ‘professional’. They, for example, operate a sociological database 
to locate their potential electorates and undertake market research to improve their 
campaign strategies. With limited access to public broadcasting, parties established their 
own publishing centres and agencies. Such ‘alternative’ sources of information like 
‘Naviny’, ‘Otkritoe obschestvo’, ‘Gramadzianin’, Belorusskaa Gazeta and others, seem 
to be relatively popular amongst the readers. The majority of them are printed in 
neighbouring states, which limits their availability to a wider readership. As an 
alternative source of information for people (especially the youth) the Internet and new 
technologies may eventually open up a wider window of opportunities.
4.2.4 Further discussion
It would be beneficial to the analysis to observe pro-governmental party organisations, 
their structure and ‘effectiveness’, which in their support of the president enjoy 
considerable material and financial aid. The only party that remained partisan is the Social 
Democratic Party of People’s Accord (SD PNS) led by Leonid Sechko. Interviews with 
the deputy Spokesman of the House of Representatives, Vladimir Konoplev, who was also 
a head of the largest faction in the 1995 parliament ‘Zgoda’, and non-partisan members of 
the new parliament, will also be analysed.
Leonid Sechko, leader of SD PNS, was rather reluctant to comment on current events, 
including the opposition between the president and parties in Belarus. He originally refused
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an interview, but, when it was mentioned that the deputy spokesman had also been 
interviewed, he changed his position. On the questions of why parliament stopped the 
practice of single ballot voting as well as factional policy, he answered that he is unaware of 
the former. Regarding the abolition of the faction politics, he said that the procedure was 
rudimentary, as there are no motions towards any kind of grouping in parliament. Leonid 
Sechko added further that with the majority of parliament being presidential supporters there 
is no need to work in factions. Throughout the interview he seemed to display a sense of 
guilt, as if he were betraying his personal beliefs. He refused for his interview to be recorded 
in the first place, but then again when it was mentioned that the deputy Spokesman had 
allowed recording, he eventually agreed. He did not want to say much about the present 
party organisation, but referred a lot to past years and its history. At present, the SD PNS 
membership is 2050 covering all regions of Belarus. It has 50 regional and 135 primary 
units, of which the majority are concentrated in Gomel (797 members), Grodno (444) and 
Mogilev (320) regions. Sechko refused to talk about party finances, however he did mention 
that the president supports them when necessary. The party is largely based in parliament 
and has a paid staff of 4 members. Sechko believed that he would win seats in parliamentary 
elections 2000, which he did -  one seat in the first round of elections.
Valentina Samuseva is a non-partisan member of parliament, who was also interviewed. 
The conversation was informal and not recorded. It appears from the interview that she 
supports the majority of policy-making decisions and finds that working in discipline and 
without factions is very productive and remunerating. She scored the lowest on the activity 
scale according to her voting in the former parliament (Ygrinovich, 1996). In the new 
elections to parliament she did not win a seat.
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Vladimir Konoplev, the Deputy Spokesman of the 1997 parliament, is an essential part of 
the president’s team. In 1996 he chaired the largest faction ‘Zgoda’ (Consent) in parliament. 
He felt ‘at home’ in the 1996 parliament -  the mere fact that for the purpose of his interview 
he walked into the first available office and asked the staff to leave the room tells that his 
alliance with the president gave him sufficient authority to be above the party politics. In his 
1996 interview he confirmed that he was always an informal leader. Having experienced 
much hardship, he became a very determined and shrewd politician. His political creed was 
to reinforce an individual authority in order to maintain order in society.
In his 1999 interview he kept associating himself with the president: “If necessary we will 
take radical measures against the opposition”, “.. .the president acted super diplomatically 
in 1996 trying to solve the crisis. And /  would like to do the same. I am sure we will find 
the way out (speaking about the stalemate with opposition in the country)”, and so on. He 
does not trust anyone and thinks that the most lasting coalition would be based on 
‘knowing people’s nature’ and ‘their preferences’. He encourages unanimity: “we do not 
have orthodox thinkers in parliament. If we vote, we vote in majority, as we know that the 
question should have been prepared by a committee in charge”. He is a devotee and is 
unlikely to betray the president (his schoolmate) unless it was a self-preserving situation: 
“In order to achieve a new stage in national development we must know our 
responsibility. We must remember that we are professional cadre to support the course of 
our popularly elected and committed to its duty president A. Lukashenko” (from his 
interview, March 1999, in parliament).
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The situation of non-partisanship, lack of competition and absolute unanimity in 
parliament indicates a situation of a pocket legislature in the hands of the president. 
Members of parliament will readily surrender their ideological beliefs, and remain 
compliant to the president, as long as they are in office -  a symbol of power established 
for over 70 years. Out of fear of losing their position, members of parliament agreed to 
change parliamentary procedure and thus allow the president to manipulate the political 
agenda.
To sum up, contemporary parties experience factional divisions in their organisation and 
they possess ephemeral membership and vague ideologies and discipline. To some extent, 
they are their own worst enemy and their problems mainly stem from within. Party 
leadership seems to be based on the self-seeking opportunities of the politicians. The 
cultural and institutional environment is such that ‘power conflict’ has become dominant 
in structuring parties’ activities. Consequently, parties have lost their ideological gloss and 
programmatic profile in the struggle to overthrow the president, who due to their 
disintegration, grew in power and electoral trust.
The most organised parties, BNF and PCB, failed to provide adequate leadership to 
prevent internal feuding. BNF has resisted this tendency longer than any other, and only 
recently split. PCB faced a party division in 1996 and was devastated by it, as the party 
lost 50% of its membership. This was a tangible conflict as it related not only to 
personalities but also to the policy agenda and re-definition of its ideological standpoints. 
Those who joined the splinter party CPB, and supported the president, were ‘hard-line’ 
communists. They believed in ‘third-way’ socialist economy, social security and public
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proprietorial rights. The Agrarian Party reinvented itself as a pro-governmental 
organisation and enjoys seats in the new parliament as a bonus for its loyalty. Reformist 
parties, i.e. OGP, BSDP NG, BSDG, and partly LDP are dominated by the leadership and 
are essentially candidate-centred. As it appeared from interview and content analysis, 
these parties, by and large, have ‘flexible’ memberships. On paper they purport to 
represent a wide network of more than 2000 supporters on average, but in reality they are 
very limited. Therefore, only 17 parties out of 28 have survived the recent political audit -  
a forcible re-registration of parties declared by the president.
If one compares parties’ cross-references towards one another regarding the policy of 
coalition making, one would find that there is a discrepancy between party rhetoric and 
action. In interviews party leaders keep naming each other as political partners, for 
example: OGP referred to BSDP NG as their primary associate, and BNF, trade unions, 
PT and PCB were OGP’s already established contacts. BSDP NG who found itself closer 
to BNF and PT did not enthusiastically confirm this linkage. The BNF in turn affirms that 
as long as parties continue pursuing their personal ambitions, it will not form any alliance 
with them. The Labour party (PT) remains independent and hopes to collaborate with the 
communists if they ‘tone down’ their orthodoxy. The communists in turn assume that they 
already have a potential partner in the trade unions, and are unwilling to support any 
collaboration with the liberals and democrats. Parties have recently tried to overcome their 
ideological differences in order to resist the move towards dictatorship together. They 
attempted to organise a united movement with a single co-ordinating body and to rally
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uniformly for the presidential election. They spectacularly failed to do so at the finale of 
their electoral campaign155.
Another issue relates to parties’ collective boycotting of regional and national level 
elections. The opposition parties refused to participate in any of them, as their 
demonstration against gross violations of law by the authorities. This, nevertheless, can be 
regarded as a strategic mistake, as by not having representatives at any levels within 
government will not allow negotiation with the authorities who are presently in the 
position to dictate the rules of the political game. Huntington (1991: 174, 190) notes that 
elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also the death of dictatorship. The 
opposition in Belarus has yet to learn this lesson.
This information shows how dramatically dissipated parties are at present in Belarus. 
Ambitious party leaders are unable to overcome personal feuds when attempting to 
campaign together against the president. They are limited by formal and informal 
institutional (high threshold for turnout, majority voting, single member district) and legal 
(alterations in the constitution, new law requirements for party candidates, etc.) rules. 
Moreover, they lack a distinct ideological profile and doctrine, and have limited power 
resources and organisational cohesiveness. Parties therefore attempt to mobilise support 
from the population that does not foresee them as equal to Lukashenko. This issue will be 
thoroughly analysed in the next section.
155 The BNF literally withdrew its candidate and refused to participate in election race because it found 
that OGP was dishonestly trying to promote its own candidate on others’ behalf.
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Nevertheless, parties still survive, and are gaining skills. One can say that in Belarus 
contemporary parties, as perhaps many transitional parties, are seeking ‘accommodating’ 
opportunities to adapt. They are more candidate-centred due to their volatile electoral 
‘currency’; policy-making has become the sole prerogative of party leadership rather than 
party membership, therefore, circumstances, rather than existing programmes or 
ideologies dictate decision-making. Organisational structures are thus flexible and low- 
maintenance. Even those parties, which closely resemble true mass parties, BNF and PCB, 
in fact only tend to look like mass parties with regular members, press, congresses, 
branches, etc., but in practice deploy independence of leadership, taking dictatorial forms 
at times, and emphasise predominance of parliamentary activities. Belarusian liberals and 
democrats never had strong relations on the ground, and on this basis, develop modem 
strategies (publish on-line, internet discussion-clubs, youth conferences, public seminars) 
to capture free and uncommitted voters.
It would be logical to assume that parties should aim to win office, in order to justify their 
existence. However, if they collaborate with the incumbent government they will lose their 
credibility and financial ‘comfort’, by way of grants and partnership aid from the West; 
and certainly receive little welcome from the authorities. Hence, they chose to continue 
consulting their western partners regarding anti-system policies, and do not compromise 
and sit on ‘round-table’ discussions. This consequently becomes their long-term vocation. 
In the situation of increasing dictatorship, they should logically mobilise their scarce 
resources in order to oppose the president and fulfil their mandate. As analysis shows, this 
seems to be political rhetoric rather than action, as parties fail to unite in order to 
successfully run an anti-presidential election campaign. Moreover, they initially did not
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believe in it as the formal opposition campaign. They regarded it as an action of 
propaganda and therefore did not invest a full range of required resources. Meanwhile, 
they have allegedly received ample support and investments from abroad in order to 
organise this pseudo-manifesto.
Party policy at present seems to be to make enough efforts in order to be visible, rather 
than compromise and win office. As Grigorii Golosov concludes in his analysis of parties 
in Russia, which again can be vividly applied to the situation in Belarus:
The role of party organisation proved to be at best unclear, while strong 
personalities, attractive ideologies, the use of media, and power bases in the state 
apparatus and specific constituencies matter so much (Golosov, 1998: 535).
Nevertheless, there seems to be prospects for parties to re-establish their authority. One 
is to survive by capturing uncommitted votes in regions, and another is to negotiate with 
the state. Hunting for votes can be quite fulfilling provided that the power cleavage is 
highly divisive. Thus mass party organisations may still be able to regain vitality and 
mobilise voters’ support. The aforementioned ‘new’ parties may also attempt to form a 
wide anti-presidential coalition, as this is the only realistic means for them to survive 
while in opposition. Negotiation with the state is also necessary, as institutional, 
structural and cultural environments are becoming increasingly unfavourable for parties 
in exile. By not fighting the battle today, they may lose the war tomorrow. The issue of 
whether electoral mobilisation can be foreseeable and what chances parties may have 
with their alienated voters will be raised in the following section.
4.3 Political parties and their voters in Belarus
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Kay Lawson et al. (1988) note, “ ...to the extent that parties ever operate in a fashion to 
enhance citizen control of government, they do so because citizens have made it clear 
that only thus are their votes to be secured”. Parties exist to provide linkage between 
citizens and the state. In new democracies, this linkage is frequently broken or non­
established, and parties, hence, find themselves in the position of representing ‘fringe 
interests’ in society. It is a hard work to mobilise uncommitted and apathetic voters, 
whom in addition prefer short-term benefits from agencies in power to far-reaching 
pledges of parties in opposition. Nevertheless, adaptation to these irregularities in voting 
behaviour seems to be a survival strategy. Another possible route is, of course, to 
collaborate with the state and rely on the ensuing benefits of this alliance. This, 
however, depends on the government’s term in office, and assumes favourable relations 
between the sides involved. In any event, it is beneficial to determine the electorate’s 
attitudes to existing political players, in order to assess the possible prospects and 
directions of their ‘investments’ at election time.
In this chapter, the level of party legitimacy and public knowledge of existing players of 
the political game in Belarus will be examined. This should help establish linkage 
patterns between existing parties and their voters, and to estimate parties’ potential for 
further development. The analysis will highlight public awareness of, and attitudes to, 
political players and whether the ‘presidential divide’ that stipulated the conflict, really 
matters for electoral politics in the process of party system settlement. This chapter will 
proceed in four sections:
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1) a brief description of the methodology applied by the author will be given in the first 
section;
2) the voting environment in Belarusian society will be examined in the second 
section;
3) in the third section attention will be drawn to the relations between parties and their 
voters;
4) and finally, in section four the principal characteristics of the president’s electorate 
will be discussed, as to whether it is different from that of the contemporary parties, 
and if this difference matters for maintaining the power balance in society.
4.3.1 Methodology of data collection and analysis
For the study of general trends in voting behaviour the method of Multiple 
Classification Analysis (MCA), developed by A. Russell et al (1992) in their analysis of 
the effect of ‘Thatcherism’ on voting patterns of the UK population156, has been 
innovatively adopted. For this reason the author selected compatible data based on a 
single criterion. The database of the project “New Democracies Barometer: Belarus” 
initiated in 1992, and implemented on a regular basis 1994, 1996, 1998, was used to 
follow voting trends in Belarus157. Data collection was grounded on similar polling 
techniques, repeated questions, and representative random samples of 1000
156 Russell, A., Johnston, R. and Pattie, C. (1992) “Thatcher’s children: exploring the links between age 
and political attitudes”, Political Studies XL: 742-56.
157 The author was part of the project’s analytical team. In 1996 the author co-supervised research with 
Prof. David Rotman, Centre for Social and Political Research, Minsk State University, Belarus.
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respondents.158 This allows a detailed description of tendencies in voting behaviour of 
the Belarusian electorate and the ‘authoritarian effect’, if  such exists.
Analysis is based on the assessment of six variables, which map changes in public 
attitudes chronologically. Questions were designed along the ‘reform-anti-reform’ 
cleavage -  a uniformly divisive line in the majority of the newly emerging democracies 
of Eastern Europe (Kitschelt, 1995). The questions reflect (i) people’s opinions on the 
transition economy of 1989, (ii-iii) economic and political prospects of communist rule 
(iv) the necessity of a multi-party system and freely contested elections and (v) the 
introduction of direct presidential rule, in the case of a national emergency.159 Each of 
the attitudes observed in the three surveys was re-coded in a standardised manner so that 
‘pro-communist’ responses was given a value of (-1), neutral opinions were coded as
(0), and ‘pro-democratic’ replies were allotted a score of (+1). This undoubtedly limits 
the informational content of responses, but simultaneously ensures continuity on the 
aggregate level across a wide range of individual scores.
158 The 1992 data was not available to the author at the time of calculation.
159 The following questions were used:
(1) Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works: the top +100 through to the worst -100. Where 
on the scale would you place the socialist economy before 1989?
(2) ...Where on the scale would you place the former communist regime?
(3) ... Where on the scale would you place the present system of governing with free elections and many 
parties?
(4) Here are some statements about the rules that determine how the country is governed. Do you agree 
or disagree that... we should return to the communist regime
(5)... the army should govern the country
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An experimental Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) was utilised simultaneously 
with the Analysis of Variance for each election year. The focus was only on the 
statistically significant MCA coefficients.160 Attitudinal variables were considered 
dependent on age, place of residence, education, and occupational status. The output 
proved valid and significant. In fact these results allowed not only an investigation of 
general trends in voting behaviour, but also helped approximate public attitudes to the 
leading political parties. This will be demonstrated further in the text.
In the following sections, the author also introduced the analysis of voters’ volatility 
based on opinion polls rather than election results, for the purpose of identifying the 
linkage between parties and their electors. To examine the dynamics of electoral choice 
in Belarus, the results of the 1991-1999 opinion polls were analysed. The annual 
indexes were calculated as mean net and mean gross volatility (Pedersen’s formula) in 
voting preferences161. The outcomes proved informative and help to reiterate the effect 
of structure and agency on the party system development in Belarus.
4.3.2 The 1990-1999 Belarusian electorate: trends in electoral behaviour
Public opinion in Belarus is highly divided. On the one hand the Belarusian electorate 
distinctly favours strong leadership and the populist promises of the incumbent
(6) ...it would be better to get rid of Parliament and have a strong leader to govern the country
160 Statistically significant coefficients here are those, which take a probability of 0.1 (few cases) or 0.05 
and less, thereby providing evidence that a relationship between variables exists and that the observed 
result is unlikely to be due to the sampling variation.
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president and authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko. His public rating has not 
changed over the last three years and remained consistently around 41-45% on average, 
whereas the rating of other political actors has significantly declined. On the other hand, 
the electors show positive and stable attitudes to further democratisation, resistance to 
the idea of dictatorial governance and no desire to retreat back to the USSR. This 
controversy may be conditioned by a number of factors, of which the following are 
perhaps the most important.
First, the salience of existing political conflicts and their under-representation determine 
the degree of controversy and division in society. On the one hand, public opinion 
favours the issues of independence, nation building, inevitability of radical economic 
reforms, and on the other hand, re-union with Russia, social security and immediate 
state benefits. It is literally split in two. Nevertheless, existing political players 
inadequately represent people’s needs, as oppositional parties are not in public office to 
make policies; and pro-governmental parties unanimously express the official discourse 
dictated by the president. These factors obviously lower the degree of representation of 
public interests, which subsequently causes high levels of volatility and public distrust 
of parties. Parties are perceived therefore as not being capable of winning office, and the 
population becomes increasingly apathetic to their pledges.
Consequently, this increases people’s approval of the presidential authority, despite the 
fact that the people in principle are strongly against dictatorial governance and would 
theoretically opt for democracy. In addition, Alexander Lukashenko’s strong personality
161 The detailed description of the advantages of this method will be discussed in the section 4.3.3.
270
is a complementary factor to his success. He is charismatic, simple, fast learning, and 
has the political will for change. This distinguishes him from the rest of the political 
milieu of ‘faceless* parties, over fifteen hundred NGOs, numerous trade unions, puppet 
parliament, and inaccessible government. As Huntington (1991) notes, it is important 
for regime sustainability that the public can distinguish between the regime and the 
government or rulers. The public may be attracted by the populist promises made by 
President Lukashenko; however, they should also understand that dictatorial governance 
will not facilitate democracy building.
People may simply confuse the issues of democratic freedoms, with their personal 
concern for better living. The West is depicted as offering unlimited opportunities and 
welfare provisions, which the populace may positively assess as the goal in a 
democratic future. In reality people resist any change that may endanger their status 
quo, of personal security and a regular source of income. These hypotheses will be 
explored in the further text in relation to the principal subject matter.
According to Christian Haerpfer (2000), despite recent non-democratic developments, 
Belarus, nevertheless, demonstrates one of the highest indexes of ‘democratic thinking’ in 
Eastern Europe (41%). By this Haerpfer means a general pattern of voting behaviour -  
electoral potential -  that includes negative rating of the past communist regime, positive 
rating of democracy, optimism for the future, support for a legitimate parliament and 
political parties, and rejection of authoritarianism. According to Haerpfer, the index of 
democracy ‘measures the support for democracy’ and identifies ‘those segments of post­
communist society, which can be rightly labelled as ‘democrats’. In other words, 41% of
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the voting population in Belarus have positive expectations for the future and regards 
democratic freedoms as a means to achieve a better quality life.
By applying different methods of analysis, Rose (1998) et al. support the hypothesis of 
Belarus’ potential for further democratisation. Rose argued that in 1996 up to 57% of 
population strongly disapproved of the president’s authority and voted in preference of a 
democratic parliamentary system. Paradoxically, support for the increasingly dictatorial 
government can also be observed, as one can witness an increase in public approval of 
the government from 35% in 1992 to 48% in 1998. Furthermore, 48% of the population 
approve of free elections and a multi-party political system, whereas 35% 
simultaneously strongly disapprove. This demonstrates a high-level polarisation within 
society and the existing potential for mass mobilisation. This also suggests that in 
principle people are in favour of further democratisation, however their ultimate 
‘rationality’ and fear of change causes them support the president.
People are disappointed by parties’ ineffective policies and hence, become increasingly 
uninterested in their activities. As such 72% do not trust parties at all, and 18% remain 
neutral (Rose, 1998). Nevertheless, people still consider parties to be a necessary tool for 
building democracy and would support them if they believed they had the potential to 
enact change. For example, when asked whether parliament should be suspended and 
parties abolished in order to keep order in society, 73% of Belarusians answered ‘no’ 
(Haerpfer, 2000:11). Additionally, 72% of the population also strongly disapprove of the 
abolition or restriction of any party activity in society -  in comparison with 57% in 1994 
and 60% in 1996. 46% of Belarusians are against any continuation of authoritarian rule.
272
However, there is an apparent conflict between representation and leadership in Belarus. 
People conscientiously believe that, as representative institutions, parties are necessary. 
But as long as they are ineffective, 76% of the population agree that, . .a strong leader 
can do more for the country than all the discussions in parliament” (Mishler, 1996:232). 
As he further elaborates:
In Belarus and Bulgaria there is widespread faith that representation and strong 
leadership can coexist, and in these two countries the largest group resolves the 
tension by being leadership democrats (Mishler, 1996:235).
This implies that a considerable part of the population supports the necessity of 
economic and political reforms. However, legacy-oriented and unsure of the 
opposition’s potential, the public is more inclined to support strong and unified 
leadership, which may guarantee some consistency in decision-making.
Further analysis suggests that depending on age, place of residence, income, and the era 
of socialisation, people’s attitudes differ considerably in terms of their support for the 
current regime, democratic freedoms and political actors. The method of Multiple 
Classification Analysis (MCA) was applied to identify the above named effects.
The Age variable appeared to be significant and therefore, a special age index was 
calculated to measure the difference in public attitudes of various age groups. 1990 was 
considered the first year at which respondents may have freely voted. Each year since 
has been measured as an independent political marker with a distinct political milieu. It
273
was expected that the new ‘entrees’ (young voters) that lacked previous political 
experience, would be more open to political suggestion and therefore mirror any 
political change. It was also expected that the electoral environment in which they first 
became socialised (here: political year) should exert a long-lasting influence on their 
dispositions and future choice of political actors.
This ‘intake’ technique is based on the null hypothesis of no discernible difference 
between different sections of the electorate socialised under various political events, 
including the first presidential election. This was achieved by separating groups into 
cohorts according to each political year. Thus, the first intake would occur in 1990 
being socialised prior to the year 1991. The 1991 intake will consist of two intakes 
respectively — 1990 and 1991. By 1998 the intakes will comprise nine in total.
Two significant periods can be observed in the development of electoral politics: 
1990-1996 and 1997-1999. The first period is ‘practical’ conservatism, which the 
majority of the electorate reflected in their answers. The resultant negative Grand 
Means (GM) - a rate of -0.4-0.5 for an average voter - along with the negative rate of 
chosen attitudinal variables in the majority of the cases, indicated a clear left tendency 
in the electoral choice of the population between 1990-1996. Especially illustrative 
are the questions that assess public attitudes to (i) the communist economy, (ii) the 
economy of the 1989 transitional period and (iii) a possible return to communist rule. 
This helps us understand why president Lukashenko followed a vague line of ‘third- 
way’ socialism in his policy-making.
274
The second period is distinguished by a remarkable shift to the ‘reformist right’ in 
public attitudes to politics and growth of the ‘protest electorate’162 (Rotman, 2000: 3). 
These factors contribute to the increasing ideological division between sectors of the 
Belarusian population.
As potential cross-cut divides, such variables as the place of residence, education, and 
social status have been included in the analysis. Place o f residence, paradoxically, 
appeared to be a less informative index. Nevertheless, one can trace the gradual shift from 
left to right in the general voting patterns of the population - GM has altered from -0.5 to 
-0.1. Additionally, there is a striking difference between urban and rural population. Most 
of the rural population, including those in smaller cities of no more than 100 000 
inhabitants, perceive liberal changes in the regime and economy quite negatively, and lean 
leftward in their aggregated attitudes. The residents of Minsk clearly demonstrate their 
predisposition to democratic and nationalist politics. Frequent fluctuations in the attitudes 
of big city dwellers suggest their fluid political positions and hence their openness to 
political suggestion. Table 1 clearly demonstrates the above-mentioned tendencies.
Table 4.3.2-1, The left-right distribution of public attitudes in different regions of the 
country in relation to the introduction of direct presidential rule had civil unrest 
occurred
162 The definition of ‘protest electorate’ is offered by Rotman (2000), and includes those who are in 
opposition to the incumbent government and demands alteration of the political course. A more detailed 
description will be given in section 4.3.3
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Region r M IVTinck City Town Village
1994 -0.5 0.13 0 0 -0.18
1996 -0.24 0.3 0 0 -0.22
1998 -0.14 0 0 -0.56 -0.32
Note: There are 1000 (100%) respondents incluled in each election year. A negative coefficient indicates 
that the group is to the left of the average voter; a positive coefficient indicates a relatively right-wing 
group. Only statistically significant differences ire reported.
Source: Centre for Social and Political Reseach, BSU, with the author participating in the project. 
Author’s calculations.
‘Practical’ conservatism has been expressed towards the introduction of a multi-party 
system and freely contested elections b;' the general voter. However, this tendency has 
recently altered towards more positiv; attitudes to democratic freedoms: GM has 
changed from -0.25 to +0.29. The average voter in large cities and Minsk demonstrates 
far greater tolerance towards oppositiond politics.
Table 4.3.2-2. The left-right distributioi of public attitudes in different regions of the 
country in relation to the necessity of milti-party system and freely contested elections
Region CM Minsk City Town
■ -■ '
Village
1994 -0.25 0 0.11 -0.33 -0.13
1996 -0.19 0 0 0.16 -0.16
1998 0.29 0.12 0 -0.5 0
Note: There are 1000 (100%) respondents inclu: ed. For further details and explanation see Table 1 and
the text.
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Public attitudes have also proved dependent on the level o f education. The better 
informed and qualified the voter group, the greater the chance is for liberal democratic 
attitudes to entrench. This is demonstrated by the distribution of respondents’ answers 
to the question: “Do you agree or disagree that we should return to communist rule?”
Table 4.3.2-3. The left-right distribution of public attitudes amongst different 
educational groups of the population in relation to return to communist rule
Education GM elementary secondary/spec.alised higher/incomplete higher
1994 -0.5 -0.22 0 0.38
1996 -0.24 -0.17 0 0.31
1998 0 -0.19 0 0.38
Note: There are 1000 (100%) respondents included in each election year. For further details and 
explanation see Table 1 and the text.
By analysing the correlation between the occupational status of individuals and their 
attitudes to regime transformation, one witnesses a clear shift towards the reformist end 
of the political spectrum among the general population. Thus, by 1998 the pro­
libertarian cluster, that advocates economic and political independence, largely includes 
full and part time employed, self-employed, categories such as students, housekeepers, 
etc., and those who rely on state benefits. Among those who would vote for re-union 
with ‘elder brother’ Russia, are pensioners, both unemployed and employed, and ‘other 
state beneficiaries’.
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Table 4.3.2-4. The left-right distribution of public attitudes in different occupational 
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2 ] a1994 0.47 0 0 - 0.22 0,20 0.20 0.34 -0.10 -0.25 0 0.14
1996 -0.13 0 0.12 0.57 0.47 0.34 0.41 -0.27 -0.43 -0.14 0.46
1998 0.12 0 0 ” 0.60 0 0.52 -0.30 -0.36 -0.12 0.52
Note: There are 1000 (100%) cases included in each election year. Key to occupation groups: 1- full-time 
employed; 2- part-time employed; 3- apprentice; 4- self-employed; 5- unemployed, no state benefit; 6- 
unemployed, state benefit; 7- pensioner, employed; 8- pensioner, unemployed; 9- other state 
beneficiaries; 10- not employed (student, housekeeper, etc.).
The age variable, nevertheless, proved to be the most indicative. It shows the existence 
of a generational effect on the formation of political attitudes and voting behaviour of 
electors. As hypothesised at the beginning, there is a clear-cut difference between newly 
socialised cohorts and other sectors of the electorate. Indeed, the distribution of answers 
to the question whether a return to communist rule is desirable, demonstrates a 
continuing right-wing increase facilitated by the electoral newcomers. Older voters 
show much greater resistance to social change.
Table 4.3.2-5 The left-right distribution of public attitudes in different age groups in 
relation to return to communist rule.
Age GM 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+
1994 0 0.28 0.15 -0.15 -0.34
1996 -0.13 0.30 0.18 -0.17 -0.38
1998 0.12 0.29 0.12 0 -0.37
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Note: There are 1000 (100%) cases included in each election year. For further details and explanation see 
Table 1 and the text.
The generational effect occurs when newly socialised cohorts enter the electorate annually. 
The noticeable fact is that each new cohort intensifies the flexibility of support for 
different blocs within the political the spectrum. There is still much confusion and 
controversy among the general public about such issues as oppositional politics, economic 
freedoms, and strong presidency. The newly enfranchised electorate (1997-98) seems to 
be increasingly radical in this respect. This allows a critical retrospective score of the 
socialist past and positively receives democratic features associated with non-dictatorial 
government, multi-party system and free elections.
Table 4.3.2-6. Generational effect calculated on the basis of voters’ separation into 
cohorts according to the election year when they became socialised into politics.
Attitudes GM 1 1(1990) 2(1991) 3(1992) 4(1993) 5(1994) 6(1995) 7(1996) 8(1997) 9(1998)
To the return to commun
W SBBM
- * gi . :-
1994 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 0.38
1996 -0.13 0 0.36 0.29 0.77 0.13 0.46
■ H I
1998 0-1210 0.17 0.18 0.48 0.48 0.19 0.59 0.44 0.44
To the socialist economy of 1989
r  . 7 7 h :v;?;:;7_7^7r;-. ^  ;:'7;f^
1994 -0.50 0 0.44 0.25 0 0
1996 -0.90 0 -0.13 0 0 0 0
1998 -0.61 0
m m
0.33 0 0.16 0 0.31 0.16 0.28 0.56














0.17 0.25 0.52 0.18
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To the necessity of multi-party systei
To the ini unrest oc<
Note: There are 1000 (100%) respondents included in each election year. The entries in this table are 
MCA coefficients, which show the average distance between each group and the average voter in the data 
set. Negative coefficients indicate more left-wing groups, positive coefficients -  relatively right-wing 
groups. Only statistically significant differences are shown
0 0 0 0.32 0.25
0 0 -0.30 0.54 0.15 0.19
0 -0.17 0 0.17 0 -0.30 -0.13 0.28
Individual analysis of differentiated cohorts is necessary, as the first generation of 
electors in the 1990 election displayed no deviation from the average left-oriented voter. 
This suggests the lack of adequate underpinning of personal beliefs by a cleavage 
structure, which should have occurred in the initial process of crystallisation. These 
resulted in the outbreak of floating votes, open to political suggestion. The generations 
of 1991 and to a lesser degree 1992 show a growth of democratic ambition and 
sufficient immunisation against appeals for a return to the ‘better past’. This may be due 
to intensive political clashes and the successful manifesto of anti-Communist umbrella 
parties. In the 1992 election campaign the Nationalists failed to assert their influence; 
and the Communists, being better organised, strengthened their majority in parliament. 
This scenario presumably influenced the 1993 enfranchised electorate, who manifested 
less determination for further democratisation. The 1994 ‘entrees’, who were initially 
hypothesised as Lukashenko supporters, in fact demonstrated more desire for change
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than those of previous years. Further radicalisation of all intakes has accelerated since 
the 1996 events, which changed the constitution and dissolved parliament.
These general tendencies in Belarus’ voting behaviour seem to closely correspond with 
findings of similar research undertaken by Mishler and Rose (1996), Wyman (1996), 
Fish (1995), McAllister and White (1995), Dobson (2000), Wilson (1999), Rose, White 
and Munro (2000) in other post communist democracies. These scholars unanimously 
agree that public opinion in Belarus compared to that in other democracies is divided by 
sharp pro-presidential (in average of 20% of firm voters) vis-a-vis pro-oppositional (in 
average of 30-33%) cleavage. The rest (about 29-30%) are indecisive voters, who form 
an attractive buffer, which both sides will aim their campaigns at during the 
forthcoming presidential election. For example, according to recent independent 
surveys163, 39% of Belarusians say that Belarus is not a democracy (16% disagree); 43% 
say that people have limits of freedom (31% disagree); 39% say that media is not free 
(39% disagree); 37% agree that western criticism of human rights abuses in Belarus is 
justified (29% disagree); and 56% say that the government should enter into a dialogue 
with the opposition (19% disagree). As Dobson (2000) underlines, when presented with 
two options, half (51%) of the population say that people should be free to say whatever 
they want, even if this increases tensions in society. Simultaneously, 39% say that it is
163 R. Dobson (2000) Belarusians want more freedom, but haven't given up on Lukashenko. Opinion 
analysis, Office research, Department of State, Washington D.C. 20520; Rotman, D. (1999, 2000). The 
president and his electorate (ERI, Bath University); Manaev. O. (1997, 1998) Paradoxical electorate. 
IISEPI. Minsk.
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better to live in a society with strict order, even if it requires limiting freedom of speech. 
Residents of Minsk are twice as likely to be pro-reformist and anti-system.
Despite the split of opinion, people, nevertheless, firmly believe (at least 2/3 of the 
population) that democratic institutions are necessary to balance power in society. For 
example, as Dobson (2000: 2) notes 55% (versus 22%) say that it is impermissible to 
cancel scheduled elections; 53% (versus 27%) are against banning meetings and 
demonstrations; 54% (versus 22%) do not support censorship of mass media; and 54% 
(versus 16%) are strongly against disbanding parliament and ruling by decree.
Scholars indeed confirm that one of the unique features of new democracies is a 
paradoxical combination of democratic attitudes of the population with a desire to have 
strong leadership. Rose and Mishler (1996: 234) suggested in this respect a fourfold 
typology of political leadership: from representative and leadership democrats to the 
disaffected and authoritarians. According to them 74% of the population in Russia, for 
example, are either unqualified adherents of parties and other representative agencies, or 
else support government with representative institutions made more effective by a 
stronger leadership. In Belarus, however, these publicly supported representative 
institutions have not materialised into effective political bodies and accordingly this has 
enhanced the delegation of power to the president.
Studies into voting behaviour suggest that education and affluence are the most influential 
factors in determining people’s attitudes. The case of Belarus appeared to be more 
complicated. In their studies, Rotman (2000), Manaev (1998), Furman et al (1998) suggest
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that those who are likely to protest against the incumbent government are mainly full-time 
workers who may not possess a higher education or have sufficient means of living. The 
role of trade unions in the anti-system movements has been paramount until recently, 
when they were forced to bargain with authorities for their own survival.
The general conclusion of this section is that the electorate is split in two and is 
potentially ready for mobilisation. This may allow some leeway for parties to re­
establish their reputation through organising collective resistance to the contemporary 
regime and promoting forms of co-operation with the authorities in order to re-gain lost 
power and resources.
In the following sections public support for parties and the president -  the two 
‘oppositional’ forces in the country -  will be analysed. This will aim to answer the 
question, “why public support of parties hypothetically is high, but practically is non­
existent in Belarus”.
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4.3.3 Explaining electoral volatility
Since 1997 on average 18-20% of the population have actively supported political 
parties in Belarus, and less than 1% of the population have been directly involved in 
party membership. About 25% of the population have an explicit awareness of the 
existence of political parties and their ‘opposition’ to the president (Rotman, 2000; 
Manaev, 1998; Belapan, 1999; Furman et al 1998). Public trust of parties, nevertheless, 
has gradually declined. An index of ‘trust’ for various political institutions depicts the 
following tendencies (Rotman, 2000)164.
The aggregated index of trust was 50%165, which signifies that only half of the population 
actually trusts of existing institutions. From this index it was revealed that 65% of the 
population trust the president, 49% the government; 42% local authorities; 45% heads of 
regional administration, and 15% political parties. In fact the level of trust of 
Lukashenko’s government has grown by around 6% since 1997. In addition, the
164 Rotman, D. (2000) “Social-political and economic situation in the Republic of Belarus: contemporary 
developments”, paper presented at the University of Bath (ERI) Conference, ‘Belarus: The forgotten Heart of 
Europe?”, February 2000. The opinion poll was nation-wide, with a stratified sample of 1000 respondents 
representing all social classes of the Belarus’ population. Information was collected in 55 residential districts 
around the country. Confidence level is 95%.
165 These trends of electoral behaviour have been confirmed by data gathered within recent polls’ such as 
INTAS project (99-00245) ‘Charismatic Political leadership in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine’, University of 
Bath, ERI. For example, 40.8% trust of Lukashenko, and consider his leadership promising for implementation 
of reforms. About 75.1% believe that Lukashenko’s presidency is the most powerful institution in the country; 
and so is his government (23.2%) and the police (30.4%) supported by the president.
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distribution of answers regarding whom the electorate would vote for if the presidential 
election were held tomorrow, was such that 28% of the population said that they could not 
distinguish any worthwhile candidates for office; 8% would vote against all candidates by 
spoiling the ballot paper; 14% would not vote at all; 26% did not know; and only 24% had 
a specific choice, of which about 17% belonged to the president (Belapan, 1999). In other 
words, in 1999 public opinion appeared to be split into thirds, of which 42% said they 
would definitely not vote, 26% were hesitant, and 32% would vote, with 17% for 
Lukashenko. Whereas, in 2000 the distribution of answers has radically altered: 42% of 
the population say they would vote for Lukashenko; 41% say that they are undecided and 
only 2% of the electorate could name an alternative candidate to Lukashenko (Dobson, 
2000: 4). It is clear that the electoral trust of parties and their leaders is in danger of 
extinction; and the group of presidential supporters has the potential to grow further.
It appears, in theory that parties are deemed to be necessary for national democratic 
development, but in practice the majority of the population does not support them. In 
order to explain the existing controversy of public opinion regarding political parties, 
one has to analyse specifically the linkage between parties and their voters. For this 
purpose structural levels of electoral volatility will be examined166.
The measure of electoral volatility reflects individual vote shifts, and displays the 
distribution of party strength during the course of observation. Assuming that the 
parties’ ‘ideological’ positions are fairly stable and have recognisable images for
166 For more discussion see Korosteleva E. (2000) “Electoral volatility in post-Communist Belarus: 
explaining the paradox”, Party Politics, 6(3): 343-358
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Belarusian voters, the index of volatility should reflect the degree of stability of 
elector’s preferences and the level of their mobilisation in general.
Electoral volatility can be measured on the basis of election results or opinion poll evidence, 
depending on data availability and its informative value. In the case of the newly emerged 
democracies, with a limited number of election runs and non-settled patterns of voters’ 
participation and party competition, sample surveys can estimate perspectives for party 
system development. There are several reasons for this consideration. First, opinion polls 
permit an enhanced number of observations over a given period, and therefore, statistically 
improve chances of receiving valid results. In addition, if opinion polls are conducted on a 
regular basis, say 3-5 times a year, and allow approximation of results on a nation-wide 
sample, with a 95% confidence probability, this may provide a parsimonious and reliable 
measure of volatility over time. By this, it is implied, a full-term observation of voting 
behaviour covering various levels of political activity in the annual cycle may be obtained. 
This may also include election campaigns, which more effectively reflect the microcosm of 
change amongst voters.167 Third, the levels of survey volatility are expected to be higher and 
more receptive to change with the increasing frequency of observations, as this period is 
when voters form their opinions and are more prone to change their point of view. Therefore 
if patterned choice or short-lived allegiance should emerge, the character of volatility will 
immediately identify it. The final advantage of the poll-calculated index of volatility in this 
context is its capacity to indicate political change in action, rather than in stasis. It reflects the 
immediate outcomes of the political game - by that pre-empting the negative effect of power 
misbalance after the elections. However, one should be aware of the projective character of
167 See D. Farrell et al. (1995: 110-127)
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any measure of electoral volatility based on intended voting, which may approximate, but 
not necessarily coincide with the reality.
To examine the dynamics of electoral choice and the level of party institutionalisation in 
Belarus, the results of the 1991-1999 opinion polls were analysed168. The annual volatility 
indexes were calculated as mean net— and mean gross change in voting preferences. In the 
first instance (mean net), the absolute differences in party support between opinion polls, 
which were attached to the most salient political events of each year, were summed and 
divided by two. Counted as an average thereafter, the mean annual volatility index represents 
an alternative to Pedersen’s measure of net volatility, as it is year specific. It examines the 
degree of individual voter instability over the course of separate political events and 
campaigns during a given year. In turn, mean gross volatility refers to aggregate-level 
changes in voting and was calculated as the percentage of ‘voters’ who change their 
preference during the annual observation170. Both measures were utilised in order to conceive 
change as multi-layered and multi-dimensional: net volatility reflects instantaneous change 
in voting, i.e. from one observation to another, and gross volatility shows accumulation of 
vote shifts in total throughout the year.
168 With the author’s participation, opinion polls were conducted on a regular basis 3-4 times a year between 
1990 and 1999 by the sociological service ‘Public Opinion’ which was renamed as the Centre for Social and 
Political Research (BSU) in 1996. A stratified nationwide sample with a 95% confidence level is normally 
used, representing all adults over the age of 18 with at least 1000 respondents each time (Rotman, 2000; 
Korosteleva (2001 forthcoming)).
169 Pedersen, M. (1997) “Dynamics of European party systems: changing patterns of electoral volatility”, 
European Journal o f Political Research 7(1): 1-26.
170 See Farrell et al (1995:110-127).
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Figure 4.3.3-1. Mean Gross Volatility 1991-1999
su rv ey  y ear
Note: see text for details of estimation.
Source: author. Opinion polls 1991-1999, Centre for Social and Political Research, Belarusian State 
University, Minsk.
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Note: This measure indicates the absolute differences in party support between opinion polls that were 
attached to the most salient political events of each year, which were summed and divided by two. The 
annual index of volatility is calculated as the average of observations at a given year. See text for further 
explanation.
Source: author. Opinion polls 1991-1999, Centre for Social and Political Research, Belamsian State 
University, Minsk
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The mean gross volatility (Fig.4.3.3-1) reflects the continuing decline in vote mobility 
between existing party alternatives over time. On the aggregate level this may suggest 
either a settlement of party choice by voters or a decrease of their interest in party politics 
in general. This observation, however, contradicts the mode of the net volatility, which 
displays a steady tendency of growth. Vote interchange has intensified in recent years, and 
attained the shape of a straight progressive line, according to Figure 4.3.3-2. The question 
should be as which of the tendencies, presented in both graphics, is correct.
The net volatility, which measures change from one point in time to another, is designed 
to be more sensitive to any variation in public attitudes. It can be referred to as reflecting 
‘individual’ shifts of votes on the aggregate level; and therefore should be more precise in 
its measurement. By displaying a positive growth of mobility in voters’ choice, it confirms 
a tendency for decline in voters’ attachment to existing parties. The two measures of 
volatility, however, cannot contradict, but should supplement each other. Indeed, it has 
been established that Belarusian voters generally favour representative institutions as a 
means for building democracy. Therefore, if one assumes that both tendencies are correct - 
on the aggregate level people’s choice of the party alternatives are shown as ‘settling 
down’ or ‘depoliticising’, yet, on the individual level change in preferences persists -  one 
would have to search for a ‘third party’ that distorts the balance between these two.
Alternative analysis of volatility between and within existing ideological groups of 
parties may shed some light on the aforementioned paradox.
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Total volatility (gross/net) reflects electoral mobility of broader party fronts and gives a 
general impression of party settlement within the electorate. The measure of bloc 
volatility provided below is more informative for identifying the particularities of party 
institutionalisation, as well as voters’ dispositions and cohesion of choice.
Bartolini and Mair’s approach (1990), although based on estimates from sample surveys 
rather than election results, was used to assess the levels of bloc and within-bloc 
volatility between two ideological camps of Belarus’ political spectrum: conservative 
(communists and other related parties) versus reformist (social democrats, liberals, and 
nationalists). The party division is relative and based on expert estimations, and results 
of other surveys (Kitschelt, 1998, Evans& Whitefield, 1998; Bobkov, 1998; Ygrinovich, 
1996; Markowskii, 1998, and other).
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Figure 4.3.3-3. Comparing Mean Block Volatility (BV) 1991-1999: Structural
Influence of PCB and BNF
'
Mean blc
Note: The measure of BV implies a standard calculation of volatility for each of two ideological blocks of 
parties, which is as follows. BV=ABS (P(iV+jV+kV) + P(oV+mV+nV)}/2, where P(iV+jV+kV) represents 
absolute net change in the average vote for parties i, j, and k, all of which come from the same block, between 
two consecutive opinion polls. 2-block division was used, the centre parties were related to the left or right end 
of the spectrum according to their ideological stances. Calculation of BV with hypothetical exclusion of two 
parties from analysis, PCB and BNF, is based on the same arithmetical routine, but without taking the party 
voting results into account. For further details see the text.
Source: author. Opinion Polls 1991-1999, Centre for social and Political Research, Belarusian State 
University, Minsk.
Figure 4.3.3-4. Comparing Mean Within-Block Volatility (WBV) 1991-1999: 
Structural Influence of PCB and BNF
■
Note: WBV measures volatility within each of two party blocks. It was calculated as follows: Total Net 
Volatility -  Block Volatility (BV) = Within-Block Volatility (WBV), is the sum total, for each block, of 
those party net changes which have an algebraic sign contrary to that of the block as a whole (Bartolini 
and Mair, 1990:22). Calculation of WBV with hypothetical exclusion of two parties from analysis, PCB 
and BNF, is based on the same arithmetical routine, but without taking the party voting results into 
account. For further explanation see the text.
Source: author. Opinion polls 1991-1999, Centre for Social and Political Research, Belarusian State 
University, Minsk.
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The results conform to the general pattern of the growth in volatility exhibited by the 
mean net total measure (Fig.4.3.3-2). Evidence suggests a distinct increase in levels of 
bloc and within-bloc volatility (Fig. 4.3.3-4) during 1994-1996 (the first years of 
Lukashenko’s presidency), and later in 1998 (as conflict develops between the 
underground opposition and the president), tapping voters’ discontent during the course of 
the political year. In contrast, a remarkable fall of voters’ interest can be observed during 
the parliamentary elections in 1995, and after the 1996 crux of parties’ battle against 
Lukashenko’s violation of law. This may generally imply the existence of a ‘second-order’ 
effect on party choice by voters in the situation when the president holds the 
preponderance of power and the legislature, and political parties are virtually powerless.
In addition, the calculation of bloc/within-bloc volatility, based on the ‘exclusion’ from 
the analysis of the two major parties, PCB and BNF, which apparently constitute the 
central ideological axis of party competition, produces intriguing findings171. If we 
compare Fig. 4.3.3-3 and 4.3.3-4, we can see that the patterns of bloc volatility (BV) 
and within-bloc volatility (WBV) of these two parties, both in and out of analysis, differ 
significantly in shape. That is in the sense the BV and WBV levels display a similar 
growth line until 1997, and then the BV ‘shoots up’ and WBV respectively ‘goes down’ 
with the two leading parties excluded from analysis. In addition, when the parties are in 
the game, the WBV noticeably rises. Given the meaning of both measures, and the
171 The removal of the two leading parties - PCB and BNF - from analysis implies a standard calculation 
of bloc volatility but without taking the two parties’ voting results into account. This is based on the 
estimation of absolute net change in aggregate vote for each group of parties from the same bloc, which
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ideological significance of both parties, one should question the rise of WBV with two 
parties ‘on board’. It is logical to assume, for example, that when parties theoretically 
are ‘out of the game’; BV should rise because voters regard these parties as ideological 
markers and would find it difficult to orient without them. It is also clear why the WBV 
subsides with their exclusion from the game: ideological meanings of the camps lose 
their distinct profile. What is puzzling here is the rise of the WBV with the two parties 
included in the analysis. It may be hypothesised that, either; the real significance of 
these two leading parties for voters has necessarily declined. Or, there are other 
important ‘players’ in the institutional scenario of Belarus that make voters 
unexpectedly switch-away their settling preferences.
To recapitulate the argument: there is an increasing tendency for voters’ mobility, as the 
measure of net total and bloc volatility demonstrates; and this is despite the overall 
potential for party settlement within their core constituencies or the growing public 
apathy (mean gross volatility). Before 1996, the extreme density and fragmentation of 
the political universe, which was associated with a great number of small and hardly 
discernible parties, could largely explain this. Later developments in voting behaviour, 
with parties settled in numbers and core voters, none the less, continues to reflect 
intensive vote interchange. This may be caused by voters’ indecisiveness over the 
‘conservative-reformist’ ideological cleavage. However, it is highly unlikely this will 
occur, because the factual ideological divisions between existing parties are blurred. On 
the other hand, this may be caused by the presence of ‘a third party’ (institution or
is summed up and divided by two at the end. This technique is hypothetical and allows only projective 
conclusions, which should be treated in conjunction with other studies.
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agency), which voters may find more resourceful and appealing, and which disrupts 
their partisan loyalties. In any event, both hypotheses inevitably lead to an argument 
over the contribution of the leading parties to the process of decision-making: neither 
situation would have been possible if the national parties enjoyed sufficient power to 
balance representation in society.
In addition, if one compares the degree of total and bloc volatility, before and after the 
presidential election in 1994 and especially after 1998, one can see that electoral 
interchange has intensified in practice but not in principle, highlighting no real dilemma of 
choice between parties for voters. As Rose (1998) noticed, volatility of people’s choice is 
also accompanied by the growth of non-voting and negative voting. Electoral instability 
may be explained by change of priorities in voters’ motivation, provided that they act 
rationally. If this is the case, it could explain the actual decline of voters’ interest in party 
politics, where the change of motivation in electors’ preferences may be ascribed to the 
existing conflict between the president and the opposition parties in Belarus.
Once again the interdependence of structures and agency has demonstrated its logic. 
Parties may enjoy steady legitimacy if structures and cultural predisposition so allow. 
An explanation of vote-switching between big national parties with small, but relatively 
stable constituencies can be formulated on the basis of ‘second-order’ preferences, when 
there is not so much at stake on the parliamentary level, as compared to the presidential, 
and voters can manipulate their choice. The implication is that the balance of power in 
the country would not really be altered by the results of parliamentary elections or every 
day party actions, nor would the composition of government or the efficacy of reforms.
294
Due to new constitutional and institutional arrangements, there is little leeway for 
parties to accomplish their mission during their political cycle. Voters may ‘cherish’ 
their beliefs and remain faithful to parties’ ideologies, however this does not prevent 
them from responding rationally to the opportunities provided by the existing 
institutional order. In turn, powerless parties tend to undermine the legislature’s ability 
to pursue its own aggrandisement at the expense of the presidency, and thus contribute 
to the accretion of presidential powers. This pushes to the forefront the second line of 
party competition — the ‘Lukashenko-anti-Lukashenko’ divide.
It is obvious that public opinion is extremely divided. In their earnest desire for social 
change, people are tom between parties, which ought to provide access to power for the 
citizenry to rule the country, and the president, who seems to them, more capable of 
coping with public needs. Therefore, they often surrender their party loyalty for an 
opportunity to acquire immediate revenues, which are pledged by the government. It is 
interesting to note that the presidential and the underground parties’ electorates clash 
considerably, and this forms an environment for vote switching along the ‘president- 
anti-president’ divide. In other words, contemporary voters perform rational ‘flexibility’ 
in their voting behaviour, which allows them to pursue their own short-term policies 
despite their ideological motivations and personal beliefs.
Another explanation of the ‘swing-or-not-to-swing’ voting behaviour in Belarus may be 
ascribed to parties’ organisational insufficiency and their continuing inability to resist 
increasing the power of the president. Parties act in accordance to their rationale and in 
pursuit of the more accommodating strategies in order to survive voters’ impartiality
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and institutional-cum-structural predicaments. Nevertheless, their actions seem to be in 
continuing discrepancy with voters’ rational choice. This is when the opportunities for 
populist leaders and perhaps other agencies for interest representation emerge. The latter 
(NGOs, new trade unions, and other interest organisations), though, express fringe 
interests and, hence, enjoy only limited support from the population. All these enhance 
the rudimentary image of parties within society, which if  no consensus is achieved and 
no legal attempts by them are made to win public office, will bring parties to their 
political demise.
Van der Eijk, Franklin et al. (1996), in their research of the European Parliamentary 
elections develop a notion of ‘quasi-switching’ to explain the vote fluidity between 
individual parties in low-salient elections. This term does not imply change over time or 
radical realignments or party decay, but rather in contrast between voting preferences in 
the election sequence, while party loyalties remain continuous. This framework seems 
to prescribe well the case of problematic institutionalisation of the new party system in 
Belarus. Public behaviour is marked by ‘swing-or-not-to-swing’ attitudes to both 
governmental and oppositional policy offers, which does not yet imply de-alignment of 
voters from parties, but rather voters’ rational choice in a constitutionally limited 
environment.
The institutional and human effects of the presidency on parties’ settlement with their 
existing and potential voters will be subject to analysis in the next section.
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4.3.4 The President and the parties’ electorates: what is the difference?
In previous sections, it was established that both parties and voters tend to act rationally in 
an attempt to optimise their benefits in the situation of uncertainty and pending crisis, in 
Belarus. Their rationale, nevertheless, appears to be different. Parties have scarce electoral 
support and remain out of power. Instead of channelling the governed to their governors, 
parties often act out of instincts of self-preservation. They cannot afford to mobilise the 
mass of uncommitted voters, so they either ally with the state to access the unlimited pool 
of resources, or seek funding elsewhere to acquire votes for the purpose of winning office. 
Electors, in turn, make their own preference for ‘political investment’ and seem to choose 
to support the president as the more realistic source for social change. In other words, 
parties act by themselves and for themselves, and so do voters. The famous ‘participatory 
linkage’ as described by Kay Lawson (1988) appears to lie elsewhere.
If parties do not enjoy public support, theoretically there should be other organisations that 
can ‘channel’ public interests. In an unfavourable institutional and structural environment, 
NGOs, trade unions, youth movements, unions and other interest organisations do not 
appear able to disrupt the concentration of power in hands of Lukashenko. The majority of 
the electorate believes that with Lukashenko in power the continuity of incremental 
reforms and minimal social security will be guaranteed, especially when there is no 
alternative choice of leadership. This, of course, does not prevent them from supporting 
representative institutions for the purpose of building democracy. The majority of the 
population believes that democratisation and strong leadership can co-exist.
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The principal question, nevertheless, remains as to why the discrepancy between public 
expectations and people’s real choice persists even when parties go beyond their self- 
seeking motives, and try to re-establish linkage with their voters. It is puzzling why 
people theoretically believe in a party’s mission, but stake little hope on their capacity to 
govern; or conversely, why people steadily support Lukashenko knowing that power 
concentration may lead to dictatorship. This raises the question; as to what extent the 
existing ‘presidential divide’ between the parties and the incumbent can damage voters’ 
choice, and the prospect for democratisation.
According to Oleg Manaev (1998:22), in 1994 48.7% of the population believed that 
President Lukashenko could solve the economic and political crisis of the country. This 
level of electoral endorsement steadily continued over the next six years, and decreased 
by 4% between 1995 and 1999. Conversely, public expectations that parties are capable 
of governing the country out of the economic-cum-political crisis have significantly 
declined. In 1991 79.9% of the population believed that parties were an essential 
element for building a democratic future. However, by 1998 only 3.9% of the electorate 
still adhered to this premise, with the main decline (from 60% of confidence to 3.9%) 
occurring between 1996 and 1998 when many parties failed to remain in public office. 
Nevertheless, public attitude to the fact that parties are fundamental for balancing power 
in society, paradoxically, did not change very much, and remained on average at 29.6% 
between 1996 and 1999172. These calculations suggest that the dilemma of choice for the
172 Rotman, D.G., Korosteleva E.A., et al. (1996) Kakoy Mi Vidim Nashu Belarus? Dannye operativno- 
socioloogicheskisch oprosov 1994-1995 [What Kind of Belarus Do we See?], The results of sociological 
observations 1994-1995] (Minsk), Part 3. Rotman, D. (1997) “Kakoi mi vidim Belarus?”[What Belarus
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Belarusians has been as whether to support the president or parties; and who would be 
the better ‘political investment’ for saving democracy. High-level volatility of people’s 
choice is evidence of the painful process of the formation of public opinion, which has 
increasingly leaned towards the presidential-led administration during recent years. The 
situation can be likened to ‘robe pulling’ between the president and the remaining 
parties. This occurs because both blocs recruit their ‘human capital’ from a largely 
overlapping and rationally oriented pool of electors.
Therefore, one has to answer the question as to “what are the principal features of the 
presidential electorate in contemporary Belarus, as opposed to that of parties”. The core 
o f presidential supporters displays certain social-demographic characteristics173. They 
form around 17.9% middle aged and 37.5% elderly population, those without a higher 
education (47.3%), and full-time labour in state enterprises (43.2%) or retired (45.3%). 
Lukashenko’s followers mainly reside in small towns (24.6%) and villages (42.7%), and 
use a mixed language (local dialect) in every-day communication (45.1%). 
Paradoxically, the description of Lukashenko’s electorate closely matches that of his 
opponents. Among them are approximately the same percent of the middle aged (24.8% 
between 30-39 and 30% over 40), and full-time workers (45.5%) and those with mainly 
school/college education (41%). The principal social-demographic characteristics of the 
electoral opposition to the president are [1] young adults aged between 20 and 29
can we see?], Narodnaya Gazeta [People’s Paper], 21 October, p. 1,3; Rotman, D. (1999) Sociological 
Report 1998-99.
173 For more details, see Manaev, O. (1998) “Belorusskii Electorat: Za i Protiv Presidenta” [Belarusian 
Electorate: For and Against the President], NISAPI News 1: 22-8
299
(32.3%); [2] higher educated people (23.9%); [3] residents of Minsk (31%) and other 
large cities (34.8%); [4] those who speak Russian or Russian and Belarusian174.
Income indicators confirm that there is no difference between presidential pro-electors 
and counter-electors: there are 58% of those who live on or below the poverty line in 
both ideological blocs. At the same time, the majority of Lukashenko’s supporters think 
that their income, as well as the economic situation in the country has changed for the 
better with recent years or at least has not worsened. Among those who do not support 
the president are those who are not satisfied with their worsening living standards and 
the economic situation of the country in consequence. Paradoxically, the majority of 
Lukashenko’s supporters (62%) would find it difficult to survive if the situation became 
worse, whereas those in opposition (49.5%) would try to find some means of coping 
with the collapsing order.
From the above data it is clear that both the president and the opposition recruit their 
principal resources from similar social groups of electors, with an added extension to 
the oppositional side (youth, intelligentsia, and urban residents). This demonstrates how 
divided and controversial public opinion is at present in Belarus. As mentioned 
previously, the situation resembles ‘robe pulling* between the parties and the president 
for votes, where the president seems to have already won the authority to shape the 
institutional environment.
174 Sociological data of opinion polls, presented by IISEPS in IISEPS NEWS 1:22-28, Minsk, 1998.
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When one examines ideological beliefs and personal motivations of both electoral 
camps, considerable differences become apparent. Among Lukashenko’s electorate are 
those who support a planned, state-regulated economy, public ownership of property 
and a moderate pace of reforms. They also advocate high levels of social security and 
full guaranties of state benefits. Interestingly, these issues advanced by the part of the 
population, which mainly exists on state benefits and under state protection -  and 
subsequently also forms the majority of the Lukashenko’s electorate. Among those who 
would never vote for the Lukashenko, are those, who support the principles of market 
economy, low state interference, high, but irregular income, and the possibility to earn 
money, which the contemporary system lacks. In the majority of its parameters: income, 
age, social status, and economic activity, Manaev has described Lukashenko’s electorate 
as ‘socially’ vulnerable. Secondly, it has clear anti-reform, anti-market and state- 
oriented stance. Third, popular psychology depicts Belarus as a ‘defending fortress’ that 
blames others for its misfortunes and whose main features are collectivism, low 
tolerance to dissidents, and growing xenophobia. In other words, a process of 
‘conservation’ of Lukashenko’s electorate has taken place where more passive parts of it 
became dominant (Manaev, 1998:10).
If one compares Lukashenko’s electorate between 1994 and 1999, one finds a striking 
transformation in the cohort of his supporters. Remarkably, with all the political and 
economic upheavals that have occurred during recent years, he has not lost support, and 
his gains have also been minimal. On average 12-14% of the elderly, with school 
education, low income and highly dependence on the state have joined Lukashenko’s 
followers. They are also the regular audience of the state owned Belarusian television 
service and consumers of official newspapers. The new ‘entrees’, however, do not
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support the idea of going back ‘to the USSR’; they believe the possible political union 
with Russia controversial (36.7% are against); and support the idea of market socialism. 
To summarise, people’s ideological attitudes, levels of confidence and trust of political 
players demonstrate radical difference between those who support the president and 
those who support parties. This is especially true in relation to public attitudes towards 
the necessity to reform government, means of living and personal involvement in 
politics.
If one must label the mode of mobilisation of the presidential and oppositional 
electorates, the former can be described as being more inclined to delegate authority for 
decision-making to its representative (in this case, the president) and ‘passively’ relies 
on their ‘trustee’ to sway the nation’s destiny. With time this attitude generates hostility 
to other forms of representation, and may have a reverse effect on the level of public 
mobilisation that may result in mass depoliticisation, and further alienation from the 
process of decision-making (O’Donnell, 1996).
The oppositional electorate seems to act rather differently, being a discussant of critical 
issues of social welfare rather than a passive observer. Mass demonstrations, 
partisanship, readership of both official and oppositional sources of information, and a 
more crystallised position towards the needs of the country are the main attributes of 
this part of electorate.
When one analyses the level of trust of various political and social institutions, three 
profiles of the Belarusian electorate can be observed:
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Table 4.3.4-1. Public trust of political and social institutions in Belarus, 1998
Political values










Trust 61.6 26.2 2.6
Do not trust 5.9 25.9 76.2
New Parliament:
Trust 36.1 15.8 2.6
Do not trust 10.2 24.7 67.1
Constitutional Court:
Trust 35.8 20.1 9.0
Do not trust 19.2 33.3 70.4
Army:
Trust 52.2 30.5 12.9
Do not trust 9.0 21.2 53.7
Local Authorities:
Trust 41.8 21.2 5.8
Do not trust 22.8 35.1 70.4
Traditional Trade Unions:
Trust 12.0 7.2 3.9
Do not trust 18.2 27.3 56.3
Independent Trade Unions:
Trust 5.4 9.5 18.6
Do not trust 23.8 22.4 36.7
13th Supreme Soviet:
Trust 16.9 8.5 9.0
Do not trust 19.5 26.5 53.9
Church:
Trust 65.0 48.3 39.5
Do not trust 7.4 11.8 25.1
Official Mass Media:
Trust 75.1 43.7 15.8
Do not trust 5.1 21.0 60.1
Independent Mass Media:
Trust 13.8 25.4 33.9
Do not trust 33.8 24.1 21.9
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Source: Retrieved from Manaev (1998:27), Independent Institute for Social, Economic and Political 
Research (NISEPI), Minsk.
As one can see from the table, public opinion (middle column) in general is very divided 
and ready for political mobilisation. Three groups of the population can be clearly 
observed -  pro-governmental, oppositional and undecided voters. The latter group allows 
considerable leeway for politicians to manoeuvre in an attempt of recruiting additional 
voters for the forthcoming presidential election in 2001. It may be noted, that the pro- 
presidential part of the Belarusian electorate seems to be more consolidated and coherent 
in its judgement; whereas the ‘protest electorate’ seems to be more sceptical, and less 
enthusiastic in its support of non-presidential institutions, like the former parliament.
It has been observed that, the ‘practical’ and ‘visual’ accomplishments of the president 
(clean streets, finishing of long-term projects, low but regular wages, warm houses in 
the winter, food on shelves, and so on) work for his popularity. His audience 
respectively has become accustomed to see his short-term promises fulfilled, which 
creates a difficulty for the president to switch from ‘cosmetic’ to more radical reforms in 
the longer term. As Manaev (1998: 12) points out, today’s followers believe in the 
president not because he is prospective, but because he pledges to overcome the crisis 
swiftly using non-painful and habitual methods. For example, he promised that prices 
on alcohol and vodka in particular, would remain relatively stable, and by doing that he 
knew he would instantaneously satisfy the majority of the distressed population. This 
proved the effectiveness and exactness of his governance. Thus the chances for the 
opposition to win office become very limited, as they are unable to use a similar tactics, 
and have to operate by promises. In order for the opposition to become institutionalised,
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a knowledgeable and well-informed electorate is needed. In addition, parties must alter 
their strategies, and switch the blame for their failures from the president, and 
concentrate on a consensual and programmatic political game.
The initial hypothesis seems to have correctly suggested that the electorate does not 
support parties because they inadequately represent voters’ interests. They tend to 
support the president because he fulfils people’s basic expectations in the most visual 
way possible, and there is no one else to choose as an alternative option to his increasing 
authority. The motivation ‘self comes first’175 gives an adequate picture of the public 
rationale in defining their priorities. In addition, data demonstrates that at least two 
thirds of the electorate have no understanding of the democratic issues advocated by 
parties and other institutions. A statement like “ ...it does not matter if Lukashenko has 
violated the Constitution, what matters is that he is at least trying to do more than just to 
bluff as others do ...”, is a common conviction among the electorate. They judge by 
what they see, but not by what they are promised in grandiloquent terms. After more 
then ten years of transition with no sound achievements, the electorate has become more 
conservative and wary of political and economic experiments and pledges. This seems 
to be one of the main reasons for such a large proportion of the ‘hesitant electorate’, and 
the challenge for parties is therefore to mobilise these undecided votes. As Rotman 
(2000: 4) confirms there are presently approximately 53.7176 per cent of the population
175 This Russian proverb ‘svoya rubashka blizhe k telu’ [self comes first] adequately illustrates people’s 
rational choice in Belarus.
176 According to other surveys, the number of undecided votes is 41% (Dobson, 2000) or 47.9% (Manaev, 
1998), or 54% (Belapan, November 1999), which suggests that about fifty percent o f the population on
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who are undecided about their attitudes to contemporary political players. This figure 
remained unaltered between 1997 and 1999.
The Centre for Social and Political Research, BSU, has introduced a new technique to 
measure the dynamics of voting behaviour using specific ‘projective’ questions as a 
‘sieve’ for separating respondents into various groups according to their loyalties 
(Rotman, 2000). According to their evaluation, there are presently 18% of core 
supporters177 of the incumbent president compared to 15.6% in 1997 and 16.0% in 
1998178. The number of opponents (protest electorate) has not considerably changed and 
accounted for 28.4% in 1999. The ranks of ‘hesitant voters’ have slightly declined 
recently and accounts for 53.7% of the population. The presidential loss of potential 
votes equals 13.3%, and the gain is 14.5%, compared to 11% in 1998. So far, one can 
conclude that the president has gained rather than lost electorate’s confidence179. The 
situation is one that he is entrusted to develop policies, as long as they have vivid and
average do not have clear political stance, and may well form a pool of supporters for one of the camps: 
governmental or oppositional.
177 There may seem to be a discrepancy in figures that 18% (Rotman, 2000) or 15% (Belapan, 1999) will 
support the president against 41-45% (Rotman, 2000; Dobson 2000) who would vote for him, if 
presidential election were tomorrow. This, however, could be explained by the fact of conditionality, 
when the former represents a core of Lukashenko’s constituency and would vote for him in any occasion; 
whereas the latter are those who are very likely to vote for him, if such an opportunity emerged.
178 Recent opinion poll within INTAS (99-00245) project, showed that in 2001 ‘firm supporters’ form 
about 8.7% as against 34.7% of Lukashenko’s ‘opponents’ amongst the electorate.
179 In later estimations (2001 opinion poll in Belarus, INTAS), the president’s support equals to 42%, and 
consists of 8.7% ‘firm supporters’, 20.1% of those who steadily vote ‘yes’ for Lukashenko, and 13.2% of 
his electoral gain. For more details see Rotman (2001) INTAS Report, University of Bath, ERL
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convincing outcomes. This allows him so much leeway for electoral manoeuvring that 
the idea of ‘pulling the robe of representation’ away from the parties is a credible one.
The data suggest the ‘hesitant electors’ form a desirable pool of potential recruits, or 
floating voters, for both the president and parties. However it is the president who is best 
positioned to motivate the undecided vote and parties would therefore need to vastly 
increase their segment of the electorate from 2% to an overall majority, in order to change 
the situation (Dobson, 2000). Even if the situation spirals out of control, Lukashenko 
presently remains the only plausible candidate for the presidency180, and as long as public 
opinion181 remains higher than that of the opposition he will continue to rule.
This respectively raises the question of what chances the opposition stand when 
attempting to mobilise Lukashenko’s opponents and motivating the floating electorate, 
in order to win office. This will certainly be a difficult, but not an impossible task to 
achieve. Although institutionally constrained, and structurally remote from the 
electorate, the opposition parties must demonstrate more initiative, especially at the 
grassroots, and be more pro-active with the electorate. However, most importantly in 
building their credibility with voters, parties must alter their communication strategy 
with the authorities in order to compromise and form consensus; as this seems to be the 
only way to gain office.
180 This would be likely, if externally supported candidates will not appear to ‘play’ in tune with 
Lukashenko’s agenda using such issues as union with Russia, stable and high wages, and security.
181 Public opinion is also reinforced by respective structures and institutions of unlimited presidential 
powers (see Chapter 3 for details).
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Despite their recent failure, parties nevertheless, have learnt to survive. Even though 
some ‘mass’ parties, like the PCB, AP, BNF, PT, and others, lost substantial human 
resources, they presently do not rely on state gratuity. They have broadened their appeal 
and expanded their network with international organisations. The new liberal and 
democratic parties have found ample support from the West by way of grants and direct 
collaboration. This international co-operation has remarkably altered the parties’ style of 
management and instilled ambitions for winning public office.
Parties’ management strategies have also changed since 1996. Realising how limited 
their influence is on the wider audience of voters, instead of advocating new 
parliamentary elections, parties have done the opposite. They organised an electoral 
campaign to call for an alternative presidential election and by doing so inflamed public 
opinion. First, parties advertised candidates who could be considered an alternative to 
the president, and although party backed, they were not tainted by bad public 
perceptions. Second, they provoked an aggressive reaction from the authorities, by way 
of public threats, imprisonment, media bans, and a re-registration campaign imposed by 
the president on parties. Altogether, this created a negative reaction towards the 
authorities among the population. Third, the opposition underlined that the incumbent 
president had actually outstayed his legitimate tenure in office according to the 
Constitution of 1994.
According to Huntington (1991: 150-1), the opposition in Belarus is acting according to 
the classic plan that third wave democracies use in order to overthrow undemocratic 
rulers. This is as follows:
1. “Focus attention on the illegitimacy or dubious legitimacy of the 
authoritarian regime; that is the most vulnerable point”. The opposition has 
started education campaigns illustrating the illegitimacy of Lukashenko’s 
regime. Parties’ boycott of the recent parliamentary elections, was however, 
a step in the wrong direction. They definitely demonstrated the illegality of 
the regime, and at the same time, lost another chance of winning office.
2. “Authoritarian rulers over time alienate erstwhile supporters. Encourage 
these disaffected groups to support democracy as the necessary alternative 
to the current regime”. In reality, the opposition had chosen Michael Chigir, 
the former Prime Minister, to be their prime candidate for the alternative 
presidential election in May 1999. Many other ousted members of 
Lukashenko’s government have also joined the opposition.
3. “Support from the military could be helpful in the event of a crisis, however, 
it is preferred to be military laissez-faire in the argument between 
authorities and opposition”. The opposition in Belarus had limited support 
from the military in face of the former Minister of Defence Yuri 
Zakharenko. From informal sources, the upper military echelons began if 
not disagree, then to question Lukashenko’s policy and its implications.
4. “Practice and preach non-violence. Seize every opportunity to express 
opposition to the regime, including participation in the elections it 
organises”. As practice shows, continuing Marches of Freedom, and 
demonstrations have been organised in order to resist the regime. However,
the refusal of many oppositional parties to participate in elections failed to 
advance democratisation.
5. “Develop contacts with the global media, foreign human rights 
organisations, and trans-national organisations”. Previous sections 
demonstrated how successfully the opposition used the opportunity to be 
anti-system, and hence, attract western aid in the situation of increasingly 
non-democratic politics of Lukashenko.
6. “Promote unity among opposition groups. Attempt to create comprehensive 
umbrella organisations that will facilitate co-operation among such groups”. 
The opposition is slowly but steadily moving to the stage when it could 
unite to resist the tendency towards authoritarism in the country. It is hoped 
that a generational shift within the leadership of some parties will allow the 
policy of coalition to become dominant.
7. “When the authoritarian regime falls, be prepared quickly to fill the vacuum 
of authority that results”. This is what the opposition has to learn to do, as it 
seems that the majority of parties do not have programmes for building 
authority had they come to power.
8. “Force authority to hold elections”. Unfortunately, the opposition did not 
participate in the 2000 parliamentary elections, and did not use the 
opportunity to challenge authorities.
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If parties cannot win office now, they can at least prepare themselves for other electoral 
campaigns, and a role in public life. What is more important is that they can learn how 
to sustain ‘delegative’ democracy without the danger of dictatorship.
In summary, the data used in these three sections suggests an ambivalent answer to the 
question, whether parties are failing in Belarus. If one evaluates party development as a 
linkage between civil society and state, it is clear that parties are attaining a new quality, 
which may allow them to survive in the future. The ‘presidential divide’ appears to be 
both damaging and stimulating for party political development. On the one hand, the 
political balance of the country is weighed towards the president; which has enabled 
voters to rationally switch their choice away from parties who increasingly become 
‘second-order preferences’, and ‘delegate’ to the president maximal authority to lead the 
country out of crisis. Voters’ perceptions of parties as lacking power will obviously 
hinder the process of establishing party system equilibrium in Belarus.
On the other hand, the situation of electoral and financial decline has stimulated parties 
to seek new opportunities for survival. As the analysis demonstrated, successfully or 
not, parties are developing a new image within civil society. Parties are presently 
characterised as attaining a distinct cartel shape, which may be unique to Belarus. At 
present it is a ‘state detached’ model of party cartelisation for the opposition. It is 
believed development in the direction of communication with the state is the only 
sensible means for Belarusian parties to survive the present political decline.
Parties should focus on professional-electoral campaigning, that is more based on 
financial investments during this period, and intends to utilise sociological information,
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and modem means of communication, including Russian broadcasting channels, the 
Internet, and street canvassing, especially in regions. At the same time, agents’ 
behaviour by itself will not provide a sufficient background for the advancement of 
democracy. There are much bigger tasks to achieve: these are the alterations of 
institutions and structures, including those of regional legislature-executive powers, and 
respectively of public rationality, on which parties’ authority for winning office is 
founded.
Belarus as a transient regime faces particular difficulties with an existing public 
dilemma between representation and leadership. The prospects for party system 
consolidation as one means for sustaining democratic balance in society will be 
analysed in the next chapter; as well as the possible alternatives for further 
developments of the current regime. It is believed that the regime in Belarus may 
progress towards a form of a ‘delegative’ democracy and may be prevented from sliding 
into plebiscitarian dictatorship if parties and other interest organisations were to revive 
round-table talks with authorities and, by that, re-gain public confidence.
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Chapter 5. Democratic perspectives for party system institutionalisation in Belarus
Post-communist transitions, however ‘troubled’, may still 
be regarded as transitions to democracy -  if only because 
leading political actors recognize that there is nothing else 
to make a transition to... They may do a lot of harm, but 
cannot challenge the centrality of the democratic project.
(GhiaNodia, 1996: 15)
The principal focus of this chapter will be on the quality of democracy and the role of 
parties in developing regimes, including Belarus. As scholars note, new polyarchies 
show little tendency for further system institutionalisation. In more than ten years of 
transition many CIS continue facing ineffective parliaments, volatile and non-partisan 
electorates, manipulative interest organisations, and legitimate but powerless parties. 
Despite these socio-cum-political problems, reinforced by economic stagnation, the new 
CIS regimes nevertheless, remain sustainable and functional. This suggests that there 
may be some infrastructures, which ensure the process of system sustainability and 
informal institutionalisation. The essential inquiry, therefore, will be, first, to define 
whether the new regimes can be classified as democratic, and, second, to establish what 
infrastructures exist to make new democracies functional, and finally, to assess parties’ 
contribution to system sustainability.
This chapter will discuss alternative conceptual forms of democracy offered by 
contemporary scholars, in an attempt to differentiate new regimes. This will assist in
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identifying the path that Belarus’ regime has taken, and the prospects for its party system 
development. As suggested, Belarus might be classified as an incomplete democracy of a 
‘delegative’ type (O’Donnell, 1993). This presumes popular vote endorsement of an 
individual leader, which may seem democratic in form, but is dictatorial in practice. If 
legal and representative institutions are not reinforced in Belarus, the regime may 
eventually develop into dictatorship182. Over a few years, it has moved from an initial 
semi-parliamentary system to an individual rule, which is characterised by increasing 
power of the president, weak parliament and declining parties. This is despite continuing 
practice of elections, international assistance, and popular support for democracy. 
Accordingly, this raises the issue of the quality of new democracies and the role of parties 
in supporting them. Democracy does not appear to be only “about voters casting their 
competitive ballots on polling day as [an] institutionalised interaction between regime and 
society” (White, 2000a). There are many other, formal and informal, mechanisms 
involved to provide democratic sustainability and ensure that democracy becomes the 
‘only game in town’ (Kitschelt et al. 1999).
5.1 Democracy with adjectives: analytical differentiation
The third wave of democratisation has presented scholars with the challenge of 
conceptualising new transitional regimes. Although transitions in Latin America, Asia, 
Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe may be classified as democracies, they, 
nevertheless, differ considerably in their mode, paths and ‘quality’ of democratic
182 Or at least remain incomplete and hence jeopardising the process of democracy building over the years 
to come.
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consolidation. After a decade of transformation, some new regimes may approximate a 
democratic state, in accordance with their legal and economic achievements; whereas 
others are observed as to be ‘static* and ‘incomplete* or indeed ‘failing’ to institutionalise 
further. The striking feature that brings the majority of the new regimes183 together is that 
despite their vivid non-institutionalisation, they are functional and sustainable. This may 
imply that ‘informal system institutionalisation’ (O’Donnell, 1996) has taken place, and 
that this has made it possible for these regimes to survive.
In contemporary literature, there are two general tendencies, which attempt to classify new 
regimes and account for their diversity. On the one extreme, analytical differentiation has 
occurred in an attempt to capture varied forms of emerged democracies. At the other 
extreme is the growing concern, regarding the proliferation of these theories and 
explanatory frameworks that breed conceptual stretching of the primary understanding of 
democracy. As a result, there is a respective effort to reduce the plethora of opinions to a 
common denominator or at least a standardised classification.
What one can witness today is an overabundance of alternative conceptual forms of 
‘democracy’ that frequently appears with ‘adjectives’ to reflect the complexity of 
transition. Examples from amid the hundreds of subtypes that have emerged include 
‘authoritarian democracy’, ‘neopatrimonial democracy’, ‘military-dominated democracy’, 
‘protodemocracy’, and ‘delegative democracy’, to which a reference will be made further. 
Paradoxically, they are all grounded on a standardized usage of the root term of
183 This has particular reference to the new regimes in the CIS. See chapter 1 for more details.
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democracy, which Joseph Schumpeter (1947) and Robert Dahl (1971)184 accurately 
formulated. These are, nevertheless, procedural definitions that have been widely 
exploited in research of third-wave democratisation at the level of national political 
regimes. Dahl and Schumpeter’s definitions refer to democratic procedures rather than 
substantive policies or holistic systems classified as liberal democracy. These procedural 
definitions are ‘minimal’ in the sense that they offer the smallest possible range of 
attributes that are seen as producing the effect of democratic consolidation. This is where 
problems begin. Reality offers a vast range of third-wave democracies that may fit Dahl’s 
criteria as democratic, but exercise non-democratic practices, or have a low degree of 
institutionalisation that stipulates further instability and unpredictability of the system. The 
only possible way to ‘operationalise’ these regimes seems to be by adding adjectives to the 
root term of ‘democracy’ in some standardised way.
For comparison of developing democracies some scholars tend to construct a ‘ladder of 
abstraction’ (Sartori, 1976), and offer classical subtypes of democratic regimes that can 
usefully serve either to increase differentiation or to avoid conceptual stretching. 
Sartori’s initial proposal was to move up the ladder to the concepts that have fewer 
defining attributes and correspondently fit a broader range of cases, or move down with 
the reversed effect. However, as David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) argue, the 
main problem with this strategy is that scholars typically tend to add adjectives to the 
regime type, which is by default regarded as democratic. This generates regime subtypes
184 For discussion of procedural definition of democracy, which has been used here, see also O’Donnell 
(1993, 1994, 1996), Huntington, (1991); L. Dimond, J. Linz and S. Lipset (1989) Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America; and G. Di Palma (1990).
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that often may be quite remote from the actual meaning of democracy. Examples 
include ‘civilian’, ‘competitive’, ‘electoral’ regimes. Collier and Levitsky (Ibid: 437) 
argue further that “the resulting subtypes remain more general than the concept of 
democracy... although scholars thus achieve some conceptual differentiation in relation 
to regimes, they do not specifically commit themselves to the idea that the case under 
discussion is a democracy”, and confusion often takes place.
As an alternative strategy for dealing with a variety of the new regimes, other scholars 
have created ‘diminished’ subtypes that contribute both to achieving differentiation and 
to avoiding conceptual stretching (Collier and Mahon, 1993). In contrast with the above 
scheme of analysis, diminished subtypes are not full instances of the root definition of 
‘democracy’, and hence, allow more modest claims to the extent of democratisation. In 
other words they generally identify specific attributes that are missing in developing 
democracy, at the same time referring to other attributes that are present. With their 
principal focus on missing features, they clearly differentiate the case from the root 
definition of democracy. Examples here include ‘oligarchical democracy’ with missing 
full suffrage; ‘controlled’ or ‘restrictive’ democracy with missing full contestation; or 
‘illiberal’ democracy with missing civil liberties, and so on (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997). These subtypes are a useful means for simultaneous definition and avoidance of 
conceptual stretching of the meaning of ‘democracy’, especially in cases that are less 
than fully democratic. They also provide differentiation by creating new analytic 
categories. As Linz and Stepan (1996), Mainwaring (1999), and many other scholars 
have pointed in the analysis of the new post-authoritarian or post-totalitarian regimes,
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there is a real need to move beyond a dichotomous conceptualisation of democracy and 
recognise its ‘hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ character.
Some scholars suggest shifting the overarching concept of democracy to the concept of 
a democratic government or democratic state. For example, in the analysis of post-1985 
Brazil, O’Donnell (1993) named the government as ‘democratic’ meaning that it was 
democratically elected, however in practice it may have been opposite to what classic 
definition of democracy offers. He argued further that Brazil can be recognized as 
having a ‘democratic’ regime following the minimal definition of democracy, but the 
failure of the legal and bureaucratic institutions to protect and promote a broader set of 
rights for citizens excludes it from the range of democratic states. This strategy will be 
discussed below.
On the other hand, for the countries that are less than fully democratic, another problem 
arises, such as whether it would be better to avoid identifying these countries as 
subtypes of democracy, for example, in cases of growing violation of human rights or 
restriction on electoral competition, and to classify them within a ‘dictatorial’ or ‘post- 
totalitarian’ type of regime (Linz, 1996).
In summation, one has to be careful when analysing and labelling newly emerged 
transitional regimes. They may well have democratic prerequisites, but never develop 
into a fully established democracy. They balance unevenly between the extent of 
institutionalisation and non-democratic practices. Provided that Belarus formally meets 
Dahl’s criteria to be classified as a democracy in minimalist terms, this research will
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follow the second aforementioned direction, which searches for what is missing in the 
regime in order to understand how it can be made more democratic.
5.2 Delegative democracy: illusory consolidation or sustainable regime?
Guillermo O’Donnell suggests, that “the problem with new polyarchies is not that they 
lack institutionalisation” (1996: 35), which is traditionally seen as a predicament to 
efficient system operation. If they survive but not according to a supposedly classic 
pattern of democratisation, there must be some other informal or hidden mechanisms, 
that help to sustain non-institutionalised policies and to receive significant public 
support. Elections and “informal, permanent and pervasive particularism” (Ibid: 35) 
may be the two principal features, as O’Donnell argues, that create a functional and 
informally structured polyarchy. This is obviously not a fully operative liberal 
democracy, but it can be defined as the minimal circuit for democratisation. The 
question is whether the system has enough incentives to progress further to a well- 
balanced polity.
If one returns to Dahl’s (1971) definition of polyarchy, five principal attributes referring 
to minimal criteria for democracy, may be identified. These include:
1) elected officials;
2) free and fair elections;
3) inclusive suffrage;
4) the right for contestation;
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5) basic civil liberties -  freedom of expression, alternative information; and
associational autonomy.
All five relate to the issue of elections, by which the public express their votes; the 
government is elected; decisions are made; and established liberties guarantee further 
democratisation. O’Donnell expands the list of democratic criteria by adding that
1) officials should serve their office to the end of their constitutionally 
mandated terms;
2) elected authorities should not be the subject of severe constraints, or 
vetoes, or exclusion from certain policy domains by other non-elected 
actors, especially armed forces;
3) there should be an uncontested national territory that clearly defines the 
voting population; and finally,
4) there should be a generalised expectation that a fair electoral process and its 
surrounding freedoms will continue into an indefinite future (Ibid: 35-36).
This, he argues, should exclude such countries as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and many 
others of Eastern Europe and Latin America (Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, 
Honduras, Brazil) from the range of democratic regimes. O’Donnell’s suggestion may 
have its own rationale, however, it does not assist the reduction of the multifarious 
theories of democracy. Perhaps it is more sensible to regard ‘muddling-through’ 
regimes as borderline procedural democracies using Dahl’s minimal criteria, which in 
fact may form an ‘interim’, transitional type of regime that lies between non-democratic,
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on the one hand, and fully democratic polities, on the other. Dahl (1971) puts it as, 
“polyarchies [are] polities characterised by some degree of stability in representation 
and leadership; but they are not yet democracies.” For the purpose of analysis it may 
also be useful to establish what are the attributes that are missing to make a polyarchy 
fully functional, and what are the central factors that inhibit their entrenchment.
O’Donnell narrowed Dahl’s definition of democracy in order to identify the principal 
‘markers’ of democratisation. In his view, elections may serve as a minimal requirement 
for initiation of democratic consolidation, and often signify the irreversibility of 
democratisation, through which system institutionalisation gradually takes place. If 
elections are institutionalised - that is practised and accepted - it would imply a situation 
when:
...leaders and voters take for granted that in the future inclusive, fair, and 
competitive elections that take place as legally scheduled, voters will be properly 
registered and free from physical coercion, and their votes will be counted fairly.
It is also taken for granted that the winners will take office, and will not have their 
terms arbitrarily terminated. Furthermore, for this electoral process, freedom of 
opinion and of association and an uncensored media must also exist. Countries 
where elections do not have these characteristics do not qualify as polyarchies 
(O’Donnell, 1996: 37).
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As one can see, elections act as markers of democratisation: at elections, constitutional 
rights and institutional settings are normally stipulated even further, producing an 
enduring effect on governance and interest representation.
Nevertheless, the democratic appearance of a regime can be misleading, and the practice 
of elections often may not be entirely encompassing. Belarus’ political fa9ade, for 
example, can be regarded as democratic when elections are scheduled in accordance 
with the law, and the public can cast their preferences following their expectations. In 
addition, the occurrence of massive forgery is highly unlikely, as well as open 
realisation of coercive mechanisms by authorities or explicitly fraudulent usage of the 
mass media. However, this is not because the system is democratic or strained by 
international vigilance, but because there are some other informal mechanisms that 
allow the government to achieve desirable results and manipulate public opinion. The 
phenomenon of organised elections exemplifies one of these elaborate levers that the 
state may use to sustain its democratic exterior in third-wave regimes185. This implies de 
facto  approved election outcomes by the head of state. For example, in Belarus the 
president gave his full support to some MPs, which were consequently ‘assisted’ by 
local authorities in their campaign for the parliamentary elections 2000. The 
phenomenon of ‘assistance’ derives from presidential particularism and supremacy of 
power -  features typical of incomplete ‘democracies’. Structures and mechanisms,
185 More details can be found in OSCE/ODIHR Statement o f Conclusions on Parliamentary elections in 
Belarus. Vienna 30 August 2000. at http://www.osce.org/belarus/publications/30-8-2000.t>df/ retrieved 
June 2001.; or OSCE Belarus homepage at http://www.osce.org/belarus/index.php3. retrieved June 2001.
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created by the president, i.e. the presidential ‘vertical’, informal vigilance, expanded 
KGB authority, empowered police forces, and a system of patronage186 -  exert 
considerable influence throughout the system to censor election campaigns, and control 
the formation of public opinion. In this sense, the competition for the 2000 
parliamentary elections in Belarus was a foregone conclusion, as a presidential verdict 
of who would be elected in public office had already taken place. A similar conclusion 
can be applied to Russia, as Stephen White (2000a: 303) suggests, “the Russian 
elections of 1999 and 2000 ... were better seen in terms of a dynastic succession that 
made clear that the president and his entourage were now in a position to organise 
elections that satisfied formal requirements but which would also give them the result 
they wanted”.
On the other hand, whatever organisational ‘quality’ the new transitions may have, 
elections still signpost some degree of formal or informal institutionalisation for a 
democratising regime. This is where a paradox lies. If elections are regular, people expect 
to express their verdict of the previous government and to choose the next whom best suit 
their needs. Simultaneously, this public intention is carefully manipulated by elite 
decision-making. In fa?ade regimes, like Belarus, a popularly voted president governs in 
whatever manner he considers fit for the country, by crafting institutions and laws to his 
‘design’. This means that elections are run according to existing constitutional laws and
Additionally, the OSCE conclusion and recommendation regarding the alteration of electoral code in 
Belarus can be found in http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/belaOO-1 -adopted.htm. retrieved June 2001.
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institutional arrangements. In fact, the aim of such an exercise is quite democratic -  to 
achieve routine stability. This can even lead to the eventual recognition by political parties 
and organised interests that elections are the only alternative to gain power lawfully (Linz, 
1996). However, the fact remains that public opinion is clandestinely manipulated, and 
there is no equal accessibility of mass media for oppositional politicians. The lack of 
legality demonstrates that procedural democracy in Dahl’s terms is far from being 
democratic. What matters is not the degree of institutionalisation, or formalised elections, 
but the daily routine, in which parties, legislature, executives, and other organisations are 
given equal opportunities to exert their power.
O’Donnell argues (1996) that many third wave polyarchies may not be institutionalised 
in the classical sense, but they may be well sustained by informal and influential, and 
sometimes concealed institutions of clientelism, or more generally, particularism. This 
includes various sorts of relationship ranging from hierarchical particularistic exchange, 
patronage, nepotism, and favours, to actions that, under the formal rules of the 
institutionalised package of polyarchy, would be considered corrupt. However, this is 
the style, within which an informally structured system functions and survives.
Belarus adequately demonstrates neo-patrimonial relations, in which a better ‘action’ 
outcome can be achieved through informal channels of communication: actions of
186 See Belova, O. (1999) Difficulties o f elite formation in Belarus after 1991, paper presented for ERI 
conference, ‘Belarus: the Forgotten Heart of Europe?’, University of Bath, February. The author explores 
various mechanisms of patronage, inherited from the soviet regime and stipulated by Lukashenko.
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favour, blat (bribery), connections, and so on187. These ‘informal’ and patrimonial routes 
of communication make the system operational, and can only be possible if there is an 
external structure for them. Scholars observe that the difference between real and legal 
practices is considerable in the newly emerged polyarchies. O’Donnell submits:
...with many of these countries claiming to be democracies and adopting a 
constitutional framework, the persistence and high visibility of the split between 
real and formal, may not necessarily threaten the survival of their polyarchies -  
but neither does it facilitate overcoming the split (O’Donnell, 1996: 43).
He continues his observation of particularism in Latin American democracies by 
underlying that it is a permanent feature of a human society, and it indeed inhabits 
consolidation of most of the contemporary political institutions. The system exterior 
may look democratic, when the top leaders are popularly elected, and decision-making
187 As Olga Belova comments (1999: 15): “All the mechanisms of recruitment that Lukashenko 
introduced reveal different forms of patronage when the personal consideration is decisive in the 
appointment. The main recruitment strategy he used to create the Presidential Administration staff was 
the recruitment from the old associates, mainly from his supporters during electoral campaign. This is 
why Leonid Sinitsin, who was a manager o f the electoral team, became the chief of the Presidential 
Administration. Ivan Titenkov, in charge o f financial support for the electoral team, got a post of 
Presidential Manager (“upravliayushiy delami presidenta”). Viktor Sheyman, ex-responsible for the 
security of Lukashenko, was appointed as the Secretary of the National Council of Security. Vladimir 
Konoplev, MP assistant of Lukashenko and responsible for collecting votes in Mogilev oblast during the 
electoral campaign, became First Advisor o f the President. In the same manner most of the electoral 
campaign team members were rewarded for their support by the new appointments”.
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may have some degree of transparency188. Nevertheless, democratically organised 
regimes in scrutiny often enjoy non-democratic practices189, as well as democratically 
elected leaders may intend to exercise dictatorial rule. Both are typical features of 
modem democracies.
‘Delegative regime’ is one of the subtypes of incomplete democratic regimes that reflect 
controversial democratisation, and imperfect party system development as a result of 
power imbalance in society. O’Donnell defines a delegative type of democracy as a 
regime where,
.. .whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or 
she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a 
constitutionally limited term of office (O’Donnell, 1994: 59).
Democracy can be achieved through a combination of factors, of which institutional and 
structural arrangements, elite rational choice and voters’ collective strategies, and 
economic requisites are part. According to O’Donnell, some newly emerged regimes are 
democratic but not in the manner that representative democracies assume. In addition,
188 In Belarus’ case, Lukashenko often uses the practice of referenda -  a popular approval of his 
manipulative actions.
189 See report on Human Rights in Belarus, 1999:
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/europe/belarus.html retrieved June 2001; or Nation in Transit 
Report 2000, at http://www.ffeedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2000/belarus/belams.htm: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2000/belams/belams intro.htm; and
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/200Q/belams/belams democ.htm. retrieved June 2001.
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these democracies are not and do not seem to be on the path towards becoming a 
representative democracy. They may also be quite enduring. Historical legacies of non- 
democratic past, and deep social and economic crises tend to reinforce certain practices 
of delegative, rather than representative styles, of governance. This implies that political 
institutions during the ‘second wave’ of their transformation -  after breaking away from 
a non-democratic regime -  may become institutionalised in the way that cultural 
prerequisites anticipate, and elite-bargaining permits.
Delegative regime is more common in a presidential democracy, where the president is 
an embodiment of the nation, and the principal definer of its interests. Policies of the 
government may be radically different from that of the presidential campaign, as the 
president has been given the right to do what he deems best for the country. The 
prevailing discourse of relations between institutions and actors is patrimonial; and 
clientelism and particularism largely determine the course of action. The president puts 
himself above party or any interest-group organisation, as well as other institutions, 
such as legislature, courts, and local councils, and turns them into “nuances that come 
attached to the domestic and international advantages of being a democratically elected 
president” (O’Donnell, 1994: 60).
Despite non-democratic nuances, delegative regime fits Dahl’s minimal definition of 
democracy. This type of governance even implies more democracy, as it involves more 
direct participation and citizens’ approval of policy-making. In reality it is obviously less 
liberal than representative democracy or any other type. Delegative democracy is strongly 
majoritarian and frequently survives in plurality systems with majority run-off. As
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O’Donnell theorises, parliament, parties and the press are formally free from presidential 
control in delegative democracies; however, there may be some informal restrictions or 
indirect channels of control that put an end on ‘free’ activities of the bodies.
Delegative democracy theoretically may be called a ‘representative delegation’ when the 
whole nation delegates its representation to one. With this in mind, one can trace 
similarities between both regimes especially in the field of accountability. What happens 
in the ideal type of a delegative democracy, though, is that vertical accountability is 
strengthened, as the pyramid structure presumes individual responsibility for collective 
decision-implementation. Thus, ministers tend to have effective portfolios, as they are 
answerable to the prime minister and the president whose legitimacy is dependent on the 
ballot box. Horizontal accountability, in contrast, is minimal, which means that 
responsibility of appointed officials across a network of relatively autonomous powers, 
like other institutions, is not usually called into question by other institutions.
Furthermore, as O’Donnell (1994: 61) argues, since “the institutions that make horizontal 
accountability effective are seen by delegative presidents as unnecessary encumbrances to 
their ‘mission’, they make strenuous efforts to hamper the development of such 
institutions”. The transparency of decision-making is also minimal, as vertical 
accountability to the president seems sufficient for the system to function, and horizontal 
responsibility has little if any effect. Mainwaring adds, “[a] weakly institutionalised party 
system is at the core of delegative democracy” (1999: 328).
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The logic of power delegation also presumes that the executive does little, or opposes 
strengthening the judiciary and the legislature. The resulting shortage of effective and 
autonomous institutions places immense responsibility on the president. The typical 
incumbent in a delegative democracy wins elections by promising to save the country 
from a crisis at a minimal cost to everyone; yet, when in power, he gambles the fate of 
his government on policies that entail substantial costs to many parts of the population. 
This results in policy-making under pressure. The president always is ready to play an 
‘ace move’ in order to remain in power. This frequently results in sacking prime 
ministers, reshuffling cabinets, and obstructing the government in office. With 
spectacular enactment of the promised policy packages by the president, the anti­
representative features of a delegative democracy accentuate, as well as the tendency for 
further personalisation and concentration of power in the hands of the incumbent. 
Decision-making becomes more spontaneous and frenzied, more based on presidential 
decrees rather than the rule of law. Short-term regulations and unilateral hasty executive 
orders are the likely outcome of such governance that tend to accumulate problems 
further and result in a massive gridlock, disarray and revolutionary motions. Unless the 
president has leamt ‘scapegoating’ and mobilising quick-fix benefits, the country could 
face revolution. It is true that delegative regimes are more prone to breakdowns and 
interruptions. However, as O’Donnell observes (1994) delegative democracies can also 
exhibit a remarkable capacity for endurance if public support for regime is achieved190.
190 See Rose and Mishler (2000) Regime Support in Non-democratic and Democratic Contexts, CSPP 
336. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.
Delegative democracy alongside presidentialism is relatively widespread amongst 
transitions of Latin America and CIS, and has frequently been labelled as caesarism, or 
caudillismo, presidentealismo, populism, and the like. What is worth noting, and which is 
common to the above named alterations of the subtype, is the fact that although they 
possess ‘the democratic genus’, they, however, ‘could hardly be less congenial to the 
building and strengthening of democratic political institutions’ (O’Donnell, 1993: 62). 
Understandably, as long as presidential policies are recognised as successful by the 
electorate, delegative presidents are constrained by the constitutionally limited terms of 
their office and tend to improve the situation by promoting constitutional reforms with 
alterations in favour of the incumbent. They frequently utilise the mechanism of direct 
democracy and referenda, because as popularly elected they are entitled to direct 
communication with their voters. This obviously further weakens whatever horizontal 
accountability still exists, and makes anaemic the remaining democratic institutions. As 
O’Donnell suggests (1993: 45) “pervasive particularism, delegative rule, and weak 
horizontal accountability” might enable “old authoritarian practices to reassert 
themselves”.
What many scholars find paradoxical and dramatic is the fact that the emergence, 
strengthening, and legitimation of effective institutions and congenial practices take 
time to endure, during which a complex process of positive learning occurs. However, 
in order to deal effectively with economic and social crises the newly democratised 
countries require such institutions already to be in place, which instant 
institutionalisation is not possible. O’Donnell comments:
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.. .this is the drama of countries bereft of a democratic tradition: like all emerging 
democracies, past and present, they must cope with the manifold negative legacies 
of their authoritarian past, while wrestling with the kind of extraordinary severe 
social and economic problems that few if any of the older democracies faced at 
their inception (O’Donnell, 1994: 68).
This paradox may entail endurance of these Tow-quality’ or facade democratic regimes, 
which nevertheless, can be incrementally altered and put into practice, if structures, 
agencies and agents would act in congruence for this purpose.
5.3 Can democracy develop from a delegative regime in Belarus?
As one has already seen from the above description, Belarus is a good candidate for the 
analysis of the logic and mechanics of development of a delegative democracy. Some 
observers submit that Belarus is not a polyarchy, as it has one of the worst human rights 
records in Eastern Europe191. Nevertheless, according to Dahl’s (1971) minimal criteria 
Belarus can be formally classified as a procedural democracy associated with 
institutionalised elections, constitutionally guaranteed liberties, and basic social 
security192. The operation of the system is reinforced by existing informal rules and
191Human Rights Watch Reports, Belarus 1999 & 2000,
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/europe/belarus.html retrieved June 2001,
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/wr2k/Eca-03 .htm. retrieved June 2001 http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/belaOO-1 - 
adopted.htm. retrieved June 2001.
192 Experience of elections in Belarus is rather limited, but existent. There have been three sets of 
parliamentary elections so far: in 1990 -semi-soviet styled parliamentary elections, in 1995 -  much freer
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structures that together make it relatively manageable, and to certain degree, successful 
in overcoming economic crises compared to Russia and Ukraine.
There is, however, an obvious controversy in the argument. Despite a democratic 
fa?ade, the regime in Belarus does not function democratically. Failure includes abuse 
of human rights and ineffective guarantees of civil liberties. The paradox is, however, 
that the system is actually structured in accordance with democratic laws: popular 
elections for the legislature and the president; there is also a constitutional law, which 
was altered by referendum; independent judiciary, and no media censorship. The 
difference, as O’Donnell (1993) points out, seems to be between a democratic regime 
and a democratic state. Regime may be ‘designed’ as democratic, that is allowing some 
degree of ‘public participation’ including full suffrage, elections, political competition 
and certain civil liberties. The state, however, may not work in the same manner, and 
may be rather suppressive and authoritarian. As O’Donnell argues the authoritarian state 
has a fundamental characteristic:
.. .there does not exist (or if it exists, it does not have real effectiveness, or can be 
annulled and hoc, or is subordinate to secret rules and /or to the whim of the rulers) a 
legal system that guarantees the effectiveness of rights and guarantees that
but still overwhelmed with the communist conservative majority, and in 2000 won by the majority of 
pro-presidential candidates. The presidential elections were held only once in 1994; and with the 
referendum on amendments of the 1994 constitution the president’s term in office was extended until 
2001. Belarus is lagging behind Russia and Ukraine that seem to be more open and pro-democratic.
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individuals and groups can uphold against the rulers, the state apparatus, and others
at the top of the existing social and political hierarchy (O’Donnell, 1993: 1360).
In other words, an individual can enjoy full citizenship, but has no real rights to 
reinforce its meaning in the situation of truncated legality. This includes situations when 
individuals are unable to receive fair treatment in courts, or obtain services from state 
agencies to which they are entitled, or to be safe from police violence, etc. A curious 
disjunction arises from such a state/regime dilemma: the participatory rights of citizens 
are generally respected, but the liberal component of polyarchy is systematically 
missing. The concealed denial of liberal rights produce an effect of disparity in the 
distribution of economic, social and political resources, and marches alongside low- 
intensity citizenship, because “a state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a 
democracy of low-intensity citizenship” (O’Donnell, 1993: 1361).
The situation in Belarus is such that it allows citizens to formally pursue their rights and 
enjoy some liberties, which does not necessarily mean their effective implementation. 
One, for example, is not safe from the police, which can illegally charge a citizen for a 
fabricated crime, or even assault someone without accusation or reason. One is also 
subject to long corridors of bureaucracy in order to satisfy minimal queries or to obtain a 
tedious official signature. One can also be defenceless before courts or any other authority 
that possesses even a minimal share of power; and finally one can have freedom of 
associations and choice, which may be claimed illegal by authorities at any time and for 
any insignificant reason. In other words one can enjoy freedom that cannot be reached or 
is only available to certain segments of the population. In Belarus, people connected to
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officials in power can feel relatively safe and ‘capable’. ‘Feeling safe’ when one is 
attached to the right people, is ‘particularism’, which creates extensive networks of 
clienteles and dictates its own informal laws that are more powerful and much more 
effective than that of the ‘state-of-the-law’. Therefore, O’Donnell is correct in stressing 
that formal institutionalisation can rarely be seen in the new democracies that are 
nevertheless, sustainable because they enjoy informal laws and paternal accountability -  a 
structural problem of the new regimes.
As mentioned previously, presidentialism is frequently a prevailing form of governance in 
a delegative democracy, in which popularly elected presidents eventually aim at 
expanding their powers. Belarus sets a relevant case study for this. By legal means on the 
basis of a referendum, Alexander Lukashenko has shifted the form of governance from 
semi-parliamentarism to a super-presidential regime with full authority constitutionally 
granted to the president. Within a few years he has developed a system of personal rule 
where if the relevant authority cannot solve the problem, Lukashenko will. He is the law, 
and the guarantor of law. Alterations in the 1994 constitution officially stipulate unlimited 
authority of the president who appoints the majority of the Constitutional Court, and holds 
parliament compliant under the quick-fixed benefits, which deputies enjoy. If they are 
compliant, such a presidential guarantee allows them to be re-elected. The only remaining 
principal -  vertical accountability -  works in a reverse to a normal polyarchy. This is 
when government officials are responsible for their actions not before electors but before 
the popularly elected president and his appointees, who embody the voice of the nation.
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Horizontal accountability is non-existent, as within the structure of super power, only one 
person has the legal right to control the system. NGOs and political parties may function 
freely if they are officially registered with authorities, and must re-register on the president’s 
demand, which in turn creates numerous obstacles for their formal acclamation. As a result, 
in Belarus many smaller parties ceased to exist after the 1999 presidential decree on re­
registration. NGOs also stopped proliferating as another possible alternative for expressing 
public interests. Trade unions have been also ‘tamed’ by manifold bureaucratic and financial 
means of presidential power control. As described previously they cannot afford to resist 
presidential pressure, as the latter controls a pool of resources on which trade unions build 
their authority with their members. Notably, membership fees are deducted directly from 
members’ wages, discount holiday vouchers and summer camps for children, health centres 
and sanatoriums, etc. -  all these benefits that have traditionally been administered by trade 
unions, may be taken away from them by presidential decree. Hence, trade unions toned 
down their public critique of presidential authority and symbolize ‘the dog that never barks’. 
Parties continue doing exceptionally poorly in the situation of the accretion of executive 
authority at the expense of the legislature. They failed to sustain parliamentary government, 
and now they are failing, often by their own actions, to remain as visible and acting 
competitive forces of the political regime. Nathan Yanai (1999: 8) particularly stresses that 
parties “are bound to become anaemic and to lose their viability, if they abandon their claim 
to lead institutions of government or if they consistently fail to be represented in them”. 
Their ever failing and non-competitive image tends to create enduring perceptions in voters 
that parties are not capable of winning office and providing an alternative government. This 
seems to be a sheer waste of vote and not worthy of electoral investment. This may mark the 
end of parties as well as other representative institutions in the republic. Delegative power is
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total and cumulative, which obviously entails low-intensity citizenship and depoliticisation 
of the population.
Since 1997 the Belarusian Parliament became non-factional, non-partisan and non­
initiative. The bargain between MPs and the president was reciprocal and assumed a 
policy of laissez-faire for the former. The president has ensured that parliament will not 
interfere with his decision-making to have unlimited rule of the country. Parliament, in 
turn, agreed on comfortable conditions of living (free accommodation in the capital of 
Belarus, free public transport, good wages, and profiting connections, and finally a 
promise of being re-elected in the second run for office), and a non-painfiil pass to the 
2000 parliament for the majority of deputies. Thus the meaning of the organised elections 
derives from this silent negotiation between the president and the parliament.
What is really disturbing about the whole situation is the fact that the remaining 
institutions of democracy may begin to behave in parochial ways following public 
expectations of their continuing failure. This produces an effect of a vicious circle and 
has an enduring image of failure on interest representing organisations, other than a 
president. The chief executive will remain the principal hope for change for the majority 
of the population, especially in worsening economic and social conditions. In turn, 
parties, NGOs and trade unions continue their attempts to mobilise certain segments of 
the population in an attempt to overthrow the president and win office, but at present 
these attempts seem to be a foregone conclusion in the system of the presidential rule.
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The logical question would be whether the delegative democracy in Belarus might be 
possible with national predisposition to a strong leadership; and whether this type of 
regime can guarantee a stable democratic future. O’Donnell observes that:
...delegative democracies in general, because of their institutional weakness and 
erratic patterns of policy making, are more prone to interruption and breakdown 
than representative democracies (O’Donnell, 1994: 67).
However, there can be certain conditions under which such systems survive and even 
progress to more effective forms of governance.
First of all, economic reforms are ‘the magic wand* for achieving political stability. 
Przeworski (1997) argues that poorly institutionalised regimes have equal chances to 
generate economic growth and by that to guarantee more stable government and a more 
tolerant electorate. In presidential regimes, economic growth is more likely to happen, 
associated with consistency in policy-making and functional state mechanisms of 
decision-implementation.
Secondly, constitutional and electoral codes have to be such as to promote equal 
opportunities for various representative institutions to win office, and to be answerable 
to their citizens. This means that the Belarusian constitution has to be altered in order to 
limit accretion of presidential powers and to reach a reasonable balance of ‘dual 
legitimacy’ with other interest organisations. Perhaps the introduction of a third party -
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a prime minister -  to the game may help to avoid collisions in decision-making. 
Parliamentary authority needs to be strengthened by legal means.
Third, parties by reorganising themselves, reaching ‘round-table’ agreements with 
authorities, and seeking international cooperation, may vastly improve their chances to 
access power. As many scholars suggest, parties must become more publicly initiative. 
The instrument of initiative, according to Muller (1999: 309) “clearly has the potential 
to lend additional weight to an issue and to have a distinct impact on the processes of 
issue competition and opinion formation”. Any initiative shown by parties on the 
ground may increase the legitimacy of demand and provide a degree of publicity that the 
oppositional parties have difficulty achieving by other means. Because of this, even if 
the opposition does not win on the issue of the initiative itself, it may be able to use the 
surrounding publicity to shift the issue agenda. This can be, nevertheless, quite a risky 
enterprise, but the Belarusian parties have little to lose in order to follow this strategy.
In summary, metaphorically speaking Belarus is like a building site within the new- 
Europe. Historically it has some foundations on which to construct a legitimate 
democratic state. However, it needs to be strengthened institutionally and by consensual 
decision-making of political workmen. A definitive international standpoint in foreign 
policy-making will be conducive to identifying future prospects for national 
development, and respectively a position o f parties on the political arena.
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Further Discussion and Conclusion
The principal objective of the thesis has been an attempt to explain the problematic 
development of the political party system in the Republic of Belarus. The thesis 
proceeded in five chapters.
The discussion began with a general overview of the particularities of the CIS and 
broader transitional states, in order to outline the complexity of the environment within 
which contemporary parties in Belarus operate. Subsequent chapters analysed existing 
transition methodologies in order to help realise that a complex tripartite framework was 
required for analysis of causes and consequences that have affected party system 
development in the new regime. Hence, structures, institutions and agency (per se 
parties) form the basis of research. Structural study of parties was grounded on an 
overview of Belarus’ political history and existing institutional arrangements; and 
became part of a wider discussion of parties’ failure to consolidate in Belarusian society. 
From the agency perspective, parties were discussed as a three-dimensional 
organisational entity, which was actively involved in public office, in central office, and 
at a grassroots. Additionally, the analysis of parties’ core constituencies, and public 
perception of parties was included in the study in order to identify the modality of 
relationships and failure to sustain participatory linkages between parties and their 
voters. The final chapter discussed parties’ prospects in a transitional environment, as 
well as forms of democratic developments o f the new regimes.
The aim of this concluding chapter will be first, to summarise the principal arguments of 
the thesis, and second, to develop a hypothesis for the further prospects of party system 
institutionalisation and democratisation in Belarus. It will be established that the regime in 
Belarus had the potential to incrementally build democracy, utilising such prerequisites as 
a relatively stable economy, and social-political conflicts; however this did not take place 
due to incongruous interactions of structure and agency. As it has appeared, legacies and 
inherited structures, reinforced by institutional developments, created an unfavourable 
environment for further party system consolidation in Belarus. At the other extreme, 
parties’ low ideological profile, their inability to capitulate on voters’ preferences, their 
limited organisational and financial capacities and the alteration of the competition mode - 
which focused political parties’ attention on the unequal struggle against the president - 
explains why they remain legitimate but increasingly powerless players of the political 
game. This has been reflected in their declining membership and partisan support, and 
their low impact on policy-making in the country.
The public’s failure to be included in the decision-making process, through the failure of 
parties and other interest organisations, facilitated a formal process of power delegation to 
an individual leader. This has had a great impact on the mode of democratisation in the 
country. Parties have become increasingly ‘second-rated’ by the population, which favours 
the immediate achievements of the president. The formal contribution of trade unions, and 
non-governmental organisations remains unsound, as there are limited structural and 
media mechanisms to articulate their mission. In addition, since 1997 the essential 
function of parliament as an interest-accommodating arena has halted, due to the total 
unanimity of opinions amongst the pro-presidential forces in the legislature. Institutions
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encapsulated the new structural arrangements providing further support for a strong 
presidency. Today’s Belarusian society is highly divided: many favour the incumbent 
President and oppose democracy, as they favour the policy of integration with Russia and 
the CIS in opposition to those who favour democracy and closer union with the EU.
‘Philosophy' o f third wave transitions and the CIS
Third-wave democratisation has challenged classic theories of transition, and 
unquestionably requires further conceptualisation. Early discussions of the uniqueness 
and complexity of third wave transition have been understandably situational and based 
on hypotheses rather than definitive conclusions. In this respect many scholars 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999; Lawson et al. 1999; Mainwaring, 1999; Elster et al, 1998) 
naturally aimed at adapting a more complex approach to understanding causality and 
consequences of slow democratisation of the new regimes, especially those of the CIS. 
Consequently, the ‘structure-agency’ approach was used to reflect the controversial 
nature of these emerging polities, as it allows a threefold view of the joint impact on the 
process of building democracy of:
1. structural conditions inherited from the non-democratic past;
2. successively introduced institutional environment to reinforce a developing 
regime;
3. and strategical decision-making by the agency, of which parties are part.
The analytical method was essentially based on Elster’s et al (1998) approach to 
understanding transitions, and included his argument of tripartite relations between
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legacies, institutions and decisions, as well as his dual framework of ‘forward’ and 
‘backward’ linkages193.
Despite the diversity of their national contexts third wave regimes appeared to 
demonstrate many commonalities in their transition to democracy, which, admittedly, 
brings them into one transitional league. They not only share similar transitional 
features (elected governments, non-violent extrication from the prior regime and a 
globality of change), but are also characterised by analogous conditions that triggered 
this transformation around the globe. These are:
(i) exacerbated problems of legitimacy of prior regimes;
(ii) global economic growth;
(iii) powerful influence of the Church;
(iv) instigating international environment; and finally
(v) the effect of democratisation that provides models for regime change.
The third feature that unites new regimes is the enormity of tasks they have to achieve 
simultaneously - democratisation, state building and market liberalisation. These have 
proved difficult to follow, and ultimately only few regimes have been successful. The 
final and perhaps most notable feature of many new regimes is their continuing non­
consolidation. This has particular relevance to the CIS states. All new regimes have 
adopted elections as a signpost of democracy, but not all of them attempt to reiterate
193 See Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of the chosen methodological framework, which draws on 
the vantage points of structure- and process-oriented traditions of analysis.
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their democratic practices on a daily basis194, which considerably reduces levels of 
contestation and public inclusiveness -  the basic principles of democracy (Dahl, 1971). 
These naturally inhibit the progression of democratic institutions, especially those of 
representation, and often promote forms of delegated leadership, fraught with unruly 
individual authority. Nevertheless, these regimes prove sustainable and functional in 
their own domestic ways.
In this research the CIS states have been singled out for their more complex, though less 
successful democratisation. It was argued that, primarily because of their economic, 
political and cultural closeness to Russia, and the dual expansion of Europe and NATO, 
these countries are becoming political-cum-economic ‘outsiders’ of the general process 
of globalisation. New international trends affect stabilisation within the CIS countries, 
which are becoming excluded by a new ‘Schengen Curtain’ between them and ‘new’ 
Europe. They seem to be stuck in their attempt to simultaneously restructure the state, 
nation and economic markets and they are characterised by fragile, failing systems of 
representation and increasingly authoritarian presidencies.
Chapter 1 argued that the principal determinants for such protracted and often inverse 
development lie in economic and structural dependence of these countries on Russia, 
their lack of national resources, and hence, their limited ability to embark on radical 
reform ventures. In addition, their cultural ‘traditionalism’, ethnic heterogeneity and
194 These are equal rights and opportunities for citizens in every-day life. For a more elaborate discussion 
see Chapter 5.
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adherence to a Slavic Union as a quick-fix form of co-operation195 frequently becomes 
an impediment to democratisation and reform. As part of the third wave turnover, 
Belarus exemplifies transitional problems of the CIS, as well as draws on the difficulties 
of new democracies in the whole.
Implications o f  a weak party system for Belarus
Outwardly, Belarus seems to be a stable economy characterised by optimistic transition 
indexes196 and economic growth. Inwardly, however, it presents a case of impending 
economic and political crises with no policy for reform. Externally, Belarus ‘fits’ Dahl’s 
(1971) criteria of a developing polyarchy, as it has an institutionalised practice of 
elections and nominally guaranteed constitutional liberties to its citizenry. Internally, the 
legal and bureaucratic systems fail to protect and promote individual human rights, and 
there are many informal mechanisms that allow the government to manipulate public 
opinion to its own advantage. Finally, there is an impression of an active political 
society in Belarus. This is associated with a stable number of national political parties of 
crystallised ideological profiles, a multiplicity of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the consolidation of trade unions. However, this does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that they all possess equal opportunities for accessing the decision­
making arena in Belarus. Since the alteration of the 1994 Constitution this has been the
195 This is in opposition to a secondary-periphery role on the global economic and political market, in 
public and elite perception.
196 See discussion in Chapter 1 and Appendix 5 for detailing statistics.
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sole prerogative of the incumbent president, and his government and subsequently 
Belarus is ruled under a system of super-presidentialism.
The research demonstrated that the party system continues to decline, despite the efforts of 
parties to re-establish themselves and of international organisations to strengthen the role 
of the non-governmental sector in building democracy in Belarus. Moreover, one would 
expect better-structured outcomes from a system that has survived at least four major 
elections -  the ‘markers’ of democratisation. Belarus, nevertheless, is the notable 
exception to the rule, in the sense that despite electoral practice, players still have a limited 
understanding of fully contested elections as the only means to win power in a democratic 
society. Belarus has experienced three semi-independent parliamentary elections in 1990, 
1995, and 2000, and one presidential election in 1994, and yet, it has achieved little 
movement towards further democratisation. Elections may help parties to win votes and 
seats, and hence, advance their policy-making on the national stage. This, however, does 
not occur, when parties pursue individual strategies or simply boycott elections, as 
happened in autumn 2000, and do not even attempt to negotiate with the authorities. 
Consequently, parties remain in a position outside parliament, and the president continues 
enjoying the steady support of around 40% of the population. The forthcoming 
presidential election is scheduled for Autumn 2001, and there has been little change seen 
in the political arena in terms of the configuration of potential candidates, or coalition 
reshuffles amongst parties and other interest organisations in an attempt to promote their 
own alternative candidates. Parties continue suffering partisan decline and membership 
difficulties, and presently remain dormant. In addition, the recently adopted Presidential 
Decree No. 8 (12.03.01) ‘On some measures concerning the rules of receipt and utilization
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of foreign gratuitous aid’, is now in force and parties will find it more difficult to organise 
co-operation with the West by way of sponsorship of their election campaigns, and to 
mobilise uncommitted voters.
It has been established that there is a degree of dependency between prolonged 
development of parties, and structural properties of the past reinforced by ad hoc 
institutions. Parties depend on the power of the legislature, and strength of legal 
institutions, limited elite rotation and Lukashenko’s system of patronage, state-owned 
media and impending economic crisis. They are also reliant on public support and 
cultural adherence to a strong leadership. Even more, they are dependent on their own 
organisational resources and collective policy-making. Hence, in order to explain 
parties’ protracted development in Belarus, a range of external and internal determinants 
were analysed. The following conclusions have been drawn in relation to the failure of 
the party system to consolidate in Belarus:
First, this research demonstrates the definitive impact of structures and institutions on 
the process of building a stable party system and democracy. In Belarus, low level 
economic reforms (including limited liberalisation and privatisation); nominal rather 
than the essential rule of law and power separation; the nomenklatura’s control over 
state resources (including mass media); and a pervasive system of patronage197 have
197 ISA European Institute, Sussex University, GJW Europe ‘Evaluation of the PHARE and TACIS 
Programme, 1992-1997’. http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/renorts/tacis/951432.pdf. retrieved 
June 2001
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considerably inhibited the way, by which individual citizens can participate in decision­
making through political parties and interest organisations. These include the following:
(i) According to UN estimates the Republic of Belarus is presently characterised by 
regular but low paid wages and pensions, low-level unemployment, a relatively low 
external debt, apparently high growth rates, and the highest standard of living in the CIS 
since 1996. Nevertheless, there are grounds to question the sustainability of Belarus’ 
progressive development in the future. Belarus’ cumulative level of direct foreign 
investment per capita was the lowest amongst the CIS, its private sector contribution to 
GDP was also minimal and on average 45% less than that in other NIS198. Belarus has 
not advanced in any of the principal reform directions, including (a) macro-economic 
stabilisation; (b) private sector development; (c) liberalisation of prices and trade; (d) 
enterprise reform; and finally (e) development of financial institutions. In other words, 
the relatively progressive economic fa?ade disguises a situation of impending economic 
crisis, and inevitable worsening of living conditions. Future economic uncertainty, 
stemming from limited diplomatic relations with the West, and its obvious dependence 
on elite decision-making in Russia, further isolates Belarus from the global economic 
community, and makes it an ‘outsider’ of further democratisation.
(ii) This thesis argues that as a weak state, Belarus was not legally or logistically prepared 
to embark on the course of democratic reforms, and subsequently has been manipulated by 
the former communist nomenklatura to their own advantage. Targeted privatisation, and 
favourable conditions for certain business players, has widely promoted state
198 Transition Report, 1999. EBRD. See Chapter 1 for more detailed explanation.
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monopolisation of economy, and limited advancement of independent interests. Elite 
strategical considerations and public ‘traditionalist’ adherence to a strong leadership 
creates a unique opportunity for institutional reinforcement of the uneven power balance 
in society, that is in the hands of the vested interests, and away from weak democratic 
forces. Respective institutional steps have been undertaken to strengthen the authority of 
successor elites. This included the introduction of the presidency, strategic ‘conservation’ 
of a majoritarian electoral code and the pre-perestroika power structures, and the quest for 
economic-cum-political Union with Russia. The leftover Socialist ‘properties’ secured by 
the weak state, for example, decisively outplayed the democratic initiative in 19921". A 
similar outcome took place during the 1995 election campaign, when the system did not 
simply allow the accession of nationalists to the new legislature. The 1996 crisis 
demonstrated the precedence of the President and the Moscow elites’ decision-making,200 
over the national constitutional law, and the dissipated efforts of the opposition.
(iii) It is, therefore, often suggested that the introduction of the presidency as well as 
Lukashenko’s outstanding ability to manoeuvre through the political landscape, was one 
o f the crucial factors that brought the country to a political standstill, and halted 
institutionalisation of representative bodies, notably parties and parliament. As a result,
199 This is when the BNF embarked on the initiation of the referendum to re-elect the 1990 conservative 
parliament in Belarus. It effectively failed, not only because of existing disagreements amongst the 
democrats, liberals and nationalists, but also because of the power precedence by nomenklatura in the 
1992 Belarusian parliament. The latter overruled BNF’s decision to have a referendum on the issue.
200 The same can be said about the practice of 2000 parliamentary elections, when international observers 
claimed gross violations of the democratic laws, and Russia was the only state to stand up clearly in 
support of the ‘democratic’ procedures in Belarus.
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parties had to re-focus their attention from pursuing their own mandates in policy-making 
to embarking on a political battle with a much more powerful opponent -  the president. 
Lukashenko significantly reinforced an existing system of patronage and clientelism in 
Belarus, which allowed him full control over the decision-making process. In the short 
term Lukashenko has introduced his own system of personal rule, where governance by 
decree dominates the law; and the separation of powers between legislature, executives, 
and Constitutional Court becomes nominal. Moreover, the mass media were ‘nationalised’ 
and the union with Russia set in motion. Naturally, the nation’s cultural adherence to a 
strong leadership and the weakness of democratic institutions, have ensured that a 
‘delegative’ rather than ‘representative’ style of policy-making has remained dominant. 
This is to say that the electorate tends to empower the incumbent who seems to be more 
capable of initiating and pursuing change, rather than investing their ‘political currency’ in 
the pledges of parties and other interest organisations. Thus, by granting the president a 
full mandate, around 40% of the electorate have presently ensured their interest 
representation and another 40% remain floating voters (Dobson, 2000: 4).
Second, parties as the principal agents o f the political game, have the potential to 
develop a coherent system of interest representation, but do not make sufficient efforts 
to promote democratic culture and a plurality of opinions in Belarusian society. They 
have been moulded by numerous political climaxes (March of Freedom 1-3, other 
political protests 1992, 1996, 1998-2000, alternative presidential election, Political 
Rally 2001, 26 April), which did not instigate the formation of elementary structures for 
public contestation and inclusiveness, especially in regions. Not surprisingly, the 
performance of Belarusian political parties has been poor and the electorate remains
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disenchanted. Moreover, voters’ expectations of parties as an indispensable part of the 
national process of decision-making are gradually fading.
The thesis continued by analysing parties from three principal dimensions: parties in 
public office, in central office and at grassroots.
(i) The analysis of parties’ activity in parliament has demonstrated that parties had the 
potential to develop well-functional coalitional politics during the 1990-1996 period. Party 
competition was polarised and organised along the two principal conflict lines, 
‘conservative-reformist’ and ‘power allocation’. The first divide included issues of economic 
populism, authority, state social protection, and union with Russia versus national 
sovereignty, economic liberalism and support for integration with the EU. The second divide 
displayed the conflict over power distribution between the democratic forces and 
conservative nomenklatura in the first instance, and with the introduction of the presidency, 
between the legislature and the president. By 1996 parties successfully established a culture 
of factions, promoting their group interests in parliament. These developments reiterated 
political parties’ potential to become better organised and more competent, even when they 
were under pressure of the pro/anti-presidential divide and ideologically immature. It is 
believed that their failure to resist the accretion of presidential power in 1996 and onwards 
was considerably weakened by two factors: their inability to compromise, and the 
interference of structural and institutional ‘properties’ of the system. Since 1996 there has 
been no effective move by parties to form coalitions and/or to develop a reasonable dialogue 
with the authorities. Pro-governmental party organisations, in opposition, have 
accommodated themselves in public office, and presently enjoy short-term benefits; whereas
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oppositional parties continue drifting even further away from realistic politics; which 
altogether encourages voters to support discrete, populist and anti-party individuals.
(ii) On the extra-parliamentary level, it has been established that two types of party 
organisations have developed in Belarus. The first group was hypothesised as a modified 
mass party organisation having a relatively active regional network based on cells, clubs, and 
factions; flexible membership, associated not with fees, but commitment to promote the 
party’s name and ideology; and labour-based campaigns. The best examples of such 
developments are the nationalist BNF and neo-communist PCB. Having limited financial 
resources many ‘mass’ type parties became dependent on the state between 1990 and 1996. 
Only central decision-making structures seemed to enjoy some degree of financial 
independence. The aftermath of 1996 crisis demonstrated the ‘survivability’ of mass type 
organisations. Relatively successful examples were BNF, PCB, CPB, neo-AP and LDPB. 
BNF found ample support on the West. PCB and LDPB largely remain afloat thanks to 
Russian well-wishers. CPB and neo-AP entirely depend on the state as their primary material 
source of existence.
The majority of pro-democratic parties enjoy a ‘new’ type of organisation. As a mle, they are 
organised from the top to down, having weak linkages to society, and a low membership 
base. They are generally located in urban areas and assign low priority to building up local 
structures. OGP, BSDP NG and PNS were included as examples of modem types of party 
organisation. It was established that many new parties were successful in establishing strong 
links with their western families spirituelles. This co-operation is mainly available to them 
through a system of grants, bursaries, technical and educational assistance, as well as direct
351
involvement in international projects201. New type, pro-presidential parties (PNS, for- 
example) are more dependent on state resources than those of mass type organisations, and 
are increasingly becoming functionary parts of the state machinery. The management of new 
parties has undergone both ‘generational’ and methodological shifts. Contemporary parties 
rely more on opinion polls and market research, as well as Internet resources and public 
relations (seminars, conferences, and staff exchange).
Additionally, pro-presidential parties202 appear to have their representatives in public 
office, although the latter remain non-partisan in parliament in accordance with MPs’ 
mutual agreement. They seem to ultimately rely on state resources, as their party leaders 
share key positions in government, or enjoy considerable benefits from their associates in 
parliament. They have no distinct ideological profiles or economic programmes, and 
definitively lack voters’ support.
(iii) Overall analysis has suggested that parties in Belarus are highly fragmented, 
especially in the regions, and have limited influence on the decision-making process. 
Oppositional party leaders are unable to overcome personal feuds and to uniformly 
campaign against the president. They are limited by formal and informal institutional 
settings (high threshold for turnout, majority voting, single member district) and legal
201 It is not yet known how the opposition parties will survive under the president’s decree demanding full 
registration of foreign aid (No. 8, 12/03/01). The West has already begun a boycotting campaign against 
Lukashenko’s decision (see EBRD’s resolution, IMF conclusion, and the OSCE, AMG in RFL/RE Vol. 
5 No. 70-74).
202 They can be found amongst both types of party organisations. Examples are CPB as a mass type of 
organisation, and PNS SD as a modem type of organisation.
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rules (alterations in the constitution, new law requirements for party candidates, etc.). 
All parties lack clear ideological doctrine and policy manifestos, especially those 
policies applying to system reform, and have limited linkages with their voters.
(iv) As it appears, the political balance in the country is weighed towards the president; 
which has enabled voters to rationally switch their choice away from parties who have 
become ‘second-order preferences’, and ‘delegate’ maximal authority to the president to 
lead the country out of crisis. Voters still view parties as indispensable pillars of 
building democracy, however their perceptions of parties as incapable of winning power 
make them seek immediate benefits and a sense of security from more powerful players 
in the country. Public opinion is presently very divided. Three distinct groups can be 
observed in the population: these are pro-governmental, oppositional and undecided 
voters. The latter group, which forms 1/3 of the voting electorate, may allow 
considerable leeway for politicians to manoeuvre in an attempt to recruit additional 
voters for the forthcoming presidential election in 2001. It should also be noted, that the 
pro-presidential part of the Belarusian electorate seems to be more consolidated and 
coherent in its opinion; whereas the ‘protest electorate’ is more critical, but less unified.
With a weak party organisation, there is a greater scope for personalities, and a greater 
likelihood that individuals will be important contenders in the power game. There are 
also fewer chances for coalitional politics in the legislature, which is vital for keeping 
the balance in semi-presidential polyarchies. Parties’ survival is also limited when they 
do not have the opportunity to publicise their manifestos and mobilise their supporters.
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What must be ensured, is that institutionally and structurally there are equal 
opportunities for parties and individual candidates to compete for seats and votes in 
public office. Existing structures, informal rules and levers of clandestine control and 
opinion manipulation by authorities do not promote this democratic option.
System prospects fo r  the future
There is no ‘recipe’ for democracy. The efforts of parties’ alone cannot provide a suitable 
alternative to the current regime, especially when the electorate has their own rationale for 
supporting the presidency over parties. Cognitive frameworks and institutions cannot be 
altered on demand, and require careful revision. What is certain though is, that in order to 
re-build a ship at sea a floating dock is required and thus a joint approach to structure and 
agency is necessary.
Popular interests are traditionally voiced through the panoply of mechanisms: unions, 
social movements, parties and other interest organisations. Voter-govemor linkages may 
also be sought elsewhere (Lawson et al., 1988). Nevertheless, parties continue to be seen 
as the most important mechanisms of power mediation between society and state in 
contemporary politics of new democracies. When they are weakened organisationally, 
institutionally, or structurally, the power balance will be naturally transferred to a stronger 
‘player’. As Eijk et al (1996) in their research of the democratic deficit in the European 
Union demonstrates, party failure often does not lie with uncommitted voters, or lack of 
media coverage, but it is grounded within the weak powers of the legislature. If one 
analyses the arrangement of legislative-executive relations in Belarus, it becomes clear
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that parliament has no real power for decision-making and no incentives for partisan 
debates, which considerably undermines the influence of parties and other interest 
organisations’ in politics. The balance of power, hence, must be constitutionally 
guaranteed and players must be given equal chances to build their authority. This also 
presumes full re-structuring of regional powers from the influence of ‘old-style’ 
nomenklatura. Additionally, parties must offer clear and inclusive programmes for further 
economic and political reforms, and use them to manifest their readiness for fair and 
competitive political game.
On the other hand, Linz (1994. 1996) notes that a strong presidency and structured 
parties are a contradiction in terms, and the president will always seek opportunities to 
expand his power at the expense of other institutions. In this case, a ‘delegative 
democracy’, based on a semi-presidential regime, may be a solution for a transient 
regime aiming to enjoy both entities -  strong leadership, and representative politics.
In conclusion, this thesis is written to contribute to the theory of transitional regimes, both 
in empirical and methodological terms. It has demonstrated that a transition to democracy 
is a lengthy and often disenchanting process, which is associated with the joint impact of 
past legacies and existing conflicts; and the accumulative effect of powerful institutions. 
Nevertheless, the process of decision-making, which has the power to adjust the 
constraints and opportunities of the system to the requirements of democracy, is seen as 
playing the leading role in third wave democratisation. Parties are still part of the political 
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Table 1. Political Parties in Belarus. January 2000
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of Belarus]. Minsk: BGEU.
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Appendix 2. Results of parliamentary elections in 1990,1995, and 2000.
Table 2-1. Elections 1990. One-party system
(1 round -  4 March 1990; 2 round -  22 April 1990)
Among 360 MPs, 148 were elected by the principle of majority run-off, single-member 
district. Amongst them, there were 5.4% women, 1.4% labour and 7.4% peasants; and 
93.9% member of CPSU; and 6.1% non-partisan. Turnout was 87% of voters.
Source: Sovetskaya Belorussia [Soviet Belarus], 23 April 1990
Table 2-2. Elections 1995: Multi-party system
(1 round -  28 November 1995; 2 round -  10 December 1995)
Parties Party name in 
English
Seats Votes Faction




AP Agrarian Party 33 17% Agrarian
PNS Social 
Democratic 
Party of People’s 
Accord








5 2% Social Democrat 
‘Union of Labour’
Other parties OGP; VES; 
SSBR; BPT; 
SSP; BPP; BNP; 
BSP; and other
15 8% Some belonged to 
‘Civic Action’
Non-partisan 95 48% Accord
Total 198 100%
Source: Narodnaya Gazeta, 11 December, 1995.
Table 2-3. The House of Representatives of the National Assembly, Belarus, 1997





Seats* 52 24 21 6 0 7 110
Percent 47.3 21.8 19.1 5.4 0 6.4 100
384
Source: Narodnaya Gazeta, 27.11.96
Note: * these are those deputies who agreed on Lukashenko’s invitation to the re-structured Parliament. 
See text for details.
Table 2-4. Election results 2000
(1 round -  15 October 2000; 2 round -  29 November)
Parties Party name in 
English
Seats Votes Ideology
CPB Communist Party 
of Belarus
6 6.2% Communist, pro- 
presidential
AP Agrarian Party 6 6.2% Agrarian, pro- 
presidential
RPTS Republican Party 
of Labour and 
Justice
2 2.1% Socialist, pro- 
presidential
BSS Belarusian Social 








SD PNS Social Democratic 






Source: http://www.rec.gov.bv , retrieved November, 2000. All Belamsian sites are subject to
administrative control and accessibility. They often may be temporary ‘unavailable’, depending on the 
‘political climate’ in the country.
Turnout at 1 round -  61%; 2 round -  53.8%.
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Appendix 3. Parties’ electoral profiles. December 2000.
Table 3-1. If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party or public organisation 







































































































































































































































































































































































Note: INTAS Project (99-00245) on charismatic leadership in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, sponsored by
European Union and hosted by University of Bath (more details available on www.bath.ac.uk/~mlpeak~). This 
table displays Crosstabulation analysis.
Source: Centre for Social and Political Research, BSU, Minsk; with author coordination.
Table 3-2. If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party or public organisation 
would you vote for? Division of electoral support by education
Political Parties Elementary 

























No answer 11.2 13.9 22.4 11.2 22.1 5.3 13.9
46.9 40.5 36.0 29.5 29.8 35.3 29.4 33.9
Agrarian party 10.9 20.7 25.0 12.0 19.6 2.2 9.8
12.3 16.4 10.9 8.5 7.1 3.9 5.6 9.2
Belarusian Party 25.0 50.0 25.0
"Zeljonye" .9 1.6 .6 .4
Belarusian Women 2.5 7.5 15.0 20.0 32.5 10.0 12.5
Party "Nadezhda" 1.2 2.6 2.8 6.2 5.2 7.8 3.1 4.0
Belarusian Party o f 4.5 36.4 22.7 9.1 22.7 4.5
Labour 1.2 6.9 2.4 1.6 2.0 .6 2.2
Belarusian Patriotic 22.2 27.8 11.1 27.8 5.6 5.6
party 3.4 2.4 1.6 2.0 2.0 .6 1.8
Belarusian Social- 17.6 5.9 41.2 5.9 29.4
Democratic
Hramada 1.4 .8 2.8 2.0 3.1 1.7
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Table 3-2. Continued.
Political Parties Elementary Incomplete Secondary Professional Secondary Incomplete Higher Total
(up to 7 secondary general (10- technical special higher education





Belarusian social- 66.7 33.3
sport party 1.6 .6 .3
Belarusian 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ecological Party .5 .8 .4 .6 .4
Belarusian peoples 25.0 50.0 25.0
patriotic union .9 .8 .6 .4
Belarusian Popular 4.4 11.1 8.9 40.0 6.7 28.9
front 1.7 2.4 3.1 7.1 5.9 8.1 4.5
Belarusian patriotic 3.7 3.7 33.3 22.2 14.8 11.1 11.1
youth union 1.2 .9 4.3 4.7 1.6 5.9 1.9 2.7
Belarusian union of 22.2 22.2 22.2 11.1 22.2
women 1.9 3.1 1.6 3.9 2.5 1.8
Belarusian union o f 20.8 12.5 54.2 12.5
youths 2.4 2.3 5.2 5.9 2.4
Belarusian Helsinki 100.0
committee .9 .1
Belarusian public 5.3 21.1 5.3 36.8 31.6
coalition "Yabloko .9 1.9 .8 2.8 3.8 1.9
Movement for 9.1 18.2 9.1 27.3 36.4
social progress and 1.2 .9 .8 1.2 2.5 1.1
justice
CPB (Chikin) 11.4 15.2 19.0 17.7 25.3 2.5 8.9
11.1 10.3 7.1 10.9 7.9 3.9 4.4 7.9
Liberal-Democratic 2.6 5.3 10.5 15.8 36.8 7.9 21.1
Party 1.2 1.7 1.9 4.7 5.6 5.9 5.0 3.8
United Civic Party 7.7 19.2 7.7 19.2 3.8 42.3
1.7 2.4 1.6 2.0 2.0 6.9 2.6
PCB (Kaliakin) 4.8 4.8 19.0 19.0 28.6 4.8 19.0























Social-Democratic 10.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Party o f Human
Accord 1.2 .9 1.4 1.6 .4 2.0 .6 1.0




CCP (splinter BNF) 10.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 10.0 20.0
1.2 .5 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.3 1.0
Trade unions 100.0
.4 .1
Lukashenko 28.6 28.6 28.6 14.3
2.5 1.7 .9 .8 .7
For non-partisan 50.0 50.0
candidate .4 .6 .2
Against all 11.4 7.1 24.3 10.0 18.6 7.1 21.4
9.9 4.3 8.1 5.4 5.2 9.8 9.4 7.0
Source: BSU, Centre for Social and Political Research. See table 3-1. for details.
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Table 3-3. If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party or public organisation
would you vote for? Division of electoral support by occupation




































































































































































































Belarusian Helsinki committee 100.0
2.4 .1


























CPB 20.3 25.3 1.3 3.8 44.3 1.3 3.8























































































Company o f  the Belarusian language 100.0
.8 .2






































Source: BSU, Centre for Social and Political Research, 2001. See table 3-1. for more details.
Table 3-4. If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party or public organisation
would you vote for? Division of electoral support by place of residence



















































































Belarusian Ecological Party Zelyonykh BEZ 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
.6 .6 .3 .3 .4
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Table 3-4. Continued.







Belarusian peoples patriotic union 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
.6 .3 1.7 .3 .4
Belarusian popular front 13.3 28.9 31.1 8.9 17.8
3.6 7.4 4.9 6.7 2.6 4.5
Belarusian patriotic youth union 11.1 25.9 22.2 14.8 25.9
1.8 4.0 2.1 6.7 2.3 2.7
Belarusian union o f women 27.8 27.8 11.1 16.7 16.7
3.0 2.8 .7 5.0 1.0 1.8
Belarusian union o f youths 25.0 12.5 37.5 20.8 4.2
3.6 1.7 3.1 8.3 .3 2.4
Belarusian Helsinki committee 100.0
.6 .1
Belarusian public coalition "Yabloko 21.1 26.3 21.1 31.6
2.4 2.8 1.4 1.9 1.9
Movement for social progress and justice 27.3 36.4 9.1 27.3
1.8 1.4 1.7 1.0 1.1
Communist party o f Belarus 10.1 13.9 39.2 2.5 34.2
4.8 6.3 10.8 3.3 8.7 7.9
Liberal-Democratic Party 2.6 34.2 15.8 7.9 39.5
.6 7.4 2.1 5.0 4.8 3.8
United Civic Party 11.5 53.8 23.1 11.5
1.8 8.0 2.1 1.0 2.6
Party o f the communists o f Belarus 9.5 9.5 33.3 14.3 33.3





Republican Party o f Labour and Justice 17.4 13.0 47.8 4.3 17.4
2.4 1.7 3.8 1.7 1.3 2.3
Social-Democratic Party o f Human Agreement 30.0 10.0 50.0 10.0
1.8 .6 1.7 .3 1.0
Company o f  the Belarusian language 100.0
1.2 .2
Christian-conservative party (splinter BNF) 10.0 20.0 20.0 50.0
.6 1.1 .7 1.6 1.0
Trade unions 100.0
.3 .1
Lukashenko 14.3 42.9 28.6 14.3
.6 1.0 3.3 .3 .7
Non-partisan candidate 100.0
.7 .2
Against all 14.3 18.6 20.0 2.9 44.3
6.1 7.4 4.9 3.3 10.0 7.0
Appendix 4. Some behavioural trends within the Belarusian electorate, January 2001
















No one 7 . 5%
Other 2.4%
No answer . 4%
Note: INTAS project (99-00245) on charismatic leadership in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, sponsored by the 
European Union and hosted by the University of Bath (more details available on www.bath.ac.uk/~mlpeak). 
The table displays analysis of frequencies.
Source: Centre for Social and Political Research, BSU, Minsk; with author coordination.
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Refused to answer .2%
Against all 5.1%
No answer 20. 5%
Table 4-3. Do you think economic and political situation would become better if someone 




















The leader of the united
. 1%
opposition .3%
Anyone, except Lukashenko 3.5%
No 27.3%
Difficult to say 57.2%
Refused to answer .4%
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Table 4-4. What political parties and movements do you know?
Agrarian party 17.0%
Belarusian Party "Zeljonye" 7.6%
Belarusian Women Party "Nadezhda" 7.8%
Belarusian Party of Labour 1.6%
Belarusian Patriotic party 1.4%
Belarusian Social-Democratic Gramada 5.4%
Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (Narodnaya Gramada) .2%
Belarusian social-sport party .2%
Belarusian Ecological Party Zelyonykh BEZ .8%
Belarusian peoples patriotic union . 6%
Belarusian people front 54.2%
Belarusian patriotic youth union 21.7%
Belarusian republic club of voters .3%
Belarusian union of women 2.0%
Belarusian union of youths 9.2%
Belarusian Helsinki committee .5%
Belarusian public coalition "Yabloko" 8.2%
Movement for social progress and justice . 1%
Communist party of Belarus 37 . 9%
Liberal-Democratic Party 9.7%
United Civic Party 3.3%
Party of the communists of Belarus 10.1%
Republican Party 1.2%
Republican Party of Labour and Justice .2%
Social-Democratic Party of Human Agreement 2.0%
Company of the Belarusian language 1.7%
Christian-conservative party the BNF 1.9%
Democratic party .4%
Party of people's agreement .3%
Trade unions .9%
Lukashenko .2%
Party of beer-lovers .6%
Charter -97 .3%
Belarusian union of the military men .1%
People's will .1%




Table 4-5. If parliamentary elections were tomorrow, what party or public organisation 
would you vote for?
Agrarian party 9.2%
Belarusian Party "Zeljonye" .4%
Belarusian Women Party "Nadezhda" 4.0%
Belarusian Party of Labour 2.2%
Belarusian Patriotic party 1.8%
Belarusian Social-Democratic Hramada 1.7%
Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (Narodnaya Hramada) 1.6%
Belarusian social-sport party .3%
Belarusian Ecological Party Zelyonykh BEZ .4%
Belarusian peoples patriotic union .4%
Belarusian people front 4.5%
Belarusian patriotic youth union 2.7%
Belarusian union of women 1.8%
Belarusian union of youths 2.4%
Belarusian Helsinki committee .1%
Belarusian public coalition "Yabloko" 1.9%
Movement for social progress and justice 1.1%
Communist party of Belarus 7.9%
Liberal-Democratic Party 3.8%
United Civic Party 2.6%
Party of the communists of Belarus 2.1%
Republican Party .7%
Republican Party of Labour and Justice 2.3%
Social-Democratic Party of Human Agreement 1.0%
Company of the Belarusian language .2%
Christian-conservative party the BNF 1.0%
Trade unions .1%
Lukashenko .7%
For the person who is not a member of the political party .2%
Against all 7.0%
No answer 33 . 9%
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Appendix 5. Comparison with other Transition Economies203. Economic Statistics
Belarus is a lower middle income country according to World Bank classifications,204 in 
the same classification as neighbouring states such as Ukraine, Russian Federation, 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia. Basic economic indicators are shown 
in Table 11.1. In terms of GDP growth, the Belarus economy grew at a rate in excess of 
other transition economies during 1998. Much of this growth was accounted for during 
the first half of 1998, prior to the Russian crisis. However, the recent decline in output, 
calls into question the sustainability of this growth, as has been discussed in this and 
previous Bulletins. Rates of consumer and industrial producer price inflation are 
considerably greater than in other transition economies, although the unemployment rate 
has been kept to a minimum due to an inflexible labour market. GDP per capita in dollar 
terms, although difficult to estimate accurately, is considerably lower than Belarus’ 
immediate neighbours, especially Poland and the Baltic States, and this gap has widened 
considerably during the last five years.










rate, % o f  labour force**
GDP per capita, 
U S$
Eastern-Central Europe
Albania 8.0 4.1 20.6 12.6 930
Bulgaria 3.5 4.3 22.3 22.8 12.2 1315
Croatia 2.3 3.7 5.7 -1.2 17.2 4820
Czech Republic -2.3 1.6 10.7 4.9 7.5 5479
Hungary 5.1 10.6 14.3 11.3 9.1 4730
FYR Macedonia 2.9 4.5 0.6 4.0 1548
Poland 4.8 5.0 11.8 7.3 10.4 3887
Romania -7.3 -17.0 59.2 34.6 10.3 1695
Slovak Republik 4.4 4.6 6.7 3.3 11.9 3793
Slovenia 3.9 4.6 8.0 6.0 7.9 9779
Baltic States
Estonia 4.0 1.8 8.2 3.8 9.6 3593
Latvia 3.6 3.1 4.7 1.9 13.8 2622
Lithuania 5.2 7.0 5.1 -3.9 6.4 2890
European CIS
B elarus  W 1396
Moldova -8.6 -11.0 7.7 9.7 1.9 432
Russian Federation -4.6 -5.2 27.8 7.0 12.4 1867
Ukraine -1.7 -1.5 11.0 13.0 3.7 846
Note: * Annual average, % change over preceding year.
** End of period.
.. data are not available.
Sources: Economic Survey of Europe, 1999, No.l, United Nations, Geneva; EBRD Transition Report 
1999
As shown in Table 11.2, the cumulative level of FDI inflow per capita (1989-1998) into 
Belarus has been the lowest among the European transition economies, particularly 
Belarus’ near neighbours of Poland and the Baltic States. However, the level of external 
debt in Belarus, shown in Table 11.2, at 17.6% GDP in 1998, is considerably lower than
203 Extracted from Economic Trends, Quarterly issue, January-March, 2000 www.bettacis.minsk.bv: pp. 83- 
86
204 World Bank Development Report 1996.
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the level of external debt in most transition economies, and this is a very positive factor 
for Belarus, as it is not burdened by excessive debt servicing costs. Although the level 
of trade with non-CIS countries is low, the current account deficit of 6.6% GDP in 1998 
was lower than that of all three Baltic States, and a number of the other transition 
economies.
Table 11.2. Comparative External Trade, FDI and Debt Statistics
...................................................................  m m ----------------—.......... FDllnJloZ,..VSFm External Debt, Current Account,
cumulative 1989- cum. 1989-1998 per
1998 1998 capita % GDP % GDP
Eastern-Central Europe
Albania 45 423 132 29.4 -6.3
Bulgaria 401 1323 159 92.6 -2.3
Croatia 854 1997 444 37.5 -7.1
Czech Republic 2485 9957 967 41.7 -1.9
Hungary 1453 16459 1627 55.9 -4.8
FYR Macedonia 175 242 121 39.5 -9.0
Poland 6600 15066 389 29.9 -4.5
Romania 2040 4510 200 25.2 -7.9
Slovak Republik 508 1762 326 58.5 -10.1
Slovenia 154 1192 596 25.4 0.0
Baltic States
Estonia 575 1382 953 55.8 -9.2
Latvia 220 1604 642 47.6 -11.1





Russian Federation 1200 8901 61 55.1 0.9
Ukraine 700 2626 52 27.6 -2.8
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999
Progress in Transition
In terms of transition indicators (i.e. progress towards a market economy), Belarus rates 
amongst the lowest of its former centrally planned neighbours, and it is this point that 
brings into question the sustainability of growth and development for the future. Figure 
11.1 displays EBRD estimates of the private sector shares in GDP in mid-1999 for 
European transition economies. The level of private sector contribution is a primary 
indicator of transition to a market economy. As is shown in the Figure, the level of 
contribution of the private sector in Belarus is the lowest compared to not only the most 
advanced transition economies, but also compared to European CIS countries. Thus, 
private sector contribution to GDP in Belarus was 20% of total in 1999, compared with 
70% in the Russian Federation, 55% in Ukraine and 45% in Moldova.
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Table 11.3 displays the EBRD estimates for cumulative progress in transition. As 
indicated by the EBRD Transition Report 1999, Belarus has not progressed far in any of 
the main transition indicators, including:
• macro-economic stability,
• private sector development,
• liberalisation of prices and trade and developments of competition policy,
• enterprise reform,
• development of financial institutions (liberalisation of interest rates, reform of the 
banking system, and development of securities markets and non-banking financial 
markets).
Economic progress by the transition economies has been closely correlated with 
progress in these transition components. Given the link between progress in transition 
and economic growth, it is unlikely that sustainable long-term economic growth in 
Belarus will come without substantial progress in liberalisation of markets, 




























Albania 3.2 2 4 2 3 4 2 2 2-
Bulgaria 8.2 3 3+ 2+ 3 4+ 2 3- 2
Croatia 4.5 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2 3 2+
Czech Republic 10.3 4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 3+ 3
Hungary 10.1 4 4+ 3+ 3+ 4+ 3 4 3+
FYR Macedonia 2.0 3 4 2 3 4 1 3 2-
Poland 38.8 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 3+
Romania 214 3- 4- 2 3 4 2 3- 2
Slovak Republik 5.4 4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 3- 2+
Slovenia 10 3+ 4+ 3- 3 4+ 2 3+ 3
Baltic States
Estonia 1.4 4 4+ 3 3 4 3- 4- 3
Latvia 14 3 4 3- 3 4+ 3- 3 2+
Lithuania 3.7 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2+ 3 3-
European CIS
Moldova 3+- T 2+
2
2 ............
Russian Federation 146.7 3+ 4 2- 3- 2+ 2+ 2- 2-
Ukraine 50.7 2+ 3+ 2 3 3 2 2 2
Note: The numerical indicators are intended to represent the cumulative progress in the movement from a 
centrally planned to a market economy in each dimension, rather than the rate of change in the course of 
a year. An approximate interpretation of the classifications is: 1 = Little progress towards market 
economy, 2 = moderate progress, 3 = substantial progress, 4 = significant / near complete progress, 4+ = 
standards & performance typical of advanced industrial economies
A precise definition of the classification of each category in the table above is included in the EBRD 
Transition Report 1999, and the report contains are much more detailed discussion of the progress in 
transition than we are able to include here.
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999
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Appendix 6. List of interviewees, 1996 and 1999, Belarus.
1996: included 26 members o f  government, legislature and party members.
1. Alpeev, A.N. -  leader of the Movement for People’s Defence, Rector of the non-state 
Institute of Humanities and Economics
2. Bogdankevich, S.A. -  chairman of ‘Civic Action’ faction, 1995-6 parliament; leader 
of OGP, MP
3. Borschevskii, L -  deputy leader, Belarusian Popular Front
4. Bulakhov, D. P. -  leader, Party of all-Belarusian Union and Accord, MP
5. Bukchvostov, A.I. -  leader, Labour Party, chairman of trade unions for the car and 
agriculture industry, MP
6. Giruts, M.I. -  leader of Agrarian Faction in Parliament 1995-1996, MP
7. Gonchar, V.I. -  chairman of Election Committee, 1995-6, MP
8. Gryb, M.I. -  member of Committee of International affairs, MP
9. Dobrovl’skii, A. -  deputy Chairman of OGP, MP
10. Zametalin, V. P. -  deputy head of Presidential Administration, head of the 
committee on mass media and information
11. Kaliakin, S.I. -  first secretary of PCB, MP
12. Karpenko, G.D. -  Deputy spokesman of the 1995-6 parliament.
13. Konoplev, V. N. -  leader of ‘Zgoda’ Faction, MP
14. Kravchenko, P.K. -  chairman of the committee of International Affairs, MP
15. Kuchinskii, V.F. -  president’s aide, MP, member of the Movement for People’s 
Defence
16. Lukashenko, A.G. -  the president
17. Novikov, V.N. -  deputy chairman, PCB
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18. Polevikova, V.T. -  chairwoman, women’s party ‘Nadezeya’
19. Posokhov, S.A. -  president’s aide, Presidential Administration
20. Sosnovskii, A.V. -  Minister of Culture
21. Statkevich, N. V. -  chairman of BSDG NG
22. Strazhev, V.I. -  Minister of Education
23. Tsikhinya, V.G. -  chairman of the Constitutional Court
24. Chigir, M.N. -  the Prime Minister
25. Sharetskii, S. G. -  chairman of Agrarian Party, MP
26. Shushkevich, S.S. -  former Spokesman, member of the committee of economic 
reforms, MP
1999 interviews included 17 members o f government, legislature and political parties.
1. Viachorka, V. -  deputy leader of BNF (liberal wing)
2. Krivorot, A. -  deputy leader of BNF (radical wing)
3. Bukchvostov, A. -  chairman of the Labour Party
4. Kaliakin, S. -  first secretary of PCB
5. Dobrovol’skii, A. -  deputy leader of OGP
6. Karpenko, G. -  deputy leader of OGP (independent)
7. Statkevich, N. -  chairman of BSDG NG
8. Gaidukevich, S. -  leader of LDPB
9. Sechko, L. -  leader SD PNS, MP
10. Pletyukchov, V. -  member of CPB, MP, member of the committee of education
11. Konoplev, V. -  deputy Spokesman, MP
12. Samuseva, V. -  non-partisan MP, chairman of the committee of education
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13. Rotman, D. -  director of the Centre for Social and Political Research, BSU
14. Manaev, O. -  Director of the Independent Institute (NISEPI) for Social, Economic 
and Political Research
15. Strazhev, V.I. -  Minister of Education
16. Tregubovish, V. -  journalist, former member of BNF Soim
17. Feduta, A. -  political analyst
